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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:openSearch="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/" xmlns:blogger="http://schemas.google.com/blogger/2008" xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss" xmlns:gd="http://schemas.google.com/g/2005" xmlns:thr="http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0" version="2.0"><channel><atom:id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285</atom:id><lastBuildDate>Thu, 25 Apr 2024 00:41:40 +0000</lastBuildDate><category>North Korea</category><category>analysis</category><category>DPRK</category><category>Human Rights</category><category>news</category><category>HRNK</category><category>humanrights</category><category>UN</category><category>crimes against humanity</category><category>South Korea</category><category>UNCOI</category><category>hrnkus</category><category>KimJongUn</category><category>committeehrnk</category><category>NorthKorea</category><category>Korea</category><category>NK</category><category>China</category><category>Kim Jong Un</category><category>KWP</category><category>Kim Il Sung</category><category>Kim Jong Il</category><category>United States</category><category>ROK</category><category>RobertCollins</category><category>southkorea</category><category>Pyongyang</category><category>SpecialRapporteur</category><category>UNHRC</category><category>USA</category><category>WashingtonDC</category><category>North Korean Human Rights Act</category><category>Political Prison Camps</category><category>UNGA</category><category>United Nations</category><category>nonprofit</category><category>DMZ</category><category>NGO</category><category>OGD</category><category>Trump</category><category>Kim Regime</category><category>KoreanWar</category><category>NKgulag</category><category>Otto Warmbier</category><category>Torture</category><category>defector</category><category>events</category><category>human trafficking</category><category>unification</category><category>women</category><category>Diplomacy</category><category>HRuF</category><category>Information</category><category>Japan</category><category>Moon Jae In</category><category>NKdefector</category><category>TPMI</category><category>dictatorship</category><category>humanitarian</category><category>international affairs</category><category>America</category><category>Day of the Sun</category><category>Democracy</category><category>Escapee</category><category>FAO</category><category>Famine</category><category>Juche</category><category>KPA</category><category>Kaesong</category><category>Kim Jong Suk</category><category>Murder</category><category>National Assembly</category><category>Olympics</category><category>Refugees</category><category>Refugees sur place</category><category>UNHCR</category><category>UNSC</category><category>Universal Period Review</category><category>VOA</category><category>WHO</category><category>cold war</category><category>communism</category><category>education</category><category>engagement</category><category>fearpolitik</category><category>human security</category><category>international relations</category><category>internship</category><category>interview</category><category>military</category><category>multilateral</category><category>peace</category><category>religious freedom</category><category>songbun</category><category>women's rights</category><category>ACF Fiorentina</category><category>Akron-Canton Pageant</category><category>Ant-Leafleting Law</category><category>Anti-Leaflet Law</category><category>Arduous March</category><category>Art of the Deal</category><category>Assad</category><category>Berlin Wall</category><category>Birthday</category><category>Brazil</category><category>CNN</category><category>COVID</category><category>COVID-19</category><category>CPC</category><category>CVID</category><category>Cagliari Calcio Club</category><category>Charm Offensive</category><category>Chobyong</category><category>Chongjin</category><category>Chuseok</category><category>ColdWar</category><category>Commission on the Status of Women</category><category>Committee Against Torture</category><category>Congress</category><category>Crisis</category><category>Cult of Personality</category><category>DIME</category><category>DJT</category><category>DPRK. 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Union</category><category>Surrender</category><category>Suryong</category><category>Syria</category><category>TB</category><category>Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology</category><category>Thanksgiving</category><category>Tomas Ojea Quintana</category><category>Tongil Mom</category><category>Trump-Kim Summit</category><category>Truth</category><category>U.S.</category><category>UN Security Council</category><category>UNDP</category><category>UNFPA</category><category>UNICEF</category><category>UNSR</category><category>UPR</category><category>US</category><category>USCIRF</category><category>UVA</category><category>Unity</category><category>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</category><category>Uruguay</category><category>WMD</category><category>Warmbier</category><category>Wonsan</category><category>Xi Jinping</category><category>ZPU4</category><category>apartheid</category><category>art</category><category>atrocities</category><category>bilateral</category><category>black lives matter</category><category>brokers</category><category>byol</category><category>cell phones</category><category>christianity</category><category>church</category><category>climate change</category><category>conflict</category><category>coronavirus</category><category>disabilities</category><category>disability rights</category><category>discrimination</category><category>donju</category><category>executions</category><category>family reunions</category><category>football</category><category>grupo christophersen organizacion maritima</category><category>hats</category><category>historic</category><category>human rights council</category><category>inminban</category><category>jangmadang</category><category>koryolink</category><category>language</category><category>lenin</category><category>lgbtqa</category><category>manipulation</category><category>non-refoulement</category><category>onefreekorea</category><category>pandemic</category><category>persecution</category><category>poetry</category><category>power consolidation</category><category>samdera pacific</category><category>security</category><category>servicha</category><category>shengpa</category><category>shipping</category><category>slave labor</category><category>soccer</category><category>summit</category><category>terrorism</category><category>theoryofutility</category><category>training</category><category>travel</category><category>tyranny</category><category>victims</category><category>victims of communism</category><category>violations</category><category>world cup</category><title>HRNK Insider</title><description>In October of 2001, a distinguished group of foreign policy and human rights specialists launched the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) to promote human rights in North Korea.

The views expressed in these posts solely belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of HRNK.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/</link><managingEditor>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</managingEditor><generator>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>158</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>25</openSearch:itemsPerPage><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5134097913741945214</guid><pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2024 00:22:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2024-04-17T20:42:47.208-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United Nations</category><title>HRNK Advisory Opinion to His Excellency Tomoya Obokata</title><description>Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, regarding <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/calls-for-input/2024/call-input-contemporary-forms-slavery-affecting-currently-and-formerly" target="_blank">contemporary forms of slavery affecting currently and formerly incarcerated people</a>April 12, 2024 <p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 13.3px; text-align: left;">Over ten years ago, in February 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry (UN COI) reported that the DPRK was responsible for crimes against humanity. The gravity, scale, and nature of the DPRK’s violations of human rights reveal a state that has no parallel in the contemporary world. The DPRK’s systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations are thoroughly documented, including its imposition of arbitrary detention, arbitrary death penalties, political prison camps, slave labor, the absolute monopoly of information released to the public, and total control of all organized social life under the hierarchical system of songbun. Under Kim Jong-un’s rule, the scale and scope of these violations have continued to worsen and intensify.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Contemporary forms of slavery in North Korean detention facilities represent a grave and systematic violation of human rights. In these facilities, detainees, including political prisoners, are subjected to forced labor.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">&nbsp;<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Please provide the details of labor programme(s) implemented in your country for incarcerated individuals, including:<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Types of work performed.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Detainees work in mining, under dangerous conditions. Detainees are forced to work in agriculture involving strenuous labor, regardless of the detainee's physical condition or age. Detainees work in logging, typically in harsh weather conditions without adequate clothing or safety equipment. Detainees work in textile production, producing goods that may enter international markets despite sanctions.[i]<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Detention facilities often assign harsh conditions to detainees without considering their age, gender, or health condition, leading to injuries, illnesses, and deaths.[ii] Political detainees may be subjected to even harsher treatment. Hundreds of thousands of individuals are held in a network of camps. Many of them are subjected to forced labor.[iii]<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Further evidence on forced labor from escapee testimonies can be found in the HRNK and No Chain report “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.[iv]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">c) Working environment/conditions, including wages and any deduction for incarceration costs, working hours, and provisions for health &amp; safety.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">The working environment in North Korean detention facilities is harsh and dangerous, lacking basic health and safety measures.[v]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Detainees are often unpaid for their labor, with nominal wages often deducted to cover incarceration costs.[vi] Detainees work for 10-12 hours per day, seven days a week, with minimal rest.[vii] This, combined with insufficient nutrition and rest, negatively impacts their physical and mental health.[viii] Health and safety provisions are non-existent, and injuries or illnesses often go untreated, leading to numerous deaths.[ix]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Is there evidence of labour practices which may amount to exploitation? If so, please provide details.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Some of the abuses include excessive working hours. Another type of abuse includes no or extremely low pay. In addition, detainees work in an unhealthy or dangerous working environment. Conditions in North Korean detention facilities are unsanitary and hazardous. Detainees work in dangerous environments, leading to injuries and health complications. Furthermore, they face discriminatory treatments where certain groups of individuals, such as political prisoners and all those deemed to be disloyal to the regime, are subjected to even harsher treatment and forced labor practices. Finally, there is a lack of access to medical facilities.[x]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Is there evidence of sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals? If so, please provide details.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Many camp orders are conducted in secret.[xi] Despite stringent information control, escapee testimonies, reports by human rights organizations, and investigations conducted by international bodies have provided insight into the grim reality faced by inmates, which involves modern forms of slavery, including sexual exploitation (sometimes referred to as sexual slavery).[xii]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Sexual exploitation and abuse in North Korean detention facilities, particularly targeting female prisoners, is widespread. Escapees report rape, forced abortion, and sexual assault, often used as torture and control methods.[xiii] Male guards and officials abuse their power, targeting political prisoners, women suspected of having illegally crossed the border, and those detained for petty crimes.[xiv]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Are victims of labor and sexual exploitation able to seek justice and remedies? Please provide details, including legislative frameworks and complaint mechanisms.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">On paper, DPRK laws prohibit forced labor. The DPRK Constitution includes articles on the dignity and rights of citizens, and the country is a signatory to several international human rights treaties. However, in practice, the government does not uphold these laws, especially within detention facilities. The legal system is opaque and subordinated to the dictates of the ruling Korean Workers' Party.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">There is virtually no avenue for victims to seek justice or remedies within the DPRK. The judicial system lacks independence, and there is no mechanism for detainees to file complaints or challenge abuses.[xv]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Victims of labor and sexual exploitation in North Korean detention facilities are caught in a grim situation with no available mechanisms for seeking justice or remedies. The international community continues to struggle with effective strategies to address these human rights abuses, given the geopolitical complexities and the DPRK's self-imposed isolation.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">What are the main challenges in eliminating labour and sexual exploitation among incarcerated individuals, and what recommendations would you make to address them effectively?<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Despite the veil of secrecy surrounding the country's penal system, escapee testimonies and satellite imagery have provided the international community with glimpses into the dire conditions faced by incarcerated individuals. The DPRK executes a deliberate policy of human rights denial.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">The international community should increase pressure through targeted sanctions and hold the government accountable. Supporting North Korean escapees and running advocacy campaigns can help mitigate abusive government control and encourage reform. Educating North Koreans about their rights and the outside world can also help create and enhance awareness of international human rights standards.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Does your government provide tailored support to formerly incarcerated individuals which effectively meets their needs? Please provide details particularly in relation to access to temporary/long term accommodation, education/training, decent work, finance and pension, and other essential services.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">The United States provides assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers including North Koreans, to rebuild their lives.[xvi] However, the effectiveness of this support can vary based on resources, individual circumstances, and local community capacity. Challenges including cultural adjustment and language barriers can also impact resettlement experiences.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">What is the role of other stakeholders, including educational institutions, jobs/training centres, housing providers, businesses/employers’ organisations, financial institutions, trade unions and civil society organisations, in providing support to formally incarcerated individuals? Does your government actively coordinate or cooperate with them?<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">Individuals who escape from the DPRK, including former detainees, face challenges ranging from psychological trauma to the need for basic necessities and integration into a new society.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Educational institutions, job centers, housing providers, businesses, financial institutions, trade unions, and CSOs are all crucial. Educational programs, language training, vocational training, housing solutions, inclusive workplace environments, financial literacy programs, and legal assistance are essential in ensuring the rights and fair treatment of North Korean escapees.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">CSOs including HRNK[xvii] and various other stakeholders often provide direct support and advocacy work to help individuals and raise awareness about human rights abuses in the DPRK.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">What are ongoing challenges in promoting successful economic and social reintegration to formally incarcerated individuals in your country, which may include discrimination (including intersecting forms based on age, gender identity/sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, indigenous, migration, socio-economic and other status), corruption, lack of opportunities and support?<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">After escaping from the country, former North Korean detainees face challenges including lack of opportunity and inadequate support systems as well as age and socio-economic status discrimination.<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">What recommendations would you make to overcome the existing obstacles and prevent formally incarcerated individuals from being subjected to labour and sexual exploitation?<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">The situation of detainees in North Korean detention facilities remains deeply concerning, drawing attention from international human rights organizations and governments worldwide. The available reports indicate severe conditions, including forced labor, torture, inadequate food, and medical neglect, leading to high mortality rates.[xviii]<p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 18.6px; text-align: left;">To address these issues and protect both current and former detainees from exploitation, we respectfully put forth the following recommendations:<ol class="ol1"><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">International Pressure and Sanctions: Continue and intensify international pressure on the North Korean government to adhere to international human rights standards, using targeted sanctions against individuals and entities responsible for human rights abuses.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Engagement and Dialogue: Encourage diplomatic dialogue that includes human rights as a core component, alongside denuclearization and security concerns. Leverage diplomatic channels to press for the closure of camps and the release of political prisoners.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Support for Escapees: Enhance support for North Korean escapees who can provide firsthand accounts of the conditions within detention facilities. Support should include protection, rehabilitation services, and platforms to share their experiences on the global stage.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Use of Technology: Increase the use of satellite imagery analysis and other means to monitor detention centers and gather evidence of human rights abuses.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Humanitarian Aid: Ensure that humanitarian aid, when possible, is conditioned on improvements in human rights, prioritizes vulnerable groups including people in detention, and is not diverted by the regime. Aid should be designed to minimize the risk of bolstering the capacities of the regime to continue its repressive practices. Access and transparency are of the essence.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Awareness and Advocacy: Support international and regional human rights organizations in their efforts to raise awareness about the conditions in North Korean detention facilities. Promote campaigns that advocate for the rights of current and former detainees.</li><li class="li2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Legal Mechanisms: Explore legal avenues to hold North Korean leaders accountable for crimes against humanity, including labor and sexual exploitation, through international courts, tribunals, or other accountability mechanisms.</li></ol><p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">The challenges in addressing the human rights abuses in North Korean detention facilities are significant, particularly given the closed and authoritarian nature of the regime. However, sustained international focus, combined with a strategic mix of pressure and engagement, can create conditions for change and provide some level of protection for those who have suffered in these facilities.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">Thank you very much for your kind consideration.<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 10.7px; text-align: left;">&nbsp;<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 12px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"> <p class="p5" style="color: #6d6d6d; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 12px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px;"> <p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[i] Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Greg Scarlatoiu and Raymond Ha, “North Korea’s Political Prison Camp, Kwan-li-so No. 25, Update 4” and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea,” April 2, <a href="https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-7-2014-004134_EN.html?redirect"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">Parliamentary question | Forced labour in North Korea | E-004134/2014 | European Parliament (europa.eu)</a>.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[ii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) &amp; the International Bar Association (IBA), “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers,” March 2022, <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pdf"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pd.f</a> and European Parliament, Parliamentary Question, “Forced Labor in North Korea”.<p class="p8" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[iii] Amnesty International, “Images Reveal the Scale of North Korea Political Prison Camps,” May 2011, <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/05/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps/">https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/05/images-reveal-scale-north-korean-political-prison-camps/</a>.<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[iv] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families,” 2018, <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php?page=3"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php?page=3</a><span class="s7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">.<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[v] U.S. Department of State, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: North Korea”.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[vi] HRNK &amp; IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[vii] Ibid.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[viii] &nbsp;HRNK &amp; IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”<p class="p8" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[ix] Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2024: North Korea, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea">https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/north-korea</a>.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[x] HRNK &amp; IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xi] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xii] HRNK &amp; IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”<a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pdf"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">f</a> and Anti-Slavery International, “Forced Labor in North Korean Prison Camps,” December 2007, <a href="https://www.antislavery.org/reports/forced-labour-in-north-korean-prison-camps/"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.antislavery.org/reports/forced-labour-in-north-korean-prison-camps/</a>.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xiii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xiv] HRNK &amp; IBA, “Report: Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.”<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xv] Ibid.<p class="p8" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xvi] The Bush Institute, “U.S.-Based North Korean Refugees,” <a href="https://gwbcenter.imgix.net/Resources/gwb_north_korea_executive_summary_r4.pdf">https://gwbcenter.imgix.net/Resources/gwb_north_korea_executive_summary_r4.pdf</a>.<p class="p7" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xvii] See HRNK’s policy recommendations to the U.S. government: <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/publications/policy-recommendations.php"><span class="s4" style="color: #103cc0; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.hrnk.org/publications/policy-recommendations.php</a>.<p class="p6" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 13.3px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s3" style="color: #0000e9; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[xviii] The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) and No Chain, “An Investigation into the Human Rights Situation in North Korea’s Political Prison Camps: Testimonies of Detainee Families”.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/04/hrnk-letter-to-his-excellency-tomoya.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5025256152947685012</guid><pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2024 14:05:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2024-04-10T20:45:35.765-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korean Human Rights Act</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><title>South Korea’s 22nd National Assembly Elections and the Likely Effect on North Korean Human Rights</title><description>By Greg Scarlatoiu, Raymond Ha, Colleen Burns, and Gayeong LeeApril 10, 2024<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrdcVpZO-x7hN-nnTEhJStxNgBanVACoKzpbGAzCR5N4x3Qk8b4XfAhrFfI-4KKSIAPHt-K7FSRBh49lo5VcBDedCjqECQfylRcp8-dmTBv2ljKZLhziBZK_NZ9_HZhEPnHk8ap2ApMuznY1aFkP6FlWFORpjImmu5gJZfy0wEdEPRH5-fhw5rWwaXimVL/s6016/AdobeStock_163059517.jpeg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="4016" data-original-width="6016" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrdcVpZO-x7hN-nnTEhJStxNgBanVACoKzpbGAzCR5N4x3Qk8b4XfAhrFfI-4KKSIAPHt-K7FSRBh49lo5VcBDedCjqECQfylRcp8-dmTBv2ljKZLhziBZK_NZ9_HZhEPnHk8ap2ApMuznY1aFkP6FlWFORpjImmu5gJZfy0wEdEPRH5-fhw5rWwaXimVL/w640-h427/AdobeStock_163059517.jpeg" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"> </td></tr></tbody></table>Today was South Korea’s turn in this global year of elections. Close to <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240410005600315" style="font-family: georgia;" target="_blank">30 million voters</a> (approx. 67% turnout) went to the polls to elect the 300 members of the Republic of Korea’s 22nd National Assembly—254 from single-member districts, and 46 from a nationwide party list proportional vote.While the votes are still being counted, the opposition parties are on course to win a resounding victory. The Democratic Party of Korea (DP) is set to win a decisive majority, with <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240410003351315?section=national/politics" target="_blank">some exit polls</a> indicating that the liberal bloc could win over 200 seats.Inter-Korean relations <a href="https://www.nknews.org/2024/04/in-south-korean-election-north-korea-and-its-nukes-barely-move-the-needle/" target="_blank">may not have been</a> at the forefront of voters’ concerns, just as Taiwan’s January 13 election was “<a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/01/11/taiwan-presidential-election-polling-china-tsai-lai-hou-ko/" target="_blank">mostly about Taiwan, not China</a>.” However, the outcome of today’s election will have important implications for North Korean human rights.The Yoon administration's emphasis on North Korean human rights is unlikely to be immediately affected by this result. The opposition's victory, however, lowers the likelihood that there will be movement on establishing the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (NKHRF) pursuant to South Korea's North Korean Human Rights Act.Regrettably, bipartisan consensus over the NKHRF and North Korean human rights in general remains unlikely. As incomprehensible as it may be to outside observers, North Korean human rights will continue to be a political football in a South Korea ever-teetering on the brink of an ideological civil war. The Role of the National AssemblyThe National Assembly can pass laws that shape inter-Korean relations, as it did with the so-called “<a href="https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/02/legal-opinion-whether-republic-of-korea.html" style="font-family: georgia;">anti-leaflet ban</a>” in 2020. (South Korea’s Constitutional Court ultimately <a href="https://apnews.com/article/south-korea-propaganda-leaflets-kim-jong-un-b3e8c5dd05c50e1d91dafca807b91b35">struck down the law</a> last September.) The National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee can draw attention to relevant issues, as it did when the Committee <a href="https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231130102800001" target="_blank">adopted a resolution last November</a> urging China to halt the forcible repatriation of North Korean escapees.The National Assembly can also use its power of the purse to influence policy implementation at relevant agencies, including the Ministry of Unification. (In a recent example, the opposition reportedly <a href="https://www.edaily.co.kr/news/read?newsId=01230006638854480&amp;mediaCodeNo=257" target="_blank">reduced the budget</a> for the North Korean Human Rights Center, citing possible redundancies with existing institutions.) Moreover, representatives can highlight or criticize policy initiatives during the annual audit of state affairs.Parliamentary associations such as <a href="http://ipcahr.org/menu2.php" target="_blank">IPCNKR</a> can exchange views with their legislative counterparts, including the APPG on North Korea in the United Kingdom. Finally, North Korean escapees who are elected to the National Assembly can not only represent the interests of the 34,000 escapees who have resettled in South Korea, but also advocate for the human rights of the North Korean people. Overall Impact on North Korean Human Rights PolicyThe Yoon Suk-yeol administration has adopted a proactive approach to North Korean human rights issues. For the first time, the Ministry of Unification <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54278&amp;category=&amp;pageIdx=" target="_blank">released a public report</a> on the human rights situation in North Korea, as well as an analysis of socioeconomic trends under Kim Jong-un based on escapee surveys. Minister of Unification Kim Yung-ho has stressed the importance of raising awareness on North Korean human rights <a href="https://www.news1.kr/articles/?5245796" target="_blank">at home and abroad</a>.&nbsp;Furthermore, the Yoon administration <a href="https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/07/06/national/northKorea/korea-north-korea-human-rights/20230706185759469.html" target="_blank">appointed Lee Shin-wha</a> as the Ambassador for International Cooperation on North Korean Human Rights, filling a position that had been vacant for nearly five years. South Korea’s diplomats have spoken out on behalf of North Korean human rights at the United Nations in <a href="https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&amp;Seq_Code=184649" target="_blank">New York</a> and <a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5674/view.do?seq=320952" target="_blank">Geneva</a>. At the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/" target="_blank">Camp David trilateral summit</a> last August, President Yoon, President Biden, and Prime Minister Kishida “commit[ted] to strengthening cooperation on the issue,” especially with regards to “the issues of abductees, detainees, and unrepatriated prisoners of war.”These policy initiatives are unlikely to be immediately affected by today’s election results, and the Yoon administration appears poised to maintain its focus on North Korean human rights issues going forward. Parliamentary exchanges and discussions on North Korean human rights issues will depend on whether individual representatives decide to draw attention to these matters. The North Korean Human Rights FoundationA key issue in which the National Assembly plays a central role is the continued delay in establishing the North Korean Human Rights Foundation (NKHRF) pursuant to South Korea’s <a href="https://www.law.go.kr/%EB%B2%95%EB%A0%B9/%EB%B6%81%ED%95%9C%EC%9D%B8%EA%B6%8C%EB%B2%95" target="_blank">North Korean Human Rights Act</a>. The National Assembly adopted this law in a bipartisan vote in March 2016. <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/rok-north-korea-human-rights-act" target="_blank">Article 10 of the Act</a> calls for the establishment of a government-funded foundation to “report on the state of North Korea’s human rights situation, inter-Korean human rights dialogue, humanitarian assistance,” and other related issues.Article 12 further specifies that the NKHRF shall have twelve board members—two chosen by the Ministry of Unification, five by the ruling party, and five by the opposition parties. This provision does not depend on the prevailing balance of power in the National Assembly. The DP has not chosen any board members since the Act entered into force in September 2016, and the NKHRF has not been established. In its place, the Yoon administration has <a href="https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20240311077300504?input=1195m" target="_blank">formed a Committee</a> for the Promotion of North Korean Human Rights under the Ministry of Unification.Since the early days of the Yoon administration, the <a href="https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25220888#home" target="_blank">PPP called on the DP</a>&nbsp;to appoint its share of NKHRF board members in return for appointing a special inspector to investigate corruption among the president’s family and high-level officials. In early February, however, there were reports that the <a href="https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1007531218&amp;plink=ORI&amp;cooper=NAVER" target="_blank">PPP was considering dropping</a> its demand about the NKHRF. There have been no notable public discussions of the NKHRF since.Despite the <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/nkhr/policy/plan/" target="_blank">Ministry of Unification’s roadmap</a> for launching the NKHRF, it appears unlikely that the issue will gain traction in the 22nd National Assembly. Escapee Representation in the National AssemblyTwo North Korean escapees have served in the 21st National Assembly. Thae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat, was elected to represent the Gangnam-A district. Ji Seong-ho, a human rights activist, was elected from the proportional party list.For this general election, the PPP selected Thae to run against Youn Gun-young, a former high-level official in the Moon Jae-in administration, in the <a href="https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20240308000962" target="_blank">Guro-B district in southwestern Seoul</a>. Ji applied as a candidate for the Seocho-B district, but <a href="https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/A2024030513570002355" target="_blank">he was not chosen</a> as the PPP candidate. In addition, the PPP <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/05/north-korea-south-millennial-defector/" target="_blank">nominated Park Choong-kwon</a>, a 38-year old escapee who was once a missile engineer in North Korea, to the second position on its proportional party list.[1]Park is all but certain to win a seat in the National Assembly. He has said that he wishes to "<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/04/05/north-korea-south-millennial-defector/" target="_blank">play a role in inter-Korean relations</a>," and he can be expected to speak out on North Korea-related issues, including human rights concerns. Thae Yong-ho, however, appears to have failed in his bid for a second term in the National Assembly. [1] Park was formally nominated by the People's Future Party, a satellite party associated with the PPP. See Jinwan Park, "<a href="https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/understanding-satellite-parties-in-south-korea-and-their-dangers-to-democracy/" target="_blank">Understanding Satellite Parties in South Korea and Their Dangers to Democracy</a>," The Diplomat, February 28, 2024. </description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/04/south-koreas-22nd-national-assembly.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjrdcVpZO-x7hN-nnTEhJStxNgBanVACoKzpbGAzCR5N4x3Qk8b4XfAhrFfI-4KKSIAPHt-K7FSRBh49lo5VcBDedCjqECQfylRcp8-dmTBv2ljKZLhziBZK_NZ9_HZhEPnHk8ap2ApMuznY1aFkP6FlWFORpjImmu5gJZfy0wEdEPRH5-fhw5rWwaXimVL/s72-w640-h427-c/AdobeStock_163059517.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-7440797739074713855</guid><pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 18:53:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-10-27T15:08:23.757-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">China</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Forced Labor</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Seafood</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>North Korean Forced Labor in the U.S. Seafood Supply Chain</title><description><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;">By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;">October 27, 2023</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhGqmZ_qSMpRJ8NCZrnn3vMDep7hCECQCHUoP3DGClLpUTYDYag6EQ4J6SUWKZUeXgsH4cLzgk8hmo4M6f8vMFH6ybXYdxvyDh96Cji0XdyrHZTIwWhsjnZ6ilTo8h5RVmNvMuyHaKz7a9EsjWdNGFq5qQS-0BV9b6frJnh308trUoANVGgUC-aeWgBUb_x/s2940/Screenshot%202023-10-27%20at%202.58.08%E2%80%AFPM.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1912" data-original-width="2940" height="416" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhGqmZ_qSMpRJ8NCZrnn3vMDep7hCECQCHUoP3DGClLpUTYDYag6EQ4J6SUWKZUeXgsH4cLzgk8hmo4M6f8vMFH6ybXYdxvyDh96Cji0XdyrHZTIwWhsjnZ6ilTo8h5RVmNvMuyHaKz7a9EsjWdNGFq5qQS-0BV9b6frJnh308trUoANVGgUC-aeWgBUb_x/w640-h416/Screenshot%202023-10-27%20at%202.58.08%E2%80%AFPM.png" width="640" /></a></div> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: left;">Note: On October 24, 2023, HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu was invited to testify before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) for a hearing on the subject of <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings/from-bait-to-plate-how-forced-labor-in-china-taints-the-american-seafood-industry" target="_blank">forced labor in the U.S. seafood supply chain</a>.&nbsp;The following text reflects his remarks during the hearing, as prepared for delivery. The full text of his written submission to the CECC can be viewed&nbsp;<a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/CECC-HRNK-1024-2023.pdf" target="_blank">at this link</a>.</div></div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;">Chairman Smith, Chairman Merkley, distinguished Commissioners, I wish to begin by thanking you for inviting me to testify today. The official dispatch of North Korean workers to China’s seafood processing plants is a breach of applicable UN Security Council Sanctions, international human rights instruments, and most importantly of the Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> Mindful of CAATSA provisions relating to Sanctions for Forced Labor and Slavery Overseas of North Koreans, HRNK has made a preliminary determination as to whether the working conditions these workers face are subject to Section 302(b) of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9241 (b)). We further endeavored to identify Chinese entities that employ North Korean laborers, with the aim of determining if such entities and individuals in charge meet the criteria under Section 111 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7108).&nbsp; &nbsp; Until their repatriation began on August 23 or August 29, there were thousands of North Korean workers officially dispatched to Chinese seafood processing factories. In many cases, these workers processed seafood imported from North Korea. The importation of seafood processed by North Korean workers in China, seafood exported from North Korea to China, or a combination of both, into the United States would constitute a blatant violation of CAATSA. &nbsp; Three major seafood processing companies have historically employed North Korean labor and have exported their products to the United States.[1] Witnesses mentioned the presence of at least three seafood processing factories that employ North Korean workers in Donggang (<span class="s3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">東港), Dandong City. &nbsp; &nbsp; Have Chinese Factories Processed Seafood Imported from North Korea? &nbsp; North Korean seafood exported to China from Najin Port is primarily transported overland by vehicles, through Chinese customs.[2] It is then distributed and sold in China's Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, Liaoning Province, or flown to inland cities including Beijing. Seafood processed in Hunchun is exported as frozen or dried seafood to the United States, Europe, Japan, and other countries.[3] The main North Korean seafood products transported inland in this manner include various species of squid, croaker, snow crab, hair crab, and blue crab.[4]&nbsp; &nbsp; North Korean workers process fish caught seasonally, such as cod and pollock as well as clam during clam season. They also process octopus and shellfish, packaged as Chinese export products. There are reported instances of processed seafood marked “Made in China” being shipped out to Vladivostok, where labels are switched to “Made in Russia” and exported to third countries. &nbsp; &nbsp; North Korean Workers in Chinese Seafood Processing Plants:&nbsp;</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;">International Legal Implications &nbsp; The employment of North Korean workers in Chinese seafood processing plants and labor standards violations may contravene the ILO’s Forced Labor Convention (No. 29) and the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), other ILO conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (also known as the Palermo Protocol). &nbsp; The North Korean seafood processing workers face: &nbsp; 1.<span class="s5" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">&nbsp;&nbsp;Inhumane Working Conditions: Long working hours, denial of proper rest and breaks, harsh treatment, and minimal safety measures, posing a risk to their physical and mental well-being. &nbsp; 2.<span class="s5" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">&nbsp;&nbsp;Lack of Freedom and Communication: They are often isolated, facing limited contact with the outside world and their families. They are unable to exercise their right to freedom of movement and communication.&nbsp; &nbsp; 3.<span class="s5" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">&nbsp;&nbsp;Absence of Labor Rights: Such rights, including the right to unionize and engage in collective bargaining, are nonexistent. &nbsp; &nbsp; Living and Working Conditions for North Korean Overseas Workers &nbsp; North Korean workers covet overseas positions, as the average monthly remittance of $70 (500 Chinese yuan) is dramatically higher than the $3-dollar average monthly industrial wage in North Korea.[5] The average bribe paid to be dispatched overseas is $2,000 - $3,000. The workers must borrow the funds from money lenders and pay it back with interest.[6] The workers are lured with false promises and subsequently entrapped under abysmal working conditions. &nbsp; Wage violations through compulsory “contributions” extracted by the North Korean authorities, unpaid overtime, precarious safety, and health conditions are widespread.&nbsp; &nbsp; The workers must moonlight for other companies to pay back their loans, with the approval of three site supervisors (party, security agency, technical manager), who must also be bribed. Including moonlighting, a North Korean seafood processing worker in China may make up to about $210 a month. (1,500 Chinese yuan). &nbsp; The North Korean workers' monthly wages are paid upon their repatriation, in North Korean currency, at the official exchange rate.&nbsp; &nbsp; During the COVID-19 quarantine, the workers received no wages, and the interest on loans increased, reportedly leading to about thirty suicides, most of them women. &nbsp; The Chinese companies pay the North Korean regime mostly based on production volume. The payment is made in Chinese currency.&nbsp; &nbsp; Men mainly carry frozen fish blocks, and women sit down and peel fish or squid or sort clams and crabs by size. Most of the North Koreans work the whole day in cold storage. Additionally, the pungent smell inside is unbearable.&nbsp; &nbsp; North Korean workers at the Chinese seafood processing plants usually work about 10 hours a day. If production targets are not met, the workday can extend to over 12 hours.&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Recommendations &nbsp; The witness respectfully recommends the following:</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="text-indent: 0px;"> </div>Continue to encourage civil society groups with relevant networks to continue investigating conditions of work at Chinese seafood processing factories and whether products processed by North Koreans may end up on the U.S. market.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> Propose that new findings on violations affecting North Koreans at such factories be included in the Annual Report on Trafficking in Persons, required under Section 110(B) of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 707(B)).</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="text-indent: -24px;"> </div>Seek to determine whether the government of China has made any serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons, as they relate to the official dispatching of North Korean workers to Chinese seafood processing plants.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><div style="text-indent: 0px;"> </div>Seek to confirm whether seafood exported from China to the United States contains North Korean seafood products, and whether North Korean workers officially dispatched to China processed seafood exported from China to the United States. If confirmed, such products would have to be denied entry at any of the U.S. ports, pursuant to a prohibition under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307). The witness wishes to thank HRNK team members Ingyu Choe, Mohona Ganguly, Doohyun (Jake) Kim, and Damian Reddy, as well as Jung Gwang-il, Ko Young-hwan, Lee Hyun-seung and Ri Jong-ho for their invaluable contributions to research, translation, direct testimony, and securing testimony by key witnesses in China and North Korea.</div><p class="p12" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 6px; min-height: 14px; text-align: left;"> <div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><span class="s7" style="color: blue; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[1] Tim Sullivan, Martha Mendoza, and Hyung-Jin Kim, “NKorean Workers Prep Seafood Going to US Stores, Restaurants,” AP News, August 21, 2021. <span class="s8" style="color: #2b00fe; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"><a href="https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade-8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a" target="_blank">https://apnews.com/article/sports-middle-east-canada-europe-global-trade-8b493b7df6e147e98d19f3abb5ca090a</a>. <span class="s10" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; text-decoration-line: underline;">[2]<span class="s11" style="color: black; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;"> Baek Seong-ho, “North Korea’s Seafood Production and Exports” [in Korean], KITA Inter-Korean Trade Report vol. 7 (2020). <a href="https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&amp;no=13&amp;classification=19&amp;searchReqType=detail&amp;pcRadio=19&amp;searchClassification=19&amp;searchStartDate=&amp;searchEndDate=&amp;searchCondition=CONTENT&amp;searchKeyword=&amp;continent_nm=&amp;continent_cd=&amp;country_nm=&amp;country_cd=&amp;sector_nm=&amp;sector_cd=&amp;itemCd_nm=&amp;itemCd_cd=&amp;searchOpenYn=" target="_blank">https://www.kita.net/cmmrcInfo/internationalTradeStudies/researchReport/northKoreaTradeReportDetail.do?pageIndex=1&amp;no=13&amp;classification=19&amp;searchReqType=detail&amp;pcRadio=19&amp;searchClassification=19&amp;searchStartDate=&amp;searchEndDate=&amp;searchCondition=CONTENT&amp;searchKeyword=&amp;continent_nm=&amp;continent_cd=&amp;country_nm=&amp;country_cd=&amp;sector_nm=&amp;sector_cd=&amp;itemCd_nm=&amp;itemCd_cd=&amp;searchOpenYn=</a>. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 8, 2023. [6] Interview with North Korean escapee, October 9, 2023.</div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/10/north-korean-forced-labor-in-us-seafood.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhGqmZ_qSMpRJ8NCZrnn3vMDep7hCECQCHUoP3DGClLpUTYDYag6EQ4J6SUWKZUeXgsH4cLzgk8hmo4M6f8vMFH6ybXYdxvyDh96Cji0XdyrHZTIwWhsjnZ6ilTo8h5RVmNvMuyHaKz7a9EsjWdNGFq5qQS-0BV9b6frJnh308trUoANVGgUC-aeWgBUb_x/s72-w640-h416-c/Screenshot%202023-10-27%20at%202.58.08%E2%80%AFPM.png" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-4035465328914490406</guid><pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 18:26:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-10-13T21:03:35.953-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korean Human Rights Act</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>A Window of Opportunity: Addressing the Human Rights-Security Nexus in North Korea</title><description>By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive DirectorOctober 13, 2023<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 14.7px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"><table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlcEcA5LVO_HMGaoOGcQpVGLvK4NyOGW7JRxHoPyf54oq3jM30FzFerEk3RSaeD6y7hjdpghnLD47uLqxdx96CEBmpFIoczkc_nryoM1r8eu2u5HpN5nE8ydGU4-bot-OIVhTDTSLAuhhbBJeGUBmLFgI1g1VvNu0YKTXaQHlDwZJs4WOFSL5trgSKfZcY/s4971/AdobeStock_302951032_Editorial_Use_Only.jpeg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3314" data-original-width="4971" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlcEcA5LVO_HMGaoOGcQpVGLvK4NyOGW7JRxHoPyf54oq3jM30FzFerEk3RSaeD6y7hjdpghnLD47uLqxdx96CEBmpFIoczkc_nryoM1r8eu2u5HpN5nE8ydGU4-bot-OIVhTDTSLAuhhbBJeGUBmLFgI1g1VvNu0YKTXaQHlDwZJs4WOFSL5trgSKfZcY/w640-h427/AdobeStock_302951032_Editorial_Use_Only.jpeg" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">Photo Credit:&nbsp;travelview - stock.adobe.com</td></tr></tbody></table><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 14.7px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> The following essay is adapted from virtual remarks delivered to an event hosted by HRNK Canada in Ottawa on September 28, 2023. The text has been updated to reflect recent developments.&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> <div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;">I gained an interest in North Korean human rights because I was born and raised in communist Romania, the one communist country in Eastern Europe that was closest to North Korea. Nicolae Ceaușescu and Kim Il-sung were very close friends as well. I was on the streets in December 1989 when the Ceaușescu regime fell. I was 19 years old and a first-year student at Bucharest University majoring in English language and literature. More than a thousand of my peers, members of the same generation, died in the streets. I was old enough to be a part of that. &nbsp; I then took exams for overseas scholarships and became the first Romanian ever to study in South Korea. I went to South Korea and received one year of language training, as well as a BA and MA, from Seoul National University. I worked in media broadcasting in South Korea for a few years. Then, I went to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts, and in 2002 I relocated with my family to Washington, D.C., where I worked in international development for six years. After working at the Korea Economic Institute for three years, I have been executive director of the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) since July 2011. &nbsp; This is a very personal issue to me. Ceaușescu wanted to turn Romania into the North Korea of Eastern Europe. Then I spent ten years on a divided Korean Peninsula while studying, working, and living in South Korea. Initially, I thought like many others that North Korea would collapse because communism had collapsed in so many other places, in Eastern Europe in particular. But then during the days of the Great Famine, the days of the gonan-ui haenggun (Arduous March), I came to the realization that this was an entirely different situation. That is when I acquired this interest in North Korean human rights, which was almost 30 years ago.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> &nbsp; <div style="text-align: center;">North Korean Human Rights: An Overview</div>&nbsp; North Korea is a party to multiple international instruments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as a UN member state; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities. North Korea has a constitution that includes, amazingly, human rights as well, including freedom of religion and freedom of expression. And yet, each and every human right is violated in North Korea. &nbsp; The worst human rights violations happen at North Korea’s detention facilities, including its kwan-li-so political prison camps, kyo-hwa-so reeducation-through-labor camps, and also at short-term detention facilities. If they are short-term, it does not mean that human rights violations do not happen there. We <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Report%20Findings%20Inquiry%20on%20Crimes%20Against%20Humanity.pdf" target="_blank">conducted a study</a> with the International Bar Association and a law firm, Debevoise &amp; Plimpton, on short-term detention facilities. This investigation concluded that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that crimes against humanity are occurring at short-term detention facilities also. Egregious human rights violations, especially perpetrated against women forcibly repatriated from China, happen at these facilities. &nbsp; We have identified several trends under Kim Jong-un through satellite imagery analysis and North Korean escapee testimony. Number one, some detention facilities that were close to the border with China have been shut down and detainees were moved inland. Detention facilities inland have expanded. Camp 25 is one such example. Second, women have taken the brunt of human rights abuse. During and after the Arduous March, the gonan-ui haenggun, women assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families. They are the ones who go to the jangmadang, the market; the nongmin sijang, the farmers’ market; or the amsijang, the black market. They are the main market agents. They are the ones who are arrested and punished, sometimes tortured or imprisoned, for perceived wrongdoing at the markets. &nbsp; Women also often cross the border into China without official approval. The goal is to end up in a third country and then in South Korea or other countries. They are in search of economic opportunity. We have a serious problem with China when it comes to North Korean refugees. China is a party to the 1951 Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees and the 1967 additional protocol. These North Korean refugees in China, eighty percent of whom are women, are returned to North Korea, where they are tortured, imprisoned, and sometimes killed. We have had terrible reports of forced abortions performed on women with children of Chinese men—infanticide. People of religious faith are particularly in danger.&nbsp; &nbsp; According to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, if individuals return to a place where they face a credible fear of persecution, they qualify to have access to the process leading to acquiring political refugee status. There are at least 2,000 North Korean refugees in detention in China awaiting forcible repatriation now that North Korea is gradually opening its borders post-COVID, and there are reports from reliable sources that some of these refugees may already have been sent back to North Korea. There are many human rights groups that are doing their best to prevent the forcible repatriation of North Korean refugees.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> &nbsp; <div style="text-align: center;">The Human Rights-Security Nexus</div>&nbsp; The February 2014 report of the UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in North Korea recommended the referral of the North Korean regime and its leadership to the International Criminal Court (ICC). North Korea is not a party to the 2002 Rome Statute that established the ICC, so it would take a referral by the UN Security Council. &nbsp; The UN Security Council is deeply divided. There are the status quo powers amongst the five permanent (P5) members of the Security Council: the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On the other hand, there are the revisionist powers, Russia and China. We all know the abomination of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and the tremendous human suffering that this invasion has caused in Ukraine. A veto by a P5 member can block the referral, and it is practically certain that China or Russia would veto the referral of the North Korean case to the ICC. &nbsp; If we look at recent history, there have been special tribunals such as the ICTY—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Rwanda was another precedent. In each case, it required a resolution of the UN Security Council. Even if it is difficult, it does not mean we should give up. We should press for the referral. Every time China vetoes an attempt to refer Kim Jong-un to the ICC, it paints itself into a corner as a P5 member that aids and abets a regime that commits crimes against humanity. I think that the role of civil society is very important here. Civil society is very creative. Many of us have tried a lot of different ways and means, including mock trials. I think eventually that creative solutions will come from civil society. &nbsp; North Korea’s human rights violations and crimes against humanity threaten international peace and security. There is a clear security-human rights nexus. Why? For two main reasons. Reason number one: the North Korean regime oppresses and exploits its own people at home and abroad to procure the resources it needs to develop its nuclear program. Reason number two: what the United States, Canada, and the international community want is CVID—complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization. How can one have CVID if there is no access to the political prison camps? One camp in particular comes to mind. Camp 16 is very close to the nuclear test facilities at Punggye-ri. We are just about to publish a very interesting report that establishes a connection between the two facilities. &nbsp; North Korean human rights violations threaten international peace and security because they are instrumentalized by the Kim regime to procure the resources it needs to develop its nuclear program. Since the regime does not admit to the existence of these camps, there is also the possibility of concealing equipment, for example. CVID is impossible without access to the political prison camps.