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<title>The Cultural Veil: Iran’s Weaponization of Culture to Oppress Women and Deflect Criticism </title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2022/05/25/the-cultural-veil/</link>
<pubDate>Wed, 25 May 2022 10:10:40 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6569</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Jessica Yeroshalmi Iran’s legislation of the veil should be seen as a weaponization of culture in order to oppress women. Compulsion and culture are mutually exclusive and cannot exist within the same realm. On January 8th 1963, Iran’s Reza Shah … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2022/05/25/the-cultural-veil/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/v-z/">Jessica Yeroshalmi</a>
Iran’s legislation of the veil should be seen as a weaponization of culture in order to oppress women. Compulsion and culture are mutually exclusive and cannot exist within the same realm. 
<img class="alignright wp-image-6572" style="font-size: 16px" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/file76m7o3gtxms17vedhbu6-221633435-1565961126.jpg" alt="" width="386" height="233" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/file76m7o3gtxms17vedhbu6-221633435-1565961126.jpg 700w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/file76m7o3gtxms17vedhbu6-221633435-1565961126-400x241.jpg 400w" sizes="(max-width: 386px) 100vw, 386px" />
On January 8th 1963, Iran’s Reza Shah issued a decree, “<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashf-e_hijab">kashf-e hijab</a>”, banning all veils and head coverings for women. The law came as an attempt to Westernize the nation, with an emphasis on associating the religious veil as a sign of poverty and rural, non-Iranian culture. Years later, Reza Shah’s son, Mohammad Reza Shah, would lift this ban, and give Iranians freedom of choice in their way of dress. The act would come in an effort to increase popularity, with support for the Shah waning. Finally, at the onset of the Islamic revolution in 1979, soon after taking power, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini decreed that the veil was now mandatory for all Iranian women, along with a strict standard of modest dress. This law continues to be enforced today, with Iranian women lacking the basic freedom of choosing what to wear in public. Despite the fact that the head covering has been worn in Iran for thousands of years, the current mandate has seen backlash from women all over the country, even with its violent enforcement. Yet, for Westerners and non-Iranians alike, the hijab mandate is often dismissed as a factor of culture, written off as a small issue amongst a sea of much larger ones to be addressed. Is this oversimplification of the law an advantage for the Iranian government? An excuse used both within and outside of Iran to dismiss the oppression of women?

In this article, I will focus on Iran’s compulsory hijab law and how the labeling of culture has protected the Iranian government from criticism in this respect and perpetuated their oppression of women and minorities alike. I will discuss the legislation of culture in Iran, specifically targeting women and other marginalized groups, and how culture has been weaponized both towards Iranians, and against criticism from non-Iranians.
What is Culture?
Cultural anthropologists define culture as a shared set of (implicit and explicit) values, ideas, concepts, and patterns of behavior that allow a social group to function and perpetuate itself. Culture is often used as an umbrella term to describe the norms and behaviors of certain groups. In the West, <a href="https://dictionary.apa.org/cultural-sensitivity">cultural sensitivity </a>has also gained traction as groups are encouraged to respect and understand other cultures, despite how alien it may seem. This generalization of culture and the widespread promotion of cultural sensitivity is important in understanding how culture has been weaponized to oppress in many groups, and specifically in our focus, in Iran. The Islamification of culture throughout the Middle East and North Africa has left the hijab entangled in a web of culture, religion, and politics. The obscurity in the role of the hijab has granted leeway for many governments to weaponize its use and the idea of culture as a whole. In Iran, that is exactly what the government does when it classifies its compulsory hijab law as an aspect of culture.
Iranian Legislation of Culture
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Iranian government has been embedded with <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-sharia-intersection-islam-and-law">Sharia law</a> and theological ideals. There is no hiding the lack of secularity in the post-revolutionary Iranian government. The islamification of law and government in Iran has led to a gross weaponization of culture and religion to oppress women and other minority groups. The role of the hijab in this legislation began with Reza Shah’s “Kashf-e Hijab” and continues today. When Iranian women are forced to wear the hijab in public, religion and culture is being legislated. The question remains, then, can culture be legislated? If culture is a shared set of values and ideas, then legislating its practice is counterintuitive, as one actively chooses to subscribe to a set of values and ideas. Not only does Iran have a <a href="http://www.globalreligiousfutures.org/countries/iran#/?affiliations_religion_id=0&affiliations_year=2010&region_name=All%20Countries&restrictions_year=2016">non-Muslim population</a> of some 400,000 but also, according to some surveys, many Muslim citizens are <a href="https://theconversation.com/irans-secular-shift-new-survey-reveals-huge-changes-in-religious-beliefs-145253">skewing to secularism</a>. The hijab mandate, then, not only takes away women’s choice, it also imposes religion on those who may not be subscribed to it or who choose not to practice. In fact, polls have shown that a majority of the Iranian population does not support the compulsory hijab law. According to a survey done by <a href="https://gamaan.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/GAMAAN-Iran-Religion-Survey-2020-English.pdf">GAMAAN</a>, The Group for Analyzing and Measuring Attitudes in Iran, 72.4% of survey respondents disagreed with the hijab being mandatory in public.
<img class="alignright wp-image-6574" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/fdbv.png" alt="" width="641" height="359" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/fdbv.png 692w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/fdbv-400x224.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 641px) 100vw, 641px" />
If wearing a hijab was part of the “culture” of Iran, then why aren’t people taking part in the practice voluntarily? A law to mandate the act would not be necessary. Iran’s legislation of culture in this respect is done as a tactic to oppress women and other minorities, rather than maintain culture or religion. Since the Islamic Revolution, many women have resisted the hijab mandate, with protests erupting in Tehran on<a href="https://historyofyesterday.com/8th-of-march-1979-the-day-100-000-women-protested-against-the-hijab-fdde2ea71e40"> International Women’s Day in 1979</a> to more recent global campaigns like <a href="https://www.mystealthyfreedom.org">My Stealthy Freedom </a> giving Iranian women a voice in their resistance. According to Iranian-American feminist and political scientist Negar Mottahedeh, a key slogan of the post revolutionary women’s movement in Iran was, “we did not have a revolution to take a step backwards.” The Iranian government’s role in controlling women’s appearance has landed on opposite ends of the spectrum throughout history, from forcefully removing the veil to violently imposing it. It is clear that the politicization of the hijab plays a key role in the government’s strategy.
Gender Inequality and the Hijab Law
It is imperative to examine the hijab law in the context of severe gender inequality within Iran. The <a href="https://giwps.georgetown.edu/country/iran-islamic-republic-of/">Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security</a>, ranks Iran at 125 out of 170 countries for gender equality. On the scale of “<a href="https://giwps.georgetown.edu/country/iran-islamic-republic-of/">Absence of Legal Discrimination Against Women</a>” done by the same institution, Iran ranked the worst. These facts are important in understanding the larger system of oppression and discrimination that women in Iran face. Iran is <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20486695?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents">continually discriminatory towards women</a> and maintains their status as second class citizens. The compulsory Hijab law, although often dismissed as a minor issue, is a pillar of this larger system. Controlling the very basic rights of women is a main building block in perpetuating their oppression.<img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6575" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/vv.png" alt="" width="676" height="193" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/vv.png 676w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2022/05/vv-400x114.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 676px) 100vw, 676px" />
A Cultural Shield
The cultural classification of the mandatory hijab law has not only codified women’s oppression, it has also bred a veil of protection from the criticism of outsiders. Criticism of culture is considered culturally insensitive and politically incorrect. Even with the major role that Western countries have played in meddling in Iranian affairs, their newly adopted public attitude of cultural sensitivity has prevented their response to the issue. Many Western politicians have given into the Iranian narrative that the hijab is part of Iranian culture, refusing to comment on the oppressive nature of the compulsory hijab law. Politicians from foreign countries visiting Iran <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/02/13/swedens-feminist-government-criticized-for-wearing-headscarves-in-iran/">have not resisted wearing the hijab</a>, as a sign of respect to Iranian “culture.” The classification of the hijab law as an aspect of Iranian culture is a key strategy used by the Iranian government to perpetuate its oppression of women. By promoting the idea that the hijab is simply a cultural issue, the non-Iranian world dismisses the relevance of this law in perpetuating an oppressive system against women.
Conclusion
Culture, as it is defined by anthropologists and attempted to be categorized by Iranian politicians, will only be practiced when people are given a choice in doing so. Compulsion and culture are mutually exclusive and cannot exist within the same realm. To deem compulsion as culture is a political tactic used to maintain the system of women’s oppression in Iran. The legislation of culture by the Iranian government through the compulsory hijab law is a weaponization tactic used to oppress, and this must be recognized in order to achieve freedom for Iranian people.
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
<hr />
Jessica Yeroshalmi is currently a third-year student at Macaulay Honors College at Baruch at The City University of New York, pursuing a dual degree in Economics and Political Science. Jessica’s interests include human rights, international history, economics, and politics.
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<title>What does the fragmentation of the Bundestag mean for Germany?</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/09/28/fragmentation-germany/</link>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 07:53:37 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Democracy]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Environment]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Germany]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[elections]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[fragmentation]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[green parties]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[SPD]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6557</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Kilian Wirthwein Vega The increasing fragmentation of seats in the Bundestag may paradoxically lead to greater consensus on the green and digital transformation. Across Europe, the number of parties present in legislative chambers has increased, increasing the need to … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/09/28/fragmentation-germany/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/v-z/">Kilian Wirthwein Vega</a>
The increasing fragmentation of seats in the Bundestag may paradoxically lead to greater consensus on the green and digital transformation. <img class="wp-image-6558 alignright" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/09/reichstag-building-2838571_1280.jpeg" alt="" width="320" height="240" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/09/reichstag-building-2838571_1280.jpeg 1280w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/09/reichstag-building-2838571_1280-400x300.jpeg 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/09/reichstag-building-2838571_1280-768x576.jpeg 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/09/reichstag-building-2838571_1280-1024x768.jpeg 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px" />
Across Europe, the number of parties present in legislative chambers has increased, increasing the need to form coalitions rather than seeing a single party seize the power of government. In German elections, a similar trend is observed, leading to a situation in which coalitions of more than two parties enter the possible political scenarios. Although this growing fragmentation will mean a major change in Germany’s political reality, an important distinction must be made: the fragmentation of parliament does not (necessarily) translate into polarization and ungovernability. The element that defines the viability of a multiparty system is above all the underlying political pacts culture. In some countries, minority governments have been the norm. After last Sunday’s <a href="https://www.bundestagswahl-2021.de/ergebnis/">German elections</a>, the critical factor that will define the ability to form a stable government will be to concentrate the political agenda on green and digital policies, the areas where the potentials for consensus are greatest.

