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  1. <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?><rss version="2.0" xml:base="https://www.eff.org/rss/updates.xml" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  2.  <channel>
  3.    <title>Deeplinks</title>
  4.    <link>https://www.eff.org/rss/updates.xml</link>
  5.    <description>EFF&#039;s Deeplinks Blog: Noteworthy news from around the internet</description>
  6.    <language>en</language>
  7.     <atom:link href="https://www.eff.org/rss/updates.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
  8.      <item>
  9.    <title>Speaking Freely: Obioma Okonkwo </title>
  10.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/speaking-freely-obioma-okonkwo</link>
  11.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;This interview has been edited for clarity and length.*&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  12. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Obioma Okonkwo is a lawyer and human rights advocate. She is currently the Head of Legal at &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://mediarightsagenda.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Media Rights Agenda (MRA)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a non-governmental organization based in Nigeria whose focus is to promote and defend freedom of expression, press freedom, digital rights and access to information within Nigeria and across Africa. She is passionate about advancing freedom of expression, media freedom, access to information, and digital rights. She also has extensive experience in litigating, researching, advocating and training around these issues. Obioma is an alumnus of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://openinternet.global/leaders&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Open Internet for Democracy Leaders Programme&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a fellow of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://afrisig.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;African School of Internet Governance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and a Media Viability Ambassador with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://akademie.dw.com/en/home/s-9519&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Deutsche Welle Akademie&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  13. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: What does free speech or free expression mean to you?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  14. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In my view, free speech is an intrinsic right that allows citizens, journalists and individuals to express themselves freely without repressive restriction. It is also the ability to speak, be heard, and participate in social life as well as political discussion, and this includes the right to disseminate information and the right to know. Considering my work around press freedom and media rights, I would also say that free speech is when the media can gather and disseminate information to the public without restrictions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  15. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you tell me about an experience in your life that helped shape your views on free speech?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  16. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; An experience that shaped my views on free speech happened in 2013, while I was in University. Some of my schoolmates were involved in a ghastly car accident—as a result of a bad road—which resulted in their death. This led the students to start an online campaign demanding that the government should repair the road and compensate the victims’ families. Due to this campaign, the road was repaired and the victims’ families were compensated.  Another instance is the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/End_SARS&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;#End SARS protest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a protest against police brutality and corrupt practices in Nigeria. People were freely expressing their opinions both offline and online on this issue and demanding for a reform of the Nigerian Police Force. These incidents have helped shape my views on how important the right to free speech is in any given society considering that it gives everyone an avenue to hold the government accountable, demand for justice, as well as share their views about how they feel about certain issues that affect them as an individual or group.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  17. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: I know you work a bit on press freedom in Nigeria and across Africa. Can you tell me a bit about the situation for press freedom in the context in which you’re working?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  18. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; The situation for press freedom in Africa—and particularly Nigeria—is currently an eye sore. The legal and political environment is becoming repressive against press freedom and freedom of expression as governments across the region are now posing themselves as authoritarian. And they have been making several efforts to gag the media by enacting draconian laws, arresting and arbitrarily detaining journalists, imposing fines, and closing media outlets, amongst many other actions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  19. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In my country, Nigeria, the government has resorted to using laws like the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nfiu.gov.ng/images/Downloads/downloads/cybercrime.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Cybercrime Act of 2015&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.refworld.org/legal/legislation/natlegbod/1916/en/65684&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Criminal Code Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, among other laws, to silence journalists who are either exposing their corrupt practices, sharing dissenting views, or holding them accountable to the people. For instance, journalists like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cpj.org/2023/03/nigerian-journalist-agba-jalingo-detained-on-cybercrime-charges/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Agba Jalingo&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mfwa.org/issues-in-focus/nigerian-journalist-ayodele-samuel-freed-after-spending-two-weeks-in-detention/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ayodele Samuel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://closingspaces.org/incident/cmra-blast-police-as-amosun-orders-ojos-arrest/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Emmanuel Ojo&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cpj.org/2022/10/nigerian-police-detain-charge-two-journalists-for-whatsapp-messages/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Dare Akogun&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; – just to mention a few who have been arrested, detained, or charged to court under these laws. In the case of Agba Jalingo, he was arrested and detained for over 100 days after he exposed the corrupt practices of the Governor of Cross River, a state in Nigeria.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  20. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; The case is the same in many African countries including Benin, Ghana, and Senegal. Journalists are arrested, detained, and sent to court for performing their journalistic duty.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.icij.org/journalists/ignace-sossou/&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Ignace Sossou&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a journalist in Benin, was sent to court and imprisoned under the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cpj.org/2021/12/in-benin-growing-fears-over-law-that-can-jail-journalists-for-posting-news-online/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Digital Code&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for posting the statement of the Minister of justice  on his Facebook’s account. The reality right now is that governments across the region are at war against press freedom and journalists who are purveyors of information.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  21. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; Although this is what press freedom looks like across the region, civil society organizations are fighting back to protect press freedom and freedom of  expression.  To create an enabling environment for press freedom, my organization, Media Rights Agenda (MRA) has been making several efforts such as instituting lawsuits before the national and regional courts challenging these draconian laws; providing pro bono legal representation to journalists who are arrested, detained, or charged; and engaging various stakeholders on this issue. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  22. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Are you working on the issue of online regulation and can you tell us the situation of online speech in the region?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  23. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; As the Head of Legal with MRA, I am actively working around the issue of online regulation to ensure that the rights to press freedom, freedom of expression, access to information, and digital rights are promoted and protected online. The region is facing an era of digital authoritarianism as there is a crackdown on online speech. In the context of my country, the Nigerian Government has made several attempts to regulate the internet or introduce social media bills under the guise of combating cybercrimes, hate speech, and mis/disinformation. However, diverse stakeholders – including civil society organizations like my organization – have, on many occasions, fought against these attempts to regulate online speech for the reason that these proposed bills will not only limit freedom of expression, press freedom, and other digital rights. They will also shrink the civic space online, as some of their provisions are overly broad and governments are known for using laws like this arbitrarily to silence dissenting voices and witch hunt journalists, opposition entities, or individuals.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  24. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; An example is when diverse stakeholders challenged the National Information and Technology Development Agency (NITDA), an agency saddled with the duty of creating a framework for the planning and regulation of information technology practices activities and systems in Nigeria over the draft regulation, “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nitda.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/APPROVED-NITDA-CODE-OF-PRACTIVE-FOR-INTERACTIVE-COMPUTER-SERVICE-PLATFORMS-INTERNET-INTERMEDIARIES-2022-002.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Code of Practices for Interactive Computer Service Platforms/Internet Intermediaries&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” They challenged the draft regulation on the basis that it must contain some provisions that recognize freedom of expression, privacy, press freedom and other human rights concerns. Although the agency took into consideration some of the suggestions made by these stakeholders, there are still concerns that individuals, activists, and human rights defenders might be surveilled, amongst other things.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  25. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; The government of Nigeria is relying on laws like the Cybercrime Act, Criminal Code Act and many more to stifle online speech. And the Ghanaian government is no different as they are also relying on the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nita.gov.gh/theevooc/2017/12/Electronic-Communications-Act-775.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Electronic Communication Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to suppress freedom of expression and hound critical journalists under the pretense of battling fake news. Countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan, Uganda, and Morocco have also enacted laws to silence dissent and repress citizens’ internet use especially for expression.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  26. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you also tell me a little bit more about the landscape for civil society where you work? Are there any creative tactics or strategies from civil society that you work with?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  27. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; Nigeria is home to a wide variety of civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The main legislation that regulates CSOs are federal laws such as the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Nigerian Constitution&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which guarantees freedom of association, and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cseaafrica.org/allied-matters-act-cama-2020-enhancing-a-better-business-environment-for-msmes-in-nigeria-under-afcfta/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which provides every group or association with legal personality.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  28. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; CSOs in Nigeria face quite a number of legal and political hurdles. For example, CSOs that wish to operate as a company limited by guarantee need to seek the consent of the Attorney-General of the Federation which may be rejected. While CSOs operating as incorporated trustees are mandated to carry out some obligations which can be tedious and time consuming. On several occasions, the Nigerian Government has made attempts to pressure and even subvert CSOs and to single out certain CSOs for special adverse treatment. Despite receiving foreign funding support, the Nigerian government finds it convenient to berate or criticize CSOs as being “sponsored” by foreign interests, with the underlying suggestion that such organizations are unpatriotic and – by criticizing government – are being paid to act contrary to Nigeria’s interests.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  29. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; There are lots of strategies or tactics CSOs are using to address the issues they are working on, including issuing press statements, engaging diverse stakeholders, litigation, capacity-building efforts, and advocacy.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  30. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: Do you have a free expression hero?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  31. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; Yes, I do. All the critical journalists out there are my free expression heroes. I also consider &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Julian_Assange&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Julian Assange&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; as a free speech hero for his belief in openness and transparency as well as taking personal risk to expose the corrupt acts of the powerful, an act necessary in a democratic society. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  32.  