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> &nbsp; <div style="text-align: center;">The North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States</div>&nbsp; We have a problem with the North Korean Human Rights Act in the United States. It has not been reauthorized yet. S. 4216 was introduced by Congresswoman Young Kim on the House side and by Senator Marco Rubio on the Senate side. It has not passed so far, and it is very unlikely that it will pass by the end of this month. The new reauthorized version would authorize the appropriation of $10 million each year. Initially, it was from 2023 to 2027. We hope the reauthorization will pass. It will probably be 2024 to 2028, $10 million each year for ongoing programs managed by the U.S. State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Agency for Global Media to improve access to information in North Korea, to promote democracy and human rights, and provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean refugees. &nbsp; What is my assessment of the bill so far? In terms of documentation of North Korean human rights abuses supported by the U.S. State Department—the Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in particular—and the National Endowment for Democracy, the record is positive. We know much more about the North Korean human rights situation through the efforts of such agencies and organizations. &nbsp; In the information field, there are groups that have been quite successful. There is a North Korean information firewall. Eventually, that information firewall will fall. Things were very difficult under COVID. North Korea cracked down very hard on information coming in from the outside world, those attempting to distribute such information, and those attempting to access such information. It is a difficult environment, and now we have a gradual opening of the border. We will see what impact that has on information. &nbsp; In terms of the refugee element, we have not done too well. The number of North Korean refugees that have resettled in the United States after requesting asylum is very low, just about 240. There are many factors behind this. The U.S. debriefing process takes longer than the South Korean debriefing process. On the other hand, throughout their lives, they have been taught that the United States is the greatest enemy of Korea, and it is very difficult to get over this psychological obstacle. &nbsp; In South Korea, the same language is spoken, and there are resettlement allowances and vocational training. The system is not perfect, but the people and the government have tried hard to assist North Korean refugees. Many of them have had trouble. It is a very different society, after all. This tells us that there is a need for information enhancing the understanding of the United States and what the United States stands for as we approach North Korean refugees who are in transit in third countries. &nbsp;</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> <div style="text-align: center;">The North Korean Human Rights Act in South Korea</div>&nbsp; South Korea has enacted a North Korean Human Rights Act of its own, but it has not been fully implemented. The problem is with the Human Rights Foundation because of disagreement between the two sides of the aisle. This foundation has not become operational yet. To deal with this issue, the previous unification minister, Minister Kwon Young-se, established a Human Rights Promotion Committee with fifteen outstanding individuals with expertise in North Korean human rights. &nbsp; There is disagreement over the board membership of the foundation. This is the fundamental issue. According to the law, the unification minister is tasked with nominating two candidates for the board of directors. The ruling party and the opposition parties are charged with nominating five candidates each. Due to disagreement between the two main political parties, no one has been appointed to the foundation’s inaugural board in the past seven years. &nbsp; If you ask me whether there will be some movement and positive change here, the elections next April will likely be a decisive factor in the operation of the Human Rights Foundation. The unfortunate thing is that human rights is being politicized. Human rights in general and human rights in North Korea should not be politicized in democratic countries, such as the United States, Canada, or South Korea. &nbsp;</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> <div style="text-align: center;">Human Rights Up Front: A Window of Opportunity</div>&nbsp; Canada has been a great champion of human rights in general and human rights in North Korea in particular. I think that the establishment of a Canadian special envoy for North Korean human rights would be a very important step. Coordination will be very important moving ahead. There could be political shifts in South Korea a couple of years from now, so we have a very narrow window of opportunity to coordinate on and address North Korean human rights. &nbsp; President Joe Biden, President Yoon Suk-yeol, and Prime Minister Kishida had a very good meeting at Camp David. They mentioned human rights, but it is not necessarily an area where there is a coherent strategy. The promoters of North Korean human rights on the international scene and at the UN—the United States, South Korea, the European Union, Canada, and Japan—can definitely achieve even better coordination if Canada passes a North Korean human rights act, and in particular if it creates a special envoy position. &nbsp; The United States passed a North Korean Human Rights Act in 2004, and others—including South Korea—have passed such acts also. Human rights violations in North Korea will continue unless these laws become part of a coherent “human rights up front” policy that elevates human rights to a position comparable to that of political, security, and military issues. For more than 30 years, human rights has been sacrificed on the altar of political, military, and security issues. As I mentioned earlier, there is a clear security-human rights nexus when it comes to North Korea. Without addressing human rights, it is impossible to resolve the security issues.</div><div style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-position: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: left;"> </div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/10/a-window-of-opportunity-addressing.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjlcEcA5LVO_HMGaoOGcQpVGLvK4NyOGW7JRxHoPyf54oq3jM30FzFerEk3RSaeD6y7hjdpghnLD47uLqxdx96CEBmpFIoczkc_nryoM1r8eu2u5HpN5nE8ydGU4-bot-OIVhTDTSLAuhhbBJeGUBmLFgI1g1VvNu0YKTXaQHlDwZJs4WOFSL5trgSKfZcY/s72-w640-h427-c/AdobeStock_302951032_Editorial_Use_Only.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-614101670403390649</guid><pubDate>Mon, 28 Aug 2023 19:15:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-08-28T15:31:36.034-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">China</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>And the Truth Shall Set You Free</title><description>By Nick MillerAugust 28, 2023<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2loyHIBwVutByBC6-YqwlEL8BZcxozFQNHwKDfjd_OBK2DCdMn84se5OgcvndxbUw0Fgb_FJtHnCvXWJX7R3eCnQUY2_xWXHNCc_dERub8Amv15v_yocSwcGX--aFQ_S8AHGOTJ1kb2I6aWkTbTki5GF1IY4B1JOMGbDwFOLmFN5NQRTe264lNCNQmdVJ/s6016/AdobeStock_266092745.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3825" data-original-width="6016" height="406" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2loyHIBwVutByBC6-YqwlEL8BZcxozFQNHwKDfjd_OBK2DCdMn84se5OgcvndxbUw0Fgb_FJtHnCvXWJX7R3eCnQUY2_xWXHNCc_dERub8Amv15v_yocSwcGX--aFQ_S8AHGOTJ1kb2I6aWkTbTki5GF1IY4B1JOMGbDwFOLmFN5NQRTe264lNCNQmdVJ/w640-h406/AdobeStock_266092745.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Nick Miller is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Edinburgh. His doctoral work examines how the U.S. Intelligence Community analyzed North Korean and Chinese politics during the Cold War. He previously served as a defense analyst for the U.S. Air Force, managing a variety of East Asian security issues.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"> <p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"> <p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">As the war in Ukraine drags on, the United States has stated that Russia has been looking for resources from North Korea, including weapons and ammunition, in return for providing food and commodities to Pyongyang. While the food situation is reportedly at its worst since Kim Jong-un came to power, there have not been clear signs of a serious famine.[1]<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">The Biden administration’s policy of openly disseminating intelligence to U.S. allies and the public regarding the war in Ukraine should be maintained to keep everyone aware of the atrocities occurring in Ukraine. This also helps shine a much-needed light on the actions that the North Korean regime continues to take to support Russia, thus violating numerous UN sanctions that have already been imposed.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Arms<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">In March, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions against a Slovakian individual who was attempting to broker arms deals between Russia and North Korea in exchange for new commercial aircraft and raw materials, for the purpose of replacing weapons and munitions spent in Ukraine.[2] From November to December 2022, the United States exposed how North Korea has been covertly funneling weapons via the Middle East and Africa to support Russia.[3]<span class="s3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">,[4] North Korean state media, KCNA, stated that it had “never exported weapons or ammunitions to Russia” and did not plan to export any, according to an unnamed vice director general of the General Bureau of Equipment in the Ministry of National Defense.[5] Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Vassily Nebenzia, also dismissed the reports.[6]<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Labor&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">There have been reports that North Korea is potentially sending construction workers to Russian-occupied Eastern Ukraine. While this reporting is doubted by some experts, this step would further strengthen Russian-North Korean ties, which have languished after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Lim Soo-ho of South Korea’s Institute for National Security Strategy stated that Russia had utilized North Korean constructions workers in the past due to their low cost. It is also a common strategy for North Korea to export its labor as a way for the regime to generate hard currency, but this activity was targeted in 2017 under UN Security Resolution 2397. Workers were estimated to provide between $200-500 million a year for the North Korean regime. Only a small portion is ever seen by the individual workers, who are under the scrutiny of the Ministry of State Security.[7] &nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">According to an October 2021 Daily NK report, North Korea prepared to finalize the selection of 800-1,000 workers to the Donbas region in November. An unnamed source stated that North Korea, China, and Russia had agreed that sending North Korean workers did not violate existing sanctions.[8] There have been unconfirmed reports that the move was delayed due to not wanting to send people to a “danger zone.”[9]<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">What is to be done and adapted for future use?&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Intelligence assessments are almost always kept classified, but the Biden administration has publicly disclosed them to spotlight and shame Russia. It quickly declassified and disseminated intelligence to key allies to highlight a range of issues, including Iranian arms support to Russia and atrocities committed by the Wagner Group. A similar policy should be adapted and utilized as a future tool of U.S. statecraft with respect to North Korea.[10]&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Even after the War in Ukraine reaches a conclusion, this strategy needs to continue and be adapted by future administrations to assist the North Korean people, with the goal of weakening the figures and bureaucratic structures that enable the oppression of the North Korean people.&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Some areas that the Biden administration could investigate include:<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Prison Labor Complex. This includes the networks that enable the construction and operation of prison camps, as well as the distribution and export of items produced at these camps. Such networks could be targeted through sanctions by the United States, its allies, and the United Nations.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Food Security. While North Korea has not experienced a second “Arduous March,” it is reportedly experiencing a serious food shortage. Any food that is secured by the regime from the outside world will not go to the people who need it most, but rather, most likely, to elites and the Korean People’s Army.[11] If and when food aid is sent to North Korea, any diversion of this aid could be disclosed in the same way that North Korea’s ship-to-ship fuel transfers have been reported.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Oil Shipments. While China has denied facilitating North Korean oil shipments, China is still a core facilitator for the weakening of UN sanction enforcement and the current sanctions have not ended North Korea’s ability to finance and advance its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.[12]<span class="s3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">, [13] According to Cho Bong-hyun of IBK Bank in Seoul, the targeting of oil supplies could paralyze the North Korean economy. However, the biggest obstacle to a full-on oil embargo is China’s veto power in the UN Security Council, since China does not want to manage the impact of a North Korean collapse on its border.[14]<span class="s3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">, [15] In an 2020 annual report to the UN Security Council, it was noted that China’s shipping industry was instrumental in facilitating the coal and oil trade by North Korea in “defiance of UN sanctions.”[16]<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">While China continues to facilitate North Korean trade and weaken sanctions enforcement, the United States must take a tougher stance on China. China’s continued support ensures the Kim family’s security and continued control over the country. Severing that resource will be essential in creating meaningful change, as it deprives the regime of the means to fuel its weapons programs.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">&nbsp;<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">Focusing on these three issues will erode the North Korean regime’s ability to obtain and utilize resources at the expense of the people. By adapting the Ukrainian plan to North Korea, the United States can expose Pyongyang’s actions and counter its assertions. Truth must be told through information campaigns aimed at the people of North Korea. It is critical to push back against disinformation campaigns that come out of North Korea or China. By exposing Pyongyang’s policies and practices and the individuals responsible for implementing them, the United States and its allies can help bring a brighter future for the North Korean people.&nbsp;<p class="p2" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 12px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; min-height: 14px; text-align: start;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 12px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 6px; min-height: 14px; text-align: start;"> <p class="p3" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 12px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px 0px 6px; min-height: 14px; text-align: start;"> <p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[1] “U.S. says Russia looking to North Korea for weapons needed for Ukraine War,” Associated Press, March 30, 2023. <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-russia-north-korea-ukraine-food-weapons-1.6796215"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-russia-north-korea-ukraine-food-weapons-1.6796215</a>&nbsp;<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[2] U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Facilitator for Attempted Arms Deals Between North Korea and Russia,” March 30, 2023. <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1377</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[3] David Brunnstrom and Idrees Ali, “White House Says North Korea supplying Russia with artillery shells,” Reuters, November 3, 2022. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-says-north-korea-supplying-russia-with-artillery-shells-2022-11-02"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-says-north-korea-supplying-russia-with-artillery-shells-2022-11-02</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[4] George Wright, “North Korea sold arms to Russia’s Wagner group, US says,” BBC News, December 22, 2022. <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64072570"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64072570</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[5] Joori Roh, “N.Korea says it has never supplied weapons or ammunition to Russia – KCNA,” Reuters, September 21, 2022. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/nkorea-says-it-has-never-supplied-weapons-or-ammunition-russia-kcna-2022-09-21/"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.reuters.com/world/nkorea-says-it-has-never-supplied-weapons-or-ammunition-russia-kcna-2022-09-21/</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[6] Trever Hunnicutt and David Brunnstrom, “U.S.: Russia could be about to buy ‘millions’ of North Korean shells, rockets,” Reuters, September 7, 2022. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-is-buying-artillery-ammunition-nkorea-report-2022-09-06/"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-is-buying-artillery-ammunition-nkorea-report-2022-09-06/</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[7] Kim Tong-hyung, “N. Korea may send workers to Russian occupied east Ukraine,” Associated Press, September 1, 2022. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-south-korea-moscow-663c0f754b2c04644b532918fdeed3ab"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-united-nations-south-korea-moscow-663c0f754b2c04644b532918fdeed3ab</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[8] Mun Dong-Hui, “N. Korea finalises selection of workers to join reconstruction efforts in Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine,” Daily NK, October 21, 2022. <a href="https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-finalizes-selection-workers-join-reconstruction-efforts-russia-occupied-parts-ukraine/"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korea-finalizes-selection-workers-join-reconstruction-efforts-russia-occupied-parts-ukraine/</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[9] Mun Dong-Hui, “Pyongyang delays sending of workers to Eastern Ukraine due to security concerns,” Daily NK, February 1, 2023. <a href="https://www.dailynk.com/english/pyongyang-delays-sending-workers-eastern-ukraine-due-security-concerns/"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.dailynk.com/english/pyongyang-delays-sending-workers-eastern-ukraine-due-security-concerns/</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[10] Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “How the U.S. Adopted a New Intelligence Playbook to Expose Russia’s War Plans,” The New York Times, February 23, 2023. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/us/politics/intelligence-russia-us-ukraine-china.html"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/23/us/politics/intelligence-russia-us-ukraine-china.html</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[11] Human Rights Watch, “A Matter of Survival: The North Korean Government’s Control of Food and the Risk of Hunger,” May 3, 2006. <a href="https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/05/03/matter-survival/north-korean-governments-control-food-and-risk-hunger"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/05/03/matter-survival/north-korean-governments-control-food-and-risk-hunger</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[12] “China Denies Involvement in Illicit Oil Shipments to North Korea,” VOA News, December 29, 2017.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-oil-hong-kong-north-korea/4184019.html"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.voanews.com/a/south-korea-oil-hong-kong-north-korea/4184019.html</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[13] “North Korea: South seizes ship amid row over illegal oil transfer,” BBC News, December 29, 2017.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42510783"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42510783</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[14] Stella Cooper, Christoph Koetti, and Muyi Xiao, “5 Takeaways From Investigating Covert Oil Deliveries to North Korea,” The New York Times, March 22, 2021. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/world/winson-north-korea-oil-tankers.html"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/22/world/winson-north-korea-oil-tankers.html</a>.<p class="p4" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[15] Tony Monroe and Jane Chung, “For North Korea, cutting off oil supplies would be devastating,” Reuters, April 13, 2017. <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-oil-idUSKBN17F17L"><span class="s4" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: none; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal;">https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-nuclear-china-oil-idUSKBN17F17L</a>.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"><p class="p5" style="color: #0b4cb4; font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;">[16] “North Korea defies sanctions with China’s help, UN Panel says,” The Guardian, April 18, 2020. <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/18/north-korea-defies-sanctions-with-chinas-help-un-panel-says">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/18/north-korea-defies-sanctions-with-chinas-help-un-panel-says</a>.<p class="p1" style="font-feature-settings: normal; font-kerning: auto; font-optical-sizing: auto; font-size: 16px; font-stretch: normal; font-variant-alternates: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variation-settings: normal; line-height: normal; margin: 0px; text-align: start;"> </div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/08/and-truth-shall-set-you-free.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2loyHIBwVutByBC6-YqwlEL8BZcxozFQNHwKDfjd_OBK2DCdMn84se5OgcvndxbUw0Fgb_FJtHnCvXWJX7R3eCnQUY2_xWXHNCc_dERub8Amv15v_yocSwcGX--aFQ_S8AHGOTJ1kb2I6aWkTbTki5GF1IY4B1JOMGbDwFOLmFN5NQRTe264lNCNQmdVJ/s72-w640-h406-c/AdobeStock_266092745.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-3985772465389487039</guid><pubDate>Fri, 11 Aug 2023 19:20:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-08-11T15:24:35.737-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Escapee</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><title>Street Market</title><description>By Morninglight*August 11, 2023<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3JjTfwCxhAWAFvkHIM0sd9HgCE3JVmruXAXzFob-iH0GoU3Jy921dpH6WLwmxZHosXX_76kY2KAP4AM0nCJFmaN26NZLDx-k3-eUOBVIGiGvD89o08sRFZiSSEcOGmVedq73IDfB5UiaeINR6cMOA1Q3GF5k1mSThBe9Y-f64FNO-C_Yh0UdW8MupNKDX/s4752/image%20C.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3168" data-original-width="4752" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3JjTfwCxhAWAFvkHIM0sd9HgCE3JVmruXAXzFob-iH0GoU3Jy921dpH6WLwmxZHosXX_76kY2KAP4AM0nCJFmaN26NZLDx-k3-eUOBVIGiGvD89o08sRFZiSSEcOGmVedq73IDfB5UiaeINR6cMOA1Q3GF5k1mSThBe9Y-f64FNO-C_Yh0UdW8MupNKDX/w640-h427/image%20C.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"> </div><div style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">*The following short story was written by a North Korean escapee.</div><div style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"> </div><div style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"> </div><div style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"><div style="clear: both;">Kyungju got out of school around 5 p.m. Thinking that today’s school activity ended early, she chose to walk home. After passing a small playground, the station street appeared on her right. As usual, the street was half filled with folks selling stuff, buyers, and passers-by. Then, from a distance, she saw a man in a beige-brown uniform walk towards the street. He wore an armband that read gyu-chal-dae. He was a trainee at the local police station.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The trainee blew his whistle wildly to clear the street. Within an instant, many of the sellers jumped up, packed away their stuff in an instant, and ran. A lady who had chunks of cabbages took the most time. As the trainee approached, cabbages tumbled to the ground from her wide wrapping cloth. The lady struggled desperately.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;She seemed to be in her mid-40s. With a small body and a weary face, it looked as though her family depended on her to make a living. This was the first time that Kyungju had seen her, but she could tell that this woman had experienced great hardship, and could not afford to have her cabbages taken away.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;As Kyungju looked on, she hoped that the lady would run far away, so that the trainee could not catch her, and so that her cabbages wouldn’t be confiscated by the police.&nbsp;</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">The street is much quieter now. There are no sellers. The gyuchaldae trainee is nowhere to be seen. Pacing her footsteps a bit faster, Kyungju looked for the woman. If she sees her, she wants to ask her, “Are you alright?” The lady did not appear, and Kyungju felt a bit sad. Maybe she should’ve run after her. But more than that, she was relieved that the lady managed to escape.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;Then, Kyungju imagined what the lady might say in reply. She would say “Yes, it’s okay,” even though she is not alright. Then she will let out a big sigh—the sigh that speaks of her devastated heart, the sigh that tells her big relief at not being caught. Then the woman would say:</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;“Today is not the first time. And it’s not even just me.”</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;“That’s true. It’s any street where selling stuff is not allowed.”&nbsp;</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; “Folks like me can’t afford a space in the local market. Only if the gyuchaldae&nbsp;guys &nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;have mercy when chasing us down, it would be so much bearable.”</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;“I wish we can make them never show up again.”</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">The lady will smile in silence. Though she understands the futility of her situation, she is comforted by hearing these words.&nbsp;</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">The conversation in Kyungju’s imagination ended with unrealistic hope. But her thoughts kept on going. Like the woman said, today’s incident is far from a surprise. It is a norm to the point that many folks shake it off and accept it as part of life. In the worst case, though, they would lose their merchandise. This could shatter their lives. If the officer has mercy on you and lets you go, you are lucky that day. But not everyone is so lucky, and you can’t afford to take risks. Then, could you tell the trainee guys to leave the sellers alone? Sure, a brave soul could stand up and raise their voice, but it will not make the problem disappear.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;The sellers hate the gyuchaldae officers. Then again, what can the officers do? As part of their post-military service, they are assigned to the local police department. Far away from home, they have no attachment to the local folks, which is why it is easier to be merciless and strict. Perhaps they might not like their job. In fact, some of them are sick and tired of chasing and shouting at commoners who are simply trying to survive. But it is their duty. Their superiors order them to clear up the merchants off the street, and they have to carry their orders.</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;It is a muddy reality. The deep resentment (han) built in people’s souls cried out quietly. Yet it does not make their lives easier, so the folks at the bottom blame themselves. They say: who would I blame? Nobody. If I was from a different background, I won’t even be living in this circumstance. If I had a connection with a police officer, I would easily avoid the gyuchaldae’s rules. It’s my fault that I’m not from a privileged family—my lack of ability to do better. And this is the cost that I have to endure…</div><div style="clear: both;">&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;No one blames the societal structure. No one blames the rule-makers. Even if they fully understand the root of the problem, they won’t dare to speak out. Of course they wouldn’t. What would they say, and why? To get in trouble and be punished? No one would dare to do so in public.</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">Kyungju felt bitter at the reality she observed. Yet she couldn’t stop her thinking there. People can’t live like this forever. This outrageous system of rules and regulations has to be fixed. Can somebody change this? It would have to be a high-ranking official with authority and influence. Then, she scorned her hope. Why would they care? They probably don’t even know what struggles these street merchants have to endure. Also, those in such positions have everything to lose. Maybe it’s better if somebody with nothing to lose can question the system. This hope seemed to be more realistic. Still, Kyungju felt bad for what that person would face. It would be too much for one person to bear.</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div><div style="clear: both;">The evening sun set slowly. The sunset painted the sky with an orange and purple hue. Under these two shades of light, the day appeared to be both ordinary and odd. Carrying the image of the street and a nameless hope in her heart, Kyungju walked steadily with her gaze on the setting sun.</div><div style="clear: both;"> </div></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/08/street-market.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg3JjTfwCxhAWAFvkHIM0sd9HgCE3JVmruXAXzFob-iH0GoU3Jy921dpH6WLwmxZHosXX_76kY2KAP4AM0nCJFmaN26NZLDx-k3-eUOBVIGiGvD89o08sRFZiSSEcOGmVedq73IDfB5UiaeINR6cMOA1Q3GF5k1mSThBe9Y-f64FNO-C_Yh0UdW8MupNKDX/s72-w640-h427-c/image%20C.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5612392677491275279</guid><pubDate>Wed, 05 Jul 2023 18:55:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-07-05T15:00:23.239-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">unification</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>North Korean Human Rights and the Future of the U.S.-ROK Alliance</title><description>By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive DirectorJuly 5, 2023<div class="separator" style="clear: both; font-size: large; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMWTi5CsG8zIpfYXisadKgtwRXpulOYhZlSRQ4uYO_DP3z_ckBkbSqcY1qkTqTrmKMyx2CrkdalMsjtl0ooe6d8ZuQKsNKNYcw40iIPHLq0tvnNuYwPZ6dDHFPGcrbhks8th-WdXK91LotzVjhKY8n4_FcQEKufE0F8-AQZeGXp8aAehoIZklr4IGeZno4/s5000/AdobeStock_512223682.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3333" data-original-width="5000" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMWTi5CsG8zIpfYXisadKgtwRXpulOYhZlSRQ4uYO_DP3z_ckBkbSqcY1qkTqTrmKMyx2CrkdalMsjtl0ooe6d8ZuQKsNKNYcw40iIPHLq0tvnNuYwPZ6dDHFPGcrbhks8th-WdXK91LotzVjhKY8n4_FcQEKufE0F8-AQZeGXp8aAehoIZklr4IGeZno4/w640-h427/AdobeStock_512223682.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: justify;">The following text is adapted from the keynote address delivered by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director, at the inaugural conference of the America Korea United Society (AKUS) at the Korean Community Center in Alexandria, VA on June 22, 2023.</div> Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,Hearty congratulations to AKUS on your vision and mission. Your credo, “respect, integrity, and transparency,” summarizes the core values we need to share to keep developing the American constitutional republic and the liberal democracy of the Republic of Korea. These values define the U.S.-ROK alliance, a brotherhood and sisterhood forged in blood on the brutal and unforgiving battlefields of the Korean War. They are also the key to unifying the Korean Peninsula under a free, democratic, capitalist Republic of Korea.This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice of July 27, 1953. The Korean Peninsula is still divided, and there is little to celebrate. It is also the 70th anniversary of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which was built on the Mutual Defense Treaty of October 1, 1953. Over those seven decades, this alliance has expanded beyond security issues to cover economic cooperation, education, and culture. This is truly an unbreakable alliance, friendship, and partnership. Your commitment to preserving and enhancing the alliance will only make our two nations and our bond even stronger.It is still the ultimate strategic objective of the Kim regime to undermine, subvert, and eventually annex South Korea. After all, the Kim family regime is not even a political cartel. It is an absolute political monopoly. The Kim family rules North Korea through the Korean Workers’ Party, led by its Organization and Guidance Department and its Central Committee.The only challenge to the post-industrial, kleptocratic, dynastic regime of North Korea is South Korea. South Korea is free, democratic, and prosperous. It is an economic powerhouse—the world’s tenth largest economy. South Korea’s success presents an existential threat to the Kim regime. In particular, it fears that the people of North Korea will come to view the South Korean model—sustained by the extraordinary talent, determination, and hard work of the Korean people and underpinned by strong ties to the United States—as a superior alternative to the Kim regime.We all want peace. We all want to lead by example. We all want peace through economic, political, social, cultural, and military strength. We all want peace, reconciliation, and the eventual reunification of all Koreans under the Republic of Korea. The path toward the dream of Korean reunification does not lie in false promises or peace declarations that ignore the human rights of North Koreans and the threat the Kim regime poses to international peace and security. There cannot be peace without justice. In striving for Korean reunification, we must address the grave military and security threats that North Korea poses, as well as its egregious human rights violations.To bring change to the Korean Peninsula, we must find out and tell the truth about the Kim regime’s crimes against humanity. It is essential to create a coalition of like-minded governments, civil society organizations, and international institutions to put an end to a human rights catastrophe that simply cannot be tolerated in the 21st century.However, change must ultimately come from the people of North Korea. We must empower them through information from the outside world by telling them three stories: first, the story of their own human rights, which they are unaware of; second, the corruption of their leadership, especially the corruption of the inner core of the Kim family; and third, the story of the outside world, especially the story of free, democratic, prosperous South Korea.The mission statement and activities of AKUS align perfectly with this vision. I wish you all God’s speed, and look forward to working together to bring freedom, human rights, democracy, and economic opportunity to the people of North Korea.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/07/north-korean-human-rights-and-future-of.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgMWTi5CsG8zIpfYXisadKgtwRXpulOYhZlSRQ4uYO_DP3z_ckBkbSqcY1qkTqTrmKMyx2CrkdalMsjtl0ooe6d8ZuQKsNKNYcw40iIPHLq0tvnNuYwPZ6dDHFPGcrbhks8th-WdXK91LotzVjhKY8n4_FcQEKufE0F8-AQZeGXp8aAehoIZklr4IGeZno4/s72-w640-h427-c/AdobeStock_512223682.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-3486003507271309775</guid><pubDate>Thu, 22 Jun 2023 19:12:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-06-22T15:22:07.176-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United Nations</category><title>North Korean Human Rights: The Path Ahead</title><description><div style="text-align: left;">By Dr. Kim Dong-su, Senior Advisor to the Institute for National Security Strategy</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">June 22, 2023</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg60OVD779_CckBtrYjQ50E6rv-JUYQTCvkJNH9FwnbDDPqC7o-OAeszYClhQowPjj-35kbjapEimZ6Rv6TGU2IzqTPl9rKFyqiLtblS34Ugvf8Z6XYBB4dOAi2XFp8zB86VUOqG5wCwMfBbnnrjCOos_MsVrmGDAfOfrcwUASoAXolfHe-aFcAmBX3rzwf/s4841/IMG_4681-2.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="2875" data-original-width="4841" height="380" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg60OVD779_CckBtrYjQ50E6rv-JUYQTCvkJNH9FwnbDDPqC7o-OAeszYClhQowPjj-35kbjapEimZ6Rv6TGU2IzqTPl9rKFyqiLtblS34Ugvf8Z6XYBB4dOAi2XFp8zB86VUOqG5wCwMfBbnnrjCOos_MsVrmGDAfOfrcwUASoAXolfHe-aFcAmBX3rzwf/w640-h380/IMG_4681-2.jpg" width="640" /></a></div> Dr. Kim Dong-su, Senior Advisor to the Institute for National Security Strategy, is a former North Korean diplomat who last served at North Korea’s mission to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome before defecting in 1998. Since arriving in South Korea, he has written extensively on North Korea’s foreign policy and regime structure. He recently served as an advisor to the Yoon Suk-yeol Presidential Transition Committee and a visiting scholar at Waseda University. Dr. Kim has a B.A. in Political Science from Dar-es-Salaam National University and the Pyongyang University of Foreign Studies, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Political Science from Kyungnam University.The following text is adapted from remarks delivered at "North Korean Human Rights: Is There Still a Way Forward?," a conference hosted by HRNK, the Hoover Institution, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) on May 18, 2023 at NED’s headquarters&nbsp;in Washington, D.C.&nbsp;&nbsp;The Kim Jong-un regime presents a challenge of the utmost urgency to the international community. Without denuclearization and fundamental political change in North Korea, peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula will only be an illusion. Likewise, the values of freedom and human rights on the Korean Peninsula will not be truly realized either. To achieve denuclearization and internal political change, we first need to carefully assess the situation the Kim Jong-un regime is facing, as well as the steps that it may take.&nbsp;The current situation in North Korea is defined by four characteristics: i) rapid nuclear advancement; ii) severe economic hardship; iii) deepening public discontent and widening social unrest; and iv) intensifying coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment against the population.As most of the national budget is spent on developing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons and missiles, the North Korean people are facing an economic catastrophe. Moreover, in the past few years, North Korea has been battered on three fronts: sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and natural disasters. This has exacerbated the shortage of goods and food supplies. Recently, there have been cases of starvation.This has given rise to greater public discontent in North Korea. The regime is losing popular support, and the influence of South Korean popular culture is expanding across the country. Under these circumstances, the Kim Jong-un regime has intensified its reign of terror as it commits egregious human rights violations. It has enacted unjust laws such as the “Anti-Reactionary Thought and Culture Act” and the “Youth Education Act."&nbsp;In this way, the Kim Jong-un regime's excessive obsession with nuclear weapons leads to a vicious cycle of severe economic difficulties, greater suffering among the people, deepening popular discontent, and harsher surveillance and repression.&nbsp;The Future of North Korea’s Human Rights DiplomacyOver the past decade, many international entities and countries, including the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the DPRK , the North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC), the U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), the UN, the European Union (EU), the United States, and Japan—together with many other NGOs in South Korea and elsewhere—have persistently advocated for and promoted North Korean human rights.Through such efforts, the human rights situation in North Korea has been exposed to the world. This includes the situation in North Korea’s kwan-li-so (political prison camps), kyo-hwa-so (long-term prison labor facilities), and jip-kyul-so (short-term detention facilities), where detainees are publicly executed, and egregious human rights violations are committed. Violations of women’s rights and children’s rights have been brought to light, including the use of children for forced labor.There have been more opportunities for North Korean escapees to testify on the international stage, resulting in greater international attention toward the issue. This has made it considerably more difficult for North Korea to address the issue through diplomacy.Through the work of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Seoul office, which specializes in investigating North Korea’s human rights violations, there is now a greater capacity to document and collect evidence of human rights violations in North Korea. Meanwhile, the Kim Jong-un regime continues to purge and execute officials and take severe measures to block the inflow of outside information.Following the release of the UN COI report in 2014, North Korea largely ignored human rights on the international stage. However, the international community has been more assertive toward North Korea on this issue. Specifically, the work of the UN COI and NGOs such as NKFC and HRNK in Seoul, London, Washington, D.C., and Tokyo helped to investigate and document the human rights situation in North Korea. The willingness of many North Korean escapees to provide testimony seemed to indicate that the Kim Jong-un regime’s days were numbered.&nbsp;Going forward, North Korea’s diplomacy on human rights is likely to focus on preventing Kim Jong-un’s name from being directly tied to documentation and accountability initiatives. To do so, North Korea will firmly shut its doors. It will cease contact, exchange, and dialogue with international human rights institutions, human rights organizations, and human rights activists.At the same time, however, North Korea will seek to counter international pressure on human rights by seeking help from its close allies on the international stage. Pyongyang will engage with individual states and do everything it can to prevent Kim Jong-un’s name from being included in UN human rights resolutions.&nbsp;In particular, North Korea will frame criticisms of its human rights record as a scheme to subvert the regime, and thereby further justify the development of nuclear weapons as a means of protection. It will heighten political tensions and pressure South Korea to break away from international efforts to address North Korean human rights.Over the past few years, efforts to address North Korean human rights on the international stage have been successful in several ways.&nbsp;The UN has taken a proactive role in comprehensively investigating human rights violations in North Korea. Specifically, the presence of the OHCHR’s Seoul office provides a lasting, institutional basis for systematically documenting North Korean human rights issues. It appears that North Korea is paying very close attention to these efforts by the international community to address the human rights issue.Going forward, North Korea will react aggressively to the international community’s action on human rights, which it regards as part of a “peaceful transition strategy” to overthrow the regime. At the same time, North Korea will try to fundamentally block the West’s calls to improve human rights, emphasizing its "political autonomy" and "right to development." Moreover, to deflect criticisms of its human rights record, North Korea will persistently raise human rights issues in South Korea, the United States, and Japan. How to Raise the Profile of North Korean Human RightsFrom now on, we must develop and execute an intensive campaign of psychological warfare to blow the wind of freedom and truth into North Korea, which stands on a sand castle of the worst lies and fabrications in the world. Comprehensive psychological warfare against the highly closed North Korean regime will be more powerful than nuclear weapons.We have the responsibility to raise awareness among the international community about the worst human rights situation in the world. At the same time, we must also seek ways to inform the North Korean people about freedom, democracy, and human rights, so that they can resist the tyrannical regime. For this purpose, the Yoon Suk-yeol government must place the protection of the North Korean people’s human rights, as well as the improvement of their economic rights, at the very center of its North Korea policy.The people of North Korea, who are citizens of the Republic of Korea (ROK) pursuant to the ROK Constitution, are dying away as slaves of the Kim family. No objective—be it unification, exchange, cooperation, or peace—can take precedence over the North Korean people's right to live or their human rights. In other words, any policy towards North Korea which ignores the suffering of the North Korean people is bound to be hypocritical.If the North Korean people are neglected, any related act and even unification itself are bound to be hypocritical. This is because the ultimate purpose of North Korea policy or unification policy is not to maintain peace or secure power, but to firstly liberate the North Korean people from slavery. If that is not the goal, then there is no reason to deal with North Korea or seek unification. It would be enough to protect ourselves and ensure our own safety.The experiences of the past half century and recent years have clearly shown that the Kim dynasty will never change its ways. Moreover, considering the Kim regime’s nature, history, and institutional structure, it is meaningless to seek reconciliation, negotiation, compromise, or coexistence with the Kim regime. It is also clear that the Kim dynasty remains the source of all evils that arise from the division of the Korean Peninsula, including nuclear and missile issues, human rights violations, threats to national security, and the “South-South divide” in South Korea.In this context, I believe it is necessary to set a basic direction for international efforts to promote human rights in North Korea. It is necessary to actively raise the issue of human rights through the UN and other related institutions which North Korea has joined. In addition, it would be productive to discuss North Korean human rights in the context of economic &amp; security cooperation. Creating a new regional human rights body in the region would also provide a forum for discussing North Korean human rights.It is especially important for the Yoon administration to work together with the rapidly growing network of domestic and international human rights NGOs to call for improvement of human rights in North Korea.There are three priorities in this regard. First, it is necessary to raise North Korean human rights issues more proactively at the UN. Second, it is critical to discuss human rights in North Korea within the framework of economic or security cooperation. A new regional human rights body could be created for such discussions as well. Third, it is of paramount importance to institutionalize cooperation with human rights NGOs, and to actively support human rights NGOs led by North Korean escapees.The North Korean human rights issue is critical because the action we take on this issue can catalyze changes in not only the consciousness and ideology of the North Korean people, but also the political system in North Korea. To facilitate political change in North Korea and address its serious human rights situation, it is imperative to develop a strategy aimed at specific segments of the population: the ruling elite; the middle class, who are forced to blindly obey the regime; and the lower class, which Kim Jong-un ignores.To realize these objectives, we need a massive information campaign to send information into North Korea about what is happening in South Korea and the world; about freedom, human rights, and the superiority of democracies; and about reform and opening. This can be via radio broadcasts, print media, movies, music, and other means. It is important that the North Korean people, including soldiers, develop an accurate understanding of freedom and democracy.By doing so, we can empower the North Korean people by enabling them to clearly recognize the repressive nature of the Kim Jong-un regime and become the driving force of opening and reform, which will lead to unification under a liberal democratic form of government. There is a surging demand for information among the North Korean people and North Korean soldiers.To the key ruling elite of North Korea, we need to disseminate information about high-ranking North Korean officials, possible succession scenarios after Kim Jong-un, South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, and how this policy is being implemented.To the leadership of the Korean People’s Army, we specifically need to send in information about the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance, President Yoon’s recent state visit to Washington, the nature and objectives of the Kim regime, the capabilities of the ROK military, and the ROK’s military strategy.To the North Korean population, including the youth, it would be valuable to disseminate Korean cultural content and American movies (such as action and martial arts movies), games, the Bible and other religious materials (including print materials), and documentaries on human rights. ConclusionIn light of growing international interest in and action on North Korea’s human rights situation, it is becoming increasingly critical for the Yoon administration to pursue a North Korean human rights policy.To raise the profile of North Korean human rights issues on the international stage and facilitate political change in North Korea, the Yoon administration must closely cooperate with NGOs led by North Korean escapees. This is an urgent priority, just as much as the nuclear issue.Many escapee-led organizations have long dedicated themselves to bringing freedom to North Korea, with an emphasis on human rights. These organizations have the capacity to be a strategic asset for the Yoon administration, which has proclaimed a principled approach to North Korean policy.The General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, a coalition of 23 organizations based in South Korea, is carrying out a wide range of activities for the cause of human rights and democracy in North Korea.Escapee-led organizations which many of you know well, including the Committee for the Democratization of North Korea, Free North Korea Radio, Free North Korea Movement Alliance, North Korea Strategy Center, and North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity, are preparing for a new leap forward after enduring a hostile political atmosphere under the previous administration.Mr. Kim Seong-min, the founder of the General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations and the leader of Free North Korea Radio, stresses that “North Korean escapees have a responsibility to fight for the North Korean people’s right to know, which is crucial for North Korea’s democratization and the unification of the Korean Peninsula as a free and open country.”Park Sang-hak, Heo Kwang-il, Kim Heung-kwang, and Jang Se-yool, who are part of the General Association of North Korean Human Rights Organizations, sent hundreds of thousands of leaflets and 5,000 USBs to the North via balloons on April 12. This was in direct opposition to the so-called “Anti-Leaflet Law,” an unjust law that was passed under the Moon Jae-in administration.&nbsp;Kim Seong-min and other leaders in the escapee community have all said that Suzanne Scholte’s Defense Forum Foundation provided invaluable support when the Moon administration harshly suppressed the activities of North Korean escapees. They have also said that the sending of leaflet balloons these past few years would not have been possible without the support of Ms. Suzanne Scholte’s NKFC and individual American citizens who were driven by a sense of justice.I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Ms. Suzanne Scholte, whom many escapees regard as the godmother of the North Korean human rights movement.&nbsp;I would also like to express my gratitude and respect for all American citizens who have lent their support to the work of North Korean escapees in our struggle for freedom and democracy in North Korea.Thank you very much for your attention. </description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/06/north-korean-human-rights-path-ahead.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg60OVD779_CckBtrYjQ50E6rv-JUYQTCvkJNH9FwnbDDPqC7o-OAeszYClhQowPjj-35kbjapEimZ6Rv6TGU2IzqTPl9rKFyqiLtblS34Ugvf8Z6XYBB4dOAi2XFp8zB86VUOqG5wCwMfBbnnrjCOos_MsVrmGDAfOfrcwUASoAXolfHe-aFcAmBX3rzwf/s72-w640-h380-c/IMG_4681-2.jpg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-2450259907144360015</guid><pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2023 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-01-30T03:07:40.226-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Otto Warmbier</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>Remembering Otto Warmbier</title><description>By Robert CollinsJanuary 30, 2023 Just before Christmas 2022, President Joe Biden signed into law the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, which included the “Otto Warmbier Countering North Korean Censorship and Surveillance Act.” The law “<a href="https://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-portman-coons-announce-otto-warmbier-countering-north-korea-censorship-and-surveillance-act-signed-into-law-as-part-of-fy-2023-ndaa">authorizes $10 million annually for the next five years to counter North Korea’s repressive censorship and surveillance state</a>.”Otto was imprisoned and tortured by the Kim regime for reasons that seem petty to almost all of us, but were taken exceedingly seriously by the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) and the Ministry of State Security (MSS). Otto died days after being returned to the United States to meet his family, unable to talk due to the torture that the North Korean regime inflicted on him.The MSS took Otto into custody after he reportedly took down a propaganda poster in the hotel he was staying at. This seems like a minor infraction to us in the West. However, if the poster had the name of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, or Kim Jong-un on it, this act would be regarded as the worst of all crimes in North Korea—even worse than first-degree murder. This is not only law in North Korea, but most importantly, it is the firm policy of the KWP. Historically, North Koreans have been executed immediately for such an offense.Any North Korean court official, security officer, or KWP member who fails to respond in the most brutal manner toward an offense against the Supreme Leader would be immediately imprisoned, along with their family members. It is hard to imagine that any government would punish its security personnel for failing to be brutal enough, but this is a fact of political life under the Kim family regime.Otto had no way of knowing this. His youthful innocence resulted in him being detained by the ye-sim-gwa (pre-trial examination section) of the MSS. These interrogators are notorious for inflicting extremely harsh torture on the accused to extract confessions. There have been plenty of reports about detainees dying during interrogations.North Korea’s courts, which are driven by party policy and not the rule of law, then issue a sentence based on forced confessions. Detainees are then sent to another detention facility, where they continue to face torture by the guards. The most extreme of these facilities are the Kim regime’s kwan-li-so political prison camps. Testimony on the horrific torture inflicted upon political prison camp detainees is beyond abundant.Why the torture? In 2005, then-Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il directed security and prison officials to treat those incarcerated in political prison camps and related facilities as “poisonous grass.” He urged those that dealt with the incarcerated to root out the “poisonous grass” to “defend the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Supreme Leader directives are regarded as superior to the law in North Korea. They must be immediately and strictly implemented without hesitation. In other words, those who work in the ye-sim-gwa or the detention facilities must prove themselves loyal to Supreme Leader directives. How so?Unlike any other country in the world, every North Korean, beginning at the age of nine and until they die, must conduct a public self-evaluation of their adherence to the directives of the Supreme Leaders—Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un—and how their performance falls short of these directives. They must criticize themselves, never compliment themselves. This is referred to as saenghwal chonghwa—lifestyle self-critique. The self-critique is followed by criticism from others.This is done at least weekly, usually on Saturdays. Records of these self-critiques are kept by the organizational secretary of the KWP committee, which is embedded in every entity in North Korea—party, government, military, economic, or social. These records are transmitted to the all-powerful KWP Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). The OGD assigns a political action officer to manage every organization or regional area, including detention facilities.There is an OGD political action officer or team of political action officers that monitor the ye-sim-gwa and detention facilities. These officers prepare reports for the Supreme Leader when deemed necessary. Considering how visible Otto’s trial was, it is difficult to believe that the North Korean leadership was not aware of exactly how he was being treated.How does all of this inform our understanding of what happened to Otto? The interrogators in the ye-sim-gwa and Otto’s incarcerators would have had to admit their inadequate ill-treatment of Otto during self-critique sessions. Their fellow torturers and incarcerators would have had to complain that the official undergoing self-critique was not being brutal enough toward Otto. The brutal treatment of Otto was likely far more severe than that suffered by incarcerated North Koreans.Many who are incarcerated in North Korea are forced to admit to fabricated charges or testify to some other fiction. Otto was also shown publicly apologizing in court. However, there is no evidence of subsequent cooperation with his torturers. Indeed, it is evident he did not cooperate any further. The North Korean regime would have made it public otherwise. Otto appears to have successfully resisted in a heroic manner, and we should remember him for that.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/01/remembering-otto-warmbier.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-742663302789382986</guid><pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2023 03:42:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2023-01-27T11:26:40.905-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Japan</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United Nations</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>The UN COI at 10 Years: Strategic Priorities & Considerations</title><description>By Michael Kirby, former Chair of the UN COI on Human Rights in the DPRKJanuary 26, 2023<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-VwHkKHXzjo7HJycHbJoPBD8Hon0ygE4J8zPFrFND6KzGqRvsnElUQgFQRwHOpZ2dW7p6n57FP1IxqmdMjlwNeuQ_EE02diR80CyR11xIa0RsM5NaYm5EG8BBZaA-5VB0BfSMd1khVJqLN-afzD37kX92fap9Sr2AM6zL96hYx0dfRkoiOQtvddycdg/s5616/AdobeStock_308333318.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3744" data-original-width="5616" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-VwHkKHXzjo7HJycHbJoPBD8Hon0ygE4J8zPFrFND6KzGqRvsnElUQgFQRwHOpZ2dW7p6n57FP1IxqmdMjlwNeuQ_EE02diR80CyR11xIa0RsM5NaYm5EG8BBZaA-5VB0BfSMd1khVJqLN-afzD37kX92fap9Sr2AM6zL96hYx0dfRkoiOQtvddycdg/w640-h427/AdobeStock_308333318.