Efficiency vs. desirability
There is no doubt: absolute majorities are more efficient in the short term. They reduce the number of veto actors and increase the ability to adopt new laws quickly, with clear direction and intent. However, absolute majorities exclude a significant portion of elected officials in the decision-making process, unless the government adopts the rare position of working very constructively with opposition parties. Consequently, coalition governments tend to be more representative, reflecting the diversity of society and finding a balance between different voices. One could speak of a dilemma between efficacy and desirability when comparing between absolute majorities and coalition governments.
But, as always, the reality is more complex when taking a long-term perspective. In democracies that have clear absolute majorities, legislative balances are far apart in time: the alternation of strong governments produces a long-term equilibrium. The alternation between absolute majority governments produces a hybrid body of legal realities that have been shaped by the passage of the parties that manage to govern. On the other hand, in democracies with large coalitions and a culture of minority government, it can be expected that the balance will be built more immediately so that each legal proposal can go ahead. Therefore, it is difficult to argue strictly for or against absolute majorities in terms of efficiency versus desirability. In the end, both options create their own balances, and the decisive element is the willingness of political actors to work together constructively over the years.
The growing diversity of politics
When there is a fragmented parliament, the key to a functioning government is the presence of a political culture of compromise that accepts and normalizes the diversity of parties with influence over decisions. Social Democratic SPD Vice-President Kevin Kühnert <a href="https://www.zdf.de/dokumentation/zdfzeit/wahl-2021-im-zdf-der-kraftakt-kampf-ums-kanzleramt-100.html">recently argued that the</a> Bundestag “has to get used to German politics becoming more colorful”, further hinting that the Social Democrats would have to see the Greens as a natural partner to form governments in the future. In the last TV debate, the SPD’s candidate for Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, suggested that his preferred option after the Bundestag elections will be to form a government with the Greens. He has maintained his position after the election results.
With the <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/1fb608e3-1b57-4361-894e-7dc1d1a5abfd">erosion of the grand coalition,</a> everything seems to indicate that the German Bundestag will need at least two parties (with the abstention of other parties) for simple majorities and possibly three parties for absolute majorities. German politicians increasingly accept this reality of diversity and call for a policy of consensus. In this context, important comparisons can be made with what happened after the 2019 European Parliament elections. After decades of a “grand coalition” in the EU institutions between the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) and the Social Democratic parties (S&D), these parties lost their joint absolute majority in the European Parliament. This raised fears that Parliament would find it difficult to elect a new European Commission and that there would be a constant deadlock in the decision-making process. However, despite the fragmentation of the European parliament, the opposite happened. Ursula von der Leyen not only became the new President of the European Commission, but also paved the way for a great legislative consensus in the European institutions: she decided to <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf">concentrate fully on the green and digital transformation,</a> the two policy areas in which most parties had important synergies.
Paradox: Fragmentation of seats can increase consensus on global challenges
The new German Chancellorship is likely to emulate the strategy that Ursula von der Leyen used to build enough consensus for the European Parliament to function. In a context in which up to three parties will be needed to produce majorities, the party that has the best chance of governing will look for areas that transcend traditional party lines. Consequently, a <a href="https://www.bundestagswahl-2021.de/koalitionen/">more fragmented structure of seats in the German Bundestag</a> will force to look for issues that can build the consensus necessary for a functioning Executive. Thus, paradoxically, the chances increase that the fragmentation of the Bundestag will create incentives to concentrate on the great challenges of our time rather than on the traditional disputes of political ideology. Specifically, the two challenges that can build this necessary consensus are the support for the green transition and the digital transition. The will to accelerate the twin transition has recently been accelerated by the climate crisis, in which the need for ecological changes is increasingly evident, and the global pandemic, in which digital solutions and teleworking prevented a general collapse of the global economy.
German political actors are determined to maintain the country’s economic strength and are increasingly pushing for European-wide solutions on the ecological and digital front. By embracing the double transition, the German Bundestag and the future Chancellery could find an elegant way to overcome fragmentation between party lines. This focus on the great global challenges of our time could produce important changes in the country’s political debates. First, the discussions would be more long-term, as the ecological and digital transition represent multi-year projects. Second, debates would become more abstract, debating more systematic changes rather than focusing on detailed immediate disputes. Third, the development of long-term strategies and major infrastructure projects will be cemented by greater attention to moral debates that question our current form of organization as a society.
Like the current trend in the institutions of the European Union, there is likely to be a shift towards long-term visionary projects of a green and digital nature. This trend of visionary politics is a solid formula for creating stable multiparty coalitions through more abstract, systematic, and long-term debates. In the current situation of erosion of the grand coalition and the greater complexity to form a stable government, the commitment to green and digital policies is the approach with more prospects of translating fragmentation into consensus in Germany.
<div class="pf-content">
A version of this article in Spanish was published in <a href="https://agendapublica.es/que-significa-para-alemania-la-fragmentacion-del-bundestag/">Agenda Pública</a>. 
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
<hr />
Kilian Wirthwein Vega is a political consultant, specialized in EU politics. He holds a BA in International Relations from the Hochschule Rhein-Waal in Germany, an MSc in Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics, and was Talentia Scholar for the MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford. His main research interests are institutional design and statebuilding.
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<title>Vox, Covid-19, and populist discourses in Spain</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/29/vox-covid-19/</link>
<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2021 12:21:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Covid-19]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Jose Javier Olivas]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[populism]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Vox]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6540</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By José Javier Olivas Osuna and José Rama The radical right party Vox has been a harsh critic of the Spanish government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on the qualitative and quantitative content analysis of parliamentary speeches, during the … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/29/vox-covid-19/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content"><img class="alignright wp-image-6541" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/abascal.jpg" alt="" width="343" height="229" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/abascal.jpg 425w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/abascal-400x267.jpg 400w" sizes="(max-width: 343px) 100vw, 343px" />
By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/editors/">José Javier Olivas Osuna</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/p-r/">José Rama</a>
The radical right party Vox has been a harsh critic of the Spanish government’s handling of the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on the qualitative and quantitative content analysis of parliamentary speeches, during the first wave of the crisis we find that Abascal’s interventions became increasingly populist as the pandemic progressed and that there is also evidence of a ‘spillover’ or contagion effect, with the level of populism displayed by other parties also increasing. This post summarises some of the most important findings of the research we recently published in <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.678526">Frontiers in Political Science</a>.
The analysis of populist discourses during great events, such as the Covid-19 pandemic, can help us to understand how populist leaders adapt their communicative style to take advantage of changing circumstances. Populist movements often appear within a crisis context. This was the case of some populist leaders in Latin America that emerged after the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/20433986">hyperinflationary crisis</a> in the late 1980s, or the recent emergence of radical populist movements in Europe such as the Alternative for Germany, Brothers of Italy, and <a href="https://www.routledge.com/VOX-The-Rise-of-the-Spanish-Populist-Radical-Right/Rama-Zanotti-Turnbull-Dugarte-Santana/p/book/9780367502430">Vox</a> after the <a href="https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/36489">Great Recession</a>.
Populism finds in economic, social and political crisis a <a href="https://nordics.fes.de/e/default-7f5ab95431">window of opportunity</a> because crisis erodes trust in representative institutions, fuels grievances, and serves as justification for radical measures. Moreover, populists frequently cite social, political and economic problems – as well as the failure to address them – to <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/how-to-perform-crisis-a-model-for-understanding-the-key-role-of-crisis-in-contemporary-populism/3A522C020FF774CFA5D0C91CD10A98F1">propagate a sense of crisis</a> and turn ‘the people’ against a dangerous ‘other’. Unfortunately, the simplistic solutions and blame attributions of populist leaders often trigger similarly simplistic and confrontational <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-8675.12127">responses from their political adversaries</a>. These populist performances can become contagious and may further divide society and polarise the electorate.
Populism in Spain during the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic
In Spain, the Covid-19 crisis has induced greater demands for techno-authoritarian decision-making, <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/dkusw/">strong leadership</a>, willingness to give up individual freedom, and support for the idea of <a href="https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/qyjtm/">recentralisation</a> of devolved powers. All these ideas resonate with the discourse of Vox, which is also the party that Spaniards with anti-democratic views are more prone to support. Vox has also grown significantly and become the third largest party in Spain and it is, therefore, a party worth studying in the context of this health crisis.
One way to study populist discourses is to compare the density of populist features for each of the <a href="https://ejpr.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1475-6765.12428">core dimensions of populism</a>, namely: antagonism, morality, the idealisation of society, popular sovereignty and personalistic leadership. Table 1 below provides a definition for each of these dimensions.
Table 1: The core dimensions of populism
<table width="576">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td width="72"></td>
<td width="245">Populist features</td>
<td width="259">Anti-populist features</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="72">Depiction of the polity</td>
<td width="245">Dual and antagonistic description of polity: ‘us’ vs ‘them’, ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ or ‘the other’ (migrants, minorities, intellectuals, etc.).
Rejection of political, legal and/or economic establishment. Claims for radical change. Confrontational tone, militaristic terms.</td>
<td width="259">Complex and nuanced (non-antagonistic) depiction of the polity. Endorsement or approval of political, legal and economic establishment. Claims for gradual change.
References to working together with political opponents and reaching agreements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="72">Morality</td>
<td width="245">Moral interpretation of actors. Moral distinction and hierarchy (superiority and inferiority). Claims against the legitimacy of the other actors. Victimisation/blame discourses.
Ad-hominem critiques and negative emotions. References to ill-intentioned, unfair or immoral behaviour or political opponents.</td>
<td width="259">Political actors are not classified according to their moral standing. The legitimacy of political opponents and their ideas is acknowledged.
Critiques not focused on the proponent’s personal attributes or motives but on their actions or policy proposals (usually backed on empirical evidence).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="72">Construction of society</td>
<td width="245">Idealisation of society. Anti-pluralist depiction of ‘the people’ focused on identity, nationhood and/or ahistorical ‘heartland’. References to unity and singularity, hyperbolic descriptions.
Emphasis on difference with ‘the other’ and in-group homogeneity. Exclusionary claims. Emotional language.</td>
<td width="259">Complex and nuanced depiction of society and history. Pluralist portrayal of the people. References to diversity of views and interests. Utilisation of empirical data to back claims.
Emphasis on commonalities with ‘the other’ and in-group heterogeneity. Recognition of a common space. Inclusive claims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="72">Sovereignty</td>
<td width="245">Absence of limits to popular sovereignty. Majoritarian logic. The ‘will of the people’ is expected to prevail over laws, minority rights and institutions.
Preference for direct democracy tools. Praise of referendums, public consultations and mass mobilisations.</td>
<td width="259">Popular sovereignty limited by laws and formal rights. Emphasis on representative democratic tools. Complexity in decision-making is acknowledged.
References the protection of minority rights and interests and to institutional and legal checks on the will of the majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td width="72">Leadership</td>
<td width="245">Leaders voice ‘the will of the people’ and represent their interests. Non-mediated relation with the people. Leaders are described as more important than political parties.