  33. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  34.     <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 19:05:27 +0000</pubDate>
  35. <guid isPermaLink="false">109550 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  36. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  37. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/speaking-obioma-banner-1.jpg" alt="Obioma portrait speaking freely" type="image/jpeg" length="103597" />
  38.  </item>
  39.  <item>
  40.    <title>Screen Printing 101: EFF&#039;s Spring Speakeasy at Babylon Burning</title>
  41.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/screen-printing-101-effs-spring-speakeasy-babylon-burning</link>
  42.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;At least twice each year, we invite current EFF members to gather with fellow internet freedom supporters and to meet the people behind your favorite digital civil liberties organization. For this year’s Bay Area based members, we had the opportunity to take over Babylon Burning’s screen printing shop in San Francisco, where Mike Lynch and his team bring EFF art(work) to life.&lt;/p&gt;
  43. &lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/22/bb_front.jpg&quot; width=&quot;1440&quot; height=&quot;1080&quot; alt=&quot;Babylon Burning Front of Building&quot; /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  44. &lt;p&gt;To kick off the evening we had EFF’s Director of Member Engagement Aaron Jue, talk about the near-20-year friendship between EFF and Babylon Burning, the shop that has printed everything from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/join&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;t-shirts&lt;/a&gt; to &lt;a href=&quot;https://shop.eff.org/products/stay-golden-hooded-sweatshirt&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;hoodies&lt;/a&gt; to &lt;a href=&quot;https://shop.eff.org/products/eff-grey-hat&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;hats&lt;/a&gt;, and now tote bags. At EFF, we love the opportunity to support a local business and have a great partnership at the same time. When we send our artwork to Mike and his staff, we know it is in good hands.&lt;/p&gt;
  45. &lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/22/eff_shirts_at_ss_copy.jpg&quot; width=&quot;3000&quot; height=&quot;1799&quot; alt=&quot;EFF Shirt Archive&quot; /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  46. &lt;p&gt;Following Aaron, EFF’s Creative Director Hugh D’Andrade dived into some of EFF’s most popular works such as the NSA Spying Eagle and the many versions of the EFF Liberty Mecha. The EFF NSA Spying Eagle focuses on mass surveillance found in the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/hepting&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Hepting&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Jewel&lt;/a&gt; cases. The EFF Liberty Mecha has been featured on four different occasions, most recently on a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/flex-your-power-own-your-tech&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;shirt for DEF CON 29&lt;/a&gt;, and highlights freedom, empowerment through technology, interoperability, and teamwork. More information about EFF’s member shirts can be found in our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/tags/member-t-shirt&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;blog&lt;/a&gt; and in our &lt;a href=&quot;https://shop.eff.org/shop&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;shop&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  47. &lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/22/mike_at_bb_copy.jpg&quot; width=&quot;1200&quot; height=&quot;600&quot; alt=&quot;Mike Lynch at Babylon Burning&quot; /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  48. &lt;p&gt;Mike jumped in after Hugh to walk members though a hands-on demonstration of traditional screen printing. Members printed tote bags, toured the Babylon Burning print shop, and mingled with EFF staff and local supporters.&lt;/p&gt;
  49. &lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/22/eff_tote_bag.jpg&quot; width=&quot;5712&quot; height=&quot;4284&quot; alt=&quot;EFF Tote Bag&quot; /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  50. &lt;p&gt;Thank you to everyone that attended this year’s Spring Members’ Speakeasy and continue to support EFF as a member. Your support allows our engineers, lawyers, and skilled advocates to tend the path for technology users, and to nurture your rights to privacy, expression, and innovation online.&lt;/p&gt;
  51. &lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/22/eff_art.jpg&quot; width=&quot;1200&quot; height=&quot;795&quot; alt=&quot;EFF Art&quot; /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  52. &lt;p&gt;Thanks to all of the EFF members who participated at our annual Bay Area meetup. If you&#039;re not a member of EFF yet, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/join&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;join us today&lt;/a&gt;. See you at the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/events&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;next event&lt;/a&gt;!&lt;/p&gt;
  53.  
  54. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  55.     <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 16:00:26 +0000</pubDate>
  56. <guid isPermaLink="false">109548 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  57. <dc:creator>Melissa Srago</dc:creator>
  58. <dc:creator>Aaron Jue</dc:creator>
  59. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/babylon_burning_banner.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="605493" />
  60.  </item>
  61.  <item>
  62.    <title>Podcast Episode: Right to Repair Catches the Car</title>
  63.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/podcast-episode-right-repair-catches-car</link>
  64.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If you buy something—a refrigerator, a car, a tractor, a wheelchair, or a phone—but you can&#039;t have the information or parts to fix or modify it, is it really yours? The right to repair movement is based on the belief that you should have the right to use and fix your stuff as you see fit, a philosophy that resonates especially in economically trying times, when people can’t afford to just throw away and replace things.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  65. &lt;p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;mytube&quot; style=&quot;width: 100%px;&quot;&gt;
  66.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetrigger&quot; tabindex=&quot;0&quot;&gt;
  67.  