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div> Next year will mark the 10th anniversary of the report issued by the UN Human Rights Council’s <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-idprk/commission-inquiryon-h-rin-dprk" target="_blank">Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)</a>. Discussions have begun in Seoul, Washington D.C., and other capitals about the steps that might be taken to commemorate and reflect upon this milestone. The goal of these efforts would be to revive knowledge about the COI report and its detailed recommendations, and to rekindle a commitment to remedial action by the international community.With this in mind, I am pleased to offer a non-exhaustive list of follow-up initiatives, together with guidance that might be taken to mark this 10th anniversary (hereafter “COI+10”). UN MANDATE HOLDERSFrom 2013 to 2014, I held the UN mandate of Chair of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK, acting always with the participation of the other members of the Commission, Mr. Marzuki Darusman and Ms. Sonja Biserko. Our mandate was effectively completed when we delivered our report to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) on 7 February 2014, or possibly after we followed up with the delivery of the report to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (GA) in the fall of 2014. On 22 December 2014, we attended the meeting of the UN Security Council, to which the GA had transmitted the COI report, together with expressions of its concern and recommendations.Since the mandate of the COI has concluded, its members have no current authority to speak or act for the UN. Although individual members of the former COI have been invited by interested audiences to share their reflections on many occasions since 2014—especially in Seoul, Washington D.C., Tokyo, and London—they have always made it clear, as I do now, that their mandate for the UN has concluded. This role belongs to successors appointed by the United Nations, acting through its relevant agencies, including the HRC and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The mandate holder of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK plays an especially important role. This is presently Professor Elizabeth Salmón, who was appointed to replace Tomás Ojea Quintana in that office last year.It will therefore be important that any follow-up action on the COI taken by member states or their agencies or individuals should always include full notification to, and cooperation with, the Special Rapporteur. In organising any hearings or events (actual or virtual), it will be important to inform the Special Rapporteur to ascertain any views she may wish to express, and to comply as far as possible with scheduling that would facilitate, where so decided, her participation in any follow-up events. ANNIVERSARY DATESMany believe that a useful way to mark the 10th anniversary of the COI would be to keep in mind (and try to coincide with) significant dates in the history of the COI, and possibly also at the venue of important earlier events. These dates include:<ul style="text-align: left;"><li>21 March 2013: Resolution of the Human Rights Council at its 22nd session in Geneva to establish the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. This was done by HRC Resolution 22/13, mandating the body to investigate the “systematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in the DPRK, with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that may amount to crimes against humanity’’ (A/HRC/RES/23/13). The resolution to establish a COI was taken without a vote. </li><li>7 May 2013: Appointment of the members of the COI by the then-President of the HRC, Ambassador Remigiusz Achilles Henczel of Poland. The appointments announced to the HRC were Michael Kirby of Australia (Chair), Marzuki Darusman of Indonesia (then-Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights, who recommended the creation of a COI), and Sonja Biserko of Serbia (human rights expert and subsequently the holder of a mandate of a follow-up UN expert group). </li><li>1 July 2013: First meeting of the COI at the Palais Wilson in Geneva, when the members of the COI established the methodology of transparency and openness that was to be adopted in the discharge of their mandate. This novel methodology was adopted unanimously by the COI and observed throughout the discharge of its mandate. </li><li>20 August 2013: Commencement of the COI’s public hearings and consultations at Yonsei University in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK). </li><li>29 August 2013: Public hearings and consultations at the UN University in Tokyo, Japan. </li><li>23 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in London, UK. </li><li>30–31 October 2013: Public hearings and consultations in Washington D.C. </li><li>1 December 2013: Commencement of deliberations of the COI at Palais Wilson, followed by approval of the draft report and arrangements for follow-up. </li><li>17 February 2014: First official publication of the COI report (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 and detailed findings, A/HRC/ 25/CRP.1). A press conference was held the same day at Palais des Nations, Geneva. </li><li>17 March 2014: Formal presentation of the report by the COI Chair to the HRC plenary session, followed by questions, comments, and remarks. </li><li>30 March 2014: Transmission of the COI report by the HRC to the UN General Assembly with strong endorsement (Vote: 30 pro; 6 contra; 9 abstain). This HRC resolution called for the report’s transmission to the GA, and by the GA to the Security Council (A/HRC/RES/25/25). </li><li>17 April 2014: Arria-formula meeting at UN headquarters in New York of Security Council members—and by other states as observers—to receive the COI report. The meeting was not attended by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, with apologies conveyed by the latter. </li><li>18 November 2014: After many months of deliberation by the GA Third Committee in New York, a Cuban amendment supporting the DPRK was defeated. The GA Third Committee then endorsed the COI report with another strong vote, followed by a GA plenary vote on December 18 (Vote: 116 pro; 20 contra; 53 abstain). As recommended by the COI, exceptionally, the GA transmitted the COI report to the Security Council (A/RES/69/188). </li><li>5 December 2014: Letter initiated by the Ambassadors of France, United States and Australia (then a non-permanent member of the Security Council) to the President of the Security Council (Chad), signed by 10 Council members, for a procedural resolution to place human rights in the DPRK on the Security Council’s agenda. For a procedural resolution to be adopted by the Security Council, an affirmative vote of nine of its members is required. </li><li>22 December 2014: UN Security Council adopted the procedural motion put forward by the 10 states, which was read out by Australia. The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation challenged the contention that the proposed resolution was procedural, but ultimately it was so decided, with 11 states in favour (Vote: 11 pro – Argentina, Australia, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, ROK, and Rwanda together with three permanent member states – France, United Kingdom, and United States; 2 contra – China, Russia; 2 abstain – Nigeria, Chad). The COI report was thus placed on the Security Council’s agenda. Thereafter, the human rights situation in North Korea was raised under the agenda item added by this procedural vote.</li></ul><div> </div>THE UN, UNITED STATES, AND JAPANThe United Nations and its various organs and agencies must be an obvious focus of the consultations surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. The problem of Korea preceded the formal establishment of the UN in 1945. As the COI report indicated, the origins of the partition of the Korean Peninsula may be found in the meeting of the Allied Powers at the Cairo Conference in 1943 (COI Report, para. 95). They agreed that, after the defeat of Japan, the colonial power, the independence of Korea would be achieved “in due course.”Thus began, in 1946, the division of Korea into two zones of control: the United States in the south, and the Soviet Union north of the 38th parallel. This was a pragmatic decision, intended to be of short duration. It was not consistent with the requirements of the UN Charter of 1945, which envisaged the right of “self-determination” for those who had been under colonial rule. The Korean people have never decided for themselves in favour of partition. Exercise of the right of self-determination is the overriding obligation of the UN and the right of the Korean people.As the effective cause of the division of Korea, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as successor to the USSR, have a primary, continuing, unfulfilled obligation. So does the United Nations itself. It is therefore proper that, in consultation, where possible with the post-war Korean states, the United States should play an important role in assisting the Korean people to exercise their fundamental human rights, and the right of peoples to self-determination. This contextual theme should inform the discussions surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary.It also explains why the two Korean states, intended to be temporary, have an obligation of their own to promote and achieve the self-determination of the Korean people, so far denied. The ROK cooperated fully with the COI. However, despite repeated efforts to make contact and to secure entry and cooperation, the DPRK has so far declined to cooperate either with the UN agencies concerned with human rights, the COI, or with the ROK.Throughout its work, the COI insisted upon affording opportunities to the DPRK to participate in its work and to provide opportunities for inspection, provision of submissions, and commentary on conclusions. It would be desirable that consultations regarding the post-COI events should likewise insist at every stage on inviting cooperation, entry, inspection, and commentary by the DPRK, just as the COI did in pursuing the neutral interests of the UN and the COI. Renewed efforts at dialogue should be made before, during, and after the 10th anniversary consultations.In the face of refusal and hostility, there should be the same neutrality as has been displayed by the UN’s organs, agencies, the COI, and the Special Rapporteur. This has an important symbolic value and, even now, may ultimately attract the engagement of the DPRK. Whether it does so or not, it is the correct stance for the UN and all impartial observers to adopt.Lastly, Japan actively supported the work of the COI throughout its inquiry. It still has a special interest in the issues presented to the world by the DPRK. This includes human rights issues, notably that of the abduction of Japanese nationals from Japan; the abduction of nationals of other countries; the return to Japan of its nationals who were induced to seek a “promised land” in the DPRK and were retained; and the need to account for prisoners of war retained in the DPRK, as well as the remains of abductees and former prisoners; and other problems that overlap with the issue of abduction. The DPRK itself has acknowledged that this issue is not concluded.The recent international security issue presented by the firing of North Korean missiles over Japanese territory and Japanese waters adds to these further unresolved issues of human rights. The recent re-election of Japan to membership in the UN Security Council also arguably provides another reason for the special involvement of Japan in events surrounding the COI’s 10th anniversary. According to media reports, the bilateral relationship between the ROK and Japan has recently improved. Consideration should be given by the sponsors to involving Japan in the COI+10 anniversary events and their design.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>CHANGING ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA The COI performed its functions during the administration of President Park Geun-hye in the ROK. She extended courtesies to the COI and the assistance of officials. A weakness of the COI’s consultations was the absence of most members of the then-opposition parties and supporters. Since at least the time of President Kim Dae-jung and his “Sunshine Policy,” there have been political differences within the ROK concerning the proper response to reports of human rights abuses in the DPRK, and the investigation and criticism of reported human rights abuses in the north. There have also been differences of opinion about initiatives taken by the ROK for the pursuit of unification, contact with the DPRK, and cooperation with human rights critics, including the COI.With the election of President Moon Jae-in, the ROK’s policies towards the COI report and responses to evidence of abuses changed. The participation of the ROK in annual UN resolutions condemning the abuse of human rights in the DPRK, in particular ROK co-sponsorship, was suspended. Criminal proceedings (challenged in the Constitutional Court) were brought against citizens of the ROK for releasing balloons containing information critical of the DPRK, including the report of the COI, which is not available in North Korea. The election to succeed President Moon Jae-in led to the election of President Yoon Suk-yeol, who entered office on 10 May 2022.The Yoon administration appears to have taken several different policy directions from its predecessor. It will be essential that the participants in the 10th anniversary events should be given information, not always available to foreign observers, on the differences already evident in the policies affecting reported human rights abuses in North Korea. Furthermore, it will be important that the omission of the COI to engage effectively with opposition parties and individuals in the ROK should not be repeated.Without intruding into partisan political issues, it will be the responsibility of public officials to alert overseas participants about any changes in policy towards the COI report; human rights investigations; participation in UN investigations; and responses to activities designed to inform citizens in the DPRK about relevant UN activities, especially the report of the COI and its follow-up. As we mark COI+10, it would be desirable for appropriate experts to give information to participants about the availability of access to international news, including UN investigations of human rights abuses.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>CIVIL SOCIETY, DEFECTORS, AND ESCAPEESApart from the possible weakness in the COI’s consultation with diverse civil society organisations, resulting from limited time and impartial reliance on official sources, it is also essential for relevant actors to consult more widely with the fullest possible range of civil society organisations, reflecting divergent points of view.Although some consultation was held with “defectors” (also referred to as escapees or refugees), it would be desirable that appropriate new consultations should be arranged with a larger number of civil society organisations, in general, and organisations of defectors, in particular. Although the number of such entrants into the ROK from the DPRK has diminished, due partly to the impact of COVID restrictions, such persons are vital sources of information on the human rights abuses that drove them to depart from the DPRK.Leading members of this community (including some who have been elected to the ROK National Assembly) should be sought out and invited to offer their perspectives to the COI+10 consultations, particularly on any changes that have occurred in the situation of human rights in the DPRK over the past 10 years.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTSThe 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) will occur on 10 December 2023. The organisation of COI+10 should emphasize this anniversary and its relevance to following up the essential criterion of the COI's critique of abuses of human rights in the DPRK. That critique was grounded in the principles of the UN Charter (with its insistence on universal human rights) and of the UDHR, which gives expression to the content of such rights, as later elaborated by several UN human rights treaties. The DPRK was, and still is, a party to some of these treaties.Although some criticism of UN organs and agencies is commonly based on alleged Western influence over the contemporary content of human rights, the UN Charter and UDHR are universal statements that apply to all member states, nations, peoples, and individuals. It would be desirable that COI+10 should rebut the suggestions of regional or national exceptionalism. The anniversary of the UDHR affords the international community an opportunity to re-assert its commitment to these universal principles.It would be desirable for the responses of the DPRK to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), conducted by the HRC, to be analysed and measured against the criticisms expressed in the COI report and subsequently by UN Special Rapporteurs.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>DIPLOMATIC TECHNIQUESWhen considering the most effective ways to achieve the DPRK’s compliance with universal human rights, it is essential to embrace normal diplomatic techniques for negotiation and securing change. This involves, normally, the avoidance of mere condemnation and noisy criticism. It involves seeking out and identifying issues on the borderline of those held in common with the negotiator concerned.Although former U.S. President Donald Trump prided himself on reaching a “deal,” his professional career was in real estate. Recent evidence suggests that he was sustained by the fortune secured by his father. Even to those—like myself—who were not opposed to President Trump’s outreach to the DPRK, after years of isolation, his negotiation technique was counterproductive.It began with his initial speech to the UN General Assembly, threatening the DPRK with destruction “like nothing seen before.’’ He then shifted his approach to a “bromance’’ with Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of the DPRK. He invited Kim first to Singapore and then to Hanoi. He plunged immediately into attempting to secure a deal regarding the most difficult subject for ultimate negotiation: nuclear weapons and long-range missile systems. As these were central to the protection and survival of the Kim family regime, the attempt quickly failed. That failure was compounded by the breakdown of the Hanoi summit on the morning of its second day. Whatever opportunity the U.S. president had from his surprising initiative was squandered and apparently wasted.The normal technique of diplomacy is to start at the outside of a circle of issues, negotiating first those issues, initially less significant, where there may be common ground and where limited agreements might be reached. This can then lead to more comprehensive agreements. Central, extremely difficult, issues are typically left to be addressed in later negotiations, especially if there is a chance of first building mutual respect and negotiating trade-offs.In its report, the COI was conscious of this diplomatic technique. Although its recommendations certainly included difficult subjects such as undertaking “profound political and institutional reforms without delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader’’ (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89a), it was accompanied by other recommendations susceptible to agreement.&nbsp;This included:&nbsp;<ul style="text-align: left;"><li>measures to ensure gender equality in practice;</li><li>the right to food without discrimination giving particular attention to the needs of women and vulnerable groups and to providing free and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid;</li><li>a moratorium on execution of the death penalty;</li><li>establishment of independent media and allowing citizens to freely access the Internet, social media, international communications, and foreign broadcasts;&nbsp;</li><li>abolition of the prohibition on foreign travel;</li><li>provision of full information to families of persons abducted;</li><li>ratification of human rights conventions;</li><li>establishment of a field-based presence with technical assistance from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights; and</li><li>introduction of postal services, restoration of railway and airline services, sporting links, and cultural links (COI Report, conclusions, para. 89).</li></ul>It would be desirable for COI+10 to have expert advice from diplomats, experienced in difficult international negotiations, to reflect upon how, in practice, success can be achieved where the initial differences between the parties are large and entrenched.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>REVIVING AWARENESS OF THE COI REPORTThe passage of 10 years has erased much of the impact caused by the COI report at the time of its issue. One of the problems of UN human rights reports is that they are usually not well published or circulated. A UN report will generally sink like a stone before the ink is dry. Real efforts were made by the COI to render its report accessible and readable. The fact that it was preceded by <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/co-idprk/public-hearings" target="_blank">a series of widely publicised public hearings</a> meant that, on publication, it was something of a sensation. It secured much international publicity. It provided detailed practical cases, based on evidence presented at public hearings, thereby identifying and personifying the human rights abuses found. It remains a different model for the writing of UN human rights reports.Although highly readable, no readily accessible version of the COI report was made available in print form. The electronic version was available online, but relatively little is known against the background of many other UN human rights reports. The 10-year anniversary affords an opportunity to reconsider creatively what can be done to better distribute the knowledge contained in this report. Perhaps if UN human rights reports were published in an improved format, there would be more follow-up. The COI report should be reconsidered for the lessons it provides for UN human rights reports more generally.The COI report, the annual reports on the DPRK’s human rights record, and other UN human rights reports should not be filed away and forgotten once delivered. There needs to be a regular system for considering their implementation and follow-up. Auditing the performance of mandate holders will also be more effective if there are available and readable reports.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: center;">UN HUMAN RIGHTS APPARATUS</div>COI+10 affords an appropriate opportunity to review the COI report in the context of the UN’s human rights apparatus more generally. To what extent did the innovations in the procedures of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK provide models that (a) have been followed in the HRC; or (b) should have been followed with or without variations? Inevitably, the immediate danger presented to the UN and international community by the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, the testing of such weapons, the development of further technology, and the risks of proliferation enliven international concern.Concern about abuses of universal human rights is important, but human rights issues tend to be regarded as endemic and less urgent when it comes to international action. Given the existential danger of nuclear weapons, the case of North Korea continues to provide an urgent reminder of the inadequacy and weakness of current international institutions to protect global peace and security, to uphold universal human rights and existential values, and to achieve justice. This is the basic lesson from the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK. The present dangers revealed in the COI report and the urgency of the problems disclosed therein have not been matched by enhanced and effective responses by the UN and the international community.<div style="text-align: left;"> </div>PRAGMATISM, REALISM, AND OPTIMISMReflecting on the last 10 years, there are many reasons for pessimism—even despair and alarm. We should use the 10th anniversary of the COI to reflect on whether humanity may take encouragement by reflecting on the alternative. What would have happened if there had been no COI or no UN?Since there is no immediate prospect of major changes to relevant international institutions, should we derive a measure of optimism about the present dangers to humanity that the world did its best? Does a practical and pragmatic approach support an optimistic perspective—that humanity usually muddles its way to survival and to accountability for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes? How, if at all, can we build on the experience of the COI on Human Rights in the DPRK to provide enhanced international remedies for grave wrongdoings that comes to light? Or are we doomed to an inescapable failure of the international community to respond quickly enough and effectively enough to the dangers to humanity? And if so, what precisely can we do to enhance human rights, international peace and security, and the attainment of justice?It would clearly be desirable for a report to be written about the engagements surrounding the 10th anniversary of the COI. This report should be followed by international dialogue and criticism. It should also be presented in an appropriate way to the UN Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the President of the UN HRC, civil society organisations, and national officials and experts.Those who silently accept the defects in the current response to the existential dangers that humanity faces are themselves part of the problem that threatens the survival of the human species. Edited for HRNK by Roberta Cohen, HRNK Co-Chair Emeritus</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2023/01/kirby-coi-tenth-anniv.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-VwHkKHXzjo7HJycHbJoPBD8Hon0ygE4J8zPFrFND6KzGqRvsnElUQgFQRwHOpZ2dW7p6n57FP1IxqmdMjlwNeuQ_EE02diR80CyR11xIa0RsM5NaYm5EG8BBZaA-5VB0BfSMd1khVJqLN-afzD37kX92fap9Sr2AM6zL96hYx0dfRkoiOQtvddycdg/s72-w640-h427-c/AdobeStock_308333318.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-9087183083004853814</guid><pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 17:00:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2022-12-16T12:26:28.334-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">NGO</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United Nations</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United States</category><title>Up Front: The Role of Civil Society in North Korean Human Rights</title><description><div style="text-align: left;">By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div style="text-align: left;">December 16, 2022</div><div style="text-align: left;"> </div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2VHM-h_LUr0RrBZ9Bmpb2z3gUfefzrh21UMN1WWapkddeVL7y_wp7ar9-E0Wul-LbPsK5rQ_oHa19vAmnF4HI09VUh_63dtLd73hYW73X_NheF3OiiQKOi03sSfsog4iX3N-ZQshFN7NKhEA9tw_4uPTeyblKAE_uRAOGa20-3kSEheAdeNAqMJe-Xg/s5000/AdobeStock_50936002.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3336" data-original-width="5000" height="429" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2VHM-h_LUr0RrBZ9Bmpb2z3gUfefzrh21UMN1WWapkddeVL7y_wp7ar9-E0Wul-LbPsK5rQ_oHa19vAmnF4HI09VUh_63dtLd73hYW73X_NheF3OiiQKOi03sSfsog4iX3N-ZQshFN7NKhEA9tw_4uPTeyblKAE_uRAOGa20-3kSEheAdeNAqMJe-Xg/w640-h429/AdobeStock_50936002.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div> NOTE: This essay is adapted from remarks delivered by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director, at an International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights organized by the Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Unification on Wednesday, December 14, 2022 in Seoul. He spoke during Session 2, which addressed “Roles of Civil Society and International Cooperation.” The other panelists were Professor Eun-Mee Kim (President, Ewha Womans University), James Heenan (Representative, UN OHCHR Office in Seoul), Joanna Hosaniak (Deputy Director-General, Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights), and Bum-Soo Kim (Executive Director, Save NK). The recorded livestream of the event can be viewed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sMWzUDwByFY">at this link</a>. Ambassador Lee Shin-Wha, thank you very much for the kind words and for the invitation to join this august group. I also would like to thank the Ministry of Unification for organizing this conference.Many words of wisdom have been uttered today. During the first session, Ambassador Lee Jung-Hoon and Professor Victor Cha mentioned a very important endeavor. How do we get Hollywood on board? How do we get celebrities on board?Remember that not too long ago, before their temporary hiatus, BTS met with President Joe Biden at the White House. Was there one word uttered about North Korean human rights? None. BTS is not just a K-pop band. BTS is a global cultural phenomenon. What a great opportunity. Where are the K-pop artists?Parasite was the first foreign movie to win the Oscars. They had the world's largest stage. Was there one word uttered about North Korean human rights, or the suffering people of North Korea? Not one. These are the type of challenges we are dealing with. This is where civil society must come in, and push as hard as we can.Of course, we understand that there are other important issues—political, security, military issues. We understand that there is a certain bias within the national security and diplomatic environment against this issue of human rights, which is sometimes perceived as a nuisance. As Joanna [Hosaniak] was mentioning, we are on the fringes. North Korean human rights is a fringe issue, practically.In order to understand North Korea, one has to look through the lens of a realist theory of international relations, if you will, even through the lens of offensive realism. From that viewpoint, I suffer from professional cognitive dissonance. I also spend my time as a Wilsonian liberal, trying to affect change through the improvement of the human rights situation in North Korea.These are all difficult issues that we have to address. We have to compete against other very important human rights crises across the world. This is not to discount the importance of attending to the other human rights crises. The North Korean human rights crisis—in particular, the North Korean refugee crisis—is a slow-motion crisis. There is somehow the impression that this is not as serious as the other terrible things happening in the world. This is where the role of non-governmental organizations (NGO) and civil society organizations (CSO) is very important.Yesterday, I was having a very interesting conversation with colleagues from the Ministry of Unification about the "three tribes." Ours is the human rights tribe. There is a humanitarian and engagement tribe. There is an unconditional peace tribe as well. Is it possible to bring the three together for the common cause of human rights, democracy, peace, prosperity, reconciliation, and eventual unification for Koreans?Our distinguished keynote speaker this morning, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, has provided us with two answers to how these three groups can be brought together. One of them is what he said this morning. Peace without human rights is meaningless. We have seen attempts at a peace declaration and peace resolutions for the Korean Peninsula. Of course, we are all in favor of peace, and there can be no peace without human rights. That is why the role of civil society is very important. We must remind everyone that there is no such thing as peace devoid of human rights.While he was Secretary-General, His Excellency Ban Ki-Moon on was very keen on the concept of "Human Rights up Front." As James [Heenan] knows very well, we have been using this term quite liberally in Washington, D.C. We have used this term to refer to an approach to national security and other issues that also factors in human rights and places it up front. In the case of the UN, of course, what it originally meant was that humanitarian interventions must be cognizant of the human rights situation.I would argue that progress on North Korea is no longer possible without factoring in human rights. We have been using the same methods to address North Korea for more than 30 years now, whether that involves the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks, the "Leap Day" agreement, or the summit meetings of the past few years. In a different shape and form, the same errors were committed again and again. Human rights is sacrificed on the altar of security, military, and political issues, which are—of course—very important. Where did that get us?I hear this all the time: "Oh, human rights in North Korea, that must be a short conversation." Well, I do not mean to take the problem lightly, but how about the nuclear weapons and missiles? How is that going?&nbsp;While not factoring in human rights, the North Koreans have reached the point where they have the capacity to launch 25 missiles during one single day. Perhaps it is time for a different approach that also factors in human rights.There are responsible UN member states, including the United States and our great allies in the Republic of Korea, that have a keen interest in preserving and improving the international system as we know it. We have nothing better in place. On the other hand, there are also revisionist powers that try to challenge it.U.S. NGOs and CSOs also feel the pressure. My organization was fortunate to acquire UN ECOSOC consultative status. My good friend Nam Ba-Da and our colleagues at PSCORE also have that consultative status and know how difficult it is to obtain it. Why do pro-democracy and pro-human rights organizations have such a hard time getting in? The answer is simple. Because revisionist powers, who are not exactly beacons of human rights or democracy, hold the key to access to the UN system through the NGO Committee. The only way to do it is to get rejected at the NGO Committee and then overturn it at ECOSOC. This takes support from many member states, including the United States, Canada, and the European Union. NGOs are also feeling this pressure, and North Korean human rights NGOs are also feeling this pressure.Very important issues have been mentioned today. CSOs can play a very important role in the implementation of these issues at the United Nations. For a few years now, the North Korean human rights issue at the Security Council has been discussed as "AOB," any other business. As Joanna [Hosaniak] was saying, crimes against humanity do not qualify as "any other business." They are much graver than just that. Following the UN Commission of Inquiry report in 2014, the issue was placed on the agenda of the UN Security Council for several years. This is a procedural matter. It takes 9 out of 15 votes of permanent and non-permanent members to hold a discussion. I can assure you that my colleagues in the audience and on the podium know that CSOs play a very important role in liaising with UN member states and UN agencies. Documentation is very important, and also providing this type of information is extraordinarily important.In the United States, we need a Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights to play the extraordinary role that Ambassador Robert King played until February 2017. He was more than just a Special Envoy. We in the NGO community know that he was our best friend and our cheerleader. It was very important to have that cheerleader in that position because of the difficulties we face.Here in South Korea, there is the eternal drama of the North Korean Human Rights Foundation. This issue has been politicized for far too long. Our South Korean friends, allies, and partners need to move beyond this. It will be for the benefit of not only NGOs based here in South Korea that address North Korean human rights, but also to all NGOs that work on the issue.Fundamentally, what we need is a paradigm shift, a paradigm shift that continues to address all of these important issues that threaten the lives of millions in Northeast Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and beyond. As we address these issues, it is also very important to include human rights in this new paradigm.This, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, is our greatest challenge moving forward.Thank you very much.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/12/up-front-role-of-civil-society-in-north.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh2VHM-h_LUr0RrBZ9Bmpb2z3gUfefzrh21UMN1WWapkddeVL7y_wp7ar9-E0Wul-LbPsK5rQ_oHa19vAmnF4HI09VUh_63dtLd73hYW73X_NheF3OiiQKOi03sSfsog4iX3N-ZQshFN7NKhEA9tw_4uPTeyblKAE_uRAOGa20-3kSEheAdeNAqMJe-Xg/s72-w640-h429-c/AdobeStock_50936002.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-7425758966900577772</guid><pubDate>Wed, 02 Nov 2022 19:30:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2022-11-02T16:01:17.347-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">human security</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><title>Long Overdue Paradigm Shift: A Human Rights up Front Approach toward North Korea</title><description>By Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive DirectorNovember 2, 2022<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><tbody><tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOXcXUAPNm-6O0jOk39c91_Pft8sqcUKtYpyLBv0T84awkfFXL2Xf1h8ywzYmciYN9Xqx-nVuRgJW5tQk1KBNtTKQ8uFU3rKjKhW2EOfhspiI3eTA9GVzYcp4yH6Wl1KtBCu3R-qvLJYnRJ1FGEAfUJd7h6oltLMERW7CaHBUZ0dd5Hu2cYYRped3UYw/s6000/AdobeStock_183559109.jpeg" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" data-original-height="4000" data-original-width="6000" height="427" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOXcXUAPNm-6O0jOk39c91_Pft8sqcUKtYpyLBv0T84awkfFXL2Xf1h8ywzYmciYN9Xqx-nVuRgJW5tQk1KBNtTKQ8uFU3rKjKhW2EOfhspiI3eTA9GVzYcp4yH6Wl1KtBCu3R-qvLJYnRJ1FGEAfUJd7h6oltLMERW7CaHBUZ0dd5Hu2cYYRped3UYw/w640-h427/AdobeStock_183559109.jpeg" width="640" /></a></td></tr><tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;">View of the Yeonggeumjeong Pavilion in Sokcho, on South Korea's east coast</td></tr></tbody></table> Today, November 2, North Korea launched 25 missiles. A ballistic missile landed just 40 miles (60 km) east of South Korea’s port town of Sokcho. North Korea perpetrated this massive provocation barely four days after the Itaewon tragedy that took the lives of 156 young people from South Korea, the United States, Australia, Austria, China, France, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. Instead of condolences and messages of solidarity, North Korea chose to threaten South Korea’s peace and security with its largest missile salvo ever.To procure the hard currency needed to develop its ballistic missile and nuclear programs, North Korea oppresses and exploits its own people at home and abroad. According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA), North Korea has spent up to $1.6 billion developing nuclear weapons, including six nuclear tests, since the 1970s. Those funds would have sufficed to buy up to 2.05 million tons of rice or 4.1 million tons of corn, the equivalent of four years’ worth of food for the entire North Korean population. According to KIDA, North Korea has spent 3 to 5 million dollars on short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), 10 to 15 million dollars on medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and 20 to 30 million dollars on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). North Korea spends about 2 percent of its $33.5 billion GDP on its missile launches.For thirty years, negotiations with North Korea and North Korea policy have sacrificed human rights for the sake of addressing nuclear weapons, missiles, and other military and security issues. Both the North Korean nuclear and missile programs have thrived. Sidelining human rights to appease the North Korean regime is not the answer, but a fundamental flaw in North Korea policy.Now is the time for a long overdue paradigm shift in addressing North Korea, an approach that places the human rights and human security of the North Korean people front and center. A "Human Rights up Front" approach toward North Korea would require: international access to North Korean political prison camps and other detention facilities; transparency and the ability to conduct unimpeded in-country fact-finding human rights and humanitarian missions; and providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable groups, in particular children, women, the elderly, and people in detention.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/11/long-overdue-paradigm-shift-human.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOXcXUAPNm-6O0jOk39c91_Pft8sqcUKtYpyLBv0T84awkfFXL2Xf1h8ywzYmciYN9Xqx-nVuRgJW5tQk1KBNtTKQ8uFU3rKjKhW2EOfhspiI3eTA9GVzYcp4yH6Wl1KtBCu3R-qvLJYnRJ1FGEAfUJd7h6oltLMERW7CaHBUZ0dd5Hu2cYYRped3UYw/s72-w640-h427-c/AdobeStock_183559109.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>1</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-7553915051559067782</guid><pubDate>Mon, 15 Aug 2022 18:38:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2022-08-15T14:53:45.914-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Information</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">unification</category><title>The Power of Information: Telling Three Stories to the North Korean People</title><description>By Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY_gysFIuWfVoiE4uus188Cv7hNFNHCjA21wqAq0t5d0TiLOiSWqIXvjskGuFmkR4oAYixyMSHlT6SxpO6qdNN2WJMo8-5Sepw4YvyaAV84dIC_xvE97XWd4w24mbQizX5rxDqh50GLWpOGCakQeoj1cLo3eSJgq7xs8enzXyirQPGmQKv6YIHA0EEDA/s5919/AdobeStock_458731651.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3946" data-original-width="5919" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY_gysFIuWfVoiE4uus188Cv7hNFNHCjA21wqAq0t5d0TiLOiSWqIXvjskGuFmkR4oAYixyMSHlT6SxpO6qdNN2WJMo8-5Sepw4YvyaAV84dIC_xvE97XWd4w24mbQizX5rxDqh50GLWpOGCakQeoj1cLo3eSJgq7xs8enzXyirQPGmQKv6YIHA0EEDA/s16000/AdobeStock_458731651.jpeg" /></a></div> NOTE: This essay is adapted from pre-recorded remarks delivered by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director, to the "<a href="https://www.globalpeace.org/content/international-forum-one-korea-2022" target="_blank">International Forum on One Korea 2022</a>" on August 13, 2022. Dear friends, distinguished ladies and gentlemen,I am delighted to join you today. It is always a pleasure and an honor to participate in events organized by the Global Peace Foundation. Let me thank my good and dear friend Kenji Sawai in particular for engaging me in this endeavor.Today, we are discussing the very important issue of sending information into North Korea. Fundamentally, as far as the United States is concerned, as far as like-minded friends, partners, and allies such as South Korea, Japan, and the European Union are concerned, we need to remember that we are facing a grave threat on the Korean Peninsula.It is a threat that combines the dozens of nuclear weapons that North Korea possesses, the long-range ballistic missiles that North Korea possesses, and also the crimes against humanity that the North Korean regime continues to commit to this day, almost a decade after the UN Human Rights Council decided to establish by consensus a UN Commission of Inquiry dedicated to looking into the regime’s human rights abuses and crimes against humanity.So, what is there to do?Applying the DIMEWe can analyze the issue by applying the “DIME” model. These are the four fundamental elements of national power: diplomacy, information, military power, and economic power.Let us begin with diplomacy. The North Korean regime has breached each and every international agreement it has ever entered. One could go back to the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. They decided to breach the terms of that agreement and develop a clandestine uranium enrichment program.The Six Party Talks, same story. The Leap Day Agreement of February 2012, right after Kim Jong-un assumed power, the same story. Ambassador Glyn Davies, at the time the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korea policy, met with Kim Kye-gwan. The North Koreans pledged to halt nuclear testing and ballistic missile testing. Two weeks later, they announced a so-called “satellite launch.” They proceeded with a missile launch that failed, two days ahead of the centennial anniversary of Kim Il-sung’s birthday. In December of the same year, they managed to place an object into orbit.To make a long story short, there is an utter lack of credibility on the North Korean side. We should blame the failure of diplomacy on the North Koreans, not on the U.S. or on South Korea. Despite those failures, as a student and practitioner of diplomacy, I believe that diplomatic efforts must continue.Next is military power, the “M” in the DIME. (I will address the “I” later since that is the focus of my remarks today.) Military power is crucial. Strong deterrence is very important. Strong containment is very important. A strong U.S.-South Korea alliance is critical. A strong U.S.-Japan alliance is critical. We need to continue to cherish our friendship, partnership, alliance with the Republic of Korea and Japan.Then there is economic power, “E” in the DIME. We have a sanctions regime in place, grounded in UN Security Council resolutions. We also have bilateral sanctions by the U.S., sanctions established by the U.S. Congress. Other allies, including the European Union and Japan, have their own sanctions in place.When it comes to UN sanctions, they are meant, first and foremost, to prevent the development and proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles. Moreover, they are meant to punish the elites in charge of that development and proliferation by severing their access to hard currency and luxury goods coming from the outside world.Are there negative adverse effects affecting the people of North Korea? We do not know because we do not have access inside the country. Access is of the essence. We now have a new UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Professor Elizabeth Salmón from Peru. We also have a new South Korean Ambassador-at-large on North Korean human rights, Professor Lee Shin-hwa of Korea University.I hope this will be at the very top of their agenda: requesting access inside the country to assess the humanitarian situation of North Korea. Why not assess side effects of sanctions, if there are any? Again, sanctions do not target the people of North Korea. But the only way to tell whether sanctions have a negative effect on the people of North Korea is by means of having access inside the country, by means of having UN officials go inside the country and conduct in-country assessments.The Power of InformationLet me now return to the “I,” which I initially skipped. Information is extraordinarily important. This is a regime that has stayed in power since its establishment in 1948 by means of unprecedented coercion, control, surveillance, and punishment. This is a regime that has gone to great lengths to prevent the people of North Korea from gaining access to information from the outside world across three regimes—the regime of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un.North Korea needs change. Let me commend the Global Peace Foundation for its vision of a unified Republic of Korea that is strong, peaceful, democratic, market-oriented, and a staunch ally, friend, and partner of the United States.How do we get there? I am not talking about a violent revolution or regime change. I am talking about change enacted by the only people who can actually enact change. They are the very people of North Korea. What can we do, in the outside world, to empower the people of North Korea?The Three StoriesWhat we can do is to send them information from the outside world—information basically telling them three fundamental stories. First, the story of the corruption of their leadership, especially the corruption of the Kim family regime. Second, the story of the outside world, especially that of South Korea, a free and democratic country with the world’s tenth largest economy. And third, the story of their own human rights, which they do not know.Let me first address the corruption of the regime. North Korea is a very strange hybrid. Entrepreneurship coexists with totalitarian regime control. Private property is not allowed in North Korea. North Koreans operate trucks, taxis, and cars as private entrepreneurs, but they do not hold property titles. In order to run those businesses, they need to register their vehicles under government agencies, under the protection of powerful officials. This is a recipe for great corruption. North Koreans need to understand that this is not how economies should operate.Second, many North Koreans know today much more about the outside world, including South Korea, than they did 10, 15, or 20 years ago. K-pop, K-drama, and anything “K-” are very powerful drivers of interest in South Korea's success. The North Korean people need to understand that South Korea is a very successful alternative to the Kim family regime’s North Korea. And they need to understand that the formula for Korean success is not the totalitarian dictatorship of the DPRK, but the very successful Republic of Korea (ROK).Human rights is another extraordinarily important story. North Korea joined the UN at the same time as South Korea in 1991. North Korea assumed international obligations as it became a UN member state. North Korea must observe the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. North Korea acceded to the two human rights covenants in 1982, nine years before it joined the UN: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It has also joined the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Children (CRC), and the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD).And yet, each and every conceivable human right is violated in North Korea.If you look at the Constitution of the DPRK or its other laws, you will see that there are wonderful stipulations that supposedly protect rights such as the freedom of religion and freedom of assembly. None of these rights are observed in practice. All that matters in North Korea are the Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology (TPMI) and Kim Il-sung-ism.Information campaigns coming in from the outside world must enable North Koreans to understand that there is a very deep rift between their Constitution and the regime’s ideology. There is a deep rift between the international obligations that North Korea has assumed and the TPMI.ConclusionUltimately, why are we doing this? I have been a student and practitioner of Korean Peninsula issues for the past 32 years. There are so many others of us out there. What we ultimately want is reconciliation, peace, unification of the Korean Peninsula under a free, democratic, and prosperous Republic of Korea. This is the ultimate key to resolving the North Korean conundrum: nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, egregious human rights violations, and crimes against humanity.</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/08/the-power-of-information-telling-three.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhY_gysFIuWfVoiE4uus188Cv7hNFNHCjA21wqAq0t5d0TiLOiSWqIXvjskGuFmkR4oAYixyMSHlT6SxpO6qdNN2WJMo8-5Sepw4YvyaAV84dIC_xvE97XWd4w24mbQizX5rxDqh50GLWpOGCakQeoj1cLo3eSJgq7xs8enzXyirQPGmQKv6YIHA0EEDA/s72-c/AdobeStock_458731651.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-492458497749980550</guid><pubDate>Mon, 25 Jul 2022 06:39:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2022-07-25T02:56:18.804-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">KoreanWar</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><title>The Forgotten South Korean Prisoners of War, Who Sacrificed and Suffered for Seven Decades for Korean Freedom</title><description>By Col. David Maxwell (U.S. Army, Ret.), HRNK Board Member<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg12C_LhvIgHk9NPNLN_RfH31s1RujvuUY8prhuWb5uSXhOvr8Qjj4Nxq5TUJwyg1tSOsEi8_hNQ97z0FCsytUDXUDCCCIXCj_QxOXmX4MQbF74W0uiWkalJ7ZGjp3Qv6qShqRnxZEK31RqDXutjoZy33Bt_fzm_Ac0ubS_9TaZX6jIo-69GfdvjcFCQg/s8192/AdobeStock_472877777.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="5464" data-original-width="8192" height="426" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg12C_LhvIgHk9NPNLN_RfH31s1RujvuUY8prhuWb5uSXhOvr8Qjj4Nxq5TUJwyg1tSOsEi8_hNQ97z0FCsytUDXUDCCCIXCj_QxOXmX4MQbF74W0uiWkalJ7ZGjp3Qv6qShqRnxZEK31RqDXutjoZy33Bt_fzm_Ac0ubS_9TaZX6jIo-69GfdvjcFCQg/w640-h426/AdobeStock_472877777.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div> NOTE: This essay is adapted from prepared remarks delivered at the "International Forum on Urging the Repatriation of Korean Prisoners of War and Human Rights Complaints," held in Seoul on July 20, 2022. It is also available <a href="https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-forgotten-south-korean-prisoners-of-war-who-sacrificed-and-suffered-for-seven-decades-for-korean-freedom/">at this link</a>.<div> </div>
The sixty-ninth anniversary of the Korean War Armistice is July 27, 2022. The war is known as the “Forgotten War.” One of the most forgotten aspects of the war are the South Korean prisoners of war who were never returned to the Republic of Korea (ROK). Although 8,134 South Korean prisoners were returned at the time of the Armistice, an estimated 50,000 South Korean soldiers were forced to remain in the north. These prisoners were subject to a life of extreme hardship, mostly mining coal for the regime in North Korea. In 2014, there were an estimated 500 still alive. Over the years, some 80 have escaped, bringing the truth about what happened to these Korean patriots who fought for freedom and were sentenced by Kim Il-sung to suffer for their sacrifices.<div> </div><div>I cannot imagine any human beings in the history of the world who have suffered so much for so long. They sacrificed the remainder of their lives since 1953 for the one thing they could never again experience: Freedom.</div><div> </div><div>We are all free today here in the Republic of Korea and around the world because these soldiers sacrificed their future and their lives in the name of freedom against the scourge of communism, a blight on the world that continues to persist in various forms in North Korea, China, and other places around the world. Had they not sacrificed so much we would not be here today, and we would never have witnessed the Miracle on the Han.</div><div> </div><div>We should all put ourselves in their shoes and think hard as to whether we could sustain a will to live and the ability to continue to live in the face of such inhumane and brutal treatment. Very few of us have endured a level of pain anywhere near theirs. And no one alive today has experienced that level of suffering for so long.</div><div> </div><div>Except for the family members who remained in the South. While they might not have suffered the same physical pain, they have suffered the loss of their loved ones that is made worse by not knowing their status, or whether they are dead or alive. They do not know where they are or where their remains are. They may never have closure.</div><div> </div><div>We believe there were some 50,000 South Korean prisoners forced to live as slaves to the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family regime. Except for the few who have been able to escape, they have lived out their lives in the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State of North Korea.</div><div> </div><div>In 2014, the UN Commission of Inquiry recognized them. Let me quote from paragraph 298 on page 84 of the report:</div><div> </div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div>Among those who suffered the most extreme discrimination were South Korean prisoners of war (POWs) retained in the DPRK after the armistice.</div><div> </div><div>Mr. Yoo Young-bok, a former POW who fled the DPRK and returned to the ROK, explained at the Seoul Public Hearing:
“Because we were POWs, we were discriminated against. They were looking down on us. Although we married North Korean women, our children were controlled, our children were kept under surveillance. They did not really give us good jobs; there were just no opportunities to make better lives for our children.”</div><div> </div><div>Another former POW from South Korea worked in a coal mine in North Hamgyong Province for 40 years. He told the Commission that about a quarter of the miners were POWs and were under particularly strict surveillance by the Ministry of Public Security and the State Security Department. The witness was regularly interrogated and his interrogators seemed to know many details about his life. He married and had three sons and two daughters. His sons were neither allowed to join the army nor go to university, and one asked him “Why are we even born?” His daughters were not able to marry a man of good songbun, because they were from a POW family. Even his grandsons were denied the opportunity to join the army or to obtain a tertiary education. The witness recalled how a POW friend hung himself because his children complained so bitterly to him about their situation yet he could not do anything about it.</div></blockquote><div> </div><div>Please put yourself in that father’s shoes and think about how your children would suffer in that situation and that there is nothing you can do for them. Thinking of the words of that father and his children makes my heart hurt.</div><div> </div><div>Although not described in the report, my assessment is that the evil regime decided to use these prisoners of war and establish a kind of slave caste that would eternally perpetuate a slave class to benefit the regime. They were allowed to marry so the regime would continue to have access to a slave labor pool in perpetuity. Such evil.</div><div> </div><div>Surely this is a crime against humanity without parallel. There is no greater example of cruelty and brutality and this will continue for as long as the Kim family regime survives.</div><div> </div><div>Their suffering is made worse because these POWs are the forgotten men of the “Forgotten War.” The lack of recognition is a terrible hurt for their families.</div><div> </div><div>The suffering of these POWs must be recognized and accepted in the South. It is time for the ROK government to recognize them and their families. Surely their sacrifices have contributed to all the greatness of the Republic of Korea today.</div><div> </div><div>Yes, it is shameful that they have never been properly honored and thanked for the contributions. However, South Korea is a strong democracy. And one of the hallmarks of a strong democracy is the ability to recognize and admit mistakes and take corrective action. Just as the ROK government is acting to investigate and hold accountable those responsible for the forced repatriation of the two fishermen in 2019, the ROK government can begin the long process to make things right for the families by recognizing what happened to their loved ones who were forced to remain in the north. They deserve recognition and respect. All freedom loving people should demand that they be recognized and honored.&nbsp;</div><div> </div><div>The strength of the ROK-U.S. alliance is that we share the values of freedom and individual liberty, liberal democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Both our countries pledge to not leave our fallen behind. Look at the efforts our militaries and governments undertake to try to account for and return all those missing in action. Look at the remains recovery operations that recently took place in the DMZ at White Horse and Arrowhead Ridge. The ROK military worked tirelessly to recover South Korean and allied remains and return them to their countries and families for proper honors. South Korea must make the same effort for all those prisoners left behind in North Korea in 1953. They and their families deserve the same recognition. In addition to recognition and respect, the remains of the prisoners who have died over the past seven decades need to be accounted for and recovered. Unfortunately, that is not possible for as long as Kim Jong-un remains in power.</div><div> </div><div>Yes, the likelihood of recovery is low as long as the Kim family regime remains in power. Closure for the ROK POWs and their descendants in the north and their families in the South will only come after there is a free and unified Korea. To return the remains and bring honor to their sacrifice we all must work toward a free and unified Korea. Then and only then will their sacrifices be realized.</div><div> </div><div>The real atrocity is that committed by the Kim family regime in the north. The regime needs to be held accountable. However, that is not likely to ever occur until there is drastic change in the north. This is because the root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.</div><div> </div><div>Frankly speaking, there will be no justice for these prisoners for as long as the regime exists.