Focus on the actions, decisions and ideas of leaders. Idealisation of their achievements. Charisma takes precedence over expertise.</td>
<td width="259">Leaders’ relations with people is mediated by institutions. Political parties represent people’s interests. Parties and other institutions are expected to control and be heard by political leaders.
Focus on the actions, decisions and ideas of political parties and institutions, not simply those of individuals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Source: Olivas Osuna (2020)
We have analysed the transcripts of the populist discourse of Vox during the debates for the approval and extension of the ‘state of alarm’ to fight against Covid-19. Our analysis reveals that, in comparison with Vox’s political manifestos, the idealised depiction of society lost relevance during these debates, whereas the moral and antagonistic dimensions largely increased their salience. Figure 1 shows the density of each of the populist features in these statements and in the party’s manifestos.
Figure 1: Aggregate levels of populism in the discourse and party manifestos of Vox
<img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6542" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/populism-1.png" alt="" width="1774" height="1187" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/populism-1.png 1774w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/populism-1-400x268.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/populism-1-768x514.png 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/populism-1-1024x685.png 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 1774px) 100vw, 1774px" />
Note: Density is measured as the number of references to each feature per 1,000 words.
Figure 2 shows that from 25 March to 3 June, the density of morality and antagonism references steadily increased during the different interventions in the case of Vox, and that ‘anti-populist’ allusions – i.e., referring to a pluralist or liberal conception of democracy – were extremely rare and decreasing in the speeches of Abascal.
Figure 2: Evolution of populist and anti-populist statements by major Spanish political parties (25 March – 3 June 2020)
<img class="alignleft size-full wp-image-6554" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Captura-de-pantalla-2021-06-29-a-las-14.35.45.png" alt="" width="2142" height="1452" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Captura-de-pantalla-2021-06-29-a-las-14.35.45.png 2142w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Captura-de-pantalla-2021-06-29-a-las-14.35.45-400x271.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Captura-de-pantalla-2021-06-29-a-las-14.35.45-768x521.png 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Captura-de-pantalla-2021-06-29-a-las-14.35.45-1024x694.png 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 2142px) 100vw, 2142px" />
 
Note: The figure shows how the frequency of populist and anti-populist statements by political parties changed from 25 March (1) to 3 June (6).
It is worth noting that Abascal’s speeches paid very little attention to the specific aspects of the pandemic. They largely attempted to delegitimise the Spanish government and its allies by accusing them of disinformation and of having hidden motives, such as eroding the unity of Spain and trying to establish a communist authoritarian regime. While the number of populist references increased, the tone of his statements also became more hyperbolic and aggressive.
‘Mr Sánchez, you can’t disguise this: tens of thousands of dead Spaniards due to sectarianism and criminal negligence by this government and millions of Spaniards ruined …’
‘I believe that Mr Iglesias wishes a civil war, […], I believe that his vanity and fanatism is capable of provoking a tragedy in Spain, but we are not going to fall into his provocations.’ 
(Santiago Abascal, 3 June 2020)
Our analysis also provides evidence of spillover effects in other parties’ communications. Pablo Casado, the leader of the People’s Party (PP), drastically modified his discourse between the first and last Covid-19 debate. Anti-populist features were abandoned and replaced by abundant populist antagonism and morality features. Although the style of Casado was not as emotional and aggressive as that of Abascal, the density of populist references displayed was also very high and several of the critiques were similar to those made by the leader of Vox.
Meanwhile, the speakers of Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Unidas Podemos (UP), parties that are usually classified as <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0010414020938081">populist</a>, took advantage of the excessive claims by Abascal to caricature and demonise Vox as well as the other right-leaning parties, the PP and Ciudadanos (Cs). Only the speakers of Cs and Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the leader of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), maintained a discourse with fewer populist than anti-populist references.
Explaining the propagation of populist rhetoric
The Covid-19 pandemic was seized upon by Vox as an opportunity to fuel discontent and transform the health and economic crisis into a political crisis in which they could set the agenda and present themselves as the only strong opposition to the government.
Abascal and other leading figures in the party employed an aggressive performative style, distancing themselves from what is politically correct and emulating the ‘bad manners’ of former US President Donald Trump and other prominent populist figures. Other parties reacted to these performances by also engaging in blame attribution and moral condemnation. Two different mechanisms seem to explain the propagation of populist discourses.
First, by adopting hyperbolic and confrontational rhetoric, populist parties can gain more media attention and differentiate themselves from other political forces. This is a sort of ‘populist outbidding’ process. Other political parties on the same side of the left-right spectrum, such as the PP in this case, may choose to adopt a similar form of populist rhetoric to avoid losing voters to more radical parties, such as Vox.
The recent regional elections in <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/3931c7e5-dc12-42e3-aab8-b16539ce2317">Catalonia in February this year</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/05/05/madrids-regional-election-how-we-got-here-what-happened-and-why-it-matters/">Madrid in May</a> help to illustrate this effect. In the former election, the PP adopted a moderate stance, but was largely beaten by Vox, while in the latter, the PP leader Isabel Díaz Ayuso used a Manichean, confrontational communication strategy and managed to largely outperform Vox – which obtained 9.1% of the vote as opposed to 18.5% in the November 2019 general election. This underlines that maintaining a pluralist discourse in the context of crisis and polarisation can be electorally damaging in the short-term.
Second, parties from the other side of the political spectrum may also enter into a populist confrontation dynamic with the party responsible for the initial escalation. Once a leader breaks implicit conventions on what is acceptable to say in parliament, other leaders may follow and thereby help normalise populist articulation, strengthening the sense of crisis.
Party speakers in Spain engaged in aggressive attacks on each other with hyperbolic accusations such as suggesting that some parties were ‘euthanising’ part of the population, calling for a military coup d’état, wishing a civil war, or engaging in fascism. This crossing of dialectic red lines in parliament was later visible in a more aggressive tone and further polarisation in the public sphere, thus contributing to increased tensions and divisions in society.
For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper at <a href="https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2021.678526">Frontiers in Political Science</a>
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE Eurocrisis or the London School of Economics. This blog has been also posted on <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2021/06/25/vox-covid-19-and-populist-discourses-in-spain/">EUROPP (European Politics and Policy) Blog</a>
—
José Javier Olivas Osuna is Senior Talento Fellow at the National Distance Education University (UNED), Madrid and Research Associate at LSE IDEAS.
José Rama is a Lecturer of Political Science in the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Faculty of Law, Autonomous University of Madrid. He is Guest Lecturer in the Department of European and International Studies, King’s College London.
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<title>The EU has lost its touristic touch: Countries like Cyprus, Spain and Malta are trying to regain it</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/15/tourism-europe/</link>
<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2021 18:24:38 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Cyprus]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6518</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Kristi Allaj The European Union has been one of the most classic tourist destinations in the world. The freedom of travel for its natives and tourists visiting one continent with various cultures has allowed the EU to take advantage … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/15/tourism-europe/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/a-c/">Kristi Allaj</a>
<img class="alignright wp-image-6520" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/1200x-1.jpeg" alt="" width="392" height="261" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/1200x-1.jpeg 1200w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/1200x-1-400x267.jpeg 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/1200x-1-768x512.jpeg 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/1200x-1-1024x683.jpeg 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 392px) 100vw, 392px" />The European Union has been one of the most classic tourist destinations in the world. The freedom of travel for its natives and tourists visiting one continent with various cultures has allowed the EU to take advantage of the plethora of tourism. Yet, the spread of COVID-19 has had a grave impact on the EU whose 10% of GDP flows from the industry. With the spread of vaccines to fight the pandemic countries are slowly opening up their borders and some of them have invented unique plans to enhance tourism.
This article will focus on Spain, Malta and Cyprus and their divergent approaches to revitalizing a sector that provides them with a big percentage of their GDP. First, I will cover the impact of COVID-19 on the profit of the EU. Then, I will focus on the different approaches the countries are taking and, lastly, I will analyze the influence of their approaches in the tourism development sector over the EU. 
How did COVID-19 affect the E.U?
Provided that each country was affected differently by the spread of the virus from 2020 to present, the EU as a whole system is experiencing a recession. The perpetual lockdown of borders in the Union created gaps in a system already struggling over unification and cohesiveness in policies that benefit, similarly all its members.
<a href="https://www.bruegel.org/2020/09/why-has-covid-19-hit-different-european-union-economies-so-differently/">Academic research suggests</a> some EU countries were hit more than others based on the stringency lockdown measures, their economic structure, public indebtedness and the quality of governance; those countries were mostly in the South. In July of 2020, the EU created a COVID-19 fund to help the Union recover, at last showing cooperativeness after months of independent survival. This physical separation that occurred in the months between hollowed the economy of countries which suffered already economically or governmentally.
Spain: The results of COVID-19 and the country’s dichotomous solution
Spain was one of the most affected countries during the COVID-19 crisis. The country’s economy <a href="https://english.elpais.com/economy_and_business/2021-01-29/spains-economy-shrank-11-in-2020-in-biggest-drop-since-civil-war.html">decreased 11%</a> during the time as a result of its lengthy three-month confinement. This naturally froze Spain’s economy, whose exports have been slowly growing but whose government is facing changes with the introduction of far-right parties.
The tourism industry that brings in almost 13% of Spain’s GPD faced one of its hardest years. In order to better comprehend the negative impact in the tourism industry, Table 1 below showcases the cancellations of hotels in March 2020 in Spain’s regions. The Canary Islands faced the highest cancellations that month at 127%, with the region of Andalusia following suit. Together all the regions shown amounted to 40% of hotel cancellations solely in the month of March.
Table 1
<img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6522" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Tabla-1.png" alt="" width="868" height="534" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Tabla-1.png 868w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Tabla-1-400x246.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Tabla-1-768x472.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 868px) 100vw, 868px" />
Source: Statista 2021
In particular, the country has applied unique rules to its tourism sector. Until March 2021, it was noted that residents of Spain could not travel from one region to another, while foreign tourists were allowed to do so, as long as they possessed a negative COVID-19 test. This situation amounts to the factor that rules on tourism are being made by regions rather than on a national level. The need to replenish the tourism sector is a driving force on governmental decision making. The distinction of tourists and locals has created a grievance in its nationals, who cannot travel freely inside their own country.
Malta: The results of COVID-19 and the country’s ‘giving’ approach
Unlike Spain, Malta a small island country is paying tourists to visit. Taking this approach in the hopes that it will make the country more competitive on the market, considering around 42% of its population is vaccinated with their first dose. Malta, whose almost 15% of GPD consist of the tourism industry will be paying independent tourists up to €200 if they stay in the country for more than <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexledsom/2021/04/19/malta-to-pay-international-travelers-to-visit-mediterranean-this-summer/?sh=36032e8d7d2f">two nights</a>.