  68.    &lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/sites/all/modules/custom/mytube/play.png&quot; class=&quot;mytubeplay&quot; alt=&quot;play&quot; style=&quot;top: -4px; left: 20px;&quot; /&gt;
  69.    &lt;div hidden class=&quot;mytubeembedcode&quot;&gt;%3Ciframe%20height%3D%2252px%22%20width%3D%22100%25%22%20frameborder%3D%22no%22%20scrolling%3D%22no%22%20seamless%3D%22%22%20src%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.simplecast.com%2F44bb4612-7130-4e8e-a047-189b6deb7cec%3Fdark%3Dtrue%26amp%3Bcolor%3D000000%22%20allow%3D%22autoplay%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E&lt;/div&gt;
  70.  &lt;/div&gt;
  71.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetext&quot;&gt;
  72.    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  73.    &lt;span&gt;This embed will serve content from &lt;em&gt;&lt;a rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; href=&quot;https://player.simplecast.com/44bb4612-7130-4e8e-a047-189b6deb7cec?dark=true&amp;amp;color=000000&quot;&gt;simplecast.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  74.  &lt;/div&gt;
  75. &lt;/div&gt;
  76. &lt;/p&gt;
  77. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  78. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  79. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/4UAplFpPDqE4hWlwsjplgt&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effs-how-to-fix-the-internet/id1539719568&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.ca/podcasts/bf81f00f-11e1-431f-918d-374ab6ad07cc/how-to-fix-the-internet?ref=dmm_art_us_HTFTI&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/howtofixtheinternet&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  80. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;(You can also find this episode on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/htfti-s3e5-gay-gordon-bryne-mix-vfinal&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt; and on &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/QQ7ey1ITp3c?feature=shared&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;YouTube&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  81. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; Companies for decades have been tightening their stranglehold on the information and the parts that let owners or independent repair shops fix things, but the pendulum is starting to swing back: New York, Minnesota, California, Colorado, and Oregon are among states that have passed right to repair laws, and it’s on the legislative agenda in dozens of other states. Gay Gordon-Byrne is executive director of The Repair Association, one of the major forces pushing for more and stronger state laws, and for federal reforms as well. She joins EFF’s Cindy Cohn and Jason Kelley to discuss this pivotal moment in the fight for consumers to have the right to products that are repairable and reusable. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  82. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In this episode you’ll learn about:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  83. &lt;ul&gt;
  84. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;13&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Why our “planned obsolescence” throwaway culture doesn’t have to be, and shouldn’t be, a technology status quo.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  85. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;13&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;2&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The harm done by “parts pairing:” software barriers used by manufacturers to keep people from installing replacement parts.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  86. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;13&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;3&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Why one major manufacturer put out a user manual in France, but not in other countries including the United States.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  87. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;13&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;4&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;How expanded right to repair protections could bring a flood of new local small-business jobs while reducing waste.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  88. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;13&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;5&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The power of uniting disparate voices—farmers, drivers, consumers, hackers, and tinkerers—into a single chorus that can’t be ignored.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  89. &lt;/ul&gt;
  90. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Gay Gordon-Byrne has been executive director of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.repair.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Repair Association&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;—formerly known as The Digital Right to Repair Coalition—since its founding in 2013, helping lead the fight for the right to repair in Congress and state legislatures. Their credo: If you bought it, you should own it and have the right to use it, modify it, and repair it whenever, wherever, and however you want. Earlier, she had a 40-year career as a vendor, lessor, and used equipment dealer for large commercial IT users; she is the author of &quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.amazon.com/Buying-Supporting-Maintaining-Software-Equipment/dp/1482232782&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Buying, Supporting and Maintaining Software and Equipment - an IT Manager&#039;s Guide to Controlling the Product Lifecycle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2014), and a Colgate University alumna.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  91. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Resources:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  92. &lt;ul&gt;
  93. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;Gay Gordon-Byrne&#039;s TED Talk: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ted.com/talks/gay_gordon_byrne_you_deserve_the_right_to_repair_your_stuff&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;You deserve the right to repair your stuff&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;(August 2021)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  94. &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ifixit.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;iFixit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, the world’s largest online repair community, offering free step-by-step repair guides for thousands of products&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  95. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;The Verge: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/23910066/right-to-repair-law-newsom-california-sb-244&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Right-to-repair is now the law in California&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (Oct. 10, 2023)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  96. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The Verge: &quot;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2023/11/8/23952928/maine-right-to-repair-law-passed-auto-repair-diagnostics&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Maine’s right-to-repair law for cars wins with 84 percent of the vote&lt;/a&gt;&quot; (Nov. 7, 2023)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  97. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Ars Technica: &quot;&lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2024/03/oregon-governor-signs-nations-first-right-to-repair-bill-that-bans-part-pairing/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Oregon governor signs nation’s first right-to-repair bill that bans parts pairing&lt;/a&gt;&quot; (Mar. 27,2024)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  98. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;National Conference of State Legislatures: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/right-to-repair-2023-legislation&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Right to Repair 2023 Legislation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  99. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;How to Fix the Internet: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/04/podcast-episode-making-hope-adam-savage&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Making Hope, with Dan Savage&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&quot; (Apr. 12, 2022)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  100. &lt;/ul&gt;
  101. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What do you think of “How to Fix the Internet?” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forms.office.com/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=qalRy_Njp0iTdV3Gz61yuZZXWhXf9ZdMjzPzrVjvr6VUNUlHSUtLM1lLMUNLWE42QzBWWDhXU1ZEQy4u&amp;amp;web=1&amp;amp;wdLOR=c90ABD667-F98F-9748-BAA4-CA50122F0423&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Share your feedback here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  102. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;Transcript&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  103. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;A friend of mine from Boston had his elderly father in a condo in Florida, not uncommon. And when the father went into assisted living, the refrigerator broke and it was out of warranty. So my friend went to Florida, figured out what was wrong, said, ‘Oh, I need a new thermostat,’ ordered the thermostat, stuck around till the thermostat arrived, put it in and it didn&#039;t work.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  104. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And so he called GE because he bought the part from GE and he says, ‘you didn&#039;t provide me, there&#039;s a password. I need a password.’ And GE says, ‘Oh, you can&#039;t have the password. You have to have a GE authorized tech come in to insert the password.’ And that to me is the ultimate in stupid.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  105. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;That’s Gay Gordon-Byrne with an example of how companies often prevent people from fixing things that they own in ways that are as infuriating as they are absurd.&lt;/p&gt;
  106. &lt;p&gt;I’m Cindy Cohn, the executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.&lt;/p&gt;
  107. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;And I’m Jason Kelley, EFF’s Activism Director. This is our podcast series How to Fix the Internet. &lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  108. &lt;p&gt;Our guest today, Gay Gordon-Byrne, is the executive director of The Repair Association, where she has been advocating for years for legislation that will give consumers the right to buy products that are repairable and reusable – rather than things that need to be replaced outright every few years, or as soon as they break. &lt;/p&gt;
  109. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Right to Repair is something we fight for a lot at EFF, and a topic that has come up frequently on this podcast. In season three, we spoke to Adam Savage about it.&lt;/p&gt;