More specifically, the only way we are going to see an end to the nuclear program and military threats as well as the human rights abuses and crimes against humanity being committed against the Korean people by the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime is through achievement of unification and the establishment of a United Republic of Korea that is secure and stable, non-nuclear, economically vibrant, and unified under a liberal constitutional form of government based on individual liberty, rule of law, and human rights as determined by the Korean people. We all must work to support a free and unified Korea. This is how we can honor the 50,000 heroes who sacrificed for our freedom and the freedom of all Koreans. The greatest gift that can be given to them is a free and unified Korea--in short, a United Republic of Korea (UROK).
</div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2022/07/the-forgotten-south-korean-prisoners-of.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg12C_LhvIgHk9NPNLN_RfH31s1RujvuUY8prhuWb5uSXhOvr8Qjj4Nxq5TUJwyg1tSOsEi8_hNQ97z0FCsytUDXUDCCCIXCj_QxOXmX4MQbF74W0uiWkalJ7ZGjp3Qv6qShqRnxZEK31RqDXutjoZy33Bt_fzm_Ac0ubS_9TaZX6jIo-69GfdvjcFCQg/s72-w640-h426-c/AdobeStock_472877777.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-2375916097039437879</guid><pubDate>Mon, 13 Dec 2021 05:05:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-12-13T00:40:06.625-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Japan</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">United Nations</category><title>Statement of Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director, at "International cooperation to resolve the abduction issue as a global issue" (Int'l Symposium hosted by the Government of Japan, December 11, 2021)</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">By Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director</h3><div> </div>NOTE:&nbsp;Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director, delivered pre-recorded video remarks at "<a href="https://abductees-2021.jp/english/">International cooperation to resolve the abduction issue as a global issue</a>," an international symposium that was hosted by the Government of Japan in Tokyo on Saturday, December 11, 2021. The full text of his remarks is reproduced below. The official video recording of the event can be accessed <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM_E4bih7zs&amp;t=7393s">at this link</a>. Dear Friends and Colleagues, Greetings and warm wishes. Let me begin by thanking the Government of Japan for the opportunity to address this extraordinarily important symposium. The entire world continues to struggle with the COVID pandemic. During these difficult times, we remember and pray for abductees from Japan and other countries as well as their families, who continue to seek closure and justice. For a brief time, early on, the DPRK’s Kim regime addressed COVID prevention as a public health threat. Then, it politicized COVID prevention, instituting draconian controls aimed at cracking down on factors threatening its grip on power, in particular informal markets, smuggled Chinese cell phones, and information coming in from the outside world. While the Kim regime claims that the DPRK is COVID-free, domestic and cross-border travel restrictions have taken a heavy toll on North Korea’s human rights and humanitarian situation. While food shortages are not as bad as the 1990s and the DPRK is likely not on the verge of a great famine, the humanitarian situation is dire. The international community needs access and transparency in order to assess the real humanitarian needs of North Koreans, in particular the needs of most vulnerable groups: Women, children, the elderly, and people in detention, especially political prisoners. The Biden administration has repeatedly emphasized human rights as a pillar of our U.S. foreign policy, an essential component of the core values we share with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other key allies, friends, and partners. The Biden administration has also underlined multilateralism as another pillar of our U.S. foreign policy. The Third Committee of the UN General Assembly has recently adopted its latest resolution on human rights in the DPRK. Regrettably, the DPRK continues to refuse to engage in dialogue with the United States or Japan. Moreover, the DPRK has repeatedly tested missiles, although only short-range. As the Kim regime continues to violate the human rights of its own people and threaten neighboring countries as well as international peace and security with its nuclear and missile development, family members of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea have continued to suffer. However difficult it may be, the international community must resolve this critical issue. The entire world will be undergoing a post-COVID reset. North Korea, as isolated as it is, will be no exception. North Korea’s trade with China will likely expand to previous levels. The international community may consider disbursing humanitarian assistance to North Korea, hopefully while upholding transparency, the need for access, and a human rights up front approach aimed to assist most vulnerable groups first. UN, U.S., Japanese and other sanctions do not target the ordinary people of North Korea, but simply aim to do away with the Kim regime’s development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. That said, Russian and Chinese attempts to float draft resolutions to unconditionally ease the North Korean sanctions regime will continue. As the DPRK undergoes a post-COVID reset, there can be hope for the North Korean people. Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has clearly signaled that he is ready to meet with North Korea’s leader face-to-face. I am certain that the governments and citizens of Japan and the United States would stand together, ready to assist the people of North Korea in seeking a bright future. This would be possible only if North Korea’s leadership made a strategic decision to change course, improve the human rights and humanitarian situation of its people, do away with its obstinate development of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other tools of death, and focus on development instead. Most importantly, if the North Korean leadership wishes to qualify for Japanese, U.S., and international humanitarian and development assistance, it must provide a full, final, and verifiable solution to the abduction conundrum. If abductees are still in North Korea, they must be reunited with their family members. If they passed away while held against their will in North Korea, their remains must be returned to their families and hometowns. Japanese families have suffered far too long, and so have the families of abductees from other countries. They deserve closure. They deserve to know the fate of their loved ones taken by the DPRK regime. They deserve to be reunited with their loved ones. As representative of the Washington, D.C.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), I am fully and painfully aware that a huge responsibility rests on the shoulders of human rights civil society organizations (CSOs). We have recently been informed that UN Economic and Social Council-accredited CSOs will be able to obtain UN passes and physical access, effective January 2022. While we have made the best of virtual programs under COVID, physical presence is important. I look forward to rejoining forces with CSOs from Japan and other like-minded democracies. I look forward to fully dedicating our minds, bodies, hearts, and souls to bringing closure and justice to Japanese abductees and their families. Their torment at the hands of the Kim regime must come to an end.<div> </div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/12/statement-of-greg-scarlatoiu-hrnk.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5583663746938521457</guid><pubDate>Fri, 15 Oct 2021 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-10-15T13:00:02.190-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">crimes against humanity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">DPRK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">FAO</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">HRNK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">humanitarian</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">UN</category><title>IN TIMES OF FOOD SCARCITY IN NORTH KOREA, FOOD-DEPRIVED POLITICAL PRISONERS SHOULD BE A PRIORITY FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">By Roberta Cohen</h3><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Edited by Raymond Ha, HRNK Director of Operations &amp; Research</h3><div> <div>NOTE FROM HRNK: This essay draws attention to the risks facing political prisoners as the food situation in North Korea worsens. Restrictions imposed by North Korea in response to Covid-19 have resulted in the withdrawal of most, if not all, international humanitarian staff from the country. As humanitarian aid to North Korea resumes, special attention should be paid to reaching the most vulnerable group in that country—those who are detained in political prison camps. Now is the time to plan steps that could be taken to better protect vulnerable populations in North Korea, who face serious risks due to lack of access to adequate food and medical care. This essay is based on an affidavit prepared by the author for the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and International Bar Association’s forthcoming Inquiry on Crimes Against Humanity in North Korean Detention Centers.<div> </div><div> <div><div>According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, North Korea is facing a severe food shortfall—a gap of at least 860,000 tons of food, which corresponds to two months’ supply.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn1">[i]</a> In ordinary times, more than 40 percent of North Korea’s population is food insecure, but conditions at present are said to be more dire. Damaging floods and the government’s Covid-19 restrictions have exacerbated the food shortage. International aid agencies have been prevented from operating and cross-border trading has been curtailed. State media openly speaks of a food crisis. In such conditions, the most food-deprived persons in the country should be identified and prioritized. But in North Korea, the government has created a food-deprived group isolated from the rest of the population: political prisoners. They are undoubtedly the first to be denied food when commodities are scarce and the last to receive food when it is available. In July 2021, the UN Secretary-General warned the international community that “there are risks that the food situation for detainees has worsened, as the food situation has become more acute for the general population.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn2">[ii]</a></div><div> The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on human rights in North Korea described the near starvation of prisoners in North Korea as a form of governmental “control and punishment” in its 2014 report.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn3">[iii]</a> The most in danger during times of crisis are those held in political prison camps (kwan-li-so). A North Korean official told the former German Ambassador that “people are only being sent there to die.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn4">[iv]</a> However, those held in long-term re-education through labor camps (kyo-hwa-so) and short-term detention facilities are also at risk, especially now that Covid-19 restrictions prevent families and friends from bringing food packages.</div><div> A total of 80,000 to 120,000 political prisoners are reported to be incarcerated in North Korea, with some sources estimating upwards of 200,000. In most cases, they are charged with ‘offenses’ that are not considered criminal in other countries: trying to leave the country without permission; trying to join relatives in South Korea or having a family member who does; listening to foreign news broadcasts; watching foreign movies and copying foreign speech and clothing; questioning or complaining about government policies, or having a family member who did; being caught up on the wrong side of a factional political dispute; possessing a Bible or organizing a Christian service; and more. During the pandemic, North Koreans who question or fail to adhere to official quarantine measures are reported to be placed in labor camps for challenging Party policy.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn5">[v]</a> In some cases, entire families of prisoners, including children, have been incarcerated on the basis of guilt-by-association (yeon-jwa-je).</div><div> Deaths in detention are known to be high. The UN COI estimated in 2014 that hundreds of thousands of prisoners perished over the past five decades from a combination of deliberate starvation, illnesses, forced labor, torture, and other brutality. It defined their deaths as “extermination,” which “can be carried out by imprisoning a large number of people and withholding the necessities of life so that mass deaths ensue.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn6">[vi]</a> With few exceptions, it has long been accepted practice for donors and aid agencies to refrain from requesting access to political prisoners, because of the political sensitivity of the issue and the fear of jeopardizing access to other vulnerable populations. Political prisoners, however, are undoubtedly the most vulnerable group in North Korea.</div><div> </div><div> <div style="text-align: left;">ON THE DENIAL OF ADEQUATE FOOD TO POLITICAL PRISONERS</div><div> </div>In the case of political prison camps (kwan-li-so) as well as long-term re-education through labor camps (kyo-hwa-so), the UN COI presented extensive evidence of the denial of adequate food to those detained. The COI also found evidence of limited access to food at short-term detention facilities.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn7">[vii]</a> In recent years, additional corroborating information has emerged regarding these short-term facilities. This information, presented below, shows how adequate food has been consistently denied from the time of arrest through interrogation and then in early short-term detention. Typically, prisoners detained in such facilities are held up to two years, at which point they may be released or transferred to long-term detention facilities. The following documentation attests to the inadequate food in short-term detention facilities:</div><div> </div><div><ol style="text-align: left;"><li>Interviews in 2019 and 2020 by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) with 25 former prisoners held in short-term facilities spanning a twenty-three year period (1996–2019) in the provinces of North Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, North Pyongan, South Pyongan, and Ryanggang.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn8">[viii]</a>&nbsp;The short-term facilities include: a) police interrogation/detention centers (An-jeon-bu ku-ryu-jang or&nbsp;ku-ryu-so); b) police stations (An-jeon-bu bo-an-so&nbsp;and&nbsp;bun-ju-so); c) Ministry of State Security (hereafter MSS) interrogation/detention centers (Bo-wi-bu ku-ryu-jang); d) short-term labor detention facilities (jip-kyul-so); and e) mobile forced labor brigades (ro-dong-dan-ryeon-dae).</li><li>Reports authored by David Hawk, a leading expert on North Korea’s prison camps and detention facilities, including The Hidden Gulag<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn9">[ix]</a> and The Parallel Gulag,<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn10">[x]</a> published by HRNK in 2012 and 2017 respectively.</li><li>The 2020 report of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human Rights Violations against Women Detained in the DPRK, based on 100 interviews of women detained between 2009 and 2019 (many in short-term detention facilities) after being forcibly repatriated from China.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn11">[xi]</a></li><li>The 2017 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights of the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), which compiled more than 500 cases of violations of the right to food in short-term detention facilities and found these violations to be “prevalent” throughout the country. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn12">[xii]</a></li><li>Information obtained over the past decade by the author from meetings with former North Korean prisoners, prison guards, and government officials, as well as officials and experts from other Asian countries, North America, and Europe.&nbsp;</li></ol><div> </div><div>LACK OF SUFFICIENT FOOD IN SHORT-TERM DETENTION FACILITIES </div>Witness after witness described the below-subsistence food rations provided at the short-term detention facilities run by the Ministry of Social Security (the police),<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn13">[xiii]</a>&nbsp;the Ministry of State Security (responsible for political crimes), or both in collaboration. Indeed, the diet provided over a period of two decades across different facilities constitutes a dangerously small fraction of minimal dietary requirements for average adults.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn14">[xiv]</a></div><div><o:p></o:p>Of course, during the great famine of the mid-1990s and subsequent periods of food scarcity, the state had little to provide prisoners. But even during periods when food was available, the authorities distributed substandard amounts to persons in detention centers, especially to those being punished on political grounds.&nbsp;</div><div> <div style="text-align: left;">The following quotes from the testimonies of former prisoners describe their daily diets in short-term facilities, spanning a nineteen-year period:</div> a) 2000: “small amounts of boiled mashed corn and salty radish leaf soup” (labor detention facility in Chongjin)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn15">[xv]</a> b) 2001: “corn soup made of whole grain unpeeled corn, amounting to three or four spoonfuls” (MSS facility in Onsong)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn16">[xvi]</a> c) 2002–3:“raw corn which had no nutritional value...not even peeled off or cleansed” (MSS facility in Onsong)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn17">[xvii]</a> d) 2005: “about 20 pieces [kernels] of corn” (labor detention facility in Chongjin)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn18">[xviii]</a> e) 2008: “only corn noodles about 2 kilograms for 200 people” (MSS facility in Hyesan)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn19">[xix]</a> f) 2009: “we really could only eat mice and corn pieces” (mobile labor brigade in Sinuiju)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn20">[xx]</a> g) 2010: “a small cup of boiled rice, about 150 grams per meal. Soup was made of dried cabbage and salt” (short-term detention facility in North Pyongan Province)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn21">[xxi]</a> h) 2011:“50 grains [of corn] at each meal...I counted the grains”(unnamed MSS short-term labor facility)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn22">[xxii]</a> i) 2012: “200 to 300 grains of corn three times a day” (unnamed MSS interrogation center)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn23">[xxiii]</a> j) 2012/13: primarily “corn that they couldn’t throw away that even the dogs did not want” (labor detention facility in Hyesan)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn24">[xxiv]</a> k) 2014: “five tiny rotten potatoes per meal” (unnamed police interrogation center)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn25">[xxv]</a> l) 2015: “five spoonfuls...boiled leftovers...three times a day” (MSS detention facility in North Hamgyong Province)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn26">[xxvi]</a> m) 2016: “a handful of corn per meal” three times a day (unnamed MSS detention center)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn27">[xxvii]</a> n) 2017: “50 grains of corn per meal” (unnamed police interrogation center)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn28">[xxviii]</a> o) 2019 (solitary confinement): “about 150 grams of food every day. I did not receive water” (held for one month and ten days at police facility in Onsong)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn29">[xxix]</a> p) 2019: 150 grams three times a day (MSS and police facilities in Onsong)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn30">[xxx]</a></div><div><a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn29"> </a>“I think they willfully made people starve in detention,” said one former prisoner to HRNK about his time at a mobile labor brigade in Hoeryong, North Hamgyong Province in 2001.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn31">[xxxi]</a> Others echoed the same sentiment: “I have...witnessed many people in the detention centers [Musan, Chongjin, Hyesan, Onsong, Pyeongsong] die of starvation even though the state has food that could be distributed”(2004–5).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn32">[xxxii]</a> Another former prisoner said that insufficient food “led to cases of starvation among the detainees” at a mobile labor brigade in Hoeryong in 2011.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn33">[xxxiii]</a> The UN OHCHR’S 2020 report described a “consistent pattern” of “grossly inadequate” food for women prisoners in both short-term and long-term facilities.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn34">[xxxiv]</a> Because constant and severe hunger was the daily predicament of many prisoners in these facilities, prisoners ate grass and other plants to survive, according to a former prisoner at a labor detention center in South Sinuiju in 2000.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn35">[xxxv]</a> Prisoners caught and ate mice at other facilities, but in many short-term detention facilities, especially overcrowded buildings, prisoners lacked access to the outside and could not even forage for grass, insects, or rodents.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn36">[xxxvi]</a></div><div> </div><div> Role of Families in Preventing Prisoner Starvation: One of the reasons prisoners incarcerated in long-term re-education through labor camps and short-term facilities have been able to survive is because their families and friends are able to bring food packages. (This is not the case in the political prison camps, which are operated by the MSS.) However, the Covid-19 lockdown in 2020 and 2021 has barred families and friends from visiting these facilities, and the food situation for prisoners has become even more precarious. Prior to the pandemic, there were difficulties in providing food packages to prisoners. Families could remain uninformed for months about the whereabouts of their loved ones, especially while they were in interrogation. Once family members found out the location of the detention facility, they often had to bribe guards to ensure that the food package was safely delivered. Sometimes, the guards stole or ate part of the food or sold it in the market. Visits could also be denied on an arbitrary basis.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn37">[xxxvii]</a> The UN OHCHR’s 2020 report points out that not all detainees received packages from their families, since not all were close by or had the capacity to do so. Prisoners who did not receive packages remained “vulnerable to malnutrition.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn38">[xxxviii]</a></div><div> When families were allowed to bring food, former prisoners acknowledged that the health of detainees typically improved. “Most of us survived only because of families and friends bringing food for us and if not, prisoners died from severe malnutrition and ultimately starvation, combined with constant hard work,” according to a former prisoner at a mobile labor brigade in 2011.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn39">[xxxix]</a> When family members were allowed to bring food “twice a week,” as was the case at a police detention facility in Onsong in 2019, conditions “got better,” said a former prisoner. However, from April 2019 until the prisoner’s escape in July, prison authorities stopped these visits without providing a reason, and prisoners began to become malnourished.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn40">[xl]</a> For those who were subject to hard labor for up to 10 or more hours a day, food was essential but not often provided. “Even when we were forced to do very hard labor,” the guards “barely provided food” (mobile labor brigade in Hoeryong, 2011).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn41">[xli]</a> The combination of inadequate food with forced labor added to the likelihood that prisoners would fall ill. “I was hungry all the time,” said a former prisoner at an MSS facility in Hyesan, Ryanggang Province in 2012–13. “[W]e received only very limited food...[while] we were made to do hard labor, including working on cleaning the railroads.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn42">[xlii]</a> Nor was clean water made regularly available. The UN OHCHR’s 2020 report recommended that North Korea make “drinking water available to every prisoner whenever she needs it.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn43">[xliii]</a></div><div><a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn42"> </a> </div><div>THE USE OF FOOD TO SICKEN AND PUNISH PRISONERS</div><div> Many detainees testified that the food provided by the state sickened them. At one MSS interrogation facility in 2017, a former prisoner testified: “Meals were carried in a bucket and the bucket was never cleaned and smelled terrible...I was unable to eat it.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn44">[xliv]</a> At many other detention facilities and over many years, different detainees repeatedly called the food provided by the state “rotten,” “inedible,” and causing “bad side effects.” “The only food that we were given was essentially waste...animal feed,” which caused many prisoners to suffer from diarrhea and other sicknesses such as enteritis, an inflammation of the small intestine commonly caused by food or drink contaminated with microbes (e.g., Chongjin MSS facility in 2001, Hyesan MSS facility in 2008).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn45">[xlv]</a> At an MSS facility in Hyesan in 2008, a former prisoner spoke of “at least two people in my cell who died from diarrhea or enteritis...I witnessed their deaths, and the prison authorities did nothing to help them.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn46">[xlvi]</a> At an MSS facility in Onsong, “a number of the detainees suffered from enteritis and starved to death” (2002–3).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn47">[xlvii]</a>&nbsp;This was also the case at multiple detention centers in North Hamgyong and Ryanggang provinces in 2004–5, where a former prisoner witnessed “many” detainees becoming ill. “I witnessed a large number of people die as a result.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn48">[xlviii]</a> Another former prisoner who suffered from an inflamed gall bladder received no medical help (police detention center in Hoeryong, 2009).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn49">[xlix]</a> Food was regularly used as a weapon of punishment and control. Some former detainees reported “having to drink dirty, contaminated water as collective punishment” (2004).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn50">[l]</a> Others reported “not being allowed to receive the dinner meal” as a form of punishment (mobile labor brigade in Chongjin, 2008).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn51">[li]</a> At a police interrogation/detention center in 2014, one former detainee stated, “I was starved on a few occasions...the MSS wanted to punish and pressure me, and therefore they did not allow me to get the meals [brought by family members].”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn52">[lii]</a> During interrogation, especially for cases concerning political crimes, “starvation” was “deliberately imposed on suspects to increase the pressure on them to confess and to incriminate other persons.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn53">[liii]</a> Sometimes, food was withheld from certain categories of prisoners as punishment. For example, pregnant women, especially those impregnated by Chinese ‘husbands,’ were reportedly denied food and water at a labor detention facility in Nongpo (Chongjin) in 1999.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn54">[liv]</a> At a mobile labor brigade in Hoeryong, “some young male detainees” were singled out and “treated so badly when it [came] to food” (2001)<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn55">[lv]</a>, while at an MSS facility in Chongjin, Christian prisoners “were treated very badly, with many beatings and little food” (2001).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn56">[lvi]</a>&nbsp;The teenage daughter of Christian missionaries at a police station in Hyesan was “not given food for almost two weeks” during interrogation (2004).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn57">[lvii]</a> According to another former prisoner, “The authorities aimed to hurt those who did not support the regime and/or belonged to the ‘wrong’ social class” (mobile labor brigade in Chongjin, 2003).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn58">[lviii]</a> In 2010, female prisoners who had been forcibly repatriated from China were told by prison guards that they were “traitors who deserved to die,” so they received little food and did not have access to medical treatment (police detention facility in South Hamgyong Province).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn59">[lix]</a> Detainees who stole food to survive, especially while working on farms, were punished severely. Guards at an MSS facility in Onsong were reported to have executed “dozens” for eating oxen (beef) in 2000,<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn60">[lx]</a> while at a short-term labor detention facility in Chongjin in 2002, a former detainee said that “I have…seen individuals executed for stealing a pig.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn61">[lxi]</a> In 2010, at a short-term detention facility in Ryanggang Province, a prisoner secretly ate uncooked rice while doing farm work, and “they put pebbles in my mouth and sealed it with adhesive tape, and they made me work” without food.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn62">[lxii]</a> When prisoners became so sick that they were in need of hospitalization, the authorities sometimes sent prisoners home. In some cases, families had to bribe the authorities or doctors to allow the sick prisoner to return home.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn63">[lxiii]</a> Clearly, prison authorities had neither the willingness nor the capacity to treat prisoners who became extremely sick, even though the insufficient food they provided—combined with the “lack of health care” and hard labor—had caused prisoners’ health to deteriorate.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn64">[lxiv]</a> In many instances, the bodies of detainees who died from starvation (and other causes) were thrown into unmarked graves.</div><div> </div><div>THE TOLL ON PRISONERS’ HEALTH</div><div> Inadequate food regularly jeopardized prisoners’ health, in many cases causing inflammation of body organs, as described above. The UN OHCHR also found that the “grossly inadequate quantity and poor quality of food,” fed to women prisoners “led to high levels of malnutrition…and the interruption of their menstrual cycles” (2009–19).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn65">[lxv]</a> Both male and female detainees who were held in short-term detention facilities for months lost considerable weight, making them weak and vulnerable to malnutrition and disease, including enteritis and tuberculosis.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn66">[lxvi]</a> Some prisoners described themselves as being reduced to “skin and bones.” Whether at an MSS facility in Hyesan (2008), an MSS facility in Musan (2003), or a labor detention facility in Chongjin (2002), prisoners spoke of how the denial of adequate food reduced their bodies to skeletons. “I weighed only 32 kilograms [70.5 pounds],” recalled one former prisoner.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn67">[lxvii]</a> Another individual, who “lost half his body weight” after three months in detention at an MSS facility in Sinuiju, collapsed from malnutrition and beatings and was sent home to die (2003).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn68">[lxviii]</a></div><div> </div><div> Impact of Food Deprivation on Children: It is well known that detained children are subjected to acute suffering, in part because they “ha[ve] no funds with them” with which to secure additional food by bribing guards. For example, at a mobile labor brigade in Chongjin, there were “many deaths of children from malnutrition or starvation” (2003).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn69">[lxix]</a> At an MSS facility in Musan in that same year, “almost all of the children were suffering from malnutrition, with a number of them dying from starvation.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn70">[lxx]</a> In 2003–4, at a labor detention facility in Hyesan, “more than 10 children died of starvation.... Other children survived but were suffering from extreme hunger and malnutrition.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn71">[lxxi]</a> At an MSS facility in Sinuiju in 2008–9, “hunger and starvation were rampant, particularly for children. Many children and young people were emaciated.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn72">[lxxii]</a> Considering that one in five non-incarcerated North Korean children suffer from stunted growth, one can only imagine the impact on incarcerated children when deliberately denied food in detention facilities. Further, it is almost certain that this deprivation also causes lasting emotional harm and irreversible intellectual deficits, in addition to the long-term physical impact on these children.</div><div> </div><div>DEATHS IN DETENTION</div><div> There is no question that inadequate food—either alone or in combination with forced labor, beatings, and lack of medicine and adequate healthcare—have resulted in deaths over the past twenty years. Thousands of North Korean detainees are estimated to die each year from the combination of starvation, beatings, labor exhaustion, lack of medicine, and disease. The UN COI’s report found that in short-term detention facilities, “many die from starvation, disease or injuries sustained during beatings and work accidents.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn73">[lxxiii]</a> The UN OHCHR’s report on women prisoners (2009–19) found that “The deprivation of food was at times so severe that detainees reportedly starved to death.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn74">[lxxiv]</a></div><div> </div><div>Testimony regarding deaths in specific short-term facilities can be found in the following: a) The UN COI’s report: for example, “After a month or two of imprisonment,” where prisoners were given starvation rations, “a lot of inmates died” (labor training facility in Hamheung).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn75">[lxxv]</a> b) Witness testimonies quoted in HRNK reports (2000–2009): <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn76">[lxxvi]</a></div><div> <ol style="text-align: left;"><li>“I witnessed many deaths due to starvation and unlivable conditions, around 35 individuals died in the Bo-wi-bu [MSS] that I know of due to starvation” (MSS facility in Onsong, 2000).</li><li>“There was at least one person dying every day from malnutrition - it was like an epidemic” (labor detention facility in Chongjin, 2003).</li><li>“Approximately 2,000 die...each year...We were told to keep track of how many prisoners died.... Of the 2,000 deaths each year, I knew a number of these individuals.... Some of the inmates died of starvation or malnutrition” (former prisoner-turned-prison administrator at mobile labor brigade in Chungsan, 2003–5).</li><li>“I saw a number of people die of starvation.... Starvation and extreme hunger were rampant in the facility” (mobile labor brigade in Pyeongsong, 2005).</li><li>Detainees “often suffer from starvation. I witnessed many detainees die” (at detention centers in Onsong, Chongjin, and Orang, 2004–5).</li><li>“I saw people die continuously. These deaths often resulted from malnutrition and untreated diseases” (mobile labor brigade in Musan, 1997, 2004, 2009).</li></ol></div></div></div><div style="text-align: left;">Prisoners continued to suffer from health problems after being released. Many former prisoners who managed to escape to South Korea continued to suffer from worms, gastrointestinal problems, and other ailments. One individual who was provided little food during detention in 2009 said six years later, “I caught tuberculosis [then] and have to take medicine now” and “My daughter still has a problem in her heart” (North Pyongan Province police labor detention facility).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn77">[lxxvii]</a> Not surprisingly, enduring psychological damage from trauma during detention also is common. “Since my release from the Kilju bo-an-so (police station) I have suffered from considerable mental and physical trauma which continues to this day” (2013).<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn78">[lxxviii]</a></div><div> </div><div> <div><div>PLACING THE ISSUE OF STARVATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA</div><div> In response to the increasing reports of starvation of North Korea’s prisoners, annual UN General Assembly resolutions have begun to list political prisoners in North Korea as a vulnerable group “suffering chronic and acute malnutrition”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn79">[lxxix]</a> and have called for the entry of international humanitarian organizations to North Korea’s “detention facilities.”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn80">[lxxx]</a> North Korea itself informed the UN in 2019 that it accepted the recommendation put forward by the&nbsp;government of Ireland at the UN’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) that the DPRK: grant immediate free and unimpeded access to international humanitarian organizations to provide assistance to the most vulnerable groups, including prisoners [emphasis added].”<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn81">[lxxxi]</a></div></div> Donors, UN agencies, and NGOs have nevertheless mostly refrained from requesting access to prisoners so as not to antagonize the North Korean government and possibly undermine aid going to other vulnerable groups. Human rights specialists, for their part, have cautioned that North Korea’s acceptance will doubtless not apply to prisoners in the political prison camps, whose existence the government denies,<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn82">[lxxxii]</a> and that a “Potemkin village”-type prison could be erected. However, the DPRK’s acceptance of the recommendation does offer an entry point for donors, UN agencies, and NGOs to request access to long-term re-education through labor camps and short-term detention facilities. North Korea should realize that it is in its own interest to allow humanitarian groups to treat prisoners with tuberculosis and other diseases, because this could benefit the wider community.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn83">[lxxxiii]</a> Gaining entry to and vaccinating prisoners against Covid-19 would also yield benefits for the broader population. In 2020, an NGO informed a U.S. Institute of Peace audience that the North Korean government had negotiated an MOU with an unnamed NGO to allow it access to prisoners with health problems.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn84">[lxxxiv]</a> The MOU had been negotiated prior to the U.S.-DPRK summit in Singapore, according to the NGO representative, but the DPRK pulled back when diplomatic tensions increased again. Surely it is time for donors, international agencies, and NGOs to develop a joint strategy that prioritizes the goal of reaching the most acute cases of hunger and disease in North Korea, which are found in its prison camps and detention facilities. Not only would this reinforce international humanitarian standards – e.g., reaching the most vulnerable and providing aid without discrimination, but a joint initiative would also help protect individual agencies from government retaliation. The UN COI, moreover, has warned that subjecting detainees to food denial on a systematic and widespread basis could constitute a crime against humanity, for which North Korea could be held accountable in an international criminal tribunal.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn85">[lxxxv]</a> Aid agencies, particularly those whose operations are visibly close to detention facilities, may be seen as complicit if they knowingly turn their heads away. Precedents exist in other countries for bringing assistance to prisoners, spearheaded by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). These precedents should be studied and built upon, with the goal of applying them to the DPRK. The UN’s Strategic Framework for the DPRK (2017–21), which governs the operations of UN agencies in the country, could be helpful. It affirms that the UN has a role in providing support to the DPRK in meeting its human rights commitments under the UPR. It therefore puts the UN in a position to offer its support to the North Korean government to help implement its acceptance of humanitarian entry to prisons, as noted above. The Strategic Framework also provides that the UN may offer support to North Korea in technical cooperation and training in international standards. With support from headquarters and donors, the UN Resident Coordinator in North Korea could feasibly bring onto the international humanitarian agenda the plight of incarcerated North Koreans who are badly in need of food and medical care. An episode in the ICRC’s history may be instructive. In 1989, the widely acclaimed organization decided to look back some fifty years to understand why it had provided so little help to those incarcerated in Nazi concentration camps during the Second World War. What its evaluators found was that ICRC staff and officials at the time feared that such advocacy could jeopardize their assistance to other groups, in particular POWs for whom they had a specific responsibility, and possibly undermine their relationship with the government. Overall, they had failed to grasp the extraordinariness of the situation. Today, the ICRC views this oversight as “the worst defeat” in its history.<a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_edn86">[lxxxvi]</a> The international humanitarian and development community owes it to long-suffering prisoners in North Korea and also to the integrity of their own missions to bring closer the human rights and humanitarian goals that lie at the foundation of their work.<div><div> ENDNOTES<div><div id="ftn1"><o:p></o:p></div></div><div> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="edn1"><div style="text-align: left;"><a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref1" name="_edn1" title="">[i]</a>&nbsp;FAO Crop Prospects and Food Situation, July 2021, p. 5, at&nbsp;<a href="http://www.fao.org/3/cb5603en/cb5603en.pdf">http://www.fao.org/3/cb5603en/cb5603en.pdf</a>. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref2" name="_edn2" title="">[ii]</a>&nbsp;UN General Assembly, “Report of the Secretary-General: Situation of human rights in the DPRK,” A/76/242, 28 July 2021, para. 16. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref3" name="_edn3" title="">[iii]</a>&nbsp;UN Commission of Inquiry,&nbsp;Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the DPRK, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014, para. 681 [hereafter UN COI report]. <o:p></o:p><a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref4" name="_edn4" title="">[iv]</a>&nbsp;Thomas Schaefer,&nbsp;From Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: How the Hardliners Prevailed&nbsp;(2021), p. 68. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref5" name="_edn5" title="">[v]</a>&nbsp;Mun Dong-Hui, “Violators of North Korea’s quarantine protocols sent to ‘total control zones,’”&nbsp;NK News, August 12, 2021; and “North Korea to Impose Hard Labor Sentences for Covid-19 Gathering Violations,”&nbsp;Radio Free Asia, August 11, 2021. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref6" name="_edn6" title="">[vi]</a>&nbsp;UN COI report, para. 1041. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref7" name="_edn7" title="">[vii]</a>&nbsp;UN COI report, paras. 1068, 1170, 1171. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref8" name="_edn8" title="">[viii]</a>&nbsp;U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, fifty testimonies taken in 2019–20 [unpublished, hereafter HRNK 2020]. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref9" name="_edn9" title="">[ix]</a>&nbsp;David Hawk,&nbsp;The Hidden Gulag&nbsp;(Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2012) [hereafter Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag]. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref10" name="_edn10" title="">[x]</a>&nbsp;David Hawk,&nbsp;The Parallel Gulag&nbsp;(Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2017) [hereafter Hawk,&nbsp;Parallel Gulag, 2017]. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref11" name="_edn11" title="">[xi]</a>&nbsp;Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,&nbsp;Human Rights Violations against Women Detained in the DPRK,&nbsp;July 2020, at <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26127&amp;LangID=E">https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26127&amp;LangID=E</a>&nbsp;[hereafter OHCHR 2020]. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref12" name="_edn12" title="">[xii]</a>&nbsp;Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB),&nbsp;2017 White Paper on North Korean Human Rights&nbsp;[hereafter NKDB 2017], p. 353.</div><div><a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref13" name="_edn13" title="">[xiii]</a>&nbsp;The Ministry of Social Security was formerly known as the Ministry of People's Security. See Jeongmin Kim, "North Korea likely renames Ministry of People's Security," NK News, June 3, 2020, at&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nknews.org/2020/06/north-korea-likely-renames-ministry-of-peoples-security/?t=1591178315505">https://www.nknews.org/2020/06/north-korea-likely-renames-ministry-of-peoples-security/?t=1591178315505</a>. See also "평양종합병원건설장으로 달려오는 마음," Ryugyong, June 2, 2020, at&nbsp;<a href="https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1591084868-679913493/%ED%8F%89%EC%96%91%EC%A2%85%ED%95%A9%EB%B3%91%EC%9B%90%EA%B1%B4%EC%84%A4%EC%9E%A5%EC%9C%BC%EB%A1%9C-%EB%8B%AC%EB%A0%A4%EC%98%A4%EB%8A%94-%EB%A7%88%EC%9D%8C/">https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1591084868-679913493/%ED%8F%89%EC%96%91%EC%A2%85%ED%95%A9%EB%B3%91%EC%9B%90%EA%B1%B4%EC%84%A4%EC%9E%A5%EC%9C%BC%EB%A1%9C-%EB%8B%AC%EB%A0%A4%EC%98%A4%EB%8A%94-%EB%A7%88%EC%9D%8C/</a>. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref13" name="_edn13" title="">[xiv]</a>&nbsp;Human Rights Watch,&nbsp;A Matter of Survival&nbsp;(2006), Appendix, p. 35; and UN COI report, paras. 539 and 804 (and note 1200). <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref14" name="_edn14" title="">[xv]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag, p. 141. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref15" name="_edn15" title="">[xvi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref16" name="_edn16" title="">[xvii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref17" name="_edn17" title="">[xviii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref18" name="_edn18" title="">[xix]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref19" name="_edn19" title="">[xx]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref20" name="_edn20" title="">[xxi]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, p. 353. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref21" name="_edn21" title="">[xxii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VI. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref22" name="_edn22" title="">[xxiii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VI. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref23" name="_edn23" title="">[xxiv]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref24" name="_edn24" title="">[xxv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VI. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref25" name="_edn25" title="">[xxvi]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, p. 357.&nbsp; <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref26" name="_edn26" title="">[xxvii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, para. 39. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref27" name="_edn27" title="">[xxviii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VI. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref28" name="_edn28" title="">[xxix]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref29" name="_edn29" title="">[xxx]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref30" name="_edn30" title="">[xxxi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref31" name="_edn31" title="">[xxxii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref32" name="_edn32" title="">[xxxiii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref33" name="_edn33" title="">[xxxiv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref34" name="_edn34" title="">[xxxv]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag, p. 124. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref35" name="_edn35" title="">[xxxvi]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Parallel Gulag, pp. 12–13. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref36" name="_edn36" title="">[xxxvii]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, pp. 346–8. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref37" name="_edn37" title="">[xxxviii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref38" name="_edn38" title="">[xxxix]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref39" name="_edn39" title="">[xl]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref40" name="_edn40" title="">[xli]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref41" name="_edn41" title="">[xlii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref42" name="_edn42" title="">[xliii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, para. 85. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref43" name="_edn43" title="">[xliv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VI. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref44" name="_edn44" title="">[xlv]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref45" name="_edn45" title="">[xlvi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref46" name="_edn46" title="">[xlvii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref47" name="_edn47" title="">[xlviii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref48" name="_edn48" title="">[xlix]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref49" name="_edn49" title="">[l]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag, p. 135. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref50" name="_edn50" title="">[li]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref51" name="_edn51" title="">[lii]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, Annex 2, VII. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref52" name="_edn52" title="">[liii]</a>&nbsp;UN Commission of Inquiry,&nbsp;Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the DPRK, A/HRC/25/63, 7 February 2014, para. 58. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref53" name="_edn53" title="">[liv]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag, p. 138. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref54" name="_edn54" title="">[lv]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref55" name="_edn55" title="">[lvi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref56" name="_edn56" title="">[lvii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref57" name="_edn57" title="">[lviii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref58" name="_edn58" title="">[lix]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, pp. 356–7. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref59" name="_edn59" title="">[lx]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref60" name="_edn60" title="">[lxi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref61" name="_edn61" title="">[lxii]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, p. 354.&nbsp; <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref62" name="_edn62" title="">[lxiii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020; and Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref63" name="_edn63" title="">[lxiv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref64" name="_edn64" title="">[lxv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref65" name="_edn65" title="">[lxvi]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref66" name="_edn66" title="">[lxvii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref67" name="_edn67" title="">[lxviii]</a>&nbsp;Hawk,&nbsp;Hidden Gulag, p. 127. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref68" name="_edn68" title="">[lxix]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref69" name="_edn69" title="">[lxx]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref70" name="_edn70" title="">[lxxi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref71" name="_edn71" title="">[lxxii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref72" name="_edn72" title="">[lxxiii]</a>&nbsp;UN COI report, para. 822. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref73" name="_edn73" title="">[lxxiv]</a>&nbsp;OHCHR 2020, para. 40. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref74" name="_edn74" title="">[lxxv]</a>&nbsp;UN COI report, para. 822. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref75" name="_edn75" title="">[lxxvi]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref76" name="_edn76" title="">[lxxvii]</a>&nbsp;NKDB 2017, p. 353. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref77" name="_edn77" title="">[lxxviii]</a>&nbsp;HRNK, 2020. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref78" name="_edn78" title="">[lxxix]</a>&nbsp;See UN General Assembly Resolution on Situation of human rights in the DPRK, A/C.3/70/L.35, 30 October 2015, para. 4.&nbsp; <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref79" name="_edn79" title="">[lxxx]</a>&nbsp;See UN General Assembly Resolution on Situation of human rights in the DPRK, A/C.3/73/L.40, 31 October 2018, paras. 2(vi), 5, 16 (m). <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref80" name="_edn80" title="">[lxxxi]</a>&nbsp;UN Human Rights Council, Recommendation 126.58, Report of the Working Group on the UPR: DPRK, A/HRC/42/10, 25 June 2019. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref81" name="_edn81" title="">[lxxxii]</a>&nbsp;David Hawk,&nbsp;Human Rights in the DPRK: The Role of the United Nations&nbsp;(Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2021), p. 93.&nbsp; <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref82" name="_edn82" title="">[lxxxiii]</a>&nbsp;World Health Organization, at <a href="http://www.who.int/tb/challenges/prisons/en/">http://www.who.int/tb/challenges/prisons/en/</a>; and <a href="http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/prisons-and- health/who-health-in-prisons-programme-hipp">http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/prisons-and- health/who-health-in-prisons-programme-hipp</a>; and see Daniel Wertz, “A Chance for Progress in North Korean Human Rights,”&nbsp;The Diplomat, November 11, 2014. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref83" name="_edn83" title="">[lxxxiv]</a>&nbsp;Daniel Jasper, “Lost Generation: Health and Human Rights of North Korea’s Children,” Panel, U.S. Institute of Peace, January 31, 2020,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqTbbSg3re4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqTbbSg3re4</a>. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref84" name="_edn84" title="">[lxxxv]</a>&nbsp;UN COI report, paras. 1068, 1170, 1171. <a href="applewebdata://4CBD3A3A-C333-4FB7-A1A4-9E2A0D490C32#_ednref85" name="_edn85" title="">[lxxxvi]</a>&nbsp;Edward Cody, “Study says Red Cross did too little to help Jews in WWII,”&nbsp;Washington Post, February 17, 1989, at <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/02/17/study-says-red-cross-did-too-little-to-help-jews-in-wwii/85c70ae0-2bd5-421f-95c9-f7a57ac5f5a5/">https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1989/02/17/study-says-red-cross-did-too-little-to-help-jews-in-wwii/85c70ae0-2bd5-421f-95c9-f7a57ac5f5a5/</a>.</div><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn2"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn4"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn5"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn6"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn7"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn8"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn9"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn10"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn11"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn12"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn13"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn14"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn15"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn16"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn17"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn18"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn19"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn20"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn21"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn22"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn23"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn24"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn25"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn26"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn27"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn28"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn29"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn30"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn31"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn32"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn33"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn34"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn35"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn36"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn37"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn38"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn39"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn40"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn41"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn42"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn43"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn44"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn45"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn46"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn47"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn48"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn49"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn50"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn51"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn53"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn54"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn55"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn56"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn57"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn58"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn59"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn60"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn61"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn62"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn63"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn64"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn65"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn66"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn67"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn68"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn69"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn70"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn71"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn72"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn73"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn74"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn75"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn76"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn77"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn78"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn79"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn80"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn81"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn82"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn84"><o:p></o:p></div><div id="edn85"><o:p></o:p></div></div></div><style class="WebKit-mso-list-quirks-style">