Significantly, in the latest years Malta’s economy has been growing at a steady pace. But this economy has been heavily based in the service sector that has definitely been wounded by the pandemic. The International Monetary Fund (Grima et al., 2020) calculated that Malta’s economy would falter by 2.8% in 2020 but would be rejuvenated by 7% in 2021. Malta is expecting 35,000 visitors in summer 2021.
Paired with the calculations presented below on Table 2 on how much the tourism industry would be benefiting per tourist that remains for two nights, the prospects seem high – if Malta is able to accumulate at least 35,000 visitors this summer. The table below presents what is paid on average for hotels, transport and meal in Malta. Altogether they would amount to €156.00 for two days. For 35,000 visitors that would amount to €5,775 000: a wind of fresh air for the economy.
 Table 2 
<img class="size-full wp-image-6524 aligncenter" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-2.png" alt="" width="488" height="386" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-2.png 488w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-2-400x316.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 488px) 100vw, 488px" />
<img class="size-full wp-image-6525 aligncenter" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-3.png" alt="" width="1082" height="384" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-3.png 1082w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-3-400x142.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-3-768x273.png 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-3-1024x363.png 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 1082px) 100vw, 1082px" />Source: Author; Data: BudgetYourTrip
Cyprus: The results of COVID-19 and the daring deal
Cyprus also an island country, due to its ongoing political concerns faced the virus differently. Cyprus holds a de facto partition between the South and North, divided into Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots accordingly. Meanwhile, two territories of the country are administered by Britain. To that end, the country has a complicated governance.
Hence, when the pandemic crisis occurred the regions were affected differently. The hardest hit was taken by the North region, whose people demonstrated a colossal need for welfare. Rising from an average of <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342293479_Under_the_COVID-19_lockdown_Rapid_review_about_the_unique_case_of_North_Cyprus">5,000 people to 60,000</a>. However, Cyprus still remains under the governance of the Republic of Cyprus, resulting in an efficient and immediate close down of the borders when the pandemic began. This ensured the safety of its natives and lower cases compared to other countries. However, similarly to other countries, the closing down of the borders stirred the country’s economy whose 22.7% of GDP is based on the tourism industry.
A pioneer in the new COVID-19 regulations Cyprus’ officials have offered to pay for the full trip (excluding flights) if a visitor contracts the virus while there. Notably, the country has prepared a hospital solely for any COVID-19 cases and <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/cyprus-to-pay-for-the-vacation-of-tourists-who-catch-the-coronavirus.html">“quarantine hotels”</a> for anyone having come in contact with the patient. This way the country is hoping to attract tourism and maintain a sense of security, saving it from its zero number visitors seen on Table 3 for the months of April and May.
Table 3
<img class="size-full wp-image-6526 aligncenter" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-33.png" alt="" width="438" height="325" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-33.png 438w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/Table-33-400x297.png 400w" sizes="(max-width: 438px) 100vw, 438px" />
Source: Statista 2020
Conclusion: Advantages and Disadvantages
After analyzing all three countries and dissecting the results of the virus in their economy as well as the measurements they are taking in order to attract tourism, it is safe to say that they all have very different approaches. Their approaches rise as a result of their differences in governance and economy. The COVID-19 crisis has led them to make quick decisions in order to rebirth the economy. The EU fund although it may benefit them temporarily, won’t provide permanent comfort. And it is this quickness in filling the cracks that were made, that play one of the biggest disadvantages on an intranational level. The height of the pandemic drove each country to individualize and stray away from the EU model, providing for themselves rather than excavating solutions together as one nation, showcasing the fragility of the European Union’s unification.
As Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated on his <a href="https://unric.org/en/tourism-europe-is-one-of-the-hardest-hit-regions-by-covid-19/">Policy Brief</a> speech “This crisis is a major shock for developed economies, but for developing countries, it is an emergency.” The European Union’s supranational reputation has been hurt but its economy may not so much if in the end each country is able to replenish their economy – even separately.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
Kristi Allaj is currently earning her BA in International and Intercultural Communications with a minor in Political Science at Baruch College of City University of New York. Having moved from Europe to the United States, her main interests rest in the development of countries’ relations and the adaptation of people of various cultures in different political environments. Follow her at <a href="https://twitter.com/KristiAllaj">@KristiAllaj</a>.
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<title>The Weaponization of Laïcité Against Muslims: Pushing More Towards Extremism</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/15/weaponization-of-laicite/</link>
<pubDate>Tue, 15 Jun 2021 17:57:33 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[France]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Migration]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Islam]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[laïcité]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Macron]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6511</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Tanzila Jamal In the last decade, France has seen particularly devastating terrorist attacks with incidents such as the Nice truck attack in 2016 sustaining a death count of nearly 84 people, the series of stabbings at the Notre Dame … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2021/06/15/weaponization-of-laicite/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/j-l/">Tanzila Jamal</a>
<img class="wp-image-6512 alignright" style="font-size: 12px" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/france-muslims-tension.jpeg" alt="" width="376" height="250" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/france-muslims-tension.jpeg 2560w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/france-muslims-tension-400x266.jpeg 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/france-muslims-tension-768x511.jpeg 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/france-muslims-tension-1024x681.jpeg 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 376px) 100vw, 376px" />In the last decade, France has seen particularly devastating terrorist attacks with incidents such as the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36800730">Nice truck attack in 2016</a> sustaining a death count of nearly 84 people, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54729957">the series of stabbings at the Notre Dame basilica</a>, or more recently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/world/europe/france-terrorism-police-station.html">the fatal stabbing of a policewoman in Southern France</a>. With a rise in terrorist attacks, a fervent demand from the public for protection and French policymakers has answered with several policies targeting what they assume to be the primary cause. Policies have included a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/14/france-senate-muslim-veil-ban">ban on niqabs</a> (full-face covering) and a ban on burkinis, among others. More recently came a proposal for a series of policies that would aim to target radicalism. These policies are not seen as an infringement on religious freedom through the French concept of “Laïcité”, a principle created in 1905 to promote a more secular France. This article will explicate laïcité and its recent weaponization in marginalizing the French Muslim community, thus pushing more to extremism.

What is Laïcité and what are its origins? 
Laïcité roughly translates to “secularism” and was enacted by The Law of 1905, officially segregating the Church from the government. Per separating the Church and State, the French concept of secularism also promised to guarantee “the freedom to practice religion.” The principle of laïcité is not fundamentally anti-religion but rather a principle emphasizing the freedom of conscience and religion. According to the official French Minister of Foreign Affairs Office, as France becomes more culturally diverse, secularism is needed more than ever to ensure the people can live together peacefully, enjoying the “freedom of conscience.” With the emergence of terrorist attacks in France, the role of laïcité has often been used in conjunction with the French Muslim community though the principle applies to all religions.
Since 2004, French politicians have attempted to use policy to forge a version of Islam they believe would be more compatible with French ideals and values. This has led to the weaponization of laïcité, mutating the principle from a guarantee of religious freedoms and freedom of conscience to a tool in restricting religious freedoms, particularly for the Muslim community. In 2003, people began to question if wearing headscarves (hijabs) by schoolgirls was compatible with French principles, as schools were considered a neutral, religion-free zone. In consideration of these concerns, the government hired the Stasi Commission to review the issue. <a href="https://www.vie-publique.fr/sites/default/files/rapport/pdf/034000725.pdf">The report</a> concluded that religious signs in public constitute “a threat to public order,” with the French parliament proceeding <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/posts/the-weaponization-of-laicite">to ban the wearing of religious symbols</a> in public schools based on laïcité. Though the law affects all religious gear including Sikh turbans, Jewish kippas, and large Christian crosses, it was primarily aimed at schoolgirls wearing hijabs. This prohibition was followed by cases of Muslim schoolgirls being expelled or removed from classes if the school administration deemed any clothing items ostentatious. Most notably was the case of a 15-year-old <a href="https://www.france24.com/fr/20150429-collegienne-privee-cours-cause-jupe-longue-noire-charleville-mezieres-laicite">Muslim schoolgirl being removed from class</a> for wearing a long black skirt as administrators saw it as a religious symbol. This has not been an isolated incident, with over 130 cases of high school and college girls being banned from classes due to <a href="https://www.islamophobie.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/RAPPORT-CCIF-2020-EN.pdf">“ostentatious” outfits</a>. The devolution of laïcité has resulted in legal islamophobia, promoting discrimination against French Muslims as acceptable under the guise of secularism.
The Emergence of Islamophobic Sentiment
While the recent phenomenon of terrorist attacks and a post 9/11 “war on terror” has been attributed to the negative perception of Muslims, this negative image is not a recent emergence in France. Anti-Muslim sentiments in France can be traced back to France’s historical role as a colonizer of Arabic and Muslim people. At the peak of its life as an empire, the French empire colonized many North African countries, including Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, and Morocco. During France’s time as a colonizer in Algeria, African Muslims were often deprived of their identity, with colonial authorities disestablishing Arab-speaking schools. Colonial life was heavily controlled, and ‘‘Code l’indigénat’’ (native code) was used to “strip native inhabitants of all civil rights, and of their status as complete human beings.” The disbandment of French colonial rule over these territories resulted in an influx of North African immigrants to France, with the French government also enlisting low-skilled workers from these countries.
An influx of North African immigrants materialized “banlieues” (slums), plagued with rampant crime, poverty, and unemployment. More than 4.4 million people of Arab or African heritage live in banlieues where they and Jews <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/22/nothings-changed-10-years-after-french-riots-banlieues-remain-in-crisis">face extreme discrimination</a>. From the beginning, Muslims and those of African and Arab heritage have been placed on the fringes of French society by the government and natives.
This trend of discrimination has bled into other facets of life, with French Muslims experiencing extremely high levels of unemployment. In 2010, Marie-Anne Valfort from the Institute Montaigne conducted a study to compare the experiences of French Christians and French Muslims. Marie-Ann Valfort is an Associate Professor at University Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne and has written several research papers focusing on anti-Muslim discrimination. <a href="http://129.199.194.17/files/Valfort2015.pdf">The report</a> concludes with Valfort determining that Muslims experience staggeringly high amounts of discrimination when job searching, as Figure 1 shows how only 5% of Muslim men are likely to be called back.
Figure 1: Callback rates for practicing Catholics, Jews, and Muslims, unseparated by gender and broken down by gender. <img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6514" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-q.png" alt="" width="892" height="496" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-q.png 892w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-q-400x222.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-q-768x427.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 892px) 100vw, 892px" />
The study continued to show how this discrimination continued to carry over when applicants indicated they were secular, though slightly less (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Impact for Muslim men of appearing as secular rather than practicing, according to whether their profile was ordinary or outstanding.