  110. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;ADAM SAVAGE&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I was trying to fix one of my bathroom faucets a couple of weeks ago, and I called up a Grohee service video of how to repair this faucet. And we all love YouTube for that, right, because anything you want to fix whether it’s your video camera, or this thing, someone has taken it apart. Whether they’re in Micronesia or Australia, it doesn’t matter. But the moment someone figures out that they can make a bunch of dough from that, I’m sure we’d see companies start to say, ‘no, you can’t put up those repair videos, you can only put up these repair videos’ and we all lose when that happens.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  111. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In an era where both the cost of living and environmental concerns are top of mind, the right to repair is more important than ever. It addresses both sustainability and affordability concerns.&lt;/p&gt;
  112. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;We’re especially excited to talk to Gay right now because Right to Repair is a movement that is on its way up and we have been seeing progress in recent months and years. We started off by asking her where things stand right now in the United States.&lt;/p&gt;
  113. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We&#039;ve had four states actually pass statutes for Right to Repair, covering a variety of different equipment, and there&#039;s 45 states that have introduced right to repair over the past few years, so we expect there will be more bills finishing. Getting them started is easy, getting them over the finish line is hard.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  114. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Oh, yes. Oh, yes. We just passed a right to repair bill here in California where EFF is based. Can you tell us a little bit about that and do you see it as a harbinger, or just another step along the way?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  115. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Well, honestly, I see it as another step along the way, because three states actually had already passed laws, in California, Apple decided that they weren&#039;t going to object any further to right to repair laws, but they did have some conditions that are kind of unique to California because Apple is so influential in California. But it is a very strong bill for consumer products. It just doesn&#039;t extend to non-consumer products.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  116. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah. That&#039;s great. And do you know what made Apple change their mind? Because they had, they had been staunch opponents, right? And EFF has battled with them in various different areas around Section 1201 and other things and, and then it seemed like they changed their minds and I wondered if you had some insights about that.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  117. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I take full responsibility.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  118. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yay! Hey, getting a big company to change their position like that is no small feat and it doesn&#039;t happen overnight.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  119. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Oh, it doesn&#039;t happen overnight. And what&#039;s interesting is that New York actually passed a bill that Apple tried to negotiate and kind of really didn&#039;t get to do it in New York, that starts in January. So there was a pressure point already in place. New York is not an insignificant size state.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  120. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And then Minnesota passed a much stronger bill. That also takes effect, I think, I might be wrong on this, I think also in January. And so the wheels were already turning, I think the idea of inevitability had occurred to Apple that they&#039;d be on the wrong side of all their environmental claims if they didn&#039;t at least make a little bit more of a sincere effort to make things repairable.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  121. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah. I mean, they have been horrible about this from the very beginning with, you know with custom kinds of dongles, and difficulty in repairing. And again, we fought them around section 1201, which is the ability to do circumvention so that you can see how something works and build. tools that will let you fix them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  122. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s just no small feat from where we set to get, to get the winds to change such that even Apple puts their finger up and says, I think the winds are changing. We better get on the right side of history.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  123. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, that&#039;s what we&#039;ve been trying to do for the past, when did we get started? I got started in 2010, the organization got started in 2013. So we&#039;ve been at it a full 10 years as an actual organization, but the problems with Apple and other manufacturers existed long before. So the 1201 problem still exists, and that&#039;s the problem that we&#039;re trying to move in federally, but oh my God. I thought moving legislation in states was hard and long.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  124. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, the federal system is different, and I think that one of the things that we&#039;ve experienced, though, is when the states start leading, eventually the feds begin to follow. Now, often they follow with the idea that they&#039;re going to water down what the states do. That&#039;s why, you know, EFF and, and I think a lot of organizations rally around this thing called preemption, which doesn&#039;t really sound like a thing you want to rally around, but it ends up being the way in which you make sure that the feds aren&#039;t putting the brakes on the states in terms of doing the right things and that you create space for states to be more bold.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s sometimes not the best thing for a company that has to sell in a bunch of different markets, but it&#039;s certainly better than  letting the federal processes come in and essentially damp down what the states are doing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  125. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;You&#039;re totally right. One of our biggest fears is that someone will... We&#039;ll actually get a bill moving for Right to Repair, and it&#039;s obviously going to be highly lobbied, and we will probably not have the same quality of results as we have in states. So we would like to see more states pass more bills so that it&#039;s harder and harder for the federal government to preempt the states.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  126. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the meantime, we&#039;re also making sure that the states don&#039;t preempt the federal government, which is another source of friction.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  127. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Oh my gosh.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  128. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, preemption is a big problem.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  129. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;It goes both ways. In our, in our Section 1201 fights, we&#039;re fighting the Green case, uh, Green vs. Department of Justice, and the big issue there is that while we can get exemptions under 1201 for actual circumvention, the tools that you need  in order to circumvent, you can&#039;t get an exception for, and so you have this kind of strange situation in which you technically have the right to repair your device, but nobody can help you do that and nobody can give you the tools to do it. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  130. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So it&#039;s this weird, I often, sometimes I call it the, you know, it&#039;s legal to be in Arizona, but it&#039;s illegal to go to Arizona kind of law. No offense, Arizona.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  131. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;That&#039;s very much the case.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  132. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;You mentioned, Gay, that you&#039;ve been doing this work while probably you&#039;ve been doing the work a lot longer than the time you&#039;ve been with the coalition and the Repair Association. We&#039;ll get to the brighter future that we want to look towards here in a second, but before we get to the, the way we want to fix things and how it&#039;ll look when we do, can you just take us back a little bit and tell us more about how we got to a place where you actually have to fight for your right to repair the things that you buy. You know, 50 years ago, I think most people would just assume that appliances and, and I don&#039;t know if you&#039;d call them devices, but things that you purchased you could fix or you could bring to a repair shop. And now we have to force companies to let us fix things.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  133. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I know there&#039;s a lot of history there, but is there a short version of how we ended up in this place where we have to fight for this right to repair?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  134. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, there is a short version. It&#039;s called about 20 years ago, right after Y2K, it became possible, because of the improvements in the internet, for manufacturers to basically host a repair manual or a user guide. online and expect their customers to be able to retrieve that information for free.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  135. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Otherwise, they have to print, they have to ship. It&#039;s a cost. So it started out as a cost reduction strategy on the part of manufacturers. And at first it seemed really cool because it really solved a problem. I used to have manuals that came in like, huge desktop sets that were four feet of paper. And every month we&#039;d get pages that we had to replace because the manual had been updated. So it was a huge savings for manufacturers, a big convenience for consumers and for businesses.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  136. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And then, no aspersions on lawyers. But my opinion is that some lawyer decided they wanted to know, they should know. For reasons we have no idea because they, they still don&#039;t make sense, that they should know who&#039;s accessing their website. So then they started requiring a login and a password, things like that.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  137. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And then another bright light, possibly a lawyer, but most likely a CFO said, we should charge people to get access to the website. And that slippery slope got really slippery or really fast. So it became obvious that you could save a lot of money by not providing manuals, not providing diagnostics and then not selling parts.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  138. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I mean, if you didn&#039;t want to sell parts, you didn&#039;t have to. There was no law that said you have to sell parts, or tools, or diagnostics. And that&#039;s where we&#039;ve been for 20 years. And everybody that gets away with it has encouraged everybody else to do it. To the point where, um, I don&#039;t think Cindy would disagree with me.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  139. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I mean, I took a look, um, as did Nathan Proctor of US PIRG when we were getting ready to go before the FTC. And we said, you know, I wonder how many companies are actually selling parts and tools and manuals, and Nathan came up with a similar statistic. Roughly 90 percent of the companies don&#039;t.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  140. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Wow.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  141. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;So we&#039;re, face it, we have now gone from a situation where everybody could fix anything if they were really interested, to 90 percent of stuff not being fixable, and that number is going, getting worse, not better. So yeah, that&#039;s the short story, it’s been a bad 20 years.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  142. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s funny because I think it&#039;s really, it&#039;s such a testament to people&#039;s desire to want to fix their own things that despite this, you can go on YouTube if something breaks and you can find some nice person who will walk you through how to fix, you know, lots and lots of devices that you have. And to me, that&#039;s a testament to the human desire to want to fix things and the human desire to want to teach other people how to fix things, that despite all these obstacles, there is this thriving world, YouTube&#039;s not the only place, but it&#039;s kind of the central place where you can find nice people who will help tell you how to fix your things, despite it being so hard and getting harder to have that knowledge and the information you need to do it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  143. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I would also add to that there&#039;s a huge business of repair that, we&#039;re not strictly fighting for people&#039;s rights to be able to do it yourself. In fact, most people, again, you know, back to some kind of general statistics, most people, somewhere around 85 percent of them, really don&#039;t want to fix their own stuff.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  144. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;They may fix some stuff, but they don&#039;t want to fix all stuff. But the options of having somebody help them have also gone. Gone just downhill, downhill, downhill massively in the last 20 years and really bad in the past 10 years. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  145. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So the industry that current employment used to be about 3 million people in the repair, in the industry of repair and that kind of spanned auto repair and a bunch of other things. But those people don&#039;t have jobs if people can&#039;t fix their stuff because the only way they can be in business is to know that they can buy a part. To know that they can buy the tool, to know that they can get a hold of the schematic and the diagnostics. So these are the things that have thwarted business as well as, do it yourself. And I think most people, most people, especially the people I know, really expect to be able to fix their things. I think we&#039;ve been told that we don&#039;t, and the reality is we do.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  146. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, I think that&#039;s right. And one of the, kind of, stories that people have been told is that, you know, if there&#039;s a silicon chip in it, you know, you just can&#039;t fix it. That that&#039;s just, um, places things beyond repair and I think that that&#039;s been a myth and I think a lot of people have always known It&#039;s a myth, you know, certainly in EFF&#039;s community.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  147. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We have a lot of hardware hackers, we even have lots of software hackers that know that the fact that there&#039;s a chip involved doesn&#039;t mean that it&#039;s a disposable item. But I wondered you know from your perspective. Have you seen that as well?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  148. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Oh, absolutely. People are told that these things are too sophisticated, that they&#039;re too complex, they&#039;re too small. All of these things that are not true, and you know, you got 20 years of a drumbeat of just massive marketing against repair. The budgets for people that are saying you can&#039;t fix your stuff are far greater than the budgets of the people that say you can.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  149. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So, thank you, Tim Cook and Apple, because you&#039;ve made this an actual point of advocacy. Every time Apple does something dastardly, and they do it pretty often, every new release there&#039;s something dastardly in it, we get to get more people behind the, ‘hey, I want to fix my phone, goddamnit!’&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  150. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, I think that&#039;s right. I think that&#039;s one of the wonderful things about the Right to Repair movement is that you&#039;re, you&#039;re surfing people&#039;s natural tendencies. The idea that you have to throw something away as soon as it breaks is just so profoundly …I think it&#039;s actually an international human, you know, desire to be able to fix these kinds of things and be able to make something that you own work for you.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  151. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So it&#039;s always been profoundly strange to have companies kind of building this throwaway culture. It reminds me a little of the privacy fights where we&#039;ve had also 20 years of companies trying to convince us that your privacy doesn&#039;t matter and you don&#039;t care about it, and that the world&#039;s better if you don&#039;t have any privacy. And on a one level that has certainly succeeded in building surveillance business models. But on the other hand, I think it&#039;s profoundly against human tendencies, so those of us on the side of privacy and repair, the benefit of us is we&#039;re kind of riding with how people want to be in the kind of world they want to live in, against, you know, kind of very powerful, well funded forces who are trying to convince us we&#039;re different than we are.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  152. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Let’s take a quick moment to say thank you to our sponsor. “How to Fix the Internet” is supported by The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Program in Public Understanding of Science and Technology. Enriching people’s lives through a keener appreciation of our increasingly technological world and portraying the complex humanity of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  153. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And now back to our conversation with Gay Gordon-Byrne.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  154. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At the top of the episode, Gay told us a story about a refrigerator that couldn’t be fixed unless a licensed technician – for a fee, obviously – was brought in to ENTER A PASSWORD. INTO A FRIDGE. Even though the person who owned the fridge had sourced the new part and installed it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  155. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;And that illustrates to me the damage that&#039;s being done by this concept of parts pairing, which is where only the manufacturer can make the part work. So even if you can find a part. Even if you could put it in, you can&#039;t make it work without calling the manufacturer again, which kind of violates the whole idea that you bought it and you own it, and they shouldn&#039;t have anything to do with it after that. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  156. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So these things are pervasive. We see it in all sorts of stuff. The refrigerator one really infuriates me.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  157. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, we&#039;ve seen it with printer cartridges. We&#039;ve seen it with garage door openers, for sure. I recently had an espresso machine that broke and couldn&#039;t get it fixed because the company that made it doesn&#039;t make parts available for, for people and that. You know, that&#039;s a hard lesson. It&#039;s one of the things when you&#039;re buying something is to try to figure out, like, is, is this actually repairable or not?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  158. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;You know, making that information available is something that our friends at Consumer Reports have done and other people have done, but it&#039;s still a little hard to find sometimes.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  159. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, that information gap is enormous. There are some resources. They&#039;re not great. none of them are comprehensive enough to really do the job. But there&#039;s an ‘index de repairability’ in France that covers a lot of consumer tech, you know, cell phones and laptops and things along those lines.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  160. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It&#039;s not hard to find, but it&#039;s in French, so use Google Translate or something and you&#039;ll see what they have to say. Um, that&#039;s actually had a pretty good impact on a couple companies. For example, Samsung, which had never put out a manual before, had to put out a manual, um, in order to be rated in France. So they did. The same manual they didn&#039;t put out in the U. S. and England.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  161. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Oh my God, it’s amazing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  162. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Music break.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  163. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;So let&#039;s flip this around a little bit. What does the world look like if we get it right? What does a repairable world look like? How is it when you live in it, Gay? Give me a day in the life of somebody who&#039;s living in the fixed version of the world.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  164. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Well, you will be able to buy things that you can fix, or have somebody fix them for you. And one of the consequences is that you will see more repair shops back in your town.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  165. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It will be possible for some enterprising person, that&#039;ll open up. Again, the kinds of shops we used to have when we were kids.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  166. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;You&#039;ll see a TV repair shop, an appliance repair shop, an electronics repair shop. In fact, it might be one repair shop, because some of these things are all being fixed in the same way. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  167. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So  you&#039;ll see more economic activity in the area of repair. You&#039;ll also see, and this is a hope, that manufacturers, if they&#039;re going to make their products more repairable, in order to look better, you know, it&#039;s more of a, more of a PR and a marketing thing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  168. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If they&#039;re going to compete on the basis of repairability, they&#039;re going to have to start making their products. more repairable from the get go. They&#039;re probably gonna have to stop gluing everything together. Europe has been pretty big on making sure that things are made with fasteners instead of glue.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  169. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think we&#039;re gonna see more activity along those lines, and more use of replaceable batteries. Why should a battery be glued in? That seems like a pretty stupid thing to do. So I think we&#039;ll see some improvements along the line of sustainability in the sense that we&#039;ll be able to keep our things longer and use them until we&#039;re done with them, not to when the manufacturer decides they want to sell you a new one, which is really the cycle that we have today.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  170. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah. Planned obsolescence I think is what the marketers call it. I love a vision of the world, you know, when I grew up, I grew up in a small town in Iowa and we had the, the people called the gearheads, right? They were the ones who were always tinkering with cars. And of course you could take your appliances to them and other kinds of things because, you know, people who know how to take things apart and figure out how they work tend to know that about multiple things.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  171. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So I&#039;d love a future of the world where the kind of gearheads rise again and are around to help us keep our stuff longer and keep our stuff again.  I really appreciate what you say, like when we&#039;re done with them. I mean, I love innovation. I love new toys.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  172. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think that&#039;s really great. But the idea that when I&#039;m done with something, you know, it goes into a trash heap. Um, or, you know, into someplace where you have to have fancy, uh, help to make sure that you&#039;re not endangering the planet. Like, that&#039;s not a very good world.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  173. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Well, look at your example of your espresso machine. You weren&#039;t done with it. It quit. It quit. You can&#039;t fix it. You can&#039;t make another cup of espresso with it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  174. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That&#039;s not what you planned. That&#039;s not what you wanted.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  175. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yep.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  176. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think we all have stories like the espresso machine and that&#039;s part of why this is such a tangible topic for everyone. Maybe I&#039;m not alone in this, but I love, you know, thrift stores and places like that where I can get something that maybe someone else was, was tired of. I was walking. Hmm. I passed a house a few years ago and someone had put, uh, a laptop that the screen had been damaged just next to the trash.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  177. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And I thought, that looks like a pretty nice laptop. And I grabbed it. It was a pretty new, like, one year old Microsoft Surface. Tablet, laptop, um, anyway, I took it to a repair shop and they were able to repair it for like way less than the cost of buying a new one and I had a new laptop essentially, um, and I don&#039;t think they gave me extra service because I worked at EFF but they were certainly happy to help because I worked at EFF, um, but then, you know, these things do eventually Sort of give up, right?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  178. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That laptop lasted me about three years and then had so many issues that I just kind of had to get rid of it Where do you think in the in the better future? We should put the things that are sort of Unfixable. You know, do we, do we bring them to a repair shop and they pull out the pieces that work like a junkyard that they can reuse?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  179. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Is there a better system for, uh, disposing of the different pieces or the different devices that we can&#039;t repair? How do you think about that more sustainable future once everything is better in the first place in terms of being able to repair things?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  180. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Excellent question. We have a number of members that are what we call charitable recyclers. And I think that&#039;s a model for more, rather than less. They don&#039;t even have to be gently used. They just have to be potentially useful. And they&#039;ll take them in. They will fix them. They will train people, often people that have some employment challenges, especially coming out of the criminal justice system.  And they&#039;ll train them to make repairs and they both get a skill, a marketable skill for future employment. And they also, they also turn around and then resell those devices to make money to keep the whole system going.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  181. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But in the commercial recycling business, there&#039;s a lot of value in the things that have been discarded if they can have their batteries removed before, before they are, quote, recycled, because recycling is a very messy business and it requires physical contact with the device to the point that it&#039;s shredded or crushed. And if we can intercept some of that material before it goes to the crusher, we can reuse more of that material. And I think a lot of it can be reused very effectively in downstream markets, but we don&#039;t have those markets because we can&#039;t fix the products that are broken.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  182. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yep. There&#039;s a whole chain of good that starts happening if we can begin to start fixing things, right? It&#039;s not just the individuals get to fix the things that they get, but it sets off kind of a cycle of things, a happy cycle of things that get better all along the way.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  183. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yep, and that can be, that can happen right now, well, I should say as soon as these laws start taking effect, because a lot of the information parts and tools that are required under the laws are immediately useful.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  184. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Right. So tell me, how do these laws work? What do they, what, the good ones anyway, what are, what are they doing? How are things changing with the current flock of laws that are just now coming online?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  185. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Well, they&#039;re all pretty much the same. They require manufacturers of things that they already repair, so there&#039;s some limitations right there, to make available on fair and reasonable terms the same parts, tools, diagnostics, and firmware that they already provide to their quote authorized or their subcontract repair providers because our original intent was to restore competition. So the bills are really a pro competition law as opposed to an e-waste law.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  186. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Mm hmm.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  187. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Because these don&#039;t cover everything. They cover a lot of stuff, but not everything. California is a little bit different in that they already had a statute that required things of be, under $50 or under $100 to be covered for three years. They have some dates in there that expand the effectiveness of the bill into products that don&#039;t even have repair options today.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  188. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But the bills that we&#039;ve been promoting are a little softer, because the intent is competition, because we want to see what competition can do, when we unlock competition, what that does for consumers.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  189. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, and I think that that dovetails nicely into something EFF has been working on quite a while now, which is interoperability, right? One of the things that unlocks competition is, you know, requiring people to build their tools and services in a way that are interoperable with others, that helps both with repair and with kind of follow on innovation that, you know, you can switch up how your Facebook feed shows up based on what you want to see rather than, you know, based upon what Facebook&#039;s algorithm wants you to see or other kinds of changes like that. And how do you see interoperability fitting into all of this?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  190. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think there will be more. It&#039;s not specific to the law, but I think it will simply happen as people try to comply with the law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  191. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Music break&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  192. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;You founded the Repair Association, so tell us a little bit about how that got started and how you decided to dedicate your life to this. I think it&#039;s really important for us to think about, like, the people that are needed to build a better world, as well as the, you know, kind of technologies and ideas.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  193. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I was always in the computer industry. I grew up with my father who was a computer architect in the 50s and 60s. So I never knew a world that didn&#039;t involve computers. It was what dad did. And then when I needed a job out of college, and having bounced around a little bit and found not a great deal of success, my father encouraged me to take a job selling computers, because that was the one thing he had never done and thought that it was missing from his resume.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  194. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And I took to it like, uh, I don&#039;t know, fish to water? I loved it. I had a wonderful time and a wonderful career. But by the mid 2000s, I was done. I mean, I was like, I can&#039;t stand this job anymore. So I decided to retire. I didn&#039;t like being retired. I started doing other things and eventually, I started doing some work with a group of companies that repair large mainframes.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  195. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I&#039;ve known them. I mean, my former boss was the president. It was kind of a natural. And they started having trouble with some of the manufacturers and I said, that&#039;s wrong. I mean, I had this sense of indignation that what Oracle had done when they bought Sun was just flatly wrong and it was illegal. And I volunteered to join a committee. And that&#039;s when, haha, that&#039;s when I got involved and it was basically, I tell people I over-volunteered.