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</style></div></div></div></div></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/10/in-times-of-food-scarcity.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-7397780980697765128</guid><pubDate>Mon, 07 Jun 2021 19:57:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-06-07T16:00:23.052-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">European Commission</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">European Union</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><title>HRNK Letter to High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell Fontelles </title><description>Josep Borrell Fontelles High Representative/Vice-President European Commission Belgium<div> May 18, 2021 Dear High Representative Borrell, Greetings and warmest regards. I am writing to you on behalf of the Board of Directors and staff of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), based in Washington, D.C., ahead of the upcoming EU-US summit in Brussels next month. We are very happy to see that both the European Union and the United States are committed to revitalizing the Transatlantic relationship, working in close cooperation to address the global challenges ahead. We believe the upcoming summit would be an excellent opportunity for the European Union and the United States to discuss a coordinated approach to bring human rights, security, and denuclearization to all people on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. The European Union and the United States enjoy a strong partnership, rooted in shared interests and fundamental values, including freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Both are forces of good on the international stage and can work together to strengthen the call for human rights and the rule of law. North Korea’s ongoing crimes against humanity and its disregard for a rules-based international order remain urgent and challenging. Thus, it would be a logical step to join forces and work together towards a breakthrough. Historically, the European Union’s role in multilateral diplomatic events involving the Korean Peninsula, such as the Geneva Agreed Framework or the Six-Party Talks, has been limited and could be strengthened. As a global leader with human rights and multilateralism at the core of its external actions, the European Union has great potential to contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, working towards the improvement of North Korean human rights and global security in the process. Several European Union member states are in the unique position of having an embassy in Pyongyang and the European Union itself has been a provider of humanitarian aid since 1995. We encourage the European Union to resume political and human rights dialogue with the North Korean regime as well as to continue to address the dire human rights situation in North Korea in multilateral and bilateral settings, such as United Nations fora and the upcoming summit. As you prepare for the EU-US summit, we therefore humbly submit that North Korea should be on the agenda, and that a focus on North Korea’s human rights situation would send a strong but vital message that the European Union and its like-minded allies have a strong and committed approach to upholding human rights for those who suffer under regimes committing atrocities.&nbsp;</div> HRNK is a non-partisan, non-profit human rights organization based in Washington, DC. Since our founding in 2001, we have sought to raise international awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea through the publication of well-documented reports and outreach activities in support of the recommendations in those publications. HRNK has UN ECOSOC special consultative status, and is certified with the EU Transparency Register Should you have any questions, HRNK stands by ready to assist. As the leading non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, we have a strong commitment to upholding universal human rights values and improving the lives of the North Korean people. If I may be of any assistance to you and your team, please ask your staff members to contact me directly at executive.director@hrnk.org. Thank you very much for your kind attention and consideration. Yours sincerely, Greg Scarlatoiu Executive Director Committee for Human Rights in North Korea </description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/06/hrnk-letter-to-high-representativevice.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-4012855055218935190</guid><pubDate>Mon, 07 Jun 2021 19:42:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-06-07T15:42:01.374-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Diplomacy</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><title>HRNK Letter to The Honorable Antony J. Blinken </title><description>The Honorable Antony J. Blinken 71st U.S. Secretary of State CC: The Honorable Philip T. Reeker Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs The Honorable Lisa J. Peterson Senior Official for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights and Acting Assistant Secretary Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Mr. Mark Libby Charge d’affaires of the U.S. Mission to the European Union Ms. Kami A. Witmer Acting Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Mission to the European Union May 25, 2021 Dear Secretary Blinken, I am writing to you on behalf of the Board of Directors and staff of the Washington, D.C.-based Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK), ahead of the upcoming U.S.-EU summit in Brussels next month. We salute the Biden administration’s commitment to revitalizing the Transatlantic relationship and working in close cooperation with our allies and partners. We believe the upcoming summit would be an excellent opportunity for the United States and the European Union to discuss a coordinated approach to bring human rights, security, and denuclearization to the Korean Peninsula. The United States and the European Union enjoy a strong partnership, rooted in shared interests and&nbsp;fundamental values, including freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Both are forces of good on the international stage and can work together to strengthen the call for human rights and the rule of law. North Korea’s ongoing crimes against humanity and its disregard for a rules-based international order remain urgent and challenging. President Biden’s new North Korea policy, exploring diplomacy and a firm stance on human rights, denuclearization, and sanctions, has much in common with the EU’s policy of critical engagement towards North Korea. It would be a logical step to join forces and work together towards a breakthrough in North Korean human rights and denuclearization. As you prepare for the U.S.-EU summit, we respectfully submit that North Korea should be on the agenda, and that a focus on North Korea’s human rights situation and the situation facing North Koreans seeking resettlement in South Korea and other countries would send a strong and vital message that the United States and our European allies have a strong and committed approach to upholding the human rights of those who suffer under regimes committing atrocities. As the United States and the European Union are looking for avenues of cooperation and ways to reinforce traditional multilateral diplomacy, addressing North Korean human rights could amount to a concrete case along the lines of such revitalized collaboration. HRNK stands by ready to assist, if our expertise is needed. As the leading U.S.-based non-partisan, nongovernmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy, we have a strong commitment to upholding universal human rights values and improving the lives of the North Korean people. We thank you for your dedication to human rights and your service to our nation. Thank you very much for your attention and consideration. Yours sincerely, Greg Scarlatoiu Executive Director Committee for Human Rights in North Korea</description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/06/hrnk-letter-to-honorable-antony-j.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-8770734020755299706</guid><pubDate>Thu, 03 Jun 2021 15:12:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-06-03T11:12:04.459-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">human rights council</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">human trafficking</category><title> HRNK Letter to Her Excellency Ms Siobhán Mullally</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn1">[1]</a>,<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn2">[2]</a> Submission for the 47th regular session of the Human Rights Council (21 June to 15 July 2021)<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn3">[3]</a></h3><h4 style="text-align: left;">By Greg Scarlatoiu, Amanda Mortwedt Oh, Rick Herssevoort, and Damian Reddy</h4><div>HRNK is a non-governmental organization (NGO) with special consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). NGOs with special consultative status are invited to submit written statements to the Human Rights Council of up to 1,500 words. <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8vnAtZlHgirTrSfRtwySbXZwfj4HkpZmHpmaFgkKRiwc_u6JOzuZ5S1j4KnolCIbB7plUCh-gAT8a8tdWPMlrVQebex06gW06oQCEzQ9W8r26gBthpt2ETI_wJoE8ujpLzWvNcDonyjRY/s2048/AdobeStock_284963763.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1367" data-original-width="2048" height="429" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8vnAtZlHgirTrSfRtwySbXZwfj4HkpZmHpmaFgkKRiwc_u6JOzuZ5S1j4KnolCIbB7plUCh-gAT8a8tdWPMlrVQebex06gW06oQCEzQ9W8r26gBthpt2ETI_wJoE8ujpLzWvNcDonyjRY/w640-h429/AdobeStock_284963763.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div> May 31, 2021 Excellency, The US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) wishes to thank you for your work on combating trafficking in persons, especially women and children. We ask to bring your attention to the plight of North Korean women and children in particular, who are victims of trafficking based on the policies and practices of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This remains a serious and life-threatening concern for vulnerable North Koreans now more than ever during the COVID-19 pandemic. As you know, the definition of “trafficking in persons” according to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Trafficking in Persons Protocol)<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn4">[4]</a> provides that exploitation is the express purpose of trafficking in persons. Exploitation includes forms of sexual exploitation and forced labor. Based on twenty years of experience as a Civil Society Organization (CSO) focusing on North Korean human rights, we see a continued pattern of exploitation by the DPRK and PRC against vulnerable DPRK persons, especially women and children. The DPRK acceded to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto (Palermo Convention)<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn5">[5]</a> on 17 June 2016 but has not acceded to or ratified the Trafficking in Persons Protocol.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn6">[6]</a>Regardless, the General Assembly adopted the Trafficking in Persons Protocol as part of the Palermo Convention as per paragraph 2. Based on the DPRK’s agreed upon international human rights covenants, the DPRK has a positive obligation to protect individuals from human rights abuses by private actors and an obligation to respect human rights. However, in the case of the DPRK, it also acts as an “organized criminal group,” particularly regarding the use of forced labor or modern-day slavery.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn7">[7]</a> The DPRK is not only a perpetrator of modern-day slavery, but it also maintains the highest prevalence of slavery in the world.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn8">[8]</a> The DPRK ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) that states at Article 8(3)(a), “No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.” While this article does not preclude hard labor as a punishment for a crime, international human rights law prohibits the arbitrary detention and inhumane treatment of prisoners. The UN Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the DPRK has established that the DPRK has been committing crimes against humanity, including against prisoners in DPRK prison camps.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn9">[9]</a> The DPRK state imprisons those suspected of disloyalty as political prisoners and forces them to engage in labor that has repeatedly been reported as causing death and disease. We draw your attention to the DPRK’s criminal code. Article 221 of the DPRK’s 2015 Criminal Law makes it a crime to “illegally” cross the border. Except for the few privileged elites with exceptional songbun (loyalty-based social-political class) in the DPRK, the North Korean people are prohibited from traveling within their country and abroad. This is a violation of the right to liberty of movement under Article 12 of the ICCPR. Under Article 63 (Treason to State), a North Korean who “defects to a foreign country in betrayal of the country...shall be committed to more than five years of reform through labor.” Reform through labor for an indefinite period or the death penalty and confiscation of property can also be imposed “in case of an extremely grave crime.” In fact, these laws amount to political discrimination at the highest levels and have led to death through forced labor due to the harsh punishment meted out by the DPRK’s internal security forces operating its prison facilities. North Koreans who are caught attempting to flee their country, or worse, arrested in China by PRC security officials and forcibly repatriated are deemed traitors to their country. Since 2018 HRNK has conducted a project with the International Bar Association to document evidence of crimes against humanity in North Korea’s detention facilities. Of the 55 former DPRK prisoners interviewed, women who had stayed in the PRC, as evidenced by their language skills, by having children in the PRC, or being pregnant upon forcible repatriation from the PRC, were seen as traitors to the DPRK state by the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and at times treated more harshly. Prisoners repeated the sentiment from prison officials that women with ‘half-Chinese’ babies or “Chinese seed” were traitors to their country. Prisoners recalled forced abortions and/or times when pregnant women were forced to work in the fields despite needing medical care. In addition, if there is evidence indicating a woman might have tried to flee the DPRK to the Republic of Korea (ROK) or was in contact with a Christian church, the more likely she is to be deemed a political traitor to Kim Jong-un. As a result, she is more likely to undergo extensive and brutal interrogation by the MSS, including a forced pregnancy test and forced abortion if she is pregnant by a man from the PRC. She may then be disappeared to one of the DPRK’s six known political prison camps. In these camps, prisoners are almost never released and serve life sentences until they succumb to crimes against humanity perpetrated inside the prisons. Family members of these prisoners may be sent to these prisons too, regardless of the DPRK’s legislation known to the international community. Even if the Criminal Law is adhered to, serving a year or less in a mobile labor brigade, for example, is known to result in prisoner deaths due to the previously mentioned lack of food and medicine, harsh forced labor, grossly inadequate prison conditions, and prisoner abuse, including torture, sexual violence, and inhumane treatment. HRNK has interviewed hundreds of North Korean refugees who had no choice but to escape their country, although they faced forcible repatriation by the PRC and interrogation, torture, and imprisonment upon return to the DPRK as highlighted above. Many North Korean refugees have been women and children. Women have assumed primary responsibility for the survival of their families after the collapse of the DPRK’s public distribution system in the 1990s. That was the time of the famine referred to as the “Arduous March.” Difficult circumstances have continued to define the lives of North Koreans since that time. Due to this vulnerability, the DPRK’s domestic legislation that contravenes its own international human rights obligations, and its known policies and practices that result in crimes against humanity, it is especially women and children who have been exploited by human traffickers on both sides of the Sino-DPRK border. Many of these women and girls’ stories reference sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) at the hands of the trafficker, the Chinese ‘husband,’ or the Chinese husband’s family (and sometimes all three). A major contributor is the lack of options in China to be recognized with any legal status and/or apply for asylum despite China’s international legal obligations, namely the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. If forcibly returned to the DPRK, North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution, involving harsh interrogation, torture, imprisonment, and in some cases death. For trafficking victims and those escapees on the run, this causes their existence in the PRC to be highly secretive, only known to the trafficker and his or her buyers and perhaps some in the rural villages where the North Korean women and girls now live. In the midst of today’s coronavirus pandemic and in light of the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on ROK CSOs and churches in the PRC that had been assisting North Koreans in crisis, women and girls face a heightened risk of SGBV as they have fewer options to escape. They have likely been pushed deeper into isolation, hiding, and confinement due, in part, to the coronavirus as well as discriminatory and oppressive DPRK and PRC policies.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn10">[10]</a> The DPRK must reconsider Articles 63 and 221 of its criminal code and must cease and desist those state policies and practices that contribute to this cycle of oppression and violence affecting North Koreans. In addition, the PRC acceded to the Trafficking in Persons Protocol on 8 February 2010.<a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftn11">[11]</a> Under Article 7, the PRC should “consider adopting legislative or other appropriate measures that permit victims of trafficking in persons to remain in [its] territory, temporarily or permanently, in appropriate cases” and “shall give appropriate consideration to humanitarian and compassionate factors.” HRNK calls for a continued human rights-based approach to combating trafficking in persons, especially women and children, in the DPRK and the PRC. Thank you, Your Excellency.<div> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="color: purple;" title="">[1]</a>&nbsp;More information on the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, is available at&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/trafficking/pages/traffickingindex.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/trafficking/pages/traffickingindex.aspx</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn2"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="color: purple;" title="">[2]</a>&nbsp;Ms. Siobhán Mullally’s bio is available at&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Trafficking/Pages/SiobhanMullally.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Trafficking/Pages/SiobhanMullally.aspx</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn3"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="color: purple;" title="">[3]</a>&nbsp;More information on the 47th regular session of the Human Rights Council (21 June to 15 July 2021) is available at&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session47/Pages/47RegularSession.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session47/Pages/47RegularSession.aspx</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn4"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="color: purple;" title="">[4]</a>&nbsp;Available at&nbsp;<a href="https://ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/ProtocolTraffickingInPersons.aspx</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn5"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="color: purple;" title="">[5]</a>&nbsp;United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, entry into force 29 September 2003,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf" style="color: purple;">https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERETO.pdf</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn6"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="color: purple;" title="">[6]</a>&nbsp;Available at&nbsp;<a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&amp;chapter=18&amp;clang=_en" style="color: purple;">https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&amp;chapter=18&amp;clang=_en</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn7"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="color: purple;" title="">[7]</a>&nbsp;For a discussion of the DPRK’s practice of forced labor overseas, see HRNK Executive Director Greg Scarlatoiu’s statement to the U.S. Congress in 2015 at&nbsp;<a href="https://hrnk.org/events/congressional-hearings-view.php?id=11" style="color: purple;">https://hrnk.org/events/congressional-hearings-view.php?id=11</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn8"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="color: purple;" title="">[8]</a>&nbsp;Available at&nbsp;<a href="https://downloads.globalslaveryindex.org/ephemeral/GSI-2018_FNL_190828_CO_DIGITAL_P-1621963158.pdf" style="color: purple;">https://downloads.globalslaveryindex.org/ephemeral/GSI-2018_FNL_190828_CO_DIGITAL_P-1621963158.pdf</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn9"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="color: purple;" title="">[9]</a>&nbsp;Human Rights Council,&nbsp;Report of the detailed findings of the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea&nbsp;-A/HRC/25/CRP.1, 7 February 2014,<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx" style="color: purple;">&nbsp;</a><a href="https://ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoIDPRK/Pages/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn10"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="color: purple;" title="">[10]</a>&nbsp;Available at&nbsp;<a href="https://unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2020/4/5e998aca4/displaced-stateless-women-girls-heightened-risk-gender-based-violence-coronavirus.html" style="color: purple;">https://unhcr.org/uk/news/press/2020/4/5e998aca4/displaced-stateless-women-girls-heightened-risk-gender-based-violence-coronavirus.html</a>.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn11"><a href="applewebdata://C1E6855B-AE71-4B85-AA89-3E32B3D9F2B6#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="color: purple;" title="">[11]</a>&nbsp;Available at&nbsp;<a href="https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&amp;chapter=18&amp;clang=_en#1" style="color: purple;">https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&amp;mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-a&amp;chapter=18&amp;clang=_en#1</a>.&nbsp;<o:p></o:p></div></div></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/06/hrnk-letter-to-her-excellency-ms.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8vnAtZlHgirTrSfRtwySbXZwfj4HkpZmHpmaFgkKRiwc_u6JOzuZ5S1j4KnolCIbB7plUCh-gAT8a8tdWPMlrVQebex06gW06oQCEzQ9W8r26gBthpt2ETI_wJoE8ujpLzWvNcDonyjRY/s72-w640-h429-c/AdobeStock_284963763.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-692854820075871558</guid><pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2021 22:08:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-04-15T19:17:55.950-04:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Day of the Sun</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">DPRK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">HRNK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Il Sung</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Regime</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><title> The True Identity of the North Korean Dictator, Hidden Behind the Mask of “Great Leader”</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">On the occasion of North Korea’s First Dictator Kim Il-sung’s birthday, April 15, 2021</h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"> By Kim Myong Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director</h3> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEixykMP774DlmKjnr5amtfplYAlnya1-hB3oQAAf_YVBdNbu2gadR9vYwUsYf1QZgn9C84Psq6Lc35KmUC5Q-UuPddu5QsXzyoyuCchLTgQwsU6m-2cNqnXjeU6DqneL3Nj75pZfpvvTUha/s594/Kim_Il-sung_in_1950.jpeg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="594" data-original-width="439" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEixykMP774DlmKjnr5amtfplYAlnya1-hB3oQAAf_YVBdNbu2gadR9vYwUsYf1QZgn9C84Psq6Lc35KmUC5Q-UuPddu5QsXzyoyuCchLTgQwsU6m-2cNqnXjeU6DqneL3Nj75pZfpvvTUha/w295-h400/Kim_Il-sung_in_1950.jpeg" width="295" /></a></div> Today marks the 109th birthday of the late dictator Kim Il-sung, revered in North Korea as the “Great Leader” and “Founder” of the country.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[1]</a> Whether they dislike him or not, the North Koreans are forced to celebrate Kim Il-sung's birthday as the "Day of the Sun," even after he died at the age of 82 in July 1994. Kim Il-sung was a tyrannical despot who ruled the northern half of the Korean peninsula for nearly five decades after liberation from Japanese imperial rule to leave his country and people in unendurable agony. Despite this infamous stigma associated with his name, the North Korean propaganda outfits keep saying: “On April 15, 1912, the Great Sun of Juche made an appearance in the universe, enabling Korea to enlighten the whole world, and bringing changes of the century to this land, which had been characterized only by backwardness and poverty.” They inspire a cult of personality of the Great Leader in the hearts of the North Korean people, encouraging them to live with “honor and pride” as citizens of “the glorious Kim Il-sung’s homeland that shines in his name and personal achievements.” When Korea was liberated, in the wake of World War II, from the 35-year-long colonial rule by Japan, Kim Il-sung returned home, wearing a double mask of “national hero” and “liberator.” In reality, he was a Soviet-backed agent who had been influenced and tamed for Stalin.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[2]</a> Enjoying the full support of the Soviet Union,<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[3]</a> he proceeded with the establishment of a communist regime in North Korea. In June 1950, he invaded South Korea in order to reunify by force the entire peninsula under communism. Due to his reckless belligerence, the Korean people in the South and the North were victimized by the tragedy of a fratricidal war (1950–1953), which resulted in the loss of millions of lives and the demolition of the fragile economic infrastructure. In the postwar period, Kim Il-sung continued to build his own style of communist dictatorship in North Korea and enslaved his people, who faithfully supported him and the Korean Workers’ Party, an apparatus for realizing the Kim family’s dictatorship. In addition, he opted for a national development strategy giving priority to military buildup over the civilian economy. The end results of his long-lasting politics were economic failure, poverty, and widespread hunger. After living for a long time as a slave of the Kim family in North Korea, I have finally resettled in the Free World with a fresh mind open towards the world. When I was younger, I used to think: “What if the North Korean army that went down to the line of the Nakdong River during the Korean War had not retreated, but instead, continued fighting and won the war?” And I was inclined to answer: “If so, we would be living a happy life in a paradise built on the reunified land.” That is because I accepted the poverty and misery I was living under as an unavoidable consequence of the national division, and not as the result of mismanagement by the Kim family. Even today, some of my fellow countrymen in the North are reasoning in the same way that I did long ago and continue to obey the authority and power of the Kim dynasty. By unveiling the truth of Kim Il-sung’s identity, hidden behind his mask of “Great Leader,” I want to help them avoid these logical fallacies.Kim Il-sung was not the Liberator of KoreaMany North Koreans, who are fooled by the regime’s propaganda, continue to believe that Kim Il-sung was the “liberator” of the country. I was one of them before my exposure to the outside world.<div> </div><div>The North Korean authorities tell the people that Kim Il-sung initiated the Korean revolution in 1926 by founding the Down-with-Imperialism Union in Huadian, Jilin province, China, and that he led for 20 years the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle for victory by engaging in numerous fierce fights on Mt. Baekdu to accomplish the historical feat of national liberation. Without his armed struggle, Korea would still remain a Japanese colony, and the Koreans would not have escaped the fate of colonized people. According to North Korean education on Kim Il-sung’s “history of revolutionary activities,” he convened a conference of Korean military leaders in Xiaohaerbaling, China in August 1940, where he put forward new strategic guidelines that the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army (KOPRA) should be prepared proactively for the great event of national liberation. Later, in order to preserve and accumulate the force of the KOPRA, he switched over from large-unit operations and movement to small-unit operations, and established multiple secret camps on Mt. Baekdu, from where he issued guidance over the anti-Japanese struggle inside and outside of Korea. When the defeat of Japan drew to a close in August 1945, Kim Il-sung issued an order to launch a final offensive for the liberation of the country, upon which KOPRA started the military operation to defeat Japan and liberated Korea.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[4]</a> North Korea is reluctant to reveal the historical facts surrounding Kim Il-sung’s life from the early 1940s until August 1945. Only a few facts have been presented in a processed format in his autobiographical memoirs, “With the Century,” that covered, partially and from his own perspective, what his life was like in the Far East after the 1940 Xiaohaerbaling conference.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[5]</a> In fact, it was known that Kim Il-sung had been exiled to the Soviet Union’s Far East region in November 1940 to escape the large-scale “punitive” military operations of the Japanese Kwantung Army, and stayed there for five years until Korea was liberated. During this time, he was admitted into the 88th Special Brigade founded by the Soviet Union with a mix of Chinese and Korean guerillas, and received special military training, including Russian-language courses and parachute jumps.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[6]</a> However, in his memoirs, Kim Il-sung skipped all the details unfavorable to forging his “glorious” image and wrote that the 88th Special Brigade itself had been established on his own initiative in preparation for Korean liberation. On the other hand, history recorded that there existed several people by the name of Kim Il-sung, who participated in the anti-Japanese independence movement in the 1930s and 1940s, and it turns out that the North Korean leader pasted other Kims’ military achievements into his own biography, which explains how North Korea’s history education on Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese armed struggle was actually fabricated.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[7]</a> Above all, Kim Il-sung and his guerilla units did not participate in the final offensive for the liberation of the country. Before the defeat of Nazi Germany, the leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union gathered in Yalta in February 1945 to discuss the post-WWII issues, including the management of the soon-to-be defeated Nazi Germany. At this meeting, they agreed, among other things, that the Soviet Union would be engaged in defeating Japan after the surrender of Nazi Germany. Consequently, the Soviet forces participated in the Pacific War against Japan in mid-August 1945, advancing from the northern border of Korea and contributing to Japan’s surrender. They occupied the area north of the 38th parallel on the Korean Peninsula to help the North Korean dictator build a communist regime. Contrary to historical facts, the North Korean propaganda still supports Kim Il-sung’s claim that his guerilla units played a leading role in the liberation of the country, while the Soviet army played only a “secondary” role. In this way, North Korea has made Kim Il-sung the “Savior of the Nation,” who liberated and saved the Korean people from Japanese oppression and occupation, as part of their effort to instill the cult of personality for the Great Leader. Since the Kim Il-sung era, the governments of the Soviet Union and North Korea have exchanged congratulatory messages on Korean Independence Day, August 15. The North Korean authorities were often reluctant to get the full text of the Soviet message translated into Korean for their population when it contained a sentence saying that “Korea was liberated by the sons and daughters of the great Soviet Union.” The Korean Liberation Monument, on Moran Hill in Pyongyang, to which limited access was given to a few people, was engraved with the following words on its front and rear walls, depicting a sharp contrast with North Korea’s claim that Kim Il-sung was the liberator of the country:<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[8] </a> <blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;">Front: “The great Soviet people defeated Japanese imperialism and liberated the Korean people. Thanks to their blood shed for Korean liberation, friendship between the Korean and Soviet peoples has ever been strengthened. This Monument has been built to express the appreciation of the whole Korean people. On August 15, 1945.”&nbsp;<div> </div><div>Rear: “Glory to the Great Soviet Army who liberated the Korean people from the Japanese militarists’ occupation and opened the way to freedom and independence. On August 15, 1945.”</div></blockquote><div> These words, prepared for the Soviet people when the monument was erected, tell us how hypocritical the North Korean regime was in forging its Great Leader’s history. Being so naïve and innocent as to only believe the North Korean propaganda, I thought that these words reflected the vain pretension of the Soviet chauvinists who consider themselves liberators of Korea. Today, when I come to know the truth of history, these words give me a feeling of great disappointment and disgust for the Soviet Union, which converted the northern half of the Korean Peninsula into a field of confrontation between communism and capitalism, and manipulated Kim Il-sung as their puppet to keep North Koreans from entering the path of free and democratic development. Kim Il-sung Destroyed Democracy in the Korean Workers' Party In any society, a political party is an organization in which people gather with the same interests or political opinions and to achieve a set of common goals. There may be variation in the methods of achieving a party’s goals. Democracy allows all members of the party to freely express their ideas to contribute to developing and adopting a common political platform. It is inevitable during this process that multiple factions break into smaller groups within the party. As a form of political democracy, the existence of factions should be allowed and their free activities should be respected. This is particularly true in the case of North Korea, which is a one-party state. Competition among the factions may give rise to some unwanted results, such as mismanagement of the party, inefficiency, and excessive political disputes.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[9]</a> However, like a multi-party system that positively impacts the building of democracy and political stability, competition among the factions, if properly managed, may contribute to strengthening of democracy within the party, fostering political elites and encouraging the diversity of policy options. The factions may ultimately expand the party's public support, strengthen its legitimacy, and amplify the likelihood of its adaptation to the existing political environment.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[10]</a> Since the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) was founded through the merger of several pre-existing political parties, there were multiple factions inside the party. This was a natural phenomenon, which provided a good opportunity for it to be developed democratically under the mutual control and influence of those various factions. The KWP originated from the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea,<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[11]</a> founded in October 1945 and renamed the Communist Party of North Korea (CPNK) in 1946, which became the Workers’ Party of North Korea as a result of the merger of the CPNK with the New People’s Party of Korea. Finally, the current KWP was established in June 1949 when the Workers’ Party of North Korea merged again with the Workers’ Party of South Korea.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[12]</a> Consequently, when the KWP took shape by the end of 1949, there already existed four competing and mutually reinforcing factions in the party—namely, the Guerilla faction led by Kim Il-sung, the Soviet Koreans’ faction led by Ho Ka-i, the Chinese Yanan faction led by Mu Chong, and the Workers’ Party of South Korea faction led by Pak Hon-yong. In the 1960s, the new Kapsan faction led by Pak Kum-chol separated from the Guerilla faction.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[13]</a></div><div> For Kim Il-sung, who had earlier planned to take full control of the KWP, the other factions were a thorn in his side that he would have to eliminate as soon as possible. He waited until he could justify his action. From the early 1950s, when the Korean War broke out, to the mid-1960s, he purged and eliminated, one by one, all the leaders and elite members of the other factions, by holding them accountable for failures of the party and state affairs or for making a failed attempt to overthrow him. By the late 1960s, he succeeded in establishing his unique leadership in the KWP (see Box 1).</div><div> <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTableGrid" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; color: black;"><tbody><tr><td style="border: 1pt solid windowtext; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 467.5pt;" valign="top" width="623">Box 1: Purges of the factions inside the Korean Workers’ Party, from the 1950s to the 1960s 1. Workers’ Party of South Korea faction: Unlike other factions that received support from China or the Soviet Union, the Workers’ Party of South Korea faction had no external sponsor and was therefore in the weakest position. Before the end of the Korean War, leaders of the faction, Pak Hon-yong and Yi Sung-yop were arrested and removed from power, charged for spying for the United States and planning a coup against Kim Il-sung. Along with some other members of the faction, they were sentenced to death and executed after the war, while others were sent to forced labor camps. The faction was virtually wiped out in North Korea. 2. Soviet Korean faction: During the Korean War, Kim Il-sung drove from power Alexei Ivanovich Hegai (also known as Ho Ka-i), leader of the Soviet Koreans faction, whom he considered a potential rival, for the delayed repair of a water reservoir. He got rid of him through an alleged “suicide” in 1953. When Pak Chang-ok and other Soviet Koreans challenged his leadership in cooperation with the Yanan faction in 1956, Kim Il-sung convened a plenary session of the KWP in August to expel them from their positions in the Party. The Soviet Korean faction was disbanded and most of the members returned to the Soviet Union. 3. Chinese Yanan faction: Kim Il-sung attacked the leadership of the Yanan faction during the Korean War when he was driven to the Chinese border. He blamed Mu Chong, a leader of the Yanan faction, for the failure of the military operations and expelled him and other military leaders, including Pak Il-u, minister of the interior and personal representative of Mao Zedong, from the KWP. In August 1956, when Choe Chang-il and other leading members of the Yanan faction devised a plan to attack Kim Il-sung, he accused them of being “anti-Party and anti-revolutionary factionalists” and dismissed them from the KWP and their positions. Several leaders fled to China to escape the purges, and Kim Tu-bong, a leader of the faction and nominal head of state, not directly involved in the “August incident,” was ultimately purged in 1958, accused of being the “mastermind” of the plot. He disappeared after removal from power. In the same year, the Yanan faction ceased to exist. 4. Domestic Kapsan faction: During the second conference of the KWP in 1966, members of the Kapsan faction sought to introduce economic reforms, challenge Kim Il-sung’s cult of personality, and appoint their leader Pak Kum-chol as his successor. Kim Il-sung cracked down on the faction in a series of speeches made at party meetings. At a plenum of the KWP in April 1967, he completed the purges of all members of the Kapsan faction, accusing them for poisoning the Party with bourgeois ideology, revisionism and the feudal Confucian ideas. They were executed or sent to political prison camps. By eliminating the last faction that challenged his leadership, Kim Il-sung succeeded in establishing a one-man rule inside the KWP by the end of 1960s.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[14]</a></td></tr></tbody></table> Today, North Korea has become a one-party state in which the KWP dominates everything.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[15]</a> Like his predecessors, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un decides on all the policies issued by the KWP. Democracy exists only on paper. A totalitarian rule has been established inside the KWP where all the party members have no right to be heard, but have the obligation to obey the instructions of the dictator and his policies. Truth Behind Kim Il-sung’s Legacy on Denuclearization In the 21st century, North Korea's nuclear weapons program poses tremendous challenges to the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula, in Northeast Asia, and the rest of the world, undermining the foundation of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The development of nuclear technology by this country goes back to the Kim Il-sung era, as early as the mid-1950s, immediately after the Korean War ended. The initial effort to lay the foundation of a national nuclear energy program was covered under layers of “peaceful” purposes as they required technological assistance from nuclear powers, the Soviet Union in particular (see Annex I). Passing through Kim Jong-il’s rule, and in the era of the current dictator Kim Jong-un, North Korea no longer hides its intention to weaponize nuclear technology. It is no exaggeration to say that the country’s ultimate goal is to be recognized as a nuclear weapons state outside of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), like India and Pakistan, by possessing as many sophisticated nuclear weapons and various types of vehicles capable of carrying and delivering nuclear warheads as possible. As the Free World was never ready to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang declared that denuclearization had been the will of the late Kim Il-sung and claimed that their nuclear development program had been the result of the external environment, such as the United States’ “hostile policy” toward North Korea. Kim Jong-un himself, has not forgotten to recall the same formula in front of a high-level South Korean delegation that visited Pyongyang in March 2018 as well as when he paid his long-awaited first “courtesy call” to Chinese President Xi Jinping during the same month.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[16]</a> Fooled by Kim’s rhetoric, the current South Korean government wanted to grant indulgence to the North Korean dictator, who had fanatically tested fired nuclear missiles until the previous year, by advertising loudly that he had clearly shown his “intention” to denuclearize the country. In fact, Kim Il-sung’s legacy on denuclearization, which no one believes anymore even inside North Korea, was invented in the mid-1990s when US-North Korea bilateral negotiations were underway amid tensions over the country’s suspected nuclear development program. Since then, North Korea has been consistently referring to this rhetoric to mislead the international community, even when they carried out a series of nuclear tests. Of course, by now, everyone can understand that Kim Il-sung wanted nuclear weapons. If Kim Il-sung had ever affirmed, while he was alive, that he wished his country to remain nuclear-free forever, this “teaching” by the Great Leader would have been upheld and implemented without condition. And if North Korea developed nuclear weapons by overlooking his will, this should have been regarded as evidence of contempt and disloyalty to the Great Leader. Historically, the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” had already been adopted by the two Koreas and entered into force in 1992. This was followed by the confirmed withdrawal of all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. Kim Il-sung knew about this before he died in 1994. As described above, Kim Il-sung took the initiative of nuclear development in the mid-1950s and consistently pursued the program over the years as an important project of his government. As such, there would be a logical contradiction in the claim that he made a sudden U-turn towards a nuclear-free North Korea before he died. Moreover, given North Korea’s continued progress in its nuclear program in the post-Kim Il-sung era, and its inclination to use the particular terminology of “denuclearization of the Korean peninsula” over “denuclearization of North Korea,” it would be more realistic to assume that Kim Il-sung had never wanted his country to be free of nuclear weapons. Instead, Kim Il-sung might have wished for North Korea to continue to develop nuclear weapons to bargain with the United States for its “wish list items”—e.g., lifting of economic sanctions, provision of security guarantees for North Korea, removal of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea, or the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. If Kim Jong-un had again brought up the outdated argument—an argument already dismantled by the international community almost three decades ago, when he made his debut on the international diplomacy stage in 2018—it would have shown that he was under tremendous pressure by the economic sanctions against North Korea. Kim Jong-un is still hoping to preserve his nuclear weapons as a way of safeguarding the survival of his regime and family, and to forever maintain his family’s dictatorship. As long as the Kim family is sitting on the throne in North Korea, the prospects of its denuclearization seem uncertain and out-of-reach. Nevertheless, an alternative, reasonable way of achieving denuclearization peacefully would be to keep ramping up maximum pressure on North Korea through concerted actions of the international community, including China and Russia, until the day that Kim Jong-un decides to give up all of his nuclear weapons and nuclear program. And this day will come when he admits that his regime can longer survive with nuclear weapons because it will be on the brink of collapse when the costs of nuclear development outweigh the gains resulting from the possession of such nuclear weapons (see Figure 1). Figure 1: Modeling of North Korea's denuclearization based on cost-benefit analysis The critical moment when Kim Jong-un decides to give up his nuclear weapons will come when the cost of nuclear development are higher than the benefits obtained by possessing nuclear weapons, that is, when the cost-benefit ratio R &gt; 1.0.<v:shapetype coordsize="21600,21600" filled="f" id="_x0000_t75" o:preferrelative="t" o:spt="75" path="m@4@5l@4@11@9@11@9@5xe" stroked="f"><v:stroke joinstyle="miter"><v:formulas><v:f eqn="if lineDrawn pixelLineWidth 0"><v:f eqn="sum @0 1 0"><v:f eqn="sum 0 0 @1"><v:f eqn="prod @2 1 2"><v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelWidth"><v:f eqn="prod @3 21600 pixelHeight"><v:f eqn="sum @0 0 1"><v:f eqn="prod @6 1 2"><v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelWidth"><v:f eqn="sum @8 21600 0"><v:f eqn="prod @7 21600 pixelHeight"><v:f eqn="sum @10 21600 0"></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:f></v:formulas><v:path gradientshapeok="t" o:connecttype="rect" o:extrusionok="f"><o:lock aspectratio="t" v:ext="edit"></o:lock></v:path></v:stroke></v:shapetype><v:shape id="Picture_x0020_1" o:spid="_x0000_i1025" style="height: 282pt; visibility: visible; width: 421pt;" type="#_x0000_t75"><v:imagedata o:title="" src="file:////Users/rosapark/Library/Group%20Containers/UBF8T346G9.Office/TemporaryItems/msohtmlclip/clip_image001.png"></v:imagedata></v:shape><o:p></o:p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ4Oos0p36caDsrg_rCNEQh1PKDjMMNM_LSN1M3NRdoFYn7tO2ZgdKogMfR1I2m66iYk8blDuC_5ByxbkSagJMgTf5zV8zmoQ77e3oTCpacBmUDfOwiy1WrtQ8g1XtxWQpHocoY0-pogfr/s1643/Picture1.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1006" data-original-width="1643" height="392" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ4Oos0p36caDsrg_rCNEQh1PKDjMMNM_LSN1M3NRdoFYn7tO2ZgdKogMfR1I2m66iYk8blDuC_5ByxbkSagJMgTf5zV8zmoQ77e3oTCpacBmUDfOwiy1WrtQ8g1XtxWQpHocoY0-pogfr/w640-h392/Picture1.png" width="640" /></a></div> Source: Developed by the author. Explanatory notes: R = Y1/Y2</div><div>Y1 = A + B + C + D + E R: Cost-benefit ratio Y1: Total costs of nuclear development A: Military expenses B: Economic losses caused by the sanctions C: Opportunity cost associated with economic development by giving up nuclear weapons D: Social unrest associated with popular grievances due to economic hardship E: International isolation Y2: Total benefits associated with safeguarding of the regime ensuring permanent and hereditary ruling by the Kim family (the value of benefits is considered to be constant) Conclusion Yi Sang-hwa,<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[17]</a> in his poem written in 1926 “Does Spring Come to These Stolen Fields?”