<img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6515" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-2.png" alt="" width="936" height="576" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-2.png 936w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-2-400x246.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2021/06/figure-2-768x473.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 936px) 100vw, 936px" />
In his journal, Engy Abdelkader analyses French perception of Muslims before and after terrorist events, focusing specifically on the incident with <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54307820">Charlie Hebdo</a>. Abdelkader. Abdelkader is currently a political science professor at Rutgers University, where she explores religion and government using her extensive knowledge as a lawyer. In 2014, 40% of French survey respondents found Islam to be a threat; however, in 2015 after the terrorist attacks, 76% of <a href="https://escholarship.org/content/qt870099f4/qt870099f4.pdf">French survey respondents</a> held optimistic views on Islam. She attributes this to social media platforms such as Twitter, where Muslims banded together publicly against the actions of the terrorist and in solidarity with the victims. She does, however, note that in 2016, 46% of French survey respondents claimed to fear that Muslim refugees would increase the chance of terrorist attacks.
Another factor in French islamophobia can be linked to the economic status of the country. Abdelkader notes that negative opinions regarding Muslims coincide with financial crises and an increase in Muslim immigrants. In 2008 when the French economy suffered due to the world financial crisis, French survey respondents vocalized the belief of Islam being incompatible with French values. Abdelkader ascribes this belief to the fear that immigrants were taking jobs though this is not true as shown previously in Figure 1 and Figure 2.
French Politicians and Islam
The rise in terrorist attacks has culminated in public demand for politicians to address the rising problem. Politicians have taken various methods to heed this demand, though regardless of party lines, there has been a general ambivalence towards the notion of Islam in France. Politicians such as current-standing President Emmanuel Macron have called for policies that would target radical Islam, emphasizing that he is not attacking the religion or practitioners but pushing for a French version of Islam. When introducing his plan to combat radical Islam, <a href="https://www.euronews.com/2020/11/02/macron-and-islam-what-has-the-french-president-actually-said-to-outrage-the-muslim-world">Macron commented</a> that his goal was to “free Islam in France from foreign influences” and to create an “Islam des lumières” (Islam of Enlightenment). However, Macron is also the first President to acknowledge the obstacles facing French immigrant communities, particularly mentioning how “We have thus created districts where the promise of the Republic has no longer been kept, and therefore districts where the attraction of these messages, where these most radical forms were sources of hope.” His comments, however, have contrasted the policies proposed by his party in recent years. Despite his position as a member of the La République En Marche! Party (a centrist and liberal party), the President has been accused of pandering to the far right to gain votes in the upcoming election. Critics have condemned the recently proposed separatism policies as a ploy by Macron to gain voters against Marine Le Penn, his current rival.
Recently, higher education minister Frédérique Vidal has also called for a formal investigation to examine “Islamo-leftist” environments in universities. “Islamo-leftism” describes the belief that challenging racism, colonialism, and similar concepts are akin to promoting radical Islamism and racism. Vidal has faced severe backlash for this instigation, with academics and the CNRS (The French National Centre for Scientific Research) criticizing her for subscribing to the ideology which does “not correspond to any scientific reality.” The Minister has reasoned the need for an investigation by exclaiming that it is needed to “distinguish proper academic research from activism and opinion.”. President Macron’s office has not yet commented on Vidal’s decision, though in the past, Macron has commented that focusing on race and discrimination served only to create a divide within French society. Despite backlash from academics, several <a href="https://www.france24.com/en/france/20210217-french-academics-blast-minister-s-warning-on-islamo-leftism">right-wing politicians have spoken out</a> in support of the investigation, deeming it necessary.
Marine Le Penn, the current President of the National Rally party and runner-up for the French Presidency, has also commented on approaching Islamist radicals. Le Penn’s party, the National Rally, is a far-right political party mainly promoting anti-immigration and anti-globalist beliefs while advocating for nationalism and a secure France. Le Penn previously lost the Presidential candidacy to Emmanuel Macron in 2017 and is now campaigning once more. In a recent move to increase her voters, Le Penn proposed a ban on hijabs in all public spaces, a move that resulted in her being tied in votes with Macron. Le Penn has also gone further to blame immigration and lax government policies for allowing Islamism and terrorism to rise. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/16/world/europe/france-le-pen-election.html?login=smartlock&auth=login-smartlock">She has commented</a>, “Acquiring French citizenship should be made harder and contingent on respecting French “customs” and “codes.””. In a more recent debate against Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, <a href="https://www.politico.eu/article/french-interior-minister-gerald-darmanin-and-marine-le-pen-spar-over-how-to-fight-radical-islam/">Le Penn criticized the government</a> for not being strict enough in handling radical Islam and “limiting everyone’s freedom to try to modify the freedoms of a few Islamists”. Interior Minister Darmanin attacked Le Penn’s advocacy for a hijab ban, arguing that “It’s citizens’ freedom to be able to live their faith freely in the public space”, “There won’t be a clothing police”, and that in response to women that are being forced to wear hijabs “it’s better to fight the men who are creating the community pressure”.
Repercussions of Anti-Muslim Policies
The introduction of anti-Islamic policies is a reoccurring trend. Most recently, Prime Minister Emmanuel Macron introduced a series of <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/frances-anti-separatism-law-aims-to-legalize-islamophobia-experts">separatism policies</a> which would include banning hijabs for minors under 18, banning homeschooling for Muslims, and the ability to close mosques or associated organizations if under suspicion and other provisions. Though the French lower house National Assembly has voted in favor of the bill, it has not come to fruition yet as it awaits the Senate’s vote. Macron claims the bill aims to reforge Islam to create a new version that would more closely align with French ideals, highlighting the secular nature of the country. Critics have spoken out against these policies, arguing they stigmatize Muslims as terrorists and infringe upon the freedom and rights of French Muslims. Amnesty International’s researcher Marco Perolini has also commented how <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/03/france-republican-values-law-risks-discrimination/">“French authorities use the vague and ill-defined concept of ‘radicalization’ or ‘radical Islam’” </a>to justify the imposition of measures without valid grounds, which risks leading to discrimination in its application against <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/world/europe/frances-anti-separatism-law-aims-to-legalize-islamophobia-experts">Muslims and other minority groups”</a>.
These policies have come to a rise in Islamophobic sentiments and hate crimes being committed against French Muslims. In 2014, there were a reported 133 hate crimes against Muslims while there were more than 400 incidents in 2015, as reported by the French National Human Rights Commission (CNCDH), meaning a 223% increase. Abdallah Zekri, the head of the National Observatory of Islamophobia, announced a <a href="https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/france-islamophobic-attacks-up-sharply-last-year/2126901">53% jump in hate crimes from 2019 to 2020</a>. Overall, hate crimes and Islamophobic sentiments have risen greatly in the last few years, with policies legitimizing this fear.
Though these policies have aimed to reduce radicalism, an unintentional consequence of targeting innocent French Muslims is the further marginalization of a minority group already on the fringes of society. The refusal to let French Muslims practice and express their religion freely contradicts their identities, contributing to the growing disconnect from French society many Muslims already feel. Segregating French Muslims, particularly young ones (through the hijab ban, for example), can create more vulnerability and play a massively contributing push factor to radicalization.
Conclusion
Conclusively, it is evident that politicians have weaponized the French concept of laïcité to foster a hostile environment towards French Muslims. The word, originally used to dictate freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, is now utilized to exploit the fear of the people and vilify the French Muslim minority. Policies created under this guise aim to further stereotype all Muslims as terrorists and further isolating an already marginalized minority. While many have pointed at terrorist events as justification for these policies, it is evident that Islamophobic sentiment has been prevalent in France since long before. The country’s past as a colonizer of Muslim Arabs and North Africans has played a heavy hand in these new separatism bills. Muslims in France are already heavily discriminated against, with many resigned to live in banlieue with low chances of employment; Muslim youth are also being discriminated against, with their ability to express their religious identity tarnished. Ultimately, the legitimization of islamophobia through the weaponization of laïcité policy has resulted in a drastic increase of hate crimes and will further alienate vulnerable people and push them towards radicalism rather than away.
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
Tanzila Jamal is an undergraduate pursuing a political science degree at Baruch College. Her interests lie in public policy, immigration, and racial issues. Follow her at <a href="https://twitter.com/tanzilajml">@tanzilajml</a>.
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<title>Ideology and Polarization in times of Coronavirus</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/06/26/polarization-coronavirus/</link>
<pubDate>Fri, 26 Jun 2020 09:06:28 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Climate Change]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[coronavirus]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Covid-19]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Ideology]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Polarization]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6493</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Javier Padilla and Belén Hípola The coronavirus crisis has reinforced some of the tendencies that were already taking place for some time. In the United States, before the demonstrations initiated by George Floyd’s death began, Donald Trump alternated between … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/06/26/polarization-coronavirus/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/p-r/">Javier Padilla</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/g-i/">Belén Hípola</a>
<img class="alignright wp-image-6502" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/adnoticias-cientos-de-personas-protestaron-en-michigan-contra-medidas-por-coronavirus-afp-1140x570.jpg" alt="" width="301" height="258" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/adnoticias-cientos-de-personas-protestaron-en-michigan-contra-medidas-por-coronavirus-afp-1140x570.jpg 665w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/adnoticias-cientos-de-personas-protestaron-en-michigan-contra-medidas-por-coronavirus-afp-1140x570-400x343.jpg 400w" sizes="(max-width: 301px) 100vw, 301px" />The coronavirus crisis has reinforced some of the tendencies that were already taking place for some time. In the United States, before the demonstrations initiated by George Floyd’s death began, Donald Trump alternated between public appearances calling for lockdown and appeals to ‘liberate’ the democrat states from the ‘oppressing’ measures their governors would have been taking. His erratic management led to conflicts with several governors, among them some republicans. However, the population’s perception of Trump’s management of the health crisis has been determined by their mentality prior to the pandemic: <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/02/5-facts-about-partisan-reactions-to-covid-19-in-the-u-s/">Most Republicans approve of it while Democrats almost unanimously consider it a failure</a>. This phenomenon, called affective polarization by Iyengar y Westwood, can affect technical as well as personal issues. In the recent years, the number of Americans who declare that they would not want their children to get married with someone of the opposing party has increased. As Rogowski and Sutherland have shown, affective polarization is conditioned by ideology: <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11109-015-9323-7">the closer the person gets to the extremes, the greater the contempt for the opponent. </a>

The high level of affective polarization in the United States has consequences in terms of public health. Utilizing Google’s mobility reports, Lipsitz and Pop-Eleches have shown that in <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3595695">democrat counties mobility has reduced more than in republican counties</a>, even as COVID-19 was spreading fast. These authors point out that one of the consequences of affective polarization is that part of the republican voters, encouraged by their political elite, do not trust scientific authorities. This situation, that is partially explained by the skepticism of the republican voters in taking measures against climate change, is influencing their behavior. Other studies have shown that the factor that best explains citizen’s behavior during the first week of the pandemic was their <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3562796">political preferences</a>. In words of Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the director of the World Health Organization, the conclusion is clear: “If you do not want many more body bags, then you refrain from politicizing it.”