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  196. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  197. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;And what happened is that because I was the only person in that organization that didn&#039;t already have relationships with manufacturers, that they couldn&#039;t, they couldn&#039;t bite the hand that fed them, I was elected chief snowball thrower. AKA Executive Director. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  198. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So it was a passion project that I could afford to do because otherwise I was going to stay home and knit. So this is way better than knitting or quilting these days, way more fun, way more gratifying. I&#039;ve had a truly wonderful experience, met so many fabulous people, have a great sense of impact that I would never have had with quilting.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  199. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I just love the story of somebody who kind of put a toe in and then realized, Oh my God, this is so important.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;And ‘I found this thing where I can make the world better.’ And then you just get, you know, kind of, you get sucked in and, um, but it&#039;s, it&#039;s fun. And what I really appreciate about the Repair Association and the Right to Repair people is that while, you know, they&#039;re working with very serious things, they also, you know, there&#039;s a lot of fun in making the world a better place.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  200. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And it&#039;s kind of fun to be involved in the Right to Repair right now because after a long time kind of shouting in the darkness, there&#039;s some traction starting to happen. So then the fun gets even more fun.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  201. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;GAY GORDON-BYRNE&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I can tell you it&#039;s ... We&#039;re so surprised. I mean, it took, we&#039;ve had over, well, well over 100 bills filed and, you know, every year we get a little further. We get past this committee and this hurdle and this hurdle and this hurdle. We get almost to the end and then something would happen. And to finally get to the end where the bill becomes law? It&#039;s like the dog that chases the car, and you go, we caught the car, now what?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  202. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah. Now you get to fix it! The car!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  203. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt; &lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, now you can repair the car.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  204. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;MUSIC TRANSITION&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  205. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;That was such a wonderful, optimistic conversation and not the first one we&#039;ve had this season. But this one is interesting because we&#039;re actually already getting where we want to be. We&#039;re already building the future that we want to live in and it&#039;s just really, really pleasing to be able to talk to someone who&#039;s in the middle of that and, and making sure that that work happens.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  206. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I mean, one of the things that really struck me is how much of the better future that we&#039;re building together is really about creating new jobs and new opportunities for people to work. I think there&#039;s a lot of fear right now in our community that the future isn&#039;t going to have work, and that without a social safety net or other kinds of things, you know, it&#039;s really going to hurt people.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  207. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And I so appreciated hearing about how, you know, Main Street&#039;s going to have more jobs. There&#039;s going to be people in your local community who can fix your things locally because devices, those are things where having a local repair community and businesses is really. helpful to people.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  208. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And so I also kind of, the flip side of that is this interesting observation that one of the things that&#039;s happened as a result of shutting off the Right to Repair is an increasing centralization, um, that the jobs that are happening in this thing are not happening locally and that by unlocking the right to repair, we&#039;re going to unlock some local opportunities for economic things.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  209. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I mean, You know, EFF thinks about this both in terms of empowering users, but also in terms of competition. And the thing about Right to Repair is it really does unlock kind of hyper local competition.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  210. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;I hadn&#039;t really thought about how specifically local it is to have a repair shop that you can just bring your device to. And right now it feels like the options are if you live near an Apple store, for example, maybe you can bring your phone there and then they send it somewhere. I&#039;d much rather go to someone, you know, in my town that I can talk to, and who can tell me about what needs to be done. That&#039;s such a benefit of this movement that a lot of people aren&#039;t even really putting on the forefront, but it really is something that will help people actually get work and, and, and help the people who need the work and the people who need the job done.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  211. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Another thing that I really appreciate about the Right to Repair movement s how universal it is. Everyone experiences some version of this, you know, from the refrigerator story to my espresso machine, to any of any number of other stories to the farmers, like everyone has some version of how.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  212. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This needs to be fixed. And the other thing that I really appreciate about her gay stories about the right to repair movement is that, you know, she&#039;s somebody who comes out of computers, and was thinking about this from the context of computers and didn&#039;t really realize that farmers were having the same problem.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  213. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Of course, we all kind of know analytically that a lot of the movement in a lot of industries is towards, you know, centralizing computers and making, you know. You know, tractors are now computers with gigantic wheels. Cars are now computers with smaller wheels. That computers have become central to these kinds of things, but also realization that we have silos of users who are experiencing a version of the same problem and connecting those silent silos together, let me say that again. I think the realization that we have silos of users who are experiencing the same problem depending on what kind of tool they&#039;re using, um, and connecting those silos together so that together we stand as a much bigger voice is something that the repair, um, the Right to Repair folks have really done well and it is a, is a good lesson for the rest of us.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  214. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah, I think we talked a little bit with Adam Savage when he was on a while ago about this sort of gatekeeping and how effective it is to remove the gatekeepers from these movements and say, you know, we&#039;re all fighting the same fight. And it just goes to show you that it actually works. I mean, not only does it get everybody on the same page, but unlike a lot of movements, I think you can really see the impact that the Right to Repair movement has had. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  215. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And we talked with Gay about this and it&#039;s just, it really, I think, should make people come away optimistic that advocacy like this works over time. You know, it&#039;s not a sprint, it&#039;s a marathon, and we have actually crested a sort of hill in some ways.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  216. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There&#039;s a lot of work to be done, but it&#039;s, it&#039;s actually work that we probably will be able to get done and, and that we&#039;re seeing the benefits of today&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  217. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yeah. And as we start to see benefits, we&#039;re going to start to see more benefits. I appreciate her. We&#039;re in, you know, we&#039;re in the whole plugging period where, you know, we got something passed and we need to plug the holes. But I also think once people start feeling the power of having the Right to Repair again, I think I hope it will help snowball.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  218. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One of the things that she said that I have observed as well is that sometimes it feels like nothing&#039;s happening, nothing&#039;s happening, nothing&#039;s happening, and then all of a sudden it&#039;s all happening. And I think that that&#039;s one of the, the kind of flows of advocacy work that I&#039;ve observed over time and it&#039;s fun to see the, the Right to Repair Coalition kind of getting to experience that wave, even if it can be a little overwhelming sometimes.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  219. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;Thanks for joining us for this episode of How to Fix the Internet.&lt;/p&gt;
  220. &lt;p&gt;If you have feedback or suggestions, we&#039;d love to hear from you. Visit EFF. org slash podcast and click on listener feedback. While you&#039;re there, you can become a member, donate, maybe pick up some merch and just see what&#039;s happening in digital rights this week and every week.&lt;/p&gt;
  221. &lt;p&gt;This podcast is licensed Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, and includes music licensed Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported by their creators.&lt;/p&gt;
  222. &lt;p&gt;In this episode you heard …Come Inside by Zep Hurme featuring snowflake and Drops of H2O ( The Filtered Water Treatment ) by J.Lang featuring Airtone.&lt;/p&gt;
  223. &lt;p&gt;You can find links to their music in our episode notes, or on our website at eff.org/podcast. &lt;/p&gt;
  224. &lt;p&gt;Our theme music is by Nat Keefe of BeatMower with Reed Mathis&lt;/p&gt;
  225. &lt;p&gt;How to Fix the Internet is supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation&#039;s program in public understanding of science and technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  226. &lt;p&gt;I hope you’ll join us again soon. I’m Jason Kelley.&lt;/p&gt;
  227. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And I’m Cindy Cohn.&lt;/p&gt;
  228. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  229.  