<a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[18]</a> deplored his status as a slave living in the country colonized by Japan. Even seven and a half decades after Korean independence, the North Korean people have not encountered a genuine spring of democracy. They still live under the dictatorial rule of the Kim family that passed over three generations starting with Kim Il-sung. On the contrary, their compatriots in the South, who overturned the decades-long dictatorship of military juntas by paying a high price through their democracy movements, enjoy the warmth of democracy and many democratic springs. Along with other people of the Free World, they sincerely wish that their parents and siblings in the North could enjoy genuine freedoms and rights as human beings, freed from the Kim family’s dictatorship. A spring of democracy never comes as an accident of history. In North Korea, it can only be witnessed when the North Korean people, awakened and united, courageously initiate and carry out a struggle against the tyranny of the Kim Jong-un regime. They would have to be inspired by and learn from democracy movements in other countries, especially the ongoing protests of the people in Myanmar who risk their lives to restore fragile democracy sabotaged by the military that denied the results of the 2020 general election. In order to accelerate the day when a spring of democracy blossoms over the North Korean territory, the international community should send more information to the North Korean people, awakening them to the true faces of the Kim family and their regime, and actively support their struggle to understand and put an end to their dictatorship. <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoTableGrid" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; color: black;"><tbody><tr><td style="border: 1pt solid windowtext; padding: 0in 5.4pt; width: 467.5pt;" valign="top" width="623">Annex I: Timeline of nuclear development in the Kim Il-Sung era, from the mid-1950s to the 1980s Feb. 5, 1955 - North Korea and the Soviet Union sign a 5-year agreement on S&amp;T cooperation, including in the field of atomic energy. Mar. 1955 - The North Korean Academy of Sciences decides at its second conference to establish a research institute on atomic and nuclear physics. Jul. 1, 1955 - In his speech at Kim Il-sung University, Kim Il-sung urges the beginning of nuclear research. Following his speech, a section on nuclear physics is set up under the Faculty of Physics. 1956 - A nuclear physics lab is opened at the Institute of Mathematics and Physics under the Academy of Sciences. Mar. 1956 - More than 30 scientists are sent to the United Institute for Nuclear Research (UINR) in Dubna, Soviet Union. Mar. 26, 1956 – North Korea participates as a founding member of the UINR. Jan. 1958 - The Soviet Union supports the construction of a nuclear training center near Kilju, North Hamgyong Province. Apr. 1958 – North Korea, through its Ambassador in Moscow, requests the Soviet Union’s assistance in nuclear development for “peaceful” use. Sep. 1959 – North Korea and the Soviet Union sign an agreement on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy. 1961 – North Korea establishes the National Atomic Energy Commission. Nov. 1962 – An atomic energy research institute is established at Yongbyon, North Pyongan Province. 1963 – North Korea starts construction of a pilot atomic reactor 2MWt IRT-2000, completed by the end of 1965. It proceeds with construction of other facilities – e.g. lab of radioactive chemistry and isotope production, K-60000 cobalt equipment, B-25 Betatron, UDS-10 decontamination drains, waste storage, special laundry, and boiler plants that generate 40 tons of steam per hour. Each year, about 200 nuclear-related researchers are sent to Dubna-based UINR to learn nuclear technology. 1970s - While expanding the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, North Korea focuses on the development of radioactive technology. 1974 – North Korea joins the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the acquisition of advanced nuclear technology. Late 1970s – North Korea conducts exploration of uranium mines across the country. 1980-1986 - North Korea constructs a 5MW pilot reactor in Yongbyon. 1985 – North Korea begins construction of a radiochemistry lab to extract plutonium from waste fuel rods for nuclear weapons. From early 1980s to 1990 – North Korea conducts 73 nuclear detonator tests to develop nuclear explosive devices, as part of the preparation for nuclear weapons production. Dec. 12, 1985 – North Korea joins the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and informs the IAEA of the existence of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. 1989 – The international community suspects North Korea’s nuclear development for military purposes, based on the intelligence released by the satellite images. Source: Kim Bo-mi (2019). From beginning to development of North Korea’s nuclear program: around the 1950s and 1960s. Research of unification policies (Vol.28-1). pp 183-208; Ku Bon-hak (2015). Evolution of North Korea’s nuclear issues and alternative solutions. Research of unification policies (Vol.24-2). pp 1-31.</td></tr></tbody></table>&nbsp; -- <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[1]</a> Kim Il-sung, whose original name at his birth was Kim Song-ju, is known to have been born on April 15, 1912. He was the eldest son of Kim Hyong-jik (father) and Kang Ban-sok (mother) in Mangyongdae, Pyongyang. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[2]</a> Kim Il-sung landed at the port city of Wonsan from a Soviet warship on September 19, 1945. Prior to his repatriation, he consulted with Soviet party and military leaders about his post-repatriation plan in order to get it approved by them. Source: Shindonga library at: https://shindonga.donga.com/Library/3/05/13/2265440/1 . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[3]</a> The Soviet Union, officially the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or USSR, was a federal socialist country that existed until 1991. It was a one-party state governed by the Communist Party, with Moscow as its capital. Upon its dissolution, Russia was recognized as its legal successor. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[4]</a> North Korean publication (2007). Father of Songun General Kim Il-sung (Vol.1). Pyongyang Publishing House. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[5]</a> Kim Il-sung (1998). With the Century (Vol.8). Korean Workers’ Party Publishing House. Source: North Korean online media Uriminzokkiri at: http://www.uriminzokkiri.com/index.php?ptype=cheigo&amp;stype=2 . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[6]</a> The 88th Special Brigade belonged to the Ministry of Interior of the Soviet Union for the defense of the Far East, and was commanded by Andrei Romanenko, the Army General of the Soviet Far East Army at the time. After Japan's defeat, Romanenko served as the head of civil affairs management of the Soviet occupation command in Pyongyang. He played a decisive role in recommending Kim Il-sung to Stalin. Source: Shindonga library at: https://shindonga.donga.com/Library/3/05/13/2265440/1 . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[7]</a> In the 1930s, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung was part of China’s Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, and the Battle of Pochonbo, which he claimed to have organized himself, has been known to have been led by another anti-Japanese independence activist by the same name, who died before liberation. Source: Kim Yong-sam (2018). I tell the truth on Kim Il-sung. Mirae Publishing House. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[8]</a> https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/해방탑 . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[9]</a> Carl J. Friedrich (1972). The Pathology of Politics. New York: Harper &amp; Row. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[10]</a> Patrick Kollner and Matthias Basedau. German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper, No.12 (2005). Factionalism in Political Parties: An Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[11]</a> The headquarters of the Communist Party of Korea was in Seoul, South Korea. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[12]</a> Source: Encyclopedia of Korean Culture- Korean Workers' Party, at: http://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/#self . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[13]</a> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Workers%27_Party_of_Korea ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapsan_Faction_Incident . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[14]</a> Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Workers%27_Party_of_Korea ; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kapsan_Faction_Incident . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[15]</a> In North Korea, there are two more political parties—namely, the Social Democratic Party of Korea and the Chondoist Chongu Party. These parties operate under the guidance of the Korean Workers’ Party and are mainly engaged in the affairs with South Korea. <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[16]</a> Source: <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">https://www.mk.co.kr/news/politics/view/2018/03/149120/</a> ; <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/international/china/838001.html</a> . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[17]</a> Yi Sang-hwa (1901–1943) was a Korean nationalist poet active in the resistance to Japanese rule. The details of his life and work can be accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yi_Sang-hwa . <a href="https://www.blogger.com/u/1/#">[18]</a> The full text of this poem in the original Korean language can be accessed at: https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/빼앗긴_들에도_봄은_오는가 .<style class="WebKit-mso-list-quirks-style">
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</style></div></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/04/the-true-identity-of-north-korean.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEixykMP774DlmKjnr5amtfplYAlnya1-hB3oQAAf_YVBdNbu2gadR9vYwUsYf1QZgn9C84Psq6Lc35KmUC5Q-UuPddu5QsXzyoyuCchLTgQwsU6m-2cNqnXjeU6DqneL3Nj75pZfpvvTUha/s72-w295-h400-c/Kim_Il-sung_in_1950.jpeg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-4245822014990494311</guid><pubDate>Wed, 03 Mar 2021 14:15:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-03-03T09:15:15.414-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">COVID</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">DPRK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">HRuF</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Jong Un</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Tomas Ojea Quintana</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">UN</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">UNCOI</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">UNSR</category><title>HRNK Letter to His Excellency Tomás Ojea Quintana</title><description>January 10, 2021 His Excellency Tomás Ojea Quintana Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Dear Mr. Quintana, Thank you for your invitation to answer two questions on progress in accountability for human rights violations in the DPRK, aimed to inform your upcoming March 2021 report to the 46th Human Rights Council session. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) is the leading US-based bipartisan, non-governmental organization in the field of North Korean human rights research and advocacy. Since our inception in 2001, HRNK has published 47 reports, investigating the DPRK’s vast system of imprisonment, including political prison camps as well as vulnerable groups, especially women, children, and people in detention. HRNK has held UN consultative status since April 2018. Ever since, we have been proactively representing civil society in the UN process. By participating in the Universal Periodic Review, by organizing online and in-person international conferences and seminars and meetings with Permanent Missions, UN agencies and offices in Geneva, New York City, and Seoul, HRNK has been disseminating the findings and recommendations put forth in our reports. All HRNK reports and report summaries are available on our website: <a href="about:blank">https://hrnk.org/publications/hrnk-publications.php</a>. We are honored to share our views relating to the two questions you pose to stakeholders.&nbsp;1. What progress and limitations do you see on accountability issues in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seven years after the COI report, and how do you envisage the way forward? On Progress:<div> The establishment of the OHCHR Office in Seoul, in June 2015 was the direct result of a recommendation made by the COI. For five and a half years, the Seoul Office has played an important role in the documentation process aimed to inform future accountability processes. While executing its mission, the Seoul Office has extensively interacted with CSOs based in the Republic of Korea and other countries, including HRNK. Since the February 2014 UN COI report, annual resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK of both HRC and UNGA have included language condemning the “long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights” committed in the DPRK, including those violations that, according to the COI, amount to crimes against humanity. UNGA resolutions have encouraged the UNSC to “continue its consideration of the relevant conclusions and recommendations of the commission of inquiry and take appropriate action to ensure accountability,” including referral of the human rights situation in the DPRK to the ICC. UNGA resolutions also recommended to the UNSC to consider targeted sanctions against those deemed most responsible for acts the COI found to amount to crimes against humanity. The UNSC held an Arria Formula Meeting on human rights in the DPRK in April 2014. Subsequently, the UNSC took up the human rights situation in the DPRK as a formal agenda item in December 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017. That outcome has not been replicated in 2018, 2019 or 2020. Building on the COI report, HRC and UNGA resolutions on human rights in the DPRK and the UNSC taking up the issue as a formal agenda item have maintained pressure on the DPRK, kept the issue in focus and galvanized civil society worldwide. On Limitations:</div><div> The perennial obstacle to efforts to address human rights and accountability in North Korea is that political, security, and military issues end up outcompeting and sidelining human rights. UNSC referral of DPRK crimes against humanity to the ICC is unlikely, due to almost certain opposition by one, if not two P5 members. On the Way Forward:</div><div> HRC and UNGA resolutions on the human rights situation in the DPRK must continue to include strong language on both DPRK crimes against humanity and the need for accountability, including ICC referral. UNSC failure to take up DPRK human rights as a formal agenda item for three years in a row has given the impression of withdrawal from the high ground the UN and the international community once held on this issue. Moreover, this “withdrawal” roughly coincided with several rounds of US and ROK “summit diplomacy” with the DPRK, giving the impression that human rights was sidelined for the sake of addressing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We would welcome it as a very positive development if the UNSC resumed taking up DPRK human rights as a formal agenda item. UNSC resolutions establishing a DPRK sanctions regime have aimed to prevent the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. UNSC resolutions have never comprised a human rights-based rationale. There is a need for UNSC resolutions to address DPRK crimes against humanity and other severe human rights violations, although that would be possible only while turning the DPRK human rights issue into a substantive, rather than procedural issue, subject to a potential P5 member veto. Despite the seemingly insurmountable obstacle of a potential P5 veto, seeking UNSC referral of the DPRK to the ICC will continue to pressure the DPRK to consider addressing and improving its human rights situation. Given the difficulty of the ICC referral route, UN member states could consider alternative accountability mechanisms, with the support of CSOs worldwide. Although not necessarily within the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur or within the scope of his reporting to the HRC, the role of CSOs, in particular CSOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, could be emphasized. Under circumstances where the UN’s accountability efforts appear to have somehow stagnated, CSOs can strive to maintain the COI’s momentum. One such example would be a documentation project HRNK is carrying out in collaboration with the International Bar Association (IBA). Once international travel is again possible, HRNK and IBA will conduct a hearing/mock trial in Seoul, based on the joint documentation project, and involving most respected international jurists and judges.</div><div> 2. What are your views on the approach that should be taken to ensure that the obligation to respect human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, including on accountability measures and ending impunity, and the need for the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula are fulfilled? Peace and human rights can never be mutually exclusive. “Saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and “reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights” are enshrined together in the Preamble to the UN Charter. The Korean Peninsula is no exception. Nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and military tensions aside, human rights and human security are closely intertwined. Efforts must be undertaken to persuade the DPRK that neither humanitarian, nor development assistance can be divorced from human rights. The COI recommended that “the United Nations Secretariat and agencies should urgently adopt and implement a common ‘Rights up Front’ strategy to ensure that all engagement with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea effectively takes into account, and addresses, human rights concerns,” including those concerns collected in the COI report. As emphasized by the COI, the adoption of a “Rights up Front” approach would help prevent “the recurrence or continuation of crimes against humanity” in the DPRK. A Human Rights up Front (HRuF) approach to disbursing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK continues to be imperative. There are certainly extraordinary difficulties facing UN humanitarian agencies involved in the DPRK, in particular pertaining to access. COVID-19-related restrictions in the DPRK have exacerbated such difficulties. With only a couple of UN international workers left in-country, conducting humanitarian operations is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the situation created by COVID restrictions in the DPRK may provide the opportunity of a reset in the disbursement of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies. Such a reset may include the fundamental building blocks of an actual HRuF strategy, beginning with requesting access to the most vulnerable groups affected by precarious health care, water and sanitation and hygiene as well as natural disasters, including women, children, and people in detention. The path to peace on the Korean Peninsula would hit a dead end in the absence of measures to prevent the recurrence of crimes against humanity in the DPRK. UN agencies and UN member states must seek access to detention facilities in the DPRK, in particular to political prison camps, whose existence the DPRK denies, despite thorough documentation via satellite imagery and escapee testimony. Recognizing the UN Special Rapporteur and allowing Mr. Quintana unconditional and unfettered access inside the country would help initiate a human rights-centered trust-building process with the DPRK. As emphasized by HRNK author David Hawk in an upcoming report, UN accountability mechanisms—applying international criminal law to the DPRK—have constituted the sole approach which has led the DPRK to make some changes to its human rights policies, however small or insignificant. For example, after the COI report, the DPRK responded with a shift in its UPR policy, “accepting” and “rejecting” recommendations for the first time. Naturally, such moves could be purely tactical, and their importance should not be exaggerated. Ultimately, peace on the Korean Peninsula would be peace between Koreans living in the South and in the North, including both victims and perpetrators. In order to prepare for peace on the Korean peninsula, the documentation process by the Seoul Office must continue. To end impunity, while engagement aimed at peace process on the Korean peninsula may continue, efforts at the HRC, UNGA, and possibly the UNSC must not relent. Respectfully submitted, Greg Scarlatoiu Executive Director<style class="WebKit-mso-list-quirks-style">
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</style></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/03/hrnk-letter-to-his-excellency-tomas.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5006986320042033706</guid><pubDate>Mon, 01 Mar 2021 17:12:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-03-01T12:12:17.170-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">crimes against humanity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">DPRK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">History</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Independence</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Il Sung</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Jong Il</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Jong Suk</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Jong Un</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kim Regime</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">March 1 Movement</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Nonviolence</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">ROK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Truth</category><title>Fixing Distorted History, a Prerequisite to Democratizing North Korea</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">On the occasion of the 102nd anniversary of the March First Movement By Kim Myong Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu, HRNK Executive Director </h3> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEggEsJ1oq60B9tedNDeuqaj5saEnjU5Cq_wBjliSsshO5YAxFwZ3EzDG6lrRZhDBkguI9xCu5niYBiH__wlCzhQmVRZ9Z38a8B4u0YKn0dEm_ECbZauNrtrbLUi5r6sXra0_Xat1RbkcFTe/s1024/March+1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="751" data-original-width="1024" height="470" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEggEsJ1oq60B9tedNDeuqaj5saEnjU5Cq_wBjliSsshO5YAxFwZ3EzDG6lrRZhDBkguI9xCu5niYBiH__wlCzhQmVRZ9Z38a8B4u0YKn0dEm_ECbZauNrtrbLUi5r6sXra0_Xat1RbkcFTe/w640-h470/March+1.jpg" width="640" /></a></div> <div>On March 1, 1919, one hundred and two years ago to this day, the Korean people turned a new page in their history by proclaiming the annulment of the 1910 Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty and the independence of Korea, and by launching a non-violent national movement for independence from Japanese colonial rule, also called the “March First Movement.”<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn1">[1]</a> Encouraged by the concept of “national self-determination” promoted by then U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, patriotic forces in Korea, a country Japan annexed by force in 1910, began a nationwide anti-Japanese movement to regain national sovereignty through a peaceful demonstration. That momentous effort was unsuccessful, crushed by the brutal repression of the Japanese imperial forces.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn2">[2]</a> However, the March First Movement marked a paradigm shift in the minds of Koreans that the sovereignty of their country and nation mattered the most, above anything personal. On this occasion, they also learned that the independence of their country could be achieved only through armed struggle, not through bare-handed peaceful demonstrations. Later on, the Korean independence movement took one step forward with the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, tasked to lead the anti-Japanese independence struggle amidst Japanese colonial rule. To observe the national pride this movement symbolizes, the Republic of Korea (ROK) proclaimed March 1 as a National Day and Public Holiday through the National Holiday Act of October 1, 1949. On the contrary, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never made March 1 a national holiday. They hold sporadically commemorative events attended by “religious” or social organizations under the control of the Korean Workers’ Party’s United Front Department as part of their effort to reunify the Korean peninsula under communism by rallying their supporters inside South Korea. Unaware of what is really going on, South Koreans may be impressed that the North Korean authorities “cherish” the common history of our nation’s anti-Japanese struggles. For North Koreans who have been brainwashed for life by history education centered on the so-called “revolutionary activities” of Kim Il-sung and his Baekdu Bloodline Family, March 1 is just an ordinary and “meaningless” day. While living in North Korea, I had no proper understanding of the March First Movement, nor did I spend this day honoring all the martyrs who died for the country. Despite being a short moment in the nation's 5,000-year history, this day is very important: The March First Movement demonstrated the national aspiration for independence and helped to catalyze the growing popular anger towards Japanese occupation. Deceived by the false propaganda of the North Korean authorities, who are so skilled in distorting the national history, dozens of millions of my fellow countrymen in North Korea worship only the Kim family while devaluing or ignoring the brilliant traditions and true historic accomplishments of their nation. Changing their distorted perceptions of history should be the first step toward democratizing North Korea.<div> North Korea’s Absurd Sophism Distorts the Historical Facts on the March First Movement Distorted education by the North Korean authorities on the March First Movement is just the tip of the iceberg. There are many other historical facts that they have warped to their liking.<div> First, North Korean education doesn’t provide any details on the 33 national activists who initiated the March First Movement and prepared the Declaration of Independence. Instead, the movement is used and abused to idolize the Kim family by claiming that it originated in Pyongyang under the leadership of Kim Il-sung's family members. In North Korea, it is taught that the first flame of the March First Movement started in Pyongyang and then spread down to Seoul, and that “the patriotic young students of Pyongyang Soongsil Middle School played a leading role under the revolutionary influence of Kim Hyong-jik, an outstanding leader of the anti-Japanese national liberation movement.” <a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn3">[3]</a> In other words, North Korean propaganda claims that Kim Hyong-jik, father of Kim Il-sung, had a decisive influence on initiating this movement through the students of Pyongyang Soongsil Middle School, where he had earlier studied. North Korean propagandists and “educators” insist that the movement was a turning point in shifting the struggle for national liberation from the nationalist movement to the communist movement. However, according to historical archives at the time, Kim Hyong-jik, who had already dropped out of school, was arrested in 1917 by the Japanese police in South Pyongan Province for the “Korean National Association” incident and was released in 1918.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn4">[4]</a> He immediately moved to Jung-gang-jin (a geographical area of North Pyongan Province), which proves that he could not participate in the March First Movement in Pyongyang. Besides, there is no specific record of his contribution to this movement, either. Even in Kim Il-sung's memoirs, “With the Century,” perhaps by his mistake, nowhere is there any mention that the students who were influenced by his father commenced this movement. Instead, he wrote that his maternal grandfather Kang Don-uk urged his fellow villagers and young people to participate in the anti-Japanese independence demonstration. According to Kim Il-sung’s memoirs, he then took the lead in their march from Chilgol to Pyongyang during the March First Movement. In his memoirs, Kim Il-sung also claims that his maternal uncle, Kang Jin-sok, led the march together with his father. He described the March First Movement in Pyongyang in more detail than that in Seoul. He also described Ryu Gwan-sun as an ordinary female student without mentioning her name,<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn5">[5]</a>and characterized the 33 national activists who led the March First Movement as incompetent elite and bourgeois nationalists.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn6">[6]</a> This shows that Kim Il-sung was trying to distort the truth about the March First Movement by under-evaluating the importance of Seoul as the origin of the movement and ignoring the historical figures who led it.</div><div> Second, North Korea exaggerates, claiming that, just before his seventh birthday, Kim Il-sung participated in person in the March First Movement, and that his participation provided an opportunity to raise his national consciousness and pushed him to later engage in the anti-Japanese armed struggle.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn7">[7]</a> “I was only eight years old at the time, but I joined in the march wearing my worn-out shoes full of holes. I shouted hurrah over and over with the marchers and reached the Botong Gate. The marchers rushed inside the castle past the Gate; I could not keep up with them in my tattered shoes and so I took them off and ran after the marchers as fast as my little legs could move. When adults sang hurray for independence, I sang hurray together.” <a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn8">[8]</a> As written above, Kim Il-sung recalled in his memoirs that he had joined the demonstrators at a young age to march with them past the Botong Gate of Pyongyang. Given that the round-trip distance from Mangyongdae where he lived to the Botong Gate was about 15-20 miles, it is hard to believe that he marched alone without help or company of any of his family members. He also recounted that in the following days, he went up to Mangyongdae Peak, blowing a trumpet and beating the drum, and shouting hurrah for independence even after sunset. Unlike his Chilgol family members, who personally participated in the March First Movement, no other members from his Mangyongdae family seemed to join him in the movement, which casts a shadow of doubt on his participation itself. Kim Il-sung wrote that his worldview broadened and he matured much faster than others by experiencing the scenes of marchers shouting hurrah for independence and witnessing people being killed by the armed police during the movement. “The March First Movement placed me in the rank of the people and left an image on my eyes of the true nature of the Korean people. Whenever I hear the echo of the March First hurrahs, I feel so proud of the Korean people's unbending determination and heroism.” <a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn9">[9]</a> In fact, North Korean textbooks show drawings illustrating young Kim Il-sung, marching in the front row of Pyongyang demonstrators and shouting hurrah with them to convince school students that their great leader hated Japanese imperialists profoundly and nurtured the big ambition of regaining the independence of his country since childhood. Third, while arguing that the Kim family was directly or indirectly involved in the March First Movement, North Korea paradoxically makes an inappropriate and parsimonious evaluation of this movement, emphasizing that only the anti-Japanese armed struggle by Kim Il-sung was appropriate and effective as a manifestation of the independence movement. North Korea’s official interpretation is that the March First Movement failed because of the following factors: a) it was not guided by an outstanding leader, a revolutionary class, and a revolutionary party; and b) the nationalist leaders of this movement had class-based limitations and deep-rooted pro-Americanism. They say that despite its failure, the movement has historical significance in that it raised the Korean people’s anti-Japanese national liberation movement to a higher level, in an attempt to secure the legitimacy for, and link it to, Kim Il-sung’s armed struggle only.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn10">[10]</a> North Korea labels the 33 national activists who wrote the March First Declaration of Independence “Bourgeois Nationalists.” Furthermore, North Korea blames them for having failed to identify an appropriate way to fight against the armed Japanese imperialists, as they were presumably “prisoners” of President Woodrow Wilson’s idea of national self-determination and counted too much on powers such as the United States. They also say that the movement proved that the nationalists were no longer in a position to lead the anti-Japanese national liberation movement.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn11">[11]</a> In his memoirs, Kim Il-sung wrote: “The failed March First Movement taught us that in order to win our fight for independence and freedom, we must have effective revolutionary leadership and organizational structures; we must use the right tactics and strategies; and we must debunk toadyism and build up our strength on our own.” And he highlighted the importance of his anti-Japanese armed struggle for combating Japanese imperialism and liberating the country.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn12">[12]</a> In history education, North Korea neither gets the historical events across to their population based on objective facts only, nor does it allow them to use their judgment to assess history. Instead, there is “one-way injection” education, based on the textbooks prepared by the Korean Workers’ Party. Therefore, North Koreans are obliged to believe and accept the severely distorted history as it is taught to them by the public education system.</div><div> </div><div> History Education in North Korea is a Legal Means to Build the Kim Family’s Cult of PersonalityThe main purpose of history education in North Korea is to highlight that Kim Il-sung’s family has been, across generations, the most revolutionary and patriotic family in the country, and that it is the only family that can yield an outstanding leader representing the popular masses. Currently, the school education’s curriculum contains four subjects related to the Kim family’s “revolutionary activities”—i.e., the history of Kim Il-sung, of Kim Jong-il, of Kim Jong-un, and of Kim Jong-suk—giving priority to these subjects and totally neglecting the Korean history per se. Instead of gaining sufficient knowledge about the Korean nation with its 5,000-year history, the North Koreans are more focused on learning about “the revolutionary life, immortal achievements and great human features” of the Kim family members, starting from Kim Il-sung’s anti-Japanese struggle and his activities after liberation. At school, students do not know much about Ryu Gwan-sun, An Jung-geun<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn13">[13]</a> and any other patriots or independence activists who devoted their lives in the anti-Japanese struggle. When the Shanghai-based Provisional Government or the Korean Liberation Army is introduced to North Korean students, more emphasis is placed on the perceived mistakes by these organizations rather than what they did right. By the end of history education, students get convinced that the anti-Japanese armed struggle by Kim Il-sung was the one and only right way to achieve national liberation. In addition, they also learn about other members of the Kim family, beginning with Kim Il-sung’s great-grandfather Kim Ung-woo, as if they were all “great examples of revolutionaries and patriots who devoted their entire lives to the independence of the country and happiness of the nation.” They are taught that great-grandfather Kim Ung-woo took the lead in destroying and sinking the General Sherman in the Daedong River, <a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn14">[14]</a> that grandfather Kim Bo-hyon and grandmother Ri Bo-ik were passionate patriots who raised their children for the revolutionary struggle, that maternal grandfather Kang Don-uk was a patriot who dedicated his life to education and the independence movement, and that all his uncles and younger siblings were revolutionaries who fought for independence (Table 1). By portraying the Kim family as the most revolutionary and patriotic family in the country, the North Korean authorities have justified the hereditary ruling by the Kim family and made it a moral obligation for their people to loyally support their leaders. Table 1: Designations used in the idolization of the Kim family</div><div> <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; color: black; width: 593px;"><tbody><tr style="height: 22pt;"><td style="border: 1pt solid black; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Names</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: solid solid solid none; border-top-color: black; border-top-width: 1pt; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Relationship with Kim Il-sung</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: solid solid solid none; border-top-color: black; border-top-width: 1pt; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Designations</td></tr><tr style="height: 22.75pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Jong-suk</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">First wife (1919–1949)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Anti-Japanese heroine; great female revolutionary; the quintessential example of ideal Korean mothers</td></tr><tr style="height: 22pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Ung-woo</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Great-grandfather (1845–1930)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Passionate patriot</td></tr><tr style="height: 22pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Bo-hyon</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Grandfather (1871–1955)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Passionate patriot</td></tr><tr style="height: 22pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Ri Bo-ik</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Grandmother (1876–1959)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Passionate patriot</td></tr><tr style="height: 34pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Hyong-jik</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Father (1894–1926)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Indomitable revolutionary fighter; passionate patriot; prominent leader of the anti-Japanese national liberation movement of the country</td></tr><tr style="height: 34.75pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 34.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kang Ban-sok </td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Mother (1892–1932)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Indomitable revolutionary fighter; great mother of Korea; great female revolutionary; the best example of Korean mothers; outstanding leader of the Korean women's movement</td></tr><tr style="height: 34pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Hyong-gwon</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Uncle (1905–1936)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 34pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Indomitable revolutionary fighter; the best example of revolutionary believers; inflexible revolutionary with conviction and commitment</td></tr><tr style="height: 22.75pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Chol-ju</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Brother (1916–1935)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Indomitable revolutionary fighter; the embodiment of great revolutionaries</td></tr><tr style="height: 22.75pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kim Won-ju</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Cousin (1927–1957)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Indomitable revolutionary fighter </td></tr><tr style="height: 22.75pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kang Don-uk</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Maternal grandfather (1871–1943)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22.75pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Passionate patriot; great educator</td></tr><tr style="height: 22pt;"><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-left-color: black; border-left-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 75pt;" valign="top" width="100">Kang Jin-sok</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 90.75pt;" valign="top" width="121">Maternal uncle (1890–1942)</td><td style="border-bottom-color: black; border-bottom-width: 1pt; border-right-color: black; border-right-width: 1pt; border-style: none solid solid none; height: 22pt; padding: 5pt; width: 279pt;" valign="top" width="372">Passionate anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter</td></tr></tbody></table></div><div>Source: Based on the North Korean version of the History of Korea.</div><div> From April 1992 until his death in July 1994, Kim Il-sung wrote and published eight volumes of his autobiographical memoirs, "With the Century.”<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn15">[15]</a> As pointed out earlier, controversy exists over many of the historical “facts” introduced in his memoirs. As soon as Kim Il-sung’s memoirs were published, all North Koreans were called on to read them every day and study their “essence” during the weekly Saturday saeng-hwal-chong-hwa “life and ideological guidance” group meetings, according to the ideological study plans assigned by the Korean Workers’ Party’s Propaganda and Agitation Department. Kim Il-sung’s memoirs constitute an important part of his cult of personality.</div><div> “Ga-gye Politics” Thrives on the Dictatorship of the Kim Family North Koreans internally refer to the extended family of Kim Il-sung as ga-gye (lineage). For example, if someone says that “he or she is married to ga-gye,” it means that he or she married someone who is lineally descended from Kim Il-sung—including his paternal and maternal lineages, i.e. Mangyongdae Kim family or Chilgol Kang family. The term ga-gye does not apply to any other families, for whom the term ga-jok (family) is used. As the years went by, the ga-gye expanded rapidly by marriage between ga-gye members and ga-jok members of different surnames or same surnames from different clans. For example, by marrying Kim Kyong-hui, who is Kim Il-sung's daughter, Jang Song-taek and his bloodline were integrated into the ga-gye. The same was true of Ho Dam, former Foreign Minister of North Korea, who married Kim Il-sung’s cousin, Kim Jong-suk, who was president of the DPRK Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations until recently. For the people of North Korea, ga-gye means royal family and represents absolute power. From the late 1960s, when Kim Il-sung’s one-man rule was being established, members of the ga-gye began occupying high-level positions in the Korean Workers’ Party, the State, and the Military. In fact, their positions did not matter in exercising power. If, for example, someone introduces him or herself as Kim Il-sung's cousin or his maternal niece’s husband, he or she will enjoy a higher privilege than the general managers or the Party secretaries of the enterprises. No one could be more powerful than a ga-gye member in resolving practical issues for smooth management of a business enterprise. For example, when public enterprises in North Korea want to build houses for their employees or import some raw materials from China, they have to obtain permission to do so from several state agencies by undergoing a multi-phased process. The North Korean term for the license they get for such business is called “waku.” Depending on the content and nature of the business, a waku requires a very complicated and hard process that, in most cases, is “facilitated” through bribery. People often fail to get a waku, even after spending a lot of time and energy for it. Members of ga-gye can help figure things out using their networks and connections because lots of their family members or relatives are already in key positions at the powerful state agencies that issue the waku. In addition, when high-level officials are subjected to legal punishment for an administrative mistake made in the line of work, ga-gye members often help them to be acquitted. It is needless to say that they receive handsome “compensation” for their help. So, fierce competition often rages among agencies in order to attract members of ga-gye to their offices.&nbsp;In this way, Kim Il-sung's relatives or members of the ga-gye penetrated all major state agencies to run “ga-gye politics,” which contribute greatly to widespread corruption and inefficient business management. As I was surrounded by a number of ga-gye members during my life in North Korea, I knew their nature like the back of my hand. I found them everywhere I went—at the schools I attended and at my workplaces as well. They enjoyed all kinds of privileges and immunities that ordinary people could not aspire to even in their dreams. To me, they were living in a totally different world, and they belonged to a different class in all aspects.</div><div> Without making any effort to study hard, they were easily accepted to the top universities of their choice, regardless of their scores on the entrance exams. Even if their school attendance was lower than 50 percent, or even if they did not diligently participate in the school’s organizational life, it did not matter. They were never reprimanded and graduated from their universities with the highest results, as if they had been excellent students. Later on, they found good jobs of their choice in the Party, law enforcement, armed forces and security agencies, in the offices that enabled them to work abroad, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Foreign Trade, or in the foreign currency-earning companies under Office 39 of the Korean Workers’ Party. They were frequently exempted from social work duties in their offices, were lazy and unfaithful in the implementation of their main tasks, but they received good end-of-year evaluations and got promoted faster than others. With no concerns at all about their daily living, they had a lot of free time. They were wasting their lives on pleasure and entertainment. Many of them became addicted to alcohol, drugs, and sex. Instead of having a bookshelf filled with books at home, they collected South Korean and foreign movies, including pornographic videos, that were banned in North Korea. If ordinary people got caught watching South Korean movies, they would be immediately sent to the kwan-li-so (political prison camps), but the members of ga-gye, accused of the same “crime,” were released soon upon receiving a severe warning. Besides, “yeon-jwa-je,” the North Korean method of punishing up to three generations of the family when a person is found guilty of a “serious crime,” hardly applied to the Kim family and ga-gye members.</div><div> In a word, North Korea was the country of the Kim family and ga-gye. These people were living with a sense of superiority, as if the space where we lived together belonged only to them and as if they were untouchable. They were the North Korean “nobility,” and lived extraordinarily selfish lives. As the dictators changed, the Mangyongdae Kim family and the Chilgol Kang family seemed to be pushed away out of the core of North Korean power, whose center seems to be shifting gradually toward the “Wonsan Kim family.” This will bring another type of ga-gye politics to North Korea.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn16">[16]</a></div><div> </div><div> Truth is More Powerful than Lies The denial of historical facts by the North Korean authorities is absolutely necessary to maintain their regime. During their seven decade-long reign, the Kim family has committed countless unforgivable crimes against the nation and humanity. They needed to alter or distort the facts to hide their crimes, and they needed to cheat their people to continue ruling over them. If the North Koreans knew the truth of history, the Pillars of Belief in the Kim family and the Myth of the Great Leader would collapse in a matter of seconds like a wall washed away by a deluge, and this would undoubtedly lead to the collapse of the North Korean regime. Truth exists to be eventually revealed. Truth always prevails over deception and lies (Diagram 1). Diagram 1: Truth Is More Powerful than Lies “Knowledge is power. Information is liberating. Education is the premise of progress, in every society, in every family.” Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhc74WNMN_m35nGfAADpqrn8q6QFrzicG_pTB9qDn7YXPrU1KHBkcEYSGDDpCXGC0NMzeaJJKQrMDsgyDK0WRCSQkmwPHoiKPkxXKuM4pHSmqxIOmMFMrruv4WFt1ufkZDYUWnfwfdeTgHd/s2048/AdobeStock_66361788.jpeg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1536" data-original-width="2048" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhc74WNMN_m35nGfAADpqrn8q6QFrzicG_pTB9qDn7YXPrU1KHBkcEYSGDDpCXGC0NMzeaJJKQrMDsgyDK0WRCSQkmwPHoiKPkxXKuM4pHSmqxIOmMFMrruv4WFt1ufkZDYUWnfwfdeTgHd/w640-h480/AdobeStock_66361788.jpeg" width="640" /></a></div> Out of so many facts that the North Korean authorities are trying to distort or hide, two facts about Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il’s births were the most shocking to me. Kim Il-sung was born into a family of devout Christians who believed in God. Kim Jong-il was born in Russia and was named “Yuri Irsenovitch Kim.” Let me take the liberty of presenting a few facts on Kim Il-sung’s birth, although they are already known to the world (Box 1).</div><div> <table border="1" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="border-collapse: collapse; border: none; color: black; width: 602px;"><tbody><tr style="height: 345pt;"><td style="border: 1pt solid black; height: 345pt; padding: 5pt; width: 451.45pt;" valign="top" width="602">Box 1: Kim Il-sung was born into a family of Christian believers Kim Il-sung's parents, Kim Hyong-jik (father) and Kang Ban-sok (mother), were devout Christians. American Presbyterian missionary Nelson Bell brokered their marriage, which would result in the birth of Kim Il-sung. Kim Hyong-jik, in his childhood, dreamed of becoming a pastor. He attended Pyongyang Sunhwa School, which was established by American missionaries, and learned to write the Bible in Korean calligraphy. At the time, American missionaries paid a cent in Korean coins to students who came to church. The missionaries loved Kim Hyong-jik, especially for showing his faith by putting all the coins he received into the church offering box. On the recommendation of American missionaries, Kim Hyong-jik entered Soongsil Middle School. This school was founded in 1897 in Pyongyang as a private school by American Presbyterian missionary <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_M._Baird">William M. Baird</a>. Kang Ban-sok was born as the second daughter of Kang Don-uk, who was a devout Presbyterian. Her real name at birth was Kang Shin-hi, but she was baptized in church by Nelson Bell and renamed Ban-sok, the Korean translation of Saint Peter, one of Jesus’ Twelve Apostles. Through Nelson Bell’s brokerage, Kim Hyong-jik and Kang Ban-sok got to know each other and married. As a result, Kim Il-sung was born into a devout family. When he was a child, Kim Il-sung followed his mother to church and faithfully believed in Christianity. Ironically, under Kim Il-sung’s rule, North Korea was transformed into the world’s worst religious persecutor. Source: Kim Il-Sung and Christianity in North Korea by Dae Young Ryu, Journal of Church and State, Volume 61, Issue 3, Summer 2019, Pages 403–430</td></tr></tbody></table> The reason why the North Korean authorities hide the true facts about Kim Il-sung’s and Kim Jong-il's births is because, once known to the people, they may become an obstacle to deifying and idolizing their “great leaders.” Like anyone else in the world, North Korean people have the right to access information. This right is an integral part of the fundamental right of freedom of expression, as recognized by Resolution 59 of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in 1946,<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn17">[17]</a> as well as by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn18">[18]</a> It has also been enshrined as a corollary of the basic human right of freedom of expression in other major international instruments, including the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.<a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftn19">[19]</a> If any government takes measures to block, for any reason, the free access to information by the North Korean people, they will be blamed by the entire Free World for forsaking 25 million North Koreans and enabling the Kim dynasty to continue to enslave them. As a result of such actions, the prospects for democratization of North Korea and for the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula will remain uncertain. <div><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /><div id="ftn1"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1" style="color: purple;" title="">[1]</a>&nbsp;The declaration released on this day is called the “March First Declaration of Independence.”<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn2"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2" style="color: purple;" title="">[2]</a>&nbsp;&nbsp;Encyclopedia of Korean Culture (https://encykorea.aks.ac.kr/Contents/Item/E0026772).<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn3"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3" style="color: purple;" title="">[3]</a>&nbsp;North Korean version of the&nbsp;History of Korea (for the 4th grade of high schools). Printed in 2000 by DPRK Educational Books Publishing House.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn4"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4" style="color: purple;" title="">[4]</a>&nbsp;The “Korean National Association” was a pro-independence clandestine organization founded in Pyongyang in 1915. It was soon discovered by the Japanese imperial authorities and its founding members were imprisoned in 1918, which led to its immediate dissolution. For more details on this organization, please visit:&nbsp;<a href="https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%A1%B0%EC%84%A0%EA%B5%AD%EB%AF%BC%ED%9A%8C" style="color: purple;">https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/조선국민회</a>&nbsp;.<o:p></o:p>&nbsp;</div><div id="ftn5"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5" style="color: purple;" title="">[5]</a>&nbsp;Ryu (Yoo) Kwang-sun (1878~?) was a Korean independence fighter and believer in Cheondoism. Arrested and sentenced to 1 year and 3 months of prison for anti-Japanese activities on November 22, 1920, her fate is unknown after that date.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn6"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6" style="color: purple;" title="">[6]</a>&nbsp;Kim Il-sung's Memoirs “With the Century” Vol. 1 (April 1992). Chapter One: Land of misfortunes.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn7"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7" style="color: purple;" title="">[7]</a>&nbsp;Kim Il-sung was born on April 15, 1912. According to the Western way of counting age, he was about to turn seven in March 1919. According to the Korean way of counting age, he was about to turn eight.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn8"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8" style="color: purple;" title="">[8]</a>&nbsp;Ibid.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn9"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9" style="color: purple;" title="">[9]</a>&nbsp;Ibid.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn10"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10" style="color: purple;" title="">[10]</a>&nbsp;North Korean version of the&nbsp;History of Korea (for the 4th grade of high schools). Printed in 2000 by DPRK Educational Books Publishing House.