In Europe, the levels of affective polarization regarding the management of the coronavirus crisis vary among countries. In some respects, Spain is similar to the United States. <a href="http://agendapublica.elpais.com/enfrentados-y-enfadados-una-realidad-preocupante/">According to Torcal</a>, already before the pandemic the levels of affective polarization in Spain were considerably high. <a href="http://agendapublica.elpais.com/politizacion-a-fuego-lento/">As Cornago has shown</a>, the way in which the management of the crisis is evaluated depends on partisanship. Moreover, this is heightened by voters’ ideology. According to the April data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Spaniards evaluate the Covid-2019 crisis management differently depending on their position in the ideological scale.
The ideological position that we perceive in the parties is marked by our own position. As citizens become more radical, they perceive parties differently: the more extreme, the greater the degree of binary logic. For example, respondents who place themselves on the extreme left in the CIS survey hardly differentiate between Vox, Ciudadanos and the PP: for them they all are on the extreme right. The same, conversely, happens with those who are on the opposite side. More worrying is that this pattern of perception, although more nuanced, is reproduced among those with more moderate positions. According to the CIS, neither Vox nor Podemos voters are as extreme as others perceive them to be: It is as if we like the extreme to always be the others. There is no doubt that the political elites have encouraged this division by electoral calculations: the allusions to the “trifachito” and the “coup left” before the pandemic still resonate.
In Figure 1, with CIS data from March 2020, we can see how voters change the perception of parties based on their position on the ideological axis. More radical voters tend to view parties that are not on their ideological side as more extreme. In other analyses, we controlled for the chosen party, and the effect of extremism remains.
Figure 1
<img class="alignright wp-image-6494" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-1.png" alt="" width="601" height="463" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-1.png 850w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-1-400x308.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-1-768x591.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 601px) 100vw, 601px" />
On the other hand, the ideology of the respondent affects how the management of the pandemic has been perceived. The April special survey (CIS) included several questions about the policies carried out to combat COVID-19 in Spain. Figures 2 and 3 show how respondents answer according to their self-positioning on the ideological scale. When asked about the need for the “measures that have been taken in Spain”, most believe that they are necessary or very necessary, with almost no differences depending on the ideology of the respondents (Figure 2). This indicates that the consensus on the need for the measures that have been taken is more or less transversal in Spain.
However, as soon as any reference is made to the measures the government has taken, the responses change substantially depending on respondents’ ideology. To the question about whether “the Government’s policy to fight against COVID-19 as a whole” deserves the trust of the respondent, the answers are divided according to ideology: 70% of those who place themselves in 1 (furthest to the Left) find that the Government’s policies are very trustworthy or trustworthy, while only 19% of those in 10 (furthest to the Right) believe the same (Figure 3). The fact that a large part of the right-wing respondents does not trust measures they consider necessary, as well as the division between the Government’s evaluation by the two ideological blocks, suggests that affective polarization is high in Spain. Furthermore, along the lines of Rogowski and Sutherland, affective polarization seems to increase with ideological extremism.
Figure 2
<img class="alignright wp-image-6495" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-2.png" alt="" width="600" height="512" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-2.png 850w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-2-400x342.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-2-768x656.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" />
Figure 3
<img class="alignright wp-image-6496" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-3.png" alt="" width="600" height="513" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-3.png 850w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-3-400x342.png 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/06/Imagen-3-768x656.png 768w" sizes="(max-width: 600px) 100vw, 600px" />
The most interesting question, and for which many of us would have an instinctive answer, is whether these levels of affective polarization have affected the management of the health crisis. Even in the absence of more systematic studies, we have enough anecdotal evidence that the political parties have politicized the pandemic: we have seen tensions between the central government and the autonomous communities due to extra-sanitary issues; casseroles encouraged by different political groups; demonstrations supported for partisan reasons; unfair criticism of the adversary. However, we do not yet have an analysis to determine whether there has been a partisan or ideological gap in the behavior of Spaniards during lockdown. Despite the resemblance to the United States, there was a fundamental difference in Spain before the pandemic:<a href="https://elpais.com/sociedad/2019/11/30/actualidad/1575133466_183632.html"> scientific issues such as climate change were not as politicized</a>. According to the CIS survey from January, an overwhelming majority of Spaniards, regardless of their ideology and political preference, agreed with the existence of climate change. The difference between left and right voters on this issue is less than in other European countries, despite the fact that Vox voters are somewhat more skeptical.
All this leads us to two hypotheses, one optimistic and the other pessimistic. The optimistic is that the consensus around scientific issues would have made it easier for Spaniards, regardless of their ideology, to follow the recommendations of the health authorities and consider lockdown measures necessary. The pessimistic is that this consensus could be disappearing due to the intensity of the polarization episodes. The actions of the majority of Spain’s political elites during the Covid-19 crisis suggests that this country is becoming more like the United States.
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<title>The vaccine Portugal discovered which Italy doesn’t know about</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/04/27/the-vaccine-portugal-discovered-which-italy-doesnt-know-about/</link>
<pubDate>Mon, 27 Apr 2020 11:32:36 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Covid-19]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Italy]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Portugal]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[António Costa]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Matteo Salvini]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[portugal]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6485</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Alessio Colonnelli The importance of April 25 in Italy and Portugal can hardly be overstated. Both celebrate being freed from a violent dictatorial regime. A day to get the flag out and put it on your balcony on full display. Lots … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/04/27/the-vaccine-portugal-discovered-which-italy-doesnt-know-about/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/a-c/">Alessio Colonnelli</a>
The importance of April 25 in Italy and Portugal can hardly be overstated. Both celebrate being freed from a violent dictatorial regime. A day to get the flag out and put it on your balcony on full display. Lots of green and red everywhere in town. And plenty of sunshine to make it a perfect day. A southern European July 4 of sorts.
<img class="alignright size-full wp-image-6486" style="font-size: 16px" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/antonio-costa.jpeg" alt="" width="299" height="168" />Similarities end here, though. Portugal has experienced the coronavirus crisis very differently; it went into lockdown comparatively earlier. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/19/swift-action-kept-portugals-coronavirus-crisis-in-check-says-minister">The gravity of it all was grasped sooner</a>. António Costa’s government’s measures – health and financial – have been endorsed by the opposition throughout.
Rui Rio, president of the centre-right Social Democratic Party and leader of the opposition, publicly said last week that attacking Costa’s left-leaning executive “is not patriotic” at times like these. <a href="https://elpais.com/internacional/2020-04-20/portugal-donde-la-oposicion-cree-que-atacar-al-gobierno-ahora-no-es-patriotico.html">He also sent a letter to party members</a> to remind them of this vital message, which also advocates for the country’s unity. A sign of political maturity. You should be so lucky to find anything like this in Italy.
That being said, Portugal’s centralised health system – unlike Italy’s – has probably made it easier to keep the whole situation manageable. Swift coordination is everything against the coronavirus. And so, while comparing one country – Portugal – against another with a population six times larger – Italy – is always going to be difficult, you still can’t escape the fact that the latter has a much bigger contagion issue.
Every aspect relating to the coronavirus has caused acrimonious debates in Italy. Tension has been a constant. During a much-awaited televised speech to the nation at the beginning of April, prime minister Giuseppe Conte felt the urge, half way through, to digress and claim that opposition leaders Matteo Salvini of Lega and Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy – often described as far-right in the international press – were just spouting “lies.” That’s the word he used, completely red in the face with rage. Conte named names. Other conservative forces just piled into him the next day. Moderation disappeared overnight from the face of the Italian earth. Maybe it’s never been there.
True, <a href="https://www.dn.pt/pais/880-mortos-e-23392-casos-de-covid-19-em-portugal-casos-sobem-26-12116266.html">Portugal’s registered fewer than 1,000 coronavirus deaths</a>; Italy over 26 times that. In such a scenario the pressure on a prime minister must be immense; and some will always be in favour of exploiting the situation and cunningly exacerbate tempers for political gain. Conte could well have fallen into a reactionary trap. Yet this is not the time to do politics as usual, as Rio grasped.
To fully comprehend this means to have been inoculated with a special vaccine that ought to be available to everyone 75 years since the end of the Second World War and 75 years of celebrating Liberation Day from nazi-fascism in Italy. But as the 93-year-old former <a href="https://www.corriere.it/cronache/20_aprile_25/25-aprile-partigiano-arno-il-vaccino-contro-fascismo-non-s-mai-trovato-non-dobbiamo-scordarlo-a8d6c16c-86b2-11ea-9b77-4fc0668b38e0.shtml">anti-fascist partigiano Gildo Bugni told Corriere della Sera the other day</a>, “a vaccine against fascism has yet to be discovered.”
How encouraging it is to see that in Lisbon, at least, they might actually have found an antidote.
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<title>The European Ecological Transition in the ‘Post-Covid’ Era</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/04/26/ecological-transition-post-covid/</link>
<pubDate>Sun, 26 Apr 2020 09:08:54 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Covid-19]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Environment]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Climate Change]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[European Commission]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Green New Deal]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[green parties]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6470</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Andrea Pérez Ruiz and Kilian Wirthwein Vega Only a few months ago, the Ifema congress centre in Madrid, now a field hospital, hosted the COP 25 climate summit, whose task was to close the rule book of the Paris … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2020/04/26/ecological-transition-post-covid/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/p-r/">Andrea Pérez Ruiz</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/v-z/">Kilian Wirthwein Vega</a>
Only a few months ago, the Ifema congress centre in Madrid, now a field hospital, hosted the COP 25 climate summit, whose task was to close the rule book of the Paris Agreement. At that time, an energetic von der Leyen had just taken up her post as President of the European Commission in a difficult context to lead the European Union. The green parties were gaining strength in the European Parliament, which had lost the traditional absolute majority between the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Socialists & Democrats (S&D) in the May 2019 elections. This parliamentary fragmentation, the need for a new impetus to the European project in the context of Brexit, and the aim of addressing citizens’ concerns about climate change were important factors in the adoption of the ambitious European Green Deal as the flagship project of Ursula von der Leyen’s new mandate. The current Covid-19 crisis, however, opens up a new set of political and economic uncertainties: decisions taken now could either hamper the Commission’s green agenda or lay the ground for paradigmatic shifts to facilitate the transition to a green economy.