  230. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  231.     <pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2024 07:06:49 +0000</pubDate>
  232. <guid isPermaLink="false">109532 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  233. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/how-to-fix-the-internet-podcast">How to Fix the Internet: Podcast</category>
  234. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/right-to-repair">Defend Your Right to Repair!</category>
  235. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation">Creativity &amp; Innovation</category>
  236. <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
  237. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/htfi-gordon-byrne-blog.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="232756" />
  238.  </item>
  239.  <item>
  240.    <title>U.S. Senate and Biden Administration Shamefully Renew and Expand FISA Section 702, Ushering in a Two Year Expansion of Unconstitutional Mass Surveillance</title>
  241.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/us-senate-and-biden-administration-shamefully-renew-and-expand-fisa-section-702-0</link>
  242.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One week after it was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate has passed what Senator Ron Wyden has called, “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;one of the most dramatic and terrifying expansions of government surveillance authority in history&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” President Biden then rushed to sign it into law.   &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  243. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The perhaps ironically named “Reforming Intelligence and Security America Act (RISAA)” does everything BUT reform &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/702-spying&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. RISAA not only reauthorizes this mass surveillance program, it greatly expands the government’s authority by allowing it to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/bad-amendments-section-702-have-failed-now-what-happens-next&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;compel a much larger group of people and providers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; into assisting with this surveillance. The bill’s only significant “compromise” is a limited, two-year extension of this mass surveillance. But overall, RISAA is a travesty for Americans who deserve basic constitutional rights and privacy whether they are communicating with people and services inside or outside of the US. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  244. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreigners abroad from inside the United States. It operates, in part, through the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://theintercept.com/2018/06/25/att-internet-nsa-spy-hubs/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;cooperation of large telecommunications service providers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;: massive amounts of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/deeper-dive-effs-backbone-motion&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;traffic on the Internet backbone&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; are accessed and those communications on the government’s secret list are copied. And that’s just one part of the massive, expensive program.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  245. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While Section 702 prohibits the NSA and FBI from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;intentionally&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; targeting Americans with this mass surveillance, these agencies routinely acquire a huge amount of innocent Americans&#039; communications “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/Incidental-collection&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;incidentally&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.” The government can then conduct &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoor-search&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;backdoor, warrantless searches&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of these “incidentally collected” communications.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  246. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The government cannot even follow the very lenient rules about what it does with the massive amount of information it gathers under Section 702, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/07/deja-vu-fbi-proves-again-it-cant-be-trusted-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;repeatedly&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/internal-documents-show-how-little-fbi-did-correct-misuse-section-702-databases&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;abusing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/newly-public-fisc-opinion-best-evidence-why-congress-must-end-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;this&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/october-3-2011-fisc-opinion-holding-nsa-surveillance-unconstitutional&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;authority&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; by searching its databases for Americans’ communications. In 2021 alone, the FBI &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2022_ASTR_for_CY2020_FINAL.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;reported conducting up to 3.4 million warrantless searches&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of Section 702 data using Americans’ identifiers. Given this history of abuse, it is difficult to understand how Congress could decide to expand the government’s power under Section 702 rather than rein it in. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  247. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One of RISAA’s most egregious expansions is its large but ill-defined increase of the range of entities that have to turn over information to the NSA and FBI. This provision allegedly “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://rules.house.gov/video/rules-committee-hearing-hr-529-hr-7888-h-res-1112-h-res-1117&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;responds&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” to a 2023 &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2023_FISC-R_ECSP_Opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;decision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; by the FISC Court of Review, which rejected the government’s argument that an unknown company was subject to Section 702 for some circumstances. While the New York Times &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/16/us/fisa-surveillance-bill-program.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;reports&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that the unknown company from this FISC opinion was a data center, this new provision is written so expansively that it potentially reaches any person or company with “access” to “equipment” on which electronic communications travel or are stored, regardless of whether they are a direct provider. This could potentially include landlords, maintenance people, and many others who routinely have access to your communications on the interconnected internet. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  248. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This is to say nothing of RISAA’s other substantial expansions. RISAA changes FISA’s definition of “foreign intelligence” to include “counternarcotics”: this will allow the government to use FISA to collect information relating to not only the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths,” but also to any of their precursors. While surveillance under FISA has (contrary to what most Americans believe) never been limited exclusively to terrorism and counterespionage, RISAA’s expansion of FISA to ordinary crime is unacceptable. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  249. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;RISAA also allows the government to use Section 702 to vet immigrants and those seeking asylum. According to a FISC&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2023/FISC_2023_FISA_702_Certifications_Opinion_April11_2023.pdf&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; released in 2023, the FISC repeatedly denied government attempts to obtain some version of this authority, before finally approving it for the first time in 2023. By formally lowering Section 702’s protections for immigrants and asylum seekers, RISAA &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/5663283/harvard-student-visa-ismail-ajjawi-lebanon/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;exacerbates&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the risk that government officials could discriminate against members of these populations on the basis of their sexuality, gender identity, religion, or political beliefs.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  250. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Faced with massive pushback from EFF and other civil liberties advocates, some members of Congress, like Senator Ron Wyden, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-i-will-do-everything-in-my-power-to-stop-bill-expanding-government-surveillance-under-fisa-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;raised&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the alarm. We were able to squeeze out a couple of small concessions. One was a shorter reauthorization period for Section 702, meaning that the law will be up for review in just two more years. Also, in a letter to Congress, the Department of Justice claimed it would only interpret the new provision to apply to the type of unidentified businesses at issue in the 2023 FISC opinion. But a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2024/4/18/24134196/senate-cloture-vote-fisa-section-702-surveillance&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;pinky promise&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; from the current Department of Justice is not enforceable and easily disregarded by a future administration. There is some possible hope here, because Senator Mark Warner &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/118/crec/2024/04/18/170/68/CREC-2024-04-18-pt1-PgS2837.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;promised&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to return to the provision in a later defense authorization bill, but this whole debacle just demonstrates how Congress gives the NSA and FBI nearly free rein when it comes to protecting Americans – any limitation that actually protects us (and here the FISA Court actually did some protecting) is just swept away.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  251. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;RISAA’s passage is a shocking reversal—EFF and our allies had worked hard