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn11"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11" style="color: purple;" title="">[11]</a>&nbsp;In his memoirs,&nbsp;Kim Il-sung wrote that the national self-determination was a hypocritical slogan issued&nbsp;by the US&nbsp;to prevent the influence of Russia’s October Socialist Revolution from spreading to other parts of the world.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn12"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12" style="color: purple;" title="">[12]</a>&nbsp;Kim Il-sung's Memoirs “With the Century” Vol. 1 (April 1992). Chapter One: Land of misfortunes.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn13"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13" style="color: purple;" title="">[13]</a>&nbsp;An Jung-geun (1879–1910) was a Korean nationalist and independence activist who assassinated Prince Ito Hirobumi, a four-time Prime Minister of Japan and former Resident-General of Korea, in 1909. He was subsequently imprisoned and executed by the Japanese authorities on March 26, 1910.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn14"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14" style="color: purple;" title="">[14]</a>&nbsp;The General Sherman was a U.S. Merchant Marine side-wheel steamer attacked and sunk in the&nbsp;Daedong&nbsp;River in 1866. The incident is often credited as a catalyst to the end of Korean isolationism in the second half of the 19th&nbsp;century.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn15"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15" style="color: purple;" title="">[15]</a>&nbsp;The eight volumes of Kim Il-sung’s memoirs cover the period from his childhood to his repatriation upon the liberation. The last two volumes were posthumously published.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn16"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16" style="color: purple;" title="">[16]</a>&nbsp;Kim Jong-un is presumed to have been born in Wonsan, on January 8, 1984.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn17"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17" style="color: purple;" title="">[17]</a>&nbsp;The&nbsp;UN General Assembly Resolution 59, A/RES/59(1), adopted on December 14, 1946, is available at:&nbsp;<a href="https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/1" style="color: purple;">https://research.un.org/en/docs/ga/quick/regular/1</a>&nbsp;.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn18"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18" style="color: purple;" title="">[18]</a>&nbsp;The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted on December 10, 1948, is available at:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/" style="color: purple;">https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/</a>&nbsp;.<o:p></o:p></div><div id="ftn19"><a href="applewebdata://BA09073A-1C00-4B0F-8C9A-DB49E1ECC2A0#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19" style="color: purple;" title="">[19]</a>&nbsp;The&nbsp;International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted on 16 December 1966, is available at:&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx" style="color: purple;">https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx</a>&nbsp;.<o:p></o:p></div></div></div></div></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/03/fixing-distorted-history-prerequisite.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/" url="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEggEsJ1oq60B9tedNDeuqaj5saEnjU5Cq_wBjliSsshO5YAxFwZ3EzDG6lrRZhDBkguI9xCu5niYBiH__wlCzhQmVRZ9Z38a8B4u0YKn0dEm_ECbZauNrtrbLUi5r6sXra0_Xat1RbkcFTe/s72-w640-h470-c/March+1.jpg" height="72" width="72"/><thr:total>1</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-5176327009354720610</guid><pubDate>Tue, 23 Feb 2021 19:54:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-02-23T15:31:42.843-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Ant-Leafleting Law</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">DPRK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Kpop</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">National Assembly</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">peace</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">ROK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">South Korea</category><title>What is Wrong with the Anti-Leafleting Law?</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">Seminar organized by the People Power Party ROK National Assembly</h3><h3 style="text-align: left;">Opening Remarks by Greg Scarlatoiu Executive Director, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea Monday, February 22, 2021</h3><div style="text-align: left;"> <div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe allowfullscreen='allowfullscreen' webkitallowfullscreen='webkitallowfullscreen' mozallowfullscreen='mozallowfullscreen' width='320' height='266' src='https://www.blogger.com/video.g?token=AD6v5dxeegj_UGqVtvHMpKtOlD7g6Gc8TUWbMoN_yas8tT4WWWaYigQsEKLCJxt0iZ2KaLBz9Oq5nuNyjpBpkKp2Ew' class='b-hbp-video b-uploaded' frameborder='0'></iframe></div> Distinguished Representative Joo Ho-young, Distinguished Assemblyman Cho Taeyong, Distinguished Assemblyman Ji Seong-ho, Esteemed Participants, Friends and Colleagues, Thank you for the invitation to give brief remarks today. Let me begin by congratulating Assemblyman Cho on this bold initiative. It comes at a time when North Korean human rights defenders face unprecedented pressure in the Republic of Korea. For 73 years, three generations of the Kim family regime have exercised draconian control of the North Korean population through overwhelming coercion, surveillance and punishment. Information control has been at the center of the regime’s totalitarian grip on power. And yet, for more than two decades, information from the outside world has been slowly, but surely piercing through North Korea’s information firewall. The number of North Koreans who watch American and South Korean movies and come in contact with Hallyu, K-pop, and South Korean TV dramas has been on the rise. And yet the number of vehicles available to deliver such content has been limited: radio broadcasting, micro-SD cards, USBs and other portable media devices sold at North Korea’s black markets, rice bottles and leaflet balloons. Removing any one of these vehicles will significantly impact the volume of information that enters North Korea. Do all leaflet balloons launched from the South reach North Korea? If the launch is timed properly, taking into account wind speed and direction, yes. Is it possible to track them all the way to the landing grounds? Yes, through GPS and other tracking devices. Do some leaflet balloons end up elsewhere? Yes, if the launch is not prepared or timed correctly. Do the leaflets, movies, K-drama, Bibles, and cash sent via leaflet balloons have an impact? Absolutely. Eighty percent of the 1.2 million-strong North Korean military is forward-deployed, south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. Large parts of the area between that line and the DMZ are within reach. And even if only officers and NCOs were to read the leaflets, the impact would be significant. That is one possible reason why the North Korean regime and its propaganda so adamantly demanded that the balloon launches be banned. Currently, under the pretext of COVID prevention, the North Korean regime is tightening control over its population. For the past few years, it has employed new content, new technologies as well as judicial and extra-judicial punishment to counter information from the outside world. Most recently, it has enacted draconian laws to punish those who circulate and access such information. The outside world, including South Korea, should answer by increasing, not decreasing the amount of information or the number of information delivery vehicles involved. The role of information sent into North Korea is critical. Such information must highlight the sharp disconnect between the North Korean regime’s propaganda and the real lives of North Koreans. Such information must empower the people of North Korea and enable them to pierce through the veil of DPRK regime indoctrination and control, by: 1. Highlighting the fundamental contradiction between the DPRK’s Constitution, other legislation and obligations pursuant to international law and treaties on the one hand, and the regime’s propaganda on the other. 2. Explaining to the people of North Korea human rights and their egregious human rights situation. 3. Focusing on the corruption of the DPRK regime, in particular the inner core of the Kim family; and 4. Featuring the story of the outside world, especially free, prosperous, democratic South Korea. On February 14, in response to a call by the ROK Ministry of Unification, my organization submitted a legal opinion on the “Anti-Leafleting Law,” authored by my colleague Amanda Morwedt Oh, HRNK human rights attorney, and our pro bono counsel. The memo finds that South Korea’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (the “Amendment”) violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Amendment infringes on international human rights, including the freedoms of expression, thought, conscience, religion, assembly, and association. The Amendment is flawed in its statutory construction, poses jurisdictional considerations, infringes on fundamental rights, and is excessively punitive. Ultimately, the Amendment unnecessarily targets North Korean escapee groups working to send information, goods, and remittances to their fellow people and families in the North. If entered into force on March 30, 2021, this Amendment will also create second-order effects on the already vulnerable and oppressed North Korean people. The Amendment is a matter of grave concern for international human rights organizations. Moreover, the Amendment runs counter to the idea that the U.S.-South Korea alliance is grounded in shared values, straining a staunch alliance, partnership, and friendship that has been so resilient for almost seven decades. The U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, due for reauthorization again soon, will need to be reviewed more closely to find ways to factor in conditions created by the Amendment. Without human rights, there can be no reconciliation, no peace, no prosperity for Koreans living in the north, and no unification. Positive change can be enacted only by the people of North Korea. In order to empower them, the best South Korea and the outside world can do is to increase the volume and quality of information as well as the range of vehicles available to deliver that information. This Amendment should be repealed before it goes into force on March 30, 2021. Thank you very much.</div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/02/what-is-wrong-with-anti-leafleting-law.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-4302522799448866950</guid><pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2021 15:58:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-03-01T14:22:30.015-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">analysis</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">crimes against humanity</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Human Rights</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Pro Bono</category><title>Legal Opinion: Whether the Republic of Korea (ROK)’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”) violates ROK domestic or international legal obligations</title><description><h3 style="text-align: left;">February 14, 2021</h3><h3 style="text-align: left;"> Authors: HRNK Pro Bono Counsel And Amanda Mortwedt Oh, HRNK Human Rights Attorney</h3> Summary South Korea’s Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (the “Amendment”) violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, namely the Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Amendment to the law is flawed in its statutory construction, poses jurisdictional considerations, infringes on fundamental rights, is excessively punitive, and has implications on existing inter-Korean agreements. The Amendment also infringes on international human rights, including the freedoms of expression, thought, conscience and religion, and assembly and association. Ultimately, the Amendment unnecessarily targets North Korean escapee groups working to send information, goods, and remittances to their fellow people and families in the North. If entered into force on March 30, 2021, this Amendment will also create second-order effects on the already vulnerable and oppressed North Korean people under the totalitarian rule of Kim Jong-un. Background 1. On February 10, 2005, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK” or “North Korea”) under Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un’s father and son of Kim Il-sung, declared itself a nuclear state,<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn1">[1]</a> having developed nuclear weapons during ROK Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun’s administrations. On December 29, 2005, the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act was first enacted under President Roh, who had continued the Sunshine Policy of his predecessor Kim Dae-jung.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn2">[2]</a> Current ROK President Moon Jae-In worked as President Roh’s chief of staff from 2007 to 2008. 2. On April 27, 2018, President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed the Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (“Panmunjom Declaration”).<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn3">[3]</a> Article 2 of the Panmunjom Declaration states: 2. The two sides will make joint efforts to defuse the acute military tensions and to substantially remove the danger of a war on the Korean peninsula. Alleviating the military tension and eliminating the danger of war is a very important issue related to the destiny of the nation and a very crucial issue for ensuring peaceful and stable life of the Koreans. ① The two sides agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts. For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) from May 1, to dismantle their means, and further to transform the DMZ into a peace zone in a genuine sense. 3. On September 19, 2018, President Moon and Chairman Kim Jong-un signed the Pyongyang Joint Declaration,<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn4">[4]</a>adopting the Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (“Comprehensive Military Agreement” (CMA) or “9.19 Military Agreement”) as an annex to the Pyongyang Declaration.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn5">[5]</a> The Pyongyang Declaration’s stated purpose, in part, was to “assess the excellent progress” since the two leaders signed the Panmunjom Declaration. 4. The CMA is an inter-Korean bilateral agreement at a ‘military level’ to ‘ease tension’ and ‘build trust’ between North and South Korea in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). CMA paragraph 1 says the two sides agree to cease all hostile acts, and CMA Annex 4, 1(3)(3) specifically prohibits “psychological warfare” in the “maritime peace zone.” 5. On June 4, 2020, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, “strongly criticized escapees living in the Republic of Korea for sending anti-leadership leaflets to the North. She also demanded that the Republic of Korea “at least make a law to stop the farce”, in accordance with the Panmunjom Declaration in which both sides agreed to cease all hostile acts, including the distribution of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn6">[6]</a> 6. On June 13, 2020, Kim Yo-jong stated that the DPRK would end the military agreement (CMA), “‘which is hardly of any value,’ while calling North Korean defectors who send leaflets from the South ‘human scum’ and ‘mongrel dogs.’”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn7">[7]</a> 7. On June 16, 2020, North Korea blew up the joint liaison office in the Kaesong Industrial Complex. The liaison office was situated in North Korea’s territory but built with South Korean funds, designed to facilitate dialogue between the two countries. “North Korea claimed the leaflets violated the deal Kim Jong-un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in struck in 2018 at their first summit, when both leaders agreed to cease ‘all hostile acts and eliminating their means, including broadcasting through loudspeakers and distribution of leaflets’ along their shared border.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn8">[8]</a> 8. Four hours later, the ROK Blue House announced that it would investigate those who disseminated leaflets into North Korea and would continue to uphold the 4.27 Panmunjom Declaration and 9.19 Military Agreement.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn9">[9]</a> 9. ROK National Assemblyman and ruling Democratic Party lawmaker Song Young-gil, chair of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, proposed an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. This Amendment was passed by South Korea’s National Assembly on December 14, 2020 and was signed into law by President Moon Jae-In on December 29, 2020. It will enter into force on March 30, 2021.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn10">[10]</a> 10. According to North Korean human rights civil society organizations and former and current officials in South Korea, “The Song Young-Gil Amendment (North Korean Information Gag Law) criminalizes (1) broadcasting of loudspeakers and posting of placards directed at North Korea in the inter-Korean border area, (2) distribution of “leaflets, etc.” to unspecified multiple persons in North Korea for the purpose of propaganda, gifts, etc. without governmental approval, and (3) movement of “leaflets, etc.” to North Korea for the purpose of propaganda, gifts, etc., including simply moving “leaflets, etc.” via a third country, without governmental approval. While the first category applies only to activities in the inter-Korean border area, the latter two have no such geographical restriction. “The leaflets, etc.” are defined broadly and vaguely to include not only leaflets but also USB flash drives and CDs, books and other publications, humanitarian aid or money. All these offenses as well as attempted offenses are punishable up to 3 years imprisonment or 30 million KRW fine.” [approximately $27,173 USD]<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn11">[11]</a> 11. According to Assemblyman Song Young-gil and Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-Myung, the Amendment is necessary to ensure the safety and security of Koreans living in the border area.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn12">[12]</a> ROK Domestic Legal Obligations As written, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act gives rise to several legal issues. The key provisions of the Amendment are as follows:<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn13">[13]</a> Article 4 (5) “Leaflets or other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other property profits. (6) “Dissemination” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or moving them to North Korea (including the simple movement of leaflets and other items via a third country) without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of “Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act” for the purpose of propaganda, donation, etc.<div> Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following activities: 1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 2. Posting visual media (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 3. Disseminating leaflets or other items. (2) The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited activities under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances. Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) (1) Any person who has violated Article 24: 1. Shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24(1)) based on Article 23(2) and (3). 2. A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished. I. Statutory Analysis &amp; Jurisdictional Considerations The first issue with these provisions as written pertains to the definition of “leaflets or other items” and how it is used in the context of Article 24. The ROK Ministry of Unification (the “MOU”) claimed that the Amendment had to be passed in order to protect its residents in the border region and improve inter-Korean relations and peace on the peninsula.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn14">[14]</a> Indeed, the MOU announced that it would plan such legislation just hours after Kim Yo-jong’s blistering statements against the leaflets in the border region, evidently to meet North Korea’s demands.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn15">[15]</a> Putting the political and policy-related merits of such a decision aside, the Amendment goes much farther than what it was seemingly intended to achieve. Unlike Articles 24(1)1 and 2, the prohibition on disseminating leaflets or other items (Article 24(1)3) is not constrained to the “areas along the Military Demarcation Line” (MDL). The provided definition of “dissemination” explicitly includes “the simple movement of leaflets and other items via a third country.” A plain reading of Article 4 and 24 suggests that the dissemination of leaflets or other items from a location other than the MDL would also be criminalized by the Amendment. The MOU released an interpretive guidance of sorts after the Amendment was passed to explain that “‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third county’ refers to an exceptional case in which leaflets and other items scattered from South Korea are sent to North Korea via a third country due to tidal current or air current.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn16">[16]</a>Geographical and logistical realities suggest that the only realistic location other than South Korea from which leaflets or other items can be sent into North Korea is China via its border with North Korea. It seems that any dissemination of leaflets or other items into North Korea through the Sino-North Korea border is also criminalized by the Amendment, which appears to overshoot the legislative intent. Even beyond the lack of geographical constraints, the list of items that are included in the definition of “leaflets or other items” seems to go beyond the goal and stated purpose of the Amendment. The definition includes any printed materials, auxiliary memory units, cash and “other property profits,” and the MOU has explained that such items were included because many balloons that carry leaflets contain such items. But effectively, such prohibition would arguably include (but not be limited to) the following items, many of which were not the subject of Kim Yo-jong’s stated objections: books, foreign news publications, religious literatures, humanitarian aid such as food, medicine and clothing, mini-radios, and multimedia units such as VHS, CD/DVD, and cassette tapes. This means that parties like humanitarian workers, religious missionaries, civil society organizations, and even individuals that want to send cash remittances to family members in North Korea could get swept up by the Amendment. As if the implications were not already massive enough, another layer of consideration is that the reach of the ROK’s criminal jurisdiction appears expansive. The general provisions in the ROK’s criminal code can be applied to “both Korean nationals and aliens who commit crimes in the territory of the Republic of Korea,”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn17">[17]</a> “all Korean nationals who commit crimes outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn18">[18]</a> “aliens who commit crimes on board a Korean vessel or Korean aircraft outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn19">[19]</a> aliens who commit a specified list of crimes outside the territory of the Republic of Korea,<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn20">[20]</a> and “aliens who commit crimes […] against the Republic of Korea or her nationals outside the territory of the Republic of Korea.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn21">[21]</a> Especially as technological advances may allow for various kinds of electronic dissemination of “leaflets or other items” into North Korea in the future, Korean nationals and foreign nationals anywhere in the world may arguably be criminalized by the Amendment, and it is hard to justify prohibiting items and activities that have little to no implications for the inter-Korean border area. The ROK government would likely say that many of these humanitarian or religious activities unrelated to leafletting would be exempt because they do not “harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger” in the same way that leafletting does. However, the same argument applies to leafletting. The dissemination of leaflets is arguably not the root cause of the harm or serious danger referenced by the Amendment, any more than the provision of humanitarian services or cash remittances is, and the Amendment seems to implicitly acknowledge this fact—as written, the dissemination of leaflets or other items seems to be a crime only if it results in such harm or serious danger. In actuality, the threat to national security, civilians’ safety, or public order that the ROK government seeks to mitigate stems from a byproduct of the leafletting: North Korea’s provocative statements and hostile postures in relation to the leafletting. In effect, the Amendment is not imposing a criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act; instead, the criminalized act depends on a reaction from a third party. Indeed, the MOU’s interpretive guidance states that “punishment can be inflicted only when there is an action of disseminating leaflets, and when the actions pose serious danger to the lives and safety of our nationals.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn22">[22]</a> As such, North Korea’s reactions to leafletting and any complaints and threats that it may communicate about other activities may very well be the biggest determinant in what is ultimately legislated and enforced as crimes under the Amendment—and given North Korea’s penchant for unpredictability and volatility, this is not a sound approach to criminal law. In fairness, the act of leafletting at the MDL did result in a skirmish in 2014 that involved North Korea firing an anti-aircraft gun to shoot down balloons from South Korea carrying leaflets and the ROK army firing back,<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn23">[23]</a> which cannot be said for most comparable humanitarian activities. However, this was an incident from over six years ago that is, tragically, not unfamiliar to the MDL, and it did not harm any South Korean citizens in the border regions. Though the MOU cites this incident as an important backdrop to the Amendment, this is not a strong justification given the rights that it infringes upon. II. Infringement of Fundamental Rights Because even if it were true, however, that the act of disseminating leaflets or other items is being punished by its own merits independent of a reaction from North Korea, this raises other issues. The ROK Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn24">[24]</a> As the ROK government has noted in its defense of the Amendment,<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn25">[25]</a> however, such freedom of expression is not unlimited, as the ROK Constitution also states, “The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by law only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when such restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn26">[26]</a> The Amendment, however, is not an appropriate restriction and curtailment of the free expression rights guaranteed in the ROK Constitution, for many of the reasons outlined above and because it falls short of the long-standing international legal principles of necessity and proportionality as they pertain to restrictions on fundamental rights.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn27">[27]</a> The necessity of the Amendment is questionable and unclear. There is no declared emergency, and given the historical backdrop of inter-Korean relations, any current “tension” claimed by the ROK government is not beyond normal bounds; the last realized danger to lives and bodies due to leafletting took place in 2014 which resulted in zero injuries or casualties—there is no “direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn28">[28]</a> In fact, it seems that a separate law like the Amendment is not needed in order to maintain peace and order near the MDL. In the MOU’s defense of the Amendment, it cites a ROK Supreme Court ruling from 2016, which “ruled that freedom of expression cannot be guaranteed under the Constitution for the flying of leaflets which threatens the safety and lives of the people,”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn29">[29]</a> and the ROK government claims that it is simply codifying this ruling into law. However, the fuller passage of the ruling presents far more nuance. The ruling, rather than endorsing the criminalization of leafletting by law, states that police officers and military personnel “may restrain the act of flying of balloons carrying anti-North leaflets in response to such a clear and present danger if it creates the said danger in accordance with article 5 (1) of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers or article 761 (2) of the Civil Code and, provided that the said restriction is not excessive, such restraining act cannot be considered unlawful.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn30">[30]</a> This ruling actually cuts against the ROK government’s argument, as enforcement personnel already have the authority to respond to any clear and present dangers, even without the Amendment. But even if such a legislation were necessary, the Amendment also falls short of the proportionality principle. A central tenet of proportionality requires consideration as to whether any government restriction is the “least restrictive means” for achieving the relevant purpose.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn31">[31]</a> As discussed above, the Amendment’s definition of “leaflets or other items” is left ambiguous and wanting: it essentially amounts to “items, cash, and other property profits” with “items” supplemented by a parenthetical of non-exhaustive examples and “other property profits” left vague. In addition, the leaflet-related prohibition lacks a tailored geographical scope, and these aspects combine to create a government response that is not the “least restrictive means.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn32">[32]</a> III. Excessive Punishment Even the prescribed punishments seem to be incongruent with the prohibited act. Article 25(1)1 prescribes a punishment “by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won” for offenders of the Amendment. The MOU justifies this by explaining that it is “the same level of punishment applied to the unapproved taking out or bringing in of goods between the two Koreas based on the ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act,’”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn33">[33]</a> and the definition of “dissemination” specifically cites Articles 13 and 20 of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. The issue, however, is that the acts being punished by the Amendment and the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act are very different in nature. Article 13 relates to the taking out or bringing in of goods between the Koreas “for the purposes of sale, exchange, lease, loan for use, donation, use, etc.” (as specified by Article 2.3), and Article 20 relates to the operation of transportation equipment (defined as “any ship, aircraft, railroad vehicles, or motor vehicles, etc.”).<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn34">[34]</a> These relevant sections of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act deal with the transport of goods for mostly commercial purposes, which may justify a punishment that involves imprisonment and a hefty fine. On the other hand, the Amendment prohibits leafletting and the sharing of information, which is, at its core, an exercise of one’s right to freedom of expression. Tomás Ojea Quintana, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, states that the punishment of imprisonment may violate the proportionality principle, and such a penalty “seems to be excessive for actions which are based on the exercise of the freedom of expression, [a] cornerstone for [a] democratic society. The bill doesn’t provide reasons to justify the use of this criminal punishment instead of sanctions from other branches of the law.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn35">[35]</a> IV. Implications of Existing Inter-Korean Agreements The MOU also cites to various other inter-Korean agreements meant to promote peace on the peninsula and improve relations between the Koreas, to show that the two countries agreed to ban mutual slander and leaflet drops on multiple occasions and that the Amendment merely seeks to codify such existing inter-Korean agreements.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn36">[36]</a> For example, Article 2.1 of the Panmunjom Declaration of 2018 states, “The two sides agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain including land, sea and air that are the root cause of military tension and conflicts. For the present, they agreed to stop all the hostile acts including the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn37">[37]</a> However, this argument is also problematic. For one, such agreements place obligations on the DPRK and ROK governments without reference to actions by private parties; it is not clear that such bilateral agreements can allow the ROK to opt out of its constitutional and international obligations to respect and observe fundamental human rights norms, such as the freedom of expression. But even if this were not an issue, the Panmunjom Declaration specifies the geographic scope of the countries’ respective obligations to the areas along the MDL. As discussed above, the Amendment provides no such limitation for leafletting.</div><div> ROK International Legal Obligations In addition to the issues identified above–statutory and jurisdictional considerations, infringement on fundamental rights, excessive punishments, and implications of existing inter-Korean agreements–the Amendment gives rise to several international legal issues based on the ROK’s international human rights treaty obligations and United Nations (UN) membership.&nbsp;</div><div> V. Contravention of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights As a UN Member State, South Korea has agreed to support the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), recognizing that “the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn38">[38]</a> Enshrined in the UDHR are the right to freedom of thought, conscious or religion (Article 18), the right to freedom of opinion and expression (Article 19), and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association (Article 20). As discussed in part above, the Amendment contravenes the right to freedom of opinion and expression by prohibiting “leaflets, etc.” from being “disseminated” to North Korea. In addition, for private citizens who are sending Bibles or religious materials to North Koreans–who have no right to practice their own religion or have their own beliefs–the Amendment infringes on the right to freedom of thought, conscious or religion. South Koreans or others imparting information or religious materials into North Korea are restricted from this practice in contravention of the UDHR. Moreover, the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association is restricted by this Amendment. Organizations dedicated to gathering and sending information, goods, such as USBs, or financial support back home would be unable to safely carry out their activities under the Amendment as written. VI. Violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights On April 10, 1990, South Korea acceded to the ICCPR.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn39">[39]</a> As a signatory to the ICCPR, the South Korean government is obligated to uphold and not violate certain human rights for South Korean citizens. The relevant provisions of the ICCPR are as follows:<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn40">[40]</a> Article 18 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Article 19 1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice. 3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals. Article 22 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 3. Nothing in this article shall authorize States Parties to the International Labour Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize to take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for in that Convention. As such, three fundamental human rights are infringed upon by the Amendment: (1) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 18); (2) the right to freedom of expression (Article 19); and (3) the right to freedom of association with others (Article 22). Like the arguments discussed in the domestic application of the Amendment, the South Korean state has a duty to uphold and protect these rights, and the justifications and responses by the ROK government are not adequate or appropriate here. While the original issue may have been, as alleged by North Korea, the content of leaflets, the Amendment overreaches in its response and application to North Korea’s illegal, escalatory, and threatening acts and statements. Other items, types of information, and remittances are sent into North Korea for the benefit of a vulnerable and severely repressed people. This often includes religious materials, and the ROK government’s blanket ban on “leaflets, etc.”, as a result, infringes on people’s rights in the South to freedom of religion. Furthermore, North Korea has an “absolute monopoly on information and total control over organized social life,”<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn41">[41]</a> yet civil society organizations in South Korea and elsewhere seek to impart information on this repressed society, as they know the potential impacts information of the outside world may have on their North Korean brothers and sisters. People have a fundamental human right to express themselves without interference and to not only receive information, but to “impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” This is what civil society organizations are doing when they send leaflets, however they may be perceived by a government. As previously mentioned, South Korea may restrict such activity for national security or public safety reasons, but there has only been one incident or cause for alarm made by North Korea. As Special Rapporteur Quintana stated, Limitations to freedom of expression further require to justify a clear necessity, in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection between the expression and the threat. In this regard, the necessity to prevent harm to the life or bodies of people or serious damages in border areas is a legitimate purpose. However, it has not been demonstrated a direct and immediate connection between all cross-border actions of civil society organizations and that kind of threat, other than the scattering of leaflets some years ago.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn42">[42]</a> Likewise, the CMA clearly is a bilateral military agreement between North and South Korea, and as such, does not apply to private citizens sending in “leaflets, etc.” Nevertheless, while a State may impose certain restrictions “as necessary,” there are already restrictions in place in the MDL and a police force that has, at times, taken steps “as necessary” to prohibit leaflets from being sent into North Korea, as previously outlined above. There is no appropriate justification to now ban all leaflets, goods, and remittances from being sent into North Korea, especially since this overbroad and unnecessarily restrictive and punitive legislation infringes on fundamental human rights. Necessarily, some of these activities to send in information, goods, and remittances, involve more than one person joined together in collective action to pursue their interests, which implicates the right to freedom of association. Groups, civil society organizations, and families may work together to send their loved ones in the North support, whether it be monetary or information based. Sadly, due to the severe human rights restrictions in North Korea, South Koreans and others have little choice in the means in which they send their love and support home, but they are often joined together in South Korea by their shared desire to improve the lives of their loved ones. This Amendment would restrict their ability to gather and associate under a common mission and spirit. In addition, the Amendment’s Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ensures a harm calculus based on North Korea’s acts, not on those of the information sender. Without question, this targets North Korean escapees and other private citizens, rather than addressing the fundamental issue—North Korea’s disrespect for its international and bilateral agreements and its severe restrictions on human rights, at times constituting crimes against humanity.<a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftn43">[43]</a> Moreover, the principles of proportionality and necessity are violated with the Amendment, as discussed in the domestic portion of this memo and by Special Rapporteur Quintana. South Korea already has means to restrict leaflets in the MDL as warranted, and this Amendment unnecessarily criminalizes such behavior deemed by the Amendment as illegal (and by North Korea as hostile). Of course, the Amendment is not just about leaflets, as the National Assembly had to clarify that “leaflets, etc.” mean flyers, goods (including advertisements and propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory devices, etc.) and money or other property profits. In fact, while strong legal arguments have been made to argue that the Amendment violates ROK domestic and international legal obligations, this Amendment is largely a political issue and therefore a matter of policy. Not only does this Amendment hurt North Korean escapees and South Korean civil society organizations in its infringements on human rights guaranteed by the ROK Constitution and the ICCPR–which in itself should be too heavy of a price to pay for appeasing the North–it creates second-order effects on innocent North Koreans who depend on these goods and remittances to survive and on information to join the rest of the world—despite being born under a regime that views information and upholding human rights in general as a threat to regime survival. Policy Considerations The people working to send in information and to improve North Korean human rights, especially those who are North Korean escapees, are brave, creative, and resilient, but the North Korean human rights community will be forced to think of new ways to overcome the ROK's Amendment should it go into effect on March 30, 2021 as planned. As we have seen, there is great concern by the international community and human rights organizations that the Amendment goes too far and improperly infringes on fundamental rights, thus penalizing North Korean escapees and civil society organizations, rather than standing up for the application of freedom and justice and the oppressed North Korean people. Should South Korea bend in its typical staunch defense of democratic principles under threat by the Kim regime, this may signal a weakness and vulnerability to North Korea ripe for exploitation. Without question, this Amendment seems to show that South Korea is willing to trade its democratic principles and values for the hope of appeasement with a regime that never abides by its own agreements or has true concern or desire to peacefully unify the Korean peninsula. In addition, the nature of the Amendment conflicts with the idea that South Korea and the United States have shared values, which potentially puts strain on a very important and otherwise resilient alliance that has operated now successfully for decades. The U.S. North Korean Human Rights Act, which is up for reauthorization again soon, will need to be reviewed more closely to find ways to manage this apparent issue. This Amendment should be repealed before it goes into force on March 30, 2021.</div><div> Annex: References 1. Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (Referred to as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA)), September 19, 2018, <a href="https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/">https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/</a> (unofficial translation). 2. Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 [English], September 18, 2018, <a href="https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322">https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322</a>. 3. Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, April 27, 2018, <a href="http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm=">http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm=</a>. 4. Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act [English, unofficial translation by NK Pro, December 13, 2020]. 5. Inter-Korean Relations Development Act [English] (Act No. 7763, Dec. 29, 2005; Amended by Act No. 12584, May 20, 2014; Act No. 15431, Mar. 13, 2018), <a href="https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&amp;type=sogan&amp;key=14">https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&amp;type=sogan&amp;key=14</a>. 6. Constitution of the Republic of Korea [English], <a href="https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=1&amp;lang=ENG">https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=1&amp;lang=ENG</a>. 7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx</a>. 8. Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho, Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea &amp; Freedom of Expression in North Korea, January 5, 2021. 9. Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), Justice For North Korea, Mulmangcho, Improving North Korean Human Rights Center, and the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), UN Petition Concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean information gag law), December 30, 2021, <a href="https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/">https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/</a>. 10. Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung, Letter to the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, January 31, 2021, <a href="http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894">http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894</a>. 11. Former Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Moon-soo, Open Letter to the US Congress Human Rights Commission by Governor Kim Opposing South Korea’s Anti-Leaflet Law Criminalizing Leaflet Sending to North Korea&nbsp;[English], February 3, 2021, <a href="https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/">https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/</a>. 12. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**, A/75/50326, October 14, 2020. 13. UN Human Rights Council, 43/... Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, A/HRC/43/L.17, March 20, 2020. 14. Young-Gil SONG, “Understanding Recent Revisions to the “Inter-Korean Relations Development Act,” 38 North, December 20, 2020, <a href="https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/">https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/</a>. 15. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2021, <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf">https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf</a>. 16. Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, <a href="https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&amp;viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000">https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&amp;viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000</a>. 17. [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1">https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1</a> [in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].</div><div> </div><div> <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref1">[1]</a> “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period,” Korean Central News Agency, February 10, 2005,<a href="https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050211-kcna01.htm">https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/dprk/2005/dprk-050211-kcna01.htm</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref2">[2]</a> Inter-Korean Relations Development Act [English], Act No. 7763, Dec. 29, 2005; Amended by Act No. 12584, May 20, 2014; Act No. 15431, Mar. 13, 2018, <a href="https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&amp;type=sogan&amp;key=14">https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_mobile/viewer.do?hseq=47876&amp;type=sogan&amp;key=14</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Panmunjom Declaration on Peace, Prosperity and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula, April 27, 2018, <a href="http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm=">http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm=</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018 [English], September 18, 2018, <a href="https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322">https://english1.president.go.kr/BriefingSpeeches/Briefings/322</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref5">[5]</a> Agreement on the Implementation of the Military Consensus in the Panmunjom Declaration (Referred to as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA)), September 19, 2018, <a href="https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/">https://eastasiaresearch.org/2018/09/30/historic-panmunjom-declaration-in-the-military-domain-south-korea-north-korea-military-agreement-signed-on-2018-9-19/</a> (unofficial translation). <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref6">[6]</a> 조선중앙통신사, “김여정제1부부장 반공화국삐라살포에 북남군사합의파기 경고,” KCNA, June 4, 2020, <a href="http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2020/06/06-04/2020-0604-004.html">http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/2020/06/06-04/2020-0604-004.html</a> [in Korean]. Kim Yo-jong is a Vice-Director of the Workers’ Party of Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) under the power Organization and Guidance Department (OGD). The PAD is “the organization that oversees the distribution of all information. Combined, the OGD and the PAD form a symbiotic relationship to violate fundamental human rights in North Korea, as they determine the information that can be seen and accessed by the population, and disseminate this information using the media, art, and group indoctrination sessions.” Since November 2017, she has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury for censorship activities. Robert Collins, The Organization and Guidance Department: Kim’s Control Tower of Human Rights Denial (Washington, D.C.: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, 2019), XV, 83, <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_OGD_Web.pdf">https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Collins_OGD_Web.pdf</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref7">[7]</a> Kim Tong-Hyung, “Kim Jong Un’s sister threatens S. Korea with military action,” AP, June 13, 2020, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/d2156411d6b432afeef371ac27bca23d">https://apnews.com/article/d2156411d6b432afeef371ac27bca23d</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref8">[8]</a> <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/profiles/joshua-berlinger">Joshua Berlinger</a>, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/profiles/jake-kwon">Jake Kwon</a> and <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/profiles/yoonjung-seo">Yoonjung Seo</a>, “North Korea blows up liaison office in Kaesong used for talks with South,” CNN, June 16, 2020, <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/16/asia/north-korea-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html">https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/16/asia/north-korea-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html</a>. For a comprehensive background and discussion on the Moon administration’s targeting of North Korean escapee groups working in South Korea, see reference 9 in the Appendix. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref9">[9]</a> 박경준, “청와대 "삐라는 백해무익…안보위해에 단호 대응할 것,"”연합뉴스, June 4, 2020, <a href="https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200604085651001">https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200604085651001</a> [in Korean]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref10">[10]</a> Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act [English, unofficial translation by NK Pro, December 13, 2020]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean Human Rights (NKHR), Justice For North Korea, Mulmangcho, Improving North Korean Human Rights Center, and the Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG), UN Petition Concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean information gag law) (December 30, 2021). See also Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho, Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea &amp; Freedom of Expression in North Korea, January 5, 2021, and Former Gyeonggi Province Governor Kim Moon-soo, Open Letter to the US Congress Human Rights Commission by Governor Kim Opposing South Korea’s Anti-Leaflet Law Criminalizing Leaflet Sending to North Korea [English], February 3, 2021, <a href="https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/">https://eastasiaresearch.org/2021/02/08/open-letter-to-the-us-congress-human-rights-commission-by-governor-kim-opposing-south-koreas-anti-leaflet-law-criminalizing-leaflet-sending-to-north-korea/</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref12">[12]</a> Song Young-Gil, “Understanding Recent Revisions to the ‘Inter-Korean Relations Development Act,’” 38 North, December 20, 2020,<a href="https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/">https://www.38north.org/2020/12/ysong122120/</a>; Gyeonggi Province Governor Lee Jae-myung, Letter to the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, Co-Chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, January 31, 2021, <a href="http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894">http://m.kmib.co.kr/view.asp?arcid=0015484894</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref13">[13]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref14">[14]</a> Id. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref15">[15]</a> “South Korean balloons: Plans to stop people sending cross-border messages”, BBC, June 4, 2020, <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52917029">https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52917029</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref16">[16]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref17">[17]</a> Criminal Act, Part I, Ch. I, Art. 2, Korea Legislation Research Institute, Korea Law Translation Center, <a href="https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=28627&amp;lang=ENG">https://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=28627&amp;lang=ENG</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref18">[18]</a> Id. at Art. 3. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref19">[19]</a> Id. at Art. 4. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref20">[20]</a> Id. at Art. 5. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref21">[21]</a> Id. at Art. 6. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref22">[22]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref23">[23]</a> Cho, Joohee, “Koreas Trade Gunfire as Kim Jong-Un Mystery Deepens,” ABC News, October 10, 2014, <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/International/koreas-trade-gunfire-kim-jong-mystery-deepens/story?id=26097426">https://abcnews.go.com/International/koreas-trade-gunfire-kim-jong-mystery-deepens/story?id=26097426</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref24">[24]</a> Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Ch. II, Art. 21(1), July 12, 1948, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html">https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref25">[25]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. See also, Byun, Duk-kun, “FM says freedom of expression can be limited over leafleting ban,” Yonhap News Agency, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201217001000325">https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20201217001000325</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref26">[26]</a> Constitution of the Republic of Korea, Ch. II, Art. 37(2), July 12, 1948, <a href="https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html">https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref27">[27]</a> Callamard, Agnes, “Freedom of Expression and National Security: Balancing for Protection,”&nbsp;Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, December 2015, <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf">https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref28">[28]</a> [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1">https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1</a>[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref29">[29]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets”, The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref30">[30]</a> “UN Petition concerning the Song Young-Gil Amendment to the Inter-Korean Relations Development Act (North Korean Information Gag Law)”, Transitional Justice Working Group, December 30, 2020, <a href="https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/">https://en.tjwg.org/2020/12/30/un-petition-north-korean-information-gag-law/</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref31">[31]</a> Callamard, Agnes, “Freedom of Expression and National Security: Balancing for Protection”, Columbia Global Freedom of Expression, December 2015, <a href="https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf">https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/A-Callamard-National-Security-and-FoE-Training.pdf</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref32">[32]</a> [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1">https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1</a>[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref33">[33]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets,” The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref34">[34]</a> Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, <a href="https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&amp;viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000">https://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=105245&amp;viewCls=engLsInfoR#0000</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref35">[35]</a> [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1">https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1</a>[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref36">[36]</a> “On the amended provisions of ‘the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act’ for disseminating leaflets,” The Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, December 2020, <a href="https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255">https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/releases/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000034&amp;mode=view&amp;cntId=54255</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref37">[37]</a> “Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (2018.4.27),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 11, 2018, <a href="https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;srchTo=&amp;srchWord=&amp;srchTp=&amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;company_cd=&amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm">https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&amp;srchFr=&amp;amp;srchTo=&amp;amp;srchWord=&amp;amp;srchTp=&amp;amp;multi_itm_seq=0&amp;amp;itm_seq_1=0&amp;amp;itm_seq_2=0&amp;amp;company_cd=&amp;amp;company_nm=&amp;page=1&amp;titleNm</a>=. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref38">[38]</a> Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 10, 1948, <a href="https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html">https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/index.html</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref39">[39]</a> Ratification Status for Republic of Korea, <a href="https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=141&amp;Lang=EN">https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=141&amp;Lang=EN</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref40">[40]</a> International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49, <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx">https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref41">[41]</a> UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 14, 2014, <a href="https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf">https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/A_HRC_25_CRP_1_ENG%20LONG.pdf</a>. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref42">[42]</a> [단독]킨타나 “대북전단금지법, 국제 인권표준에 도전, dongA, December 17, 2020, <a href="https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1">https://www.donga.com/news/article/all/20201217/104482008/1</a>[in Korean, but it contains an official statement in English from Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea]. <a href="applewebdata://85509789-B7F9-404F-AAAC-05F727EEFC19#_ftnref43">[43]</a> Id.<o:p></o:p><style class="WebKit-mso-list-quirks-style">