<img class="wp-image-6473 alignright" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/Windmils.jpg" alt="" width="431" height="287" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/Windmils.jpg 5184w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/Windmils-400x267.jpg 400w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/Windmils-768x512.jpg 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2020/04/Windmils-1024x683.jpg 1024w" sizes="(max-width: 431px) 100vw, 431px" />
Von der Leyen’s efforts to get the new Commission off to a productive start and to set the tone for the entire legislature have been reflected in the speed with which the Green Deal was proposed (in the first 11 days of her term). In addition, as early as March, the Commission unveiled several of the initiatives arising from this pact. First of all, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_335">European Climate Law</a>, which aims to give force of law to the objective of climate neutrality and which is pending approval by the European Parliament and the Council. Secondly, the new <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/es/ip_20_416">European Industrial Strategy</a>, which aims to help European industry maintain its global competitiveness in the new geopolitical context, while making the transition to climate neutrality and digital leadership. In addition, the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_420">New Circular Economy Action Plan</a> has also come to light, which aims to transform product manufacturing methods and give consumers tools to choose sustainable products, thus accelerating the ecological transition.
In order to make this transition to a sustainable economy possible, the Commission presented the <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/es/newsroom/news/2020/01/14-01-2020-financing-the-green-transition-the-european-green-deal-investment-plan-and-just-transition-mechanism">Sustainable Europe Investment Plan</a>, which aims to mobilise at least 1 trillion EUR of sustainable investment over the next decade. As a complement, the Just Transition Mechanism aims to provide targeted support to the regions most affected by the transition, helping to mobilise at least 100 billion EUR over the period 2021-2027.
Despite the momentum of the first months of the mandate and the Green Deal’s relevance, the covid-19 crisis has burst onto the European public agenda. Therefore, now the debate is about the possible alteration of the deadlines of the projects that had been proposed to address the ecological transition. There is a real risk that the health emergency will culminate in an economic crisis that will alter the ability to mobilize financial support from the private sector or member states to address this transition.
At the financial level, the Commission and the Member States have mobilised a wide range of economic stimuli to mitigate the economic effects of Covid-19. On 19 March, the European Central Bank announced the Pandemic Emergency Procurement Programme (<a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html">PEPP</a>) worth 750 billion euros, has relaxed capital ratios for commercial banks and will increase the funds available for loans (in total the measures proposed exceed one trillion euros). In addition, the European Investment Bank proposed 40 billion in loans and credits for SMEs, and the European Commission has decided to use 80 million from the 2020 horizon to finance research by the company CureVac to develop a vaccine against the coronavirus and will allocate more than 200 million for other similar projects. After intense negotiations, the Eurogroup reached an agreement to <a href="https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147815">unblock</a> half a trillion of additional grants.
The Commission has also relaxed its subsidy policy, facilitating concessions by Member States of up to 800,000 euros per company. Germany has abandoned its famous Schwarze Null (a strict balance between public revenue and expenditure) by approving a EUR 400 billion guarantee framework for refinancing companies; France will support its economy with EUR 350 billion; and Spain intends to mobilise up to EUR 200 billion in loans. All of the above measures are likely to affect the ability of the European Union and member states to allocate financial resources to the ecological transition once the covid-19 crisis is over.
In this financial context, a major question is how the debate on the climate emergency will re-emerge in the post-Covid era. Will the crisis help drive Europe’s ecological transition? Will it slow it down? On the one hand, several media predict that the lack of economic resources <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/epp-call-for-further-postponement-of-farm-to-fork-strategy/">will delay plans for green reforms</a>, and even some politicians (such as the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy-environment/news/czech-pm-urges-eu-to-ditch-green-deal-amid-virus/">Czech Prime Minister</a>) advocate altering the initial plans of the European Green Deal for financial reasons. For their part, diplomatic representatives in charge of organising the German presidency of the Council of the European Union have <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/coronavirus-to-weigh-on-every-aspect-of-germanys-eu-presidency/">warned</a> that the emergence of covid-19 will have a “<a href="https://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/corona-krise-deutscher-eu-botschafter-schreibt-brandbrief-ans-kanzleramt-a-90f62ece-5cdf-4a92-b720-16c051660ccb">massive impact</a>” on their agenda; all efforts will be focused on reversing the effects of the pandemic, which could relegate other priorities.
On the other hand, a variety of thinkers, politicians and NGOs propose to use the current health crisis to promote paradigmatic changes in social customs and established modes of production, which can address the needs of the climate emergency at the same time as the needs of the Covid-19 crisis. For example, French philosopher <a href="https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2020/03/25/la-crise-sanitaire-incite-a-se-preparer-a-la-mutation-climatique_6034312_3232.html?fbclid=IwAR0dCAfs79AvHO7RdhFtp3qf1JNGQEZ8tRU4nYHk6o158r0-UftjlKjlYjQ">Bruno Latour</a> argues that “the health crisis prepares, induces and encourages people to prepare for climate change”. According to the author, this is due to “the sudden and painful understanding” that the meaning we classically attribute to society enters a vacuum; thus, allowing great paradigmatic changes. MEP <a href="http://agendapublica.elpais.com/el-coronavirus-como-ensayo-del-cambio-climatico/">Florent Marcellesi</a> believes that from this crisis we can learn that it is “perfectly feasible” to prioritise health and people over the economy, production and consumption with a post-growth economy.
At the political level, there are important voices calling for making the response to the Covid-19 crisis compatible with green policies. Recently, the ministers of environment and climate change of ten European countries signed a <a href="https://elpais.com/sociedad/2020-04-09/diez-paises-europeos-reclaman-a-bruselas-una-salida-verde-de-la-crisis-del-coronavirus.html">petition</a> to support the Green Deal as the roadmap for overcoming the current crisis. For his part, Frans Timmermans, Vice-President of the Commission in charge of the Green Deal, in addition to defending a green recovery, highlights the role of hydrogen in this transition.
There are many other relevant actors who, in addition to advocating that the post-Covid economy be focused on the Green Deal strategy, propose that governments encourage climate-friendly investments when giving money to large industries in the aftermath of the Covid-19 crisis. This opinion is defended by experts such as Fatih Birol, Director of the International Energy Agency, and <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/18/the-covid-19-crisis-is-a-chance-to-do-capitalism-differently">Mariana Mazzucato</a>, Professor of Economics at the University College London. In a recent article, <a href="https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2020/03/26/the-epidemic-provides-a-chance-to-do-good-by-the-climate?fsrc=newsletter&utm_campaign=the-economist-today&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm_term=2020-03-31&utm_content=article-link-2">The Economist</a> also supports this opinion and assures that the political margin to guide the recovery of the economy is wide and can include ecological considerations.
The conditions of any rescue could take many forms. For example, the former Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy, <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/apr/01/financial-help-for-airlines-should-come-with-strict-climate-conditions">Miguel Arias Cañete</a>, believes that financial assistance to airlines affected by the coronavirus crisis should be conditional on compliance with measures to reduce its impact on the climate, through market mechanisms; Greenpeace UK proposes to reduce demand gradually over time through a frequent flyer tax; Climate Policy Initiative proposes to invest more in research and development of hydrogen fuels; <a href="https://www.transportenvironment.org/newsroom/blog/la-crisis-del-coronavirus-pone-de-manifiesto-la-necesidad-de-un-nuevo-pacto-verde">Transport & Environment</a> proposes to make aid to the aviation sector conditional on the payment of taxes and the adoption of clean fuel policies after the recession; and <a href="https://www.e3g.org/library/playbook-for-global-financial-crisis-and-climate-change">E3G</a> proposes to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies taking advantage of the fall in oil prices. These are some of the concrete measures that have been discussed to promote substantial changes that can transform our economy.
In short, linking a complex post-covid financial situation with the imperative of creating a green economy will be a complicated but necessary task. The great efforts that await Europe to rebuild the economy after the pandemic will produce major adversities. Saving the Green Deal in this complex and turbulent context will require major political efforts, linking the current covid-19 crisis and the financial stimulus packages that have been adopted to the need for continent-wide green reforms. The model to be adopted for the recovery strategy in Europe could tip the balance significantly towards a green economy or a traditional economy.
In times of crisis such as the current pandemic, the rigidities of the structures that condition the socio-economic habits that characterize our system are diluted. In this way, so-called critical junctures in our history widen the room for political manoeuvre and create new path-dependencies that will mark politics and the economy for centuries. The current pandemic clearly represents a critical juncture, opening an unusual margin for accelerating profound changes in our economic and social system. That is why we cannot spend our strength on returning to the previous situation. We must look to the long term and seize this moment to accelerate the process of ecological transition, and not only for environmental, climatic and economic reasons. It should be remembered that the Green Deal is also a way of involving citizens with the European project (especially the youngest ones) and promoting new consensus among member states, in order to reaffirm the European project at a time when the unity of Europe is at risk. Therefore, the future of the Green Deal in the post-Covid era will be essential for the future of Europe.
A version of this article in Spanish was published in <a href="http://agendapublica.elpais.com/la-transicion-ecologica-europea-en-la-era-post-covid/">Agenda Pública</a>. 
Note: This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the Euro Crisis in the Press blog nor of the London School of Economics.
<hr />
Andrea Pérez Ruiz holds a BA in Political Science and a BA in Sociology from the University Carlos III of Madrid in Spain. Previously she has been Policy Assistant to the former European Commissioner for Climate Action & Energy, Miguel Arias Cañete, and the Director-General for Environment of the European Commission, Daniel Calleja Crespo. Her main research interests are environmental and climate policy.
Kilian Wirthwein Vega is a political consultant, specialized in EU politics. He holds a BA in International Relations from the Hochschule Rhein-Waal in Germany, an MSc in Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics, and was Talentia Scholar for the MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the University of Oxford. His main research interests are institutional design and statebuilding.
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<title>Greta does not need to be saved, she needs to be listened</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2019/12/21/greta-does-not-need-to-be-saved-she-needs-to-be-listened/</link>
<pubDate>Sat, 21 Dec 2019 10:21:23 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[United Kingdom]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Climate Change]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[elites]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Greta Thunberg]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Malala]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6460</guid>
<description><![CDATA[By Victoria Abi Saab and Miguel Angel Zhan Dai Through a comparaison with Malala Yusafzai, the authors aim to undertsand the campaign of demonisation and decredibilisation specifically targeted at another young activist, Greta Thunberg. First, the nature of their messages is … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2019/12/21/greta-does-not-need-to-be-saved-she-needs-to-be-listened/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">By <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/a-c/">Victoria Abi Saab</a> and <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/contributors-2/guest-contributors/v-z/">Miguel Angel Zhan Dai</a>
Through a comparaison with Malala Yusafzai, the authors aim to undertsand the campaign of demonisation and decredibilisation specifically targeted at another young activist, Greta Thunberg. First, the nature of their messages is different: the education of women is not a challenge for the western status quo. Meanwhile, Greta poses a systemic change, which is inherently conflicting. Secondly, the form of the messages is different, while Malala has been reduced by some to a girl who inherently needs to be saved. Greta advocates for actions, she uses her anger and refuses to be reduced to the role of passive victim. Thus, Malala is accepted as a fetishized object, consolidating the narrative of European liberal progress and satisfying the Western Savior complex while Greta receives insults because she poses a double challenge to hegemonic discourses regarding the climate crisis, both in nature and in form.<img class="wp-image-6461 alignright" src="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/Imagen-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="313" srcset="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/Imagen-1.png 883w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/Imagen-1-318x400.png 318w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/Imagen-1-768x967.png 768w, https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/Imagen-1-813x1024.png 813w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" />
As people who grew up as a political activists, we deeply respect what Malala Yousafzai and Greta Thunberg have done to raise awareness among the youth and the not so young. They became important, global voices. They both carried the burden of becoming poster child. Yet, despite both being girls of approximate the same age, willing to come forward and deliver a message to a global audience, Malala never suffered the level of misogyny, decredibilisation and hate experienced by Greta.
After the repulsive attack against her life in October 2012, Malala Yousafzai has become a referent in favour of female education and against violent attacks to repress freedom of speech. She is widely acclaimed in the West as a fighter for Human and Children’s Rights and was awarded the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize as a recognition for her extenuating struggle.
Meanwhile, Greta Thunberg started her school climate strike in late 2018 and since then has influence teenagers all over Europe in their fight against climate change. Her single-person strike has transformed into a transnational movement under the banner of the Fridays for Future. She has also received universal praise from the “adults” of the West. Or that’s what we would like to say.
However, no day passes without a journalist, politician or even an institutional representative verbalising their criticism against her. This has become more than apparent with her presence at the COP25 in Spain. After being mocked by Trump and condemned by Merkel, Macron and Conte, in Madrid, among other less respectable figures (at least in theory), the Deputy President of the region of Madrid had harsh words for her. Furthermore, during an electoral debate a few weeks before, a <a href="https://www.elperiodico.com/es/yotele/20191102/ayetana-alvarez-toledo-enfado-eurovision-greta-thunberg-tve-7711357">spokesperson for the centre-right party PP stated</a> that “few persons have harmed more the cause of climate change than the parents of Greta Thunberg”.
The simple fact that we refer to Malala only by her first name while in the case of Greta, we predominantly use her full name denotes our collective will to distance and establish an unfamiliarity with the latter. It should also be noted that not using Yousafzai is not necessarily a good practice, since it might hide a fetishisation of her, either because of her age, gender or origin, reducing her to a female child from the Orient who is patronised by the West.
Going back to the divergence in treatments, it corresponds not only to the different messages that they defend but has to do with the nature and form of their discourses.
While Malala’s message does not cause any tension within the Western zeitgeist, Greta’s speech calls for a radical, perhaps, disturbing change in how we do things.
The first explanation of this different behaviour comes from what they advocate for. Female education does not encounter any rejection in Europe. It would be ludicrous if someone would argue that half of our population should not attend school. Furthermore, it is a cause that does not need any effective or political action here; it argues for action outside of our continent. For the European elite, it is not only a fashionable discourse that complies with the status quo but also a “pat on the back”, a “proof” that Western society is superior and more progressive.
In front of this “innocent” message, Greta’s principles and values are grounded in the ‘here and now’. They are opposed to the roots of our economic and social structure. The activist is arguing for a systematic change since that is the only way to combat the climate emergency in an effective way. Because of that, she has made herself the enemy of big polluting companies and the politicians who they have been friends with for decades.
Instead of a message in favour of peace and education, what Thunberg represents is a challenge to the source of the economic benefits that have sustained our elites. It is understandable that because of that, her message is confrontational and opposed to a peaceful modus vivendi between polluters and the future generations who will suffer the worse consequences.
Nonetheless, the nature of their messages is not the only reason for the world’s shameful attack towards a teenager. While Malala is frequently portrayed as a victim of the repressive Taliban and patronised as a child who needs our protection, Greta has rejected the label of an adolescent who is destined to suffer the errors of the past generations. On the other hand, the world has managed to define Malala as a passive victim who has survived to her enemies and is continuing to speak her truth. Apart from being a sadly simplistic recount of her discourse, this has succeeded in making her and her message acceptable to our leaders and society at large.
This process of fetishisation has not happened yet with Greta Thunberg. Her voice, her actions, continue to be an essential part of how she portrays herself. She has not resigned herself to be a smiling child who has a message of love and hope. She has decided to tell an uncomfortable truth. She has embraced her anger against the older generation and she has chosen to be authentic.
Unfortunately, it seems that our society is not prepared for authenticity nor being told what we should do in order to ensure a viable and decent future precisely for the following generations.
Some might choose to ignore these reflections and continue to justify their difference in treatment on the fact that the messages are not the same, or not even related. While Malala’s cause treats with something that is universally condemnable, Greta’s message seems too crude, ultimately too “political”. This argument first ignores the difference circumstances outside of the West and misinterprets Malala’s core audience, which is not living in Europe but on places where female education is still not the norm. Secondly, criticizing that climate change is “political” contradicts the thousands of climate scientists who have expressed their support for Greta Thunberg. Any solution to this must be political.
Malala awaken our western saviour complex, she had been cruelly attacked, she was refused the basic human right to go to school and learn, she was a girl, she was an easy target both for the Taliban, and for the western discourses. She required our help, our saving. Greta doesn’t need to be saved. In that sense she is a subversive figure, a young girl, almost a child, not asking to be saved or protected but demanding change, pointing out our contradictions and our failures regarding the greatest, defining threat of our era: the climate crisis.
Greta Thunberg is proving to be a paradigm for millions of youngsters and is challenging the hegemonical discourse both with the nature and the form of her message. Instead of trying to ignore and insult her persona, as “adults” we should engage with her arguments and celebrate the maturity of our future generations.
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<title>Debate: Social Fragmentation in Catalonia: a civil conflict?</title>
<link>https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2019/12/11/social-fragmentation-catalonia/</link>
<pubDate>Wed, 11 Dec 2019 21:05:45 +0000</pubDate>
<dc:creator><![CDATA[Eurocrisis admin]]></dc:creator>
<category><![CDATA[Jose Javier Olivas]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Nationalism]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Spain]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Catalan Independence]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Catalonia]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[civil conflict]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[Independence]]></category>
<category><![CDATA[social fragmentation]]></category>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/?p=6417</guid>
<description><![CDATA[This event explored the endogenous historical factors and contemporary dynamics that have led to unprecedented political polarisation and social fragmentation within Catalonia around the issues of secession, ethnic identity and language. The event took place on Faw 2.04, Fawcett House, … <a href="https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2019/12/11/social-fragmentation-catalonia/">Continue reading →</a>]]></description>
<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pf-content">This event explored the endogenous historical factors and contemporary dynamics that have led to unprecedented political polarisation and social fragmentation within Catalonia around the issues of secession, ethnic identity and language. The event took place on Faw 2.04, Fawcett House, on Tuesday 3 Decemeber 2019.
<iframe class='youtube-player' type='text/html' width='640' height='360' src='https://www.youtube.com/embed/3A4tfeW7kgc?version=3&rel=1&fs=1&autohide=2&showsearch=0&showinfo=1&iv_load_policy=1&wmode=transparent' allowfullscreen='true' style='border:0;'></iframe>
Chairs:
Mary Kaldor (<a href="https://twitter.com/LSE_CCS">@LSE_CCS</a>) is Director of The Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit at LSE and Professor of Global Governance. Professor Kaldor pioneered the concept of new wars and global civil society and her work on the practical implementation of human security has directly influenced European and national politics.
Jose Javier Olivas is Principal Investigator Interdisciplinary Comparative Project on Populism and Secessionism (ICPPS), Department of Political Science and Administration, UNED, and Research Associate to the Conflict and Civil Society Research Unit, LSE
Speakers:
Adolf Tobeña is Professor of Psychiatry at the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB). He researches the neurobiology of fearfulness and the neuroimage of mental disorders at the Unit of Medical Psychology, School of Medicine, Bellaterra Campus. He is the author of 18 books and 170 papers published in journals of neuroscience, psychiatry and psychology. He co-authored the paper Pathways and Legacies of the Secessionist Push in Catalonia which was recently published by Policy Network. You can find his slides here: <a href="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/CATFeastsClashesLSEDecemb2019.pdf">CATFeastsClashesLSEDecemb2019</a>
Albert Satorra is Professor of Statistics at the department of economics and business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and is research professor at Barcelona GSE. His area of expertise is statistical methodology for social sciences, especially structural equation modelling, a topic in which he has contributed with numerous articles in leading journals. He co-authored the paper Pathways and Legacies of the Secessionist Push in Catalonia which was recently published by Policy Network. You can find his slides here: <a href="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/LondonLSEpresentation2019reduced_compressed-11.pdf">LondonLSEpresentation2019reduced_compressed (11)</a>
Caroline Gray(<a href="https://twitter.com/CarolineMGray">@CarolineMGray</a>) is Lecturer in Politics and Spanish at Aston University in Birmingham and Deputy Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe. She specializes in nationalist movements, decentralization and the political consequences of the global financial crisis, with a particular focus on Spain. She is the author of Nationalist Politics and Regional Financing Systems in the Basque Country and Catalonia (Bilbao: Diputación de Bizkaia, 2016) and co-editor of Contesting Spain? The dynamics of nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2015).
Jeffrey Miley (<a href="https://twitter.com/jeffmiley">@jeffmiley</a>) is Lecturer of Political Sociology in the Department of Sociology at Cambridge University. He is co-author of Conflict in Catalonia: A Sociological Approximation, which was recently published in a special issue of Genealogy dedicated to New Perspectives on Nationalism in Spain. His research interests include comparative nationalisms, language politics, the politics of migration, religion and politics, regime types, and democratic theory. He has lectured at Yale University, Wesleyan University, and Saint Louis University (Madrid) and he has been a Garcia-Pelayo Research Fellow at the Center for Political and Constitutional Studies in Madrid (2007-2009).
Sergi Pardos-Prado (<a href="https://twitter.com/sergipardos">@sergipardos</a>) is Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Glasgow. Previously, he was Associate Professor and Fellow in Politics at Merton College, University of Oxford and Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, University of Oxford. He has a PhD in Political and Social Sciences (European University Institute in Florence). His research and teaching focus political behaviour, European comparative politics, political economy, and quantitative methods. You can find his slides here: <a href="https://blogsmedia.lse.ac.uk/blogs.dir/55/files/2019/12/pardos.pdf">pardos.</a>
This event is hosted by The Conflict and Civil Society Unit (<a href="https://twitter.com/LSE_CCS">@LSE_CCS</a>). Building on the work of the Civil Society and Human Security unit, the team was renamed in 2017 to reflect the changing focus of the research being undertaken. The core concern of the unit remains the desire to better understand the ways in which ordinary people seek to shape the decisions that affect their lives, with a particular focus on those experiencing conflict, prolonged violence, or war.
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