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</style></div></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/02/legal-opinion-whether-republic-of-korea.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item><item><guid isPermaLink="false">tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5505828638642219285.post-7400031395423156242</guid><pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2021 15:53:00 +0000</pubDate><atom:updated>2021-02-18T10:53:15.971-05:00</atom:updated><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Anti-Leaflet Law</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Hallyu</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Information</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Juche</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">Media</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">National Assembly</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">North Korea</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">ROK</category><category domain="http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#">southkorea</category><title>Anti-Leaflet Law in South Korea & Freedom of Expression in North Korea</title><description><h2>[Policy Report from the Office of Tae Yong-ho] January 5, 2021</h2><h2>Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly (the People Power Party)</h2> &lt;Table of contents&gt; Introduction 1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”) Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and Safety of South Korean Residents in the Border 2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act Criticism from the International Community Government Stance on the Criticism from the International Community 3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea North Korean Legal Structure Compulsory Political Activities Juche Ideology of North Korea Religious Policy of North Korea State Control on Outside Information 4. Recent Changes in North Korea Active Flea Markets Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture Conclusion Introduction I am honored to have been given an opportunity to serve my country, the Republic of Korea, as a member of the National Assembly. However, just four years ago, I was North Korea’s former deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom. But in 2016, I defected to South Korea with my family in search of freedom, leaving behind all privileges rendered to me. But the turning point in my life did not just happen overnight. My perspectives on the world have been shaped by the time I had spent traveling between Pyongyang and various European capitals every three to four years as a North Korean diplomat. Years of living abroad have completely transformed my belief in the North Korean system and eventually influenced my decision to defect to the South, one of the most flourishing democracies in the world. In fact, it was the elite education in North Korea that first opened my eyes to the outside world. In my teens, I was lucky enough to attend a foreign language school in Pyongyang, usually reserved for the children of the country’s elite ruling class, where we were even shown American cinema. Enthralled, I remember humming Edelweiss from The Sound of Music created by U.S. imperialists, our sworn enemies. It was a tiny opening that eventually led to my family’s flight to freedom during my posting in London in 2016 following in the von Trapp family’s footsteps. The leaflets flown north in balloons from the inter-Korean border area have likewise been an invaluable source of information for those trapped behind the Juche curtain. Having learnt about the Kim Jong-Un regime’s opulence and its self-serving diversion of resources into weapons of mass destruction over the welfare of its people, some vote with their feet by escaping a life of oppression in North Korea; others elect to stay but remain aware that there are alternatives. Pyongyang knows this too. Perhaps that is why it has been apoplectic about leaflets even by North Korean standards. On October 10, 2014, North Korean forces opened fire on balloons carrying leaflets. In June 2020, Pyongyang threatened military action for South Korea’s failure to ban leafleting. North Korea has made a series of threats against the sending of leaflets along border. The newly amended provisions of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Law, colloquially known as the “anti-leaflet law,” goes far beyond in its banned items and geographic scope. The South Korean authorities have belatedly suggested issuing legally dubious “interpretive guideline” to narrow the application, but they have been silent about revising the law. The government also likes to cite inter-Korean agreements to end leafleting but they do not cover activities by private citizens or groups. Nor do I share the government’s expectation that the anti-leaflet law will “contribute to the improvement of inter-Korean relations and promotion of peace on the Korean Peninsula”. Instead, bending over backwards to appease totalitarian rulers may embolden them to ask for more as Hitler did after the 1938 Munich agreement. What assurance is there that Pyongyang would not promise reprisals for sending of Bibles or South Korean movies through China? I am deeply grateful to the South Korean people for warmly welcoming my family, guaranteeing my life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and giving me the privilege and honor of representing my electors. None of the “people’s deputies” in North Korea would dare to speak against a government bill let alone filibuster it. The North Korean people are entitled to the same freedoms that I have enjoyed for the past four years here and its realization will be the surest guarantee of human rights and democracy, peace and prosperity in South Korea in the long term. As Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” That is why I ask your support to stand with human rights defenders in speaking up against the anti-leaflet law and protecting freedom of expression in North and South Korea before it comes into force on 30 March 2021. This special report on the anti-leaflet law has been prepared to aid your understanding of several legal issues surrounding the amendment in light of the Constitution and international law and of brutal reality of freedom of expression in North Korea. The report concludes that the anti-leaflet law is extremely problematic for three fundamental reasons. First, it undermines democracy by restricting freedom of information in North Korea. Second, the law suppresses human rights and religious freedom. Third, it also restricts freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution of South Korea. The Republic of Korea is one of the extremely rare countries among the colonized that achieved both industrialization and democracy. It is the law of nature that water flows from high to low points. The same could be said about the two Koreas. It is the law of nature that North Korean citizens, oppressed under the authoritarian rule of Kim Jong-un, accept free and democratic values of the South. The freer and democratic North Korea becomes, the sooner peaceful unification will arrive in the Korean peninsula. I will continue to fight against all attempts to blind North Korean people to the truth. I sincerely hope that you will join me in this important endeavor. January 5, 2021 Tae Yong-ho, Member of the National Assembly (the People Power Party) 1. The Constitution of the Republic of Korea and the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act (“Anti-Leaflet Law”) Article 4, Constitution of the Republic of Korea Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “the Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” As stated in the Constitution, the North Korea policy, therefore, should be based on the two pillars of ‘free and democratic order and peace,’ because after all, the most important duty of the President is to defend the Constitution. If the Constitution seeks to establish peaceful unification, North Korean people should be given more opportunities to learn about democracy and build ethnic affinity with fellow South Koreans. The decision to voluntarily give up soft power that has earned the hearts of the North Korean people, specifically through the South Korean cultural wave (Hallyu), will only serve to undermine the constitutional pillar of ‘the basic free and democratic order.’ The Enactment Process of the Anti-Leaflet Law The psychological warfare between the two Koreas first began during the Korean War. The government-led distribution of leaflets halted when Kim Dae Jung administration agreed to halt the activity to meet a precondition for the June 15th Inter-Korean summit. Kim’s successor, former President Roh Moo-hyun followed suit and agreed in 2004 to stop propaganda activities along the inter-Korean border and to remove all tools and means that facilitate such activities. Government-mandated ban on the sending of leaflets led to a rise of civilian-led launching of leaflets. In the Panmunjom Declaration signed on April 27, 2018, President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un agreed to cease all hostile acts against each other in order to defuse acute military tensions that had built up. Such acts included the loud-speaker broadcasting and scattering of leaflets in the areas along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). In fact, the distribution of leaflets by civilians contributes to promoting the rights to know of the North Korean people. The downside is that it could cause inter-Korean tension. For instance, on Oct 10, 2014, the North Korean army fired some 10 bullets with anti-aircraft guns at balloons carrying leaflets launched in Yeoncheon County, to which the South Korean military responded with return fire. Whenever North Korea ramped up its threat, past South Korean administrations responded with either prohibiting the launching of leaflets with police force or attempting to dissuade civic groups from sending leaflets at all. However, each time the government made such attempt, it received fierce criticism from the public, mainly because no legal basis existed to ban leaflet-launching activities. The government ban on the sending of leaflets would have violated freedom of expression, a fundamental right protected by the Constitution. There have been eight motions to amend the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act from years between 2008 and 2018 which aimed to prohibit the launching of leaflets to North Korea. However, all motions received criticism and were later discarded on the ground that they violated the basic right protected by the Constitution. What changed the dynamics was when Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, demanded that the South Korean government make laws to ban the sending of leaflets by activist groups consisting of defectors. Since her statement on June 4, 2020, the legislative process to enact the anti-leaflet law progressed rapidly. She threatened to shut a joint liaison office and factory town in the border town of Kaesong or discard the inter-Korean comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), if the South Korean government failed to take necessary action. In response to Kim Yo-jong’s demand, South Korean Ministry of Unification quickly held a press briefing and announced that all activities that endanger the lives and property of residents living in the border should be prohibited and that it was preparing to take steps to improve current legislation that can fundamentally correct the situation, signaling that it would hastily enact the anti-leaflet law in order to completely ban the leaflet drop. Both the South Korean public and international community denounced the anti-leaflet bill, calling it ‘legislation made under the single order of Kim Yo-jong’ and ‘legislation that guards authoritarian Kim Jong-un.’ They demanded the government retract its decision to pursue the legislative process. For example, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, advised the two Koreas to work together to resolve the leaflet issue, while Signe Poulsen, head of the Seoul office of the UN Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights, commented that the sending of leaflets is an activity intended to deliver information to North Korean citizens and thus a form of individual freedom of expression. However, despite North Korea’s demolishing of a joint liaison office in Kaesong on June 16, the government introduced a bill to the general meeting of the Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee of the National Assembly on August 3. On September 22, a South Korean civil servant from the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries was killed by North Korean soldiers while on duty, and his body was incinerated. Although the South Korean government did not even receive an assurance from Pyongyang that North Korea would take action to punish the perpetrators and prevent similar cases from occurring again, South Korea did not participate in the joint committee for the adoption of resolution on situation of human rights at UN General Assembly. On December 2, the anti-leaflet law passed with majority voting for the bill. What happened was that the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party forcibly passed the bill, disregarding and breaking a conventional rule of passing the bill only with an agreement between the ruling and opposition parties in a Foreign Affairs and Unification subcommittee a day before the vote. The anti-leaflet law passed the vote in the general meeting of the National Assembly on December 14. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect three months after promulgation, resulting in the birth of unjust law that outrightly denies the spirit of the Constitution. While the ruling party and the government claim that this is a minimal step necessary to protect the lives and safety of South Korean residents in the border, legal experts on domestic and international law, human rights activists, US Congressmen, and media criticized the passage of the bill as one that severely restricts the rights of individual to speak freely, a basic constitutional right. Freedom of Expression vs. Lives and safety of South Korean Residents in the Border The South Korean government and ruling party pointed out that the distribution of leaflets should be banned, as it endangers the lives and safety of South Korean citizens living along the border. However, this is an extremely weak argument in light of the Constitution, international law, and legal views of the National Human Rights Commission of South Korea, a national advocacy institution for human rights protection. The Republic of Korea Constitution states that “all citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association (Clause 1, Article 21).” Nevertheless, the extent to an individual can express his or her freedom is not without limit. The Constitution also reads that “the freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by Act only when necessary for national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare (Clause 2, Article 37).” The distribution of leaflet can escalate military tension between the two Koreas and may violate the right to live of the residents in the border. In fact, Defector A argued in a court case that government prohibition on the distribution of leaflets caused psychological damage to him. The South Korean Supreme Court ruled in 2016 that causality exists between the act of sending leaflets and provocation of North Korea which could directly incur bodily harm and imminent danger to the lives of residents in the border region. Therefore, it confirmed the original verdict that dismissed a claim for damages, ruling that the government can limit the leaflet sending activity under the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers and civil law. The government frequently cites this court case to support the legality of the anti-leaflet law. However, the Supreme court ruling was merely that it was not unlawful for the police to stop individuals from sending leaflets, but not that individuals who distribute leaflets should be criminalized. In particular, the ruling reads that ‘it was not unlawful unless the restriction is not excessive,’ leaving ample avenue for the law to not violate freedom of expression. Hence, this court ruling does not provide legal evidence to justify the government claim that prohibiting and criminalizing an act of distribution leaflets is legally sound. A report titled ‘Legal Response and Task of the Distribution of Leaflets’ published by the Korea Institute for National Unification, a national research institution, concludes that “the distribution of leaflets goes beyond the bound of the right to freedom of expression and can already be limited by existing legislation. If a special law was to be enacted, it should be reviewed thoroughly from legal and policy perspectives so that it does not violate the principle of excess prohibition laid out in the Constitution.” The report also added that “if a special law that prohibits and criminalizes the sending of leaflets is to be introduced, it should be drafted and written with much precision to ensure all constitutional requirements are met. Otherwise, it will be vulnerable to the claim of unconstitutionality.” Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (a.k.a. the International Covenant Civil and Political Rights) states that “the right to freedom of opinion and expression includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. Both South Korea and North Korea are the parties to the Covenant. International law is not legally binding, but carries the same force as domestic law; therefore, the two Koreas have the responsibility and duty to ensure and protect the right to freedom as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as stated in the Covenant. Moreover, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea concluded in the 2nd plenary committee in 2015 that the sending of leaflets by civic groups or individuals is a form of freedom of speech. It also expressed a view that the government should not monitor or deter the distribution of leaflets by individuals or civic groups, since threat from North Korea or the agreement between the two Koreas to stop slander or defamation of each other cannot be used to restrict basic civil liberties. This view takes into consideration the safety of South Korean citizens, including those who live in the border region. In conclusion, the Constitution, international law, and legal view of the National Human Rights Commission all point out that existing law is sufficient to restrict the sending of leaflets, and even if the enactment of special law is necessary to prohibit such an act, it should be carefully drafted to not violate the principle of excess prohibition as stated in the Constitution. 2. The Legal Problems with the Anti-Leaflet Law Laws on Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation It was the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act that the National Assembly enacted to regulate the distribution of leaflets in 2008. The prescribed purpose of the law was to define activities necessary to promote mutual exchange and cooperation. Therefore, critics of the legislation pointed out that the sending of leaflets, an act of unilateral expression of opinion, cannot be regarded as an act to promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, and therefore, does not fulfill the intended purpose of the legislation. Moreover, contrary to “the exchange, contact, and trade with North Korea” as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the act of sending leaflets to North Korea is ‘prohibited in principle,’ which damages the unity of law itself. Furthermore, since the sending of leaflets is a form of expression of opinion, all-out prohibition and stipulating a penalty clause of such an activity by law could be considered as pre-censorship which may violate constitutional right to speech. For the reasons above, a total of eight proposed amendments to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in the years between 2008 and 2018 were all discarded. The Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act When Kim Yo-jong denounced the distribution of leaflets in her statement on June 4, the South Korean government announced that it was preparing to review legislation that can fundamentally improve all legislation that intensifies tension along the inter-Korean border. The proposed law that followed was an amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act. The legislation defines an act of spreading leaflets as a violation of the terms of the inter-Korean agreement and stipulates criminal penalties for committing such an act. In other words, while the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act seeks to ban the act of sending leaflets by requiring approval from the Minister of Unification, the Amendment to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act is intended to fundamentally prohibit the distribution of leaflets by defining it as a violation of the inter-Korean agreement and criminalizing that activity. The main provisions added to the Development of Inter-Korean Relations Act are as follows:<div> <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; border-collapse: collapse; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: black; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px;"><tbody><tr style="height: 2.8pt;"><td style="border: 1pt solid black; height: 2.8pt; padding: 1.4pt 5.1pt; width: 463.35pt;" width="618">Article 4 (Definitions) 5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains. 6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’for propaganda, donation, etc (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included). Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts. 1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 3. Scattering leaflets and other items ② The Minister of Unification may, if necessary to prevent prohibited acts under each subparagraph of paragraph (1), request cooperation from the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government. In such cases, the head of the relevant central administrative agency or the head of a local government shall cooperate, except in extenuating circumstances. Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3). ② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished.</td></tr></tbody></table> First of all, Subparagraphs 5 and 6 of Article 4 are problematic for the following reasons: 5. “Leaflets and other items” are defined as, items (including but not limited to advertising propaganda materials, printed materials, auxiliary memory units), cash and other means of property gains. Clause 5 reads that “Leaflets and other items” include items, cash and other means of property gains. This means that the law prohibits sending not only leaflets, but virtually all items to North Korea, which is clearly beyond the scope of legislative intent, as the government claims. The South Korean government argues that these items were included in the legislation, as balloons carrying leaflets could include dollar notes, mini-radios, and flash drives. However, it is not convincing why cash and items which are in fact a form of economic aid to help ordinary North Korean citizens, are banned along with leaflets that Pyongyang has denounced so severely. In other words, the inclusion of “other items” in the amendment demonstrates that the government claim that this law is intended to protect South Korean citizens living in the border by prohibiting “an act of distributing leaflets and other items” that “condemns” North Korea is clearly flawed. 6. “Scattering” is defined as distributing leaflets to unspecified individuals in North Korea or move them to North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 13 or 20 of ‘Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ for propaganda, donation, etc. (leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country is also included). According to the definition of “scattering” as laid out in Clause 6, the act of “scattering” already implies that any person who engages in such an act did not obtain approval for taking out or bringing in goods, etc. (Article 13) and for operating transportation equipment (Article 20) from the Minister of Unification as stipulated in the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. In the meantime, any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. or operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without prior approval from the government is punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law. <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="MsoNormalTable" style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; border-collapse: collapse; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: black; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; width: 624px; word-spacing: 0px;"><tbody><tr style="height: 2.8pt;"><td style="border: 1pt solid black; height: 2.8pt; padding: 1.4pt 5.1pt; width: 467.85pt;" width="624">INTER-KOREAN EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ACT Article 27 (Penalty Provisions) (1) Any person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years or by a fine up to thirty million won: 1. Any person who visits North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 9 (1) and the provision to Article 9 (6); 2. Any person who obtains approval under Article 9 (1) and the proviso to Article 9 (6) by fraud or other improper means; 3. Any person who takes out or brought in goods, etc. without obtaining approval under Article 13 (1); 4. Any person who carries out any cooperative project without obtaining approval under Article 17 (1); 5. Any person who operates transportation equipment between South Korea and North Korea without obtaining approval under Article 20 (1); 6. Any person who obtains approval under Article 13 (1), 17 (1) or 20 (1) by fraud or other improper means.</td></tr></tbody></table> There has already been a legal debate in the judiciary on whether the sending of leaflets to North Korea is subject to approval under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Law. In fact, courts have interpreted and determined that the sending of leaflets is not subject to approval from the Minister of Unification. In response to the court rulings, the government has tried to punish individuals who engaged in the distribution of leaflets under other laws such as the High-Pressure Gas Safety Control Act and Wastes Control Act. However, the newly amended anti-leaflet law now makes the distribution of leaflets legally subject to government approval by defining the term “distribution/spread,” which could cause controversy on the interpretation of the law. Article 24 (Prohibition of Violation of the Inter-Korean Agreement) (1) No person shall harm the lives or bodies of the people or cause serious danger by doing any of the following acts. 1. Loudspeaker broadcasting toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 2. Posting visual materials (posts) toward North Korea in areas along the Military Demarcation Line. 3. Scattering leaflets and other items<p class="MsoNormal" style="-webkit-text-size-adjust: auto; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); color: black; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: 23.46666717529297px; margin: 0in; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-decoration: none; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; vertical-align: baseline; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-break: break-all; word-spacing: 0px;"><o:p>&nbsp;</o:p> The most problematic aspect of Article 24 is that the act of scattering leaflets and other items (Subparagraph 3) is not limited to the “Military Demarcation Line.” If the intent of the law was indeed to protect the lives of residents who live in the border region, as the government claims, then Subparagraph 3 should clearly state that the law prohibits the act only if it occurs along the Military Demarcation Line. Essentially, an act of sending any materials of value to North Korea in China-North Korea border without approval from the South Korean government will constitute an act of scattering leaflets and other items under Subparagraph 3, Paragraph 1, Article 24. Article 25 (Penalty Provisions) ① Any person who has violated Article 24 (1) shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 3 years or by fine not exceeding 30 million won. However, the provision shall not apply when South-North Korean agreements are suspended (this shall be limited to actions prohibited by Article 24 (1)) based on Article 23 (2) and (3). ② A person who has attempted any crime under paragraph (1) shall be punished. An act of sending leaflets to North Korea (particularly sending leaflets in China-North Korea border) itself does not directly involve danger that causes bodily harm to South Korean citizens. It is, in fact, North Korea’s hostile act including military provocation that causes serious harm or threat to the lives of South Korean citizens. The basic principle of criminal law is that in order to impose criminal punishment on a person for committing a specific act, that act should infringe upon another person’s benefit and protection of law. However, the amendment to this law is unusual in that the legislation punishes an individual not for the act he or she has committed, but depending on a reaction from a third party. As a result, one receives criminal punishment if his or her sending of leaflets has led North Korea to engage in an act of hostility. On the other hand, if North Korea showed no reaction, then that person would not receive punishment. Such arbitrary penalty provisions could be problematic in consideration of the principle of legality in criminal law. Another potential issue is a penalty provision for attempted crime as stated in Subparagraph 1, Paragraph 2, Article 25. In other words, even if the sending of leaflets did not cause “harm or serious danger to the lives and body of citizens,” an individual can be investigated, prosecuted, and tried for having the intent to do so. Moreover, another ambiguity is with the interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Article 25; it is not clear whether the attempted crime refers to an attempt to spread leaflets and other materials or an attempt to incur harm or danger to citizens. The amendment has been promulgated on Dec 29, 2020 and is set to take effect in three months. All legislative process has been completed, and only the interpretation of the law remains on the table. The Ministry of Unification is working on ‘interpretive guidelines,’ but as an executive branch, it has no authority whatsoever to substitute for a role of the judicial branch charged with interpreting the law. Criticism from the International Community In his unusual op-ed in a South Korean conservative newspaper, Tomás Ojea Quintana, United Nations' Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea, urged that South Korea should reconsider the legislation before it goes into effect. His main concern was that the penalty provision of a maximum three years of imprisonment for sending leaflets violates individual right to expression. In his article, Special Rapporteur Quintana requested the South Korean government and National Assembly yet another review of the legislation before its enforcement. Mr. Quintana commented that “there must be justification for restricting freedom of expression, and such restriction should be applied proportionately.” He added that the legislation used ambiguous terms such as ‘advertising propaganda materials’ and ‘other means of property gains,’ arguing that the use of those terms challenges the standards of international human rights which do not allow margin of appreciation when it comes to freedom of speech. On Dec 14, several US Congressmen including Chris Smith (R-NJ), Co-chair of the bi-partisan Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Gerald E. Connolly (D-Va.) have expressed criticism for the anti-leaflet law. Congressman Chris Smith called the legislation “insane,” urging the South Korean government to review critically its commitment to democratic values. He also declared that he intended to convene a congressional hearing regarding this issue. Former U.S. Representative Eliot Engel (D), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, commented in his recent interview with Voice of America that while he “recognizes the importance of building trust between the two Koreas,” he does not believe that building trust should come “at the expense of a common goal of promoting human rights in North Korea.” Mr. Engel added that he “hopes to work together with the South Korean government to resolve any issues that may arise as a result of the enactment of this legislation.” Robert R. King, former Special Envoy for North Korea human rights issues at the U.S. Department of State, warned in his commentary submitted to the Center for Strategic &amp; International Studies, that “there is no assurance that even with the silencing of freedom of expression in banning balloons that the North Koreans will take any action to improve inter-Korean relations. The consequence, however, could be erosion of the South Korean relationship with the United States, which is important for the people of both countries.” Politicians and human rights activists from outside of the U.S. have also joined the force in expressing their criticism for the anti-leaflet law. In the United Kingdom, David Alton, a British politician who represents All Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea, urged Secretary of State Dominic Raab to send formal request to the South Korean government to reconsider the decision to enact the anti-leaflet law. Similarly, Canada also expressed its concern over the passage of the bill. Christelle Chartrand, spokesperson for Global Affairs Canada, commented that “Freedom of expression is a cornerstone of prosperous society and a critical element in the promotion of human rights.” Similar views were found in Europe. Human Rights Without Frontiers, a non-government organization based in Belgium, stated that it would send EU leadership an official statement that requests EU member states to officially protest against the passage of the anti-leaflet law. In Japan, the Asahi Shimbun published an editorial titled ‘The Moon Jae-in administration should consistently protect the principle of freedom.’ The article stated that the anti-leaflet law “includes provisions that damage the principle of civic freedom and democracy.” It concluded that while “democracy may differ from a country to country, the South Korean government should take a cautious action regarding the new amendment because it will not be free from the voice and concern of the international community with regards to issues on conventional values such as freedom and democracy.” Official Stance of the South Korean Government on the Criticism from the International Community When the anti-leaflet bill officially became law on Dec 15, critics pointed out that the amended law ‘criminalizes even the distribution of flash drives containing Korean dramas.’ The Ministry of Unification quickly issued a statement, refuting the claim that the law does not prohibit such an act. The Ministry argued that the amended law, which critics have called ‘legislation made with a direct order from Kim Yo-jong,’ was not enacted because of the demand from Pyongyang, but to fulfill basic government duty to protect the lives and safety of its citizens. It also emphasized that this law is necessary to perform constitutional obligation of promoting substantial development of the inter-Korean relations and peace in the Korean peninsula and pursuing a policy for peaceful unification. The Ministry added that “while freedom of speech is a constitutional right, it does not prevail over the right to live of our own citizens who live along the border.” The Ministry of Unification also stated that “expressing Seoul’s commitment to comply with the inter-Korean agreement through the systematic enactment of the amended law could effectively call on and encourage North Korea to abide by the inter-Korean agreement.” Moreover, the Ministry explained that the phrase of ‘leaflets sent to North Korea simply via a third country’ refers to a case where leaflets launched from the South Korean territory are sent into North Korea via territory of a third country. It also added that this amended law is to prohibit an activity that causes serious harm to the lives of our citizens, pointing out that an act of launching leaflets in a third country will be governed by the national law of that country, not the amended legislation of South Korea. However, the Ministry of Unification has no authority to make legal judgment on how the law is interpreted and enforced. The judiciary branch does. Therefore, it is inappropriate for the Ministry, an executive branch, to interpret the law on behalf of the courts. The Ministry of Unification announced that it is working to provide 'guidelines for interpreting new regulations on launching leaflets and other materials' before the law takes effect. However, doing so would be acknowledging that the bill is not without fault, given that it requires specific guidelines to be fully understood. South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha said in her recent interview with CNN that “some people argue that the law violates freedom of expression, but while such freedom is absolutely vital to human rights, it’s not absolute.” She further argued that freedom of expression can be limited for the safety of people. Ruling Democratic Party Chairman Lee Nak-yon of South Korea expressed his regret over the decision of US Congress to urge the Korean government to review the amendment (of the Inter-Korean Development Act). In fact, the South Korean government has been working to prevent the worst case scenario from happening, that is, being labeled as a human rights abuser. The government has frequently convened high-level meetings chaired by Director of National Security Office Suh Hoon. In particular, the Blue House is making all-out efforts to prevent the holding of a US congressional hearing, being organized by the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission by utilizing international media outlets. As part of its effort, the government has urged the international community to take into consideration ‘the distinct characteristics of the inter-Korean relations’ and ‘suffering of South Korean residents living along the border.’ However, factual evidence clearly suggests that there is no causality between an act of distributing leaflets and its impact on the lives and safety of residents. First, not a single human casualty occurred due to an act of sending leaflets. Second, the passage of the new amendment is unnecessary since existing law could already restrict the act. 3. The Reality of the Right to Freedom of Expression in North Korea North Korean Legal Structure </div><div>In the North Korean legal system, Kim Jong-un’s directives and guidelines come first before any law. Below Kim Jong-un’s directives is the ‘10 principles to protect the one and only leader,’ basic bylaws of the Korean Workers’ Party, followed by the Constitution, sublaws and enforcement decrees of each administrative branch. Compulsory Political Activities In North Korea, all citizens are forced to engage in political activities for their lifetime. North Korean people are taught that they are born with two lives: a physical life rendered to them by their biological parents and political life, aka spiritual life, from the supreme leader of North Korea. Regardless of the age of the people, the political activities of all North Korean citizens are controlled by the Korean Workers’ Party. The required membership in the Party enables the state to control the daily lives of citizens. Moreover, their private lives are under complete control of the state monitoring, as no criticism whatsoever of the state is permitted. All North Korean citizens receive punishment for taking part in any type of anti-state activities or even expressing opposition to the state policies. They also get reward for reporting anyone suspected of committing an anti-state crime. Juche Ideology of North Korea The Juche ideology of North Korea is commensurate with a religious one. It postulates that ‘man is the master of his own destiny.’ However, since a man is an individual, men must be organized centrally in order to achieve their full potential. It is the Party that forms and manages such a central organization. The Juche ideology states that since the Party is a collection of the masses, the Kim family must lead the organization. In North Korean society with extreme vertical organizational structure, the Kim family has indoctrinated the North Korean people that all citizens should pay allegiance and faith to the Kim family, the brain of all lives, in order for them to effectively manage the state. This is why there are numerous statues of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il in every corner of North Korea, to which North Koreans are forced to pay tribute on a daily basis. North Korea has institutionalized an ideological education that seeks to make North Korean people worship and pay blind allegiance to the Great Leaders, effectively blocking all access to outside information unrelated to the Juche ideology. Political propaganda in North Korea is utilized to instigate nationalistic hostility towards the enemies of the state, namely the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Religious Policy of North Korea Karl Marx claimed that "religion is the opium of the people." This dictum served as a basis for communism to suppress any religious activities. However, the only communist country that obliterated religion is North Korea. While the Soviet Union, communist countries in Eastern Europe, and China persecuted religious activities, they still allowed the existence of churches and pastors. Pyongyang, once called Jerusalem of the East, is now devoid of all religious institutions, as the North Korean regime completely banned all churches and executed clerics under its policy of exterminating all religions. Churches that now exist in North Korea such as Bong-su Church, Cil-gol Church, and Jang-choong Catholic Church were all built after 1988, the year Seoul Olympics was held. In order to compete against South Korea that successfully hosted the Olympics, North Korea organized the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang just a year after the Seoul Olympics were held. Building these churches targeted foreign visitors who visited Pyongyang to attend the Festival, an attempt by the North Korean regime to make a false appearance that religious activities are tolerated in the country. State Control on Outside Information North Korean citizens are deprived of the right to access independent information that is not sourced from the state. The only provider of information in North Korea is the state-controlled media. The state strictly controls internet access as well as TV and radio broadcasting. All broadcasted materials go through watertight inspection by the state and are rejected, if they are not in line with the principles of the Korean Workers’ Party. All private phone calls are monitored, while ordinary citizens are only allowed to make domestic calls. North Korean people are punished for watching or listening to foreign media, including foreign films and dramas. 3. Recent Changes in North Korea Active Flea Markets The major change in North Korea has taken place in an upward manner, not the other way around as could be seen in the cases of East Germany, Soviet Union, and China. The main force leading the upward change is Jang-ma-dang, flea markets in North Korea which first emerged at the end of 1990s. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, foreign assistance plummeted, resulting in widespread famine struck North Korea in the mid-1990s. Millions of North Koreans, who relied exclusively on state food rationing, died in hunger. They started to sell whatever they had in an empty lot in their town in order to survive. The emergence and rise of Jang-ma-dang was the birth of capitalism in North Korea. The state authority could not stop North Korean citizens from engaging in such commercial activities, when it could not even provide enough food to the people. The North Korean regime also tolerated Jang-ma-dang activities in order to secure national budget by collecting tax from sellers in the market. Despite strict state crackdown and high price, South Korean products are extremely popular among North Korean residents. Numerous products ranging from flash drives containing Korean films and dramas, cosmetics, hanbok (traditional Korean costumes worn on special occasions such as wedding), and underwear are smuggled into North Korea and sold in Jang-ma-dang. Even state inspectors take bribery and turn a blind-eye to the illegal sale of South Korean products in the flea market which has raised a concern among North Korean officials. Korean Wave (Hallyu) in North Korea The infusion of South Korean culture in North Korea since early 2000 through Jang-ma-dang has transformed the lives of North Koreans. Thanks to the Korean Wave, the worldviews and cultures of North Korea have slowly resembled those of the South. Moreover, with technological progress, more North Koreans now have mobile phones and video cameras at home. For example, a young North Korean couple used to call each other ‘Mr. or Miss Comrade,’ a term used in communistic society. However, the millennial generation, influenced by South Korean films and drama, instead use a South Korean expression such as ‘Oppa or Honey’ to address each other. In addition, young North Koreans use South Korean colloquial expressions such as ‘ㅋㅋ, ㅎㅎ (meaning lol)’ in text messages. Fashion style among young North Koreans has also started to resemble that of young people in South Korea. Three pillars of revolution, ideology, technology, and culture, which the North Korean regime have promoted for internal solidarity are shaken to the core, thanks to the Korean Wave. Adoption of Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture North Korean state media reported in an article titled ‘Invisible fight, silent war’ on Oct 19, 2019 that the state is faced with a silent war. The article warned the public that while North Korea, which possess nuclear weapons, may not be vulnerable to a physical attack, the inflow of South Korean media content such as films and dramas could topple down the state. It described the spread of South Korean culture as a “virus invading the body.” For this reason, North Korea passed a series of law on ‘rejecting reactionary ideology and culture’ at a plenary meeting of the Supreme People’s Assembly. The intent of the law, the media reported, was to prevent the spread of anti-socialist ideology and safeguard North Korea's spirit and culture. Conclusion Since 2000, the two Koreas have focused on promoting exchange and cooperation, breaking away from an ideological conflict inherited from the Cold War. The thawing relations greatly reduced leaflet sending activities organized by the South Korean government. Civic groups, on the other hand, started to distribute leaflets by launching balloons along the inter-Korean border. North Korea has continued to denounce the leaflet launching by various civic groups in South Korea and demanded Seoul to prohibit such activities. The South Korean government responded that restricting these activities would be in violation of the right to freedom of expression as specified in the Constitution. In response, North Korea threatened to use military force and eventually demolished the inter-Korean Liaison Office on June 16, escalating tension between the two Koreas. The South Korean National Assembly, which consists of the super-majority of the ruling Democratic Party, forcibly passed the anti-leaflet bill. The bill was then debated and deliberated (Dec 22), approved by the President (Dec 24), promulgated (Dec 29), and is set to take effect within just three months. The South Korean public and international community demanded the law be rescinded, criticizing the legislation for violating the right to freedom of expression protected by the Constitution and international law. They have also argued that this ambiguous law will cause legal controversy on the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Human rights activists in South Korea announced that they would file a petition to the Constitutional Court, as the law is slated to take effect in upcoming March. The South Korean government argued that restriction of the basic constitutional right is inevitable to protect the lives and safety of residents who live in the border. Moreover, it maintains that freedom of right is not absolute and that it will continue to make effort to dissipate public concern by publishing guidelines for interpreting the newly amended law. However, one can reasonably conclude that the true intention of the Moon Jae-in administration for amending the law in such a hurried manner was to initiate a dialogue with Pyongyang in desperate attempt to appease to Kim Jong-un. The fact that there has been no human casualty incurred by the sending of leaflets weakens their claim. Article 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea reads that “it shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry out a policy of peaceful unification based on the basic free and democratic order.” North Korean people have been enslaved, having been blocked from the outside world under the brutal line of hereditary dictatorship of the Kim family in the past 70 years. However, they have started to recover their basic rights as human beings by independently maintaining their means of living through commercial activities in Jang-ma-dang. The inflow of South Korean culture smuggled into North Korea has contributed to reducing hostility towards South Korea and rebuilding ethnic identity as one Korean people. For regime survival, North Korea has vigorously sought to control the inflow of outside information into the country by enacting new laws on rejecting reactionary ideology and culture on December 4. The South Korean government, if it was sincere about protecting freedom and democratic values that the nation as a whole has worked so hard to build, should rescind its decision to enact the anti-leaflet law which hampers peaceful unification in the Korean peninsula. The least it should do is to remove unconstitutional provisions and work to make far more meticulous laws that can satisfy the original legislative intent, that is, to protect the lives of residents living in the border region. 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</style></description><link>https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2021/02/anti-leaflet-law-in-south-korea-freedom.html</link><author>noreply@blogger.com (Committee for Human Rights in North Korea)</author><thr:total>0</thr:total></item></channel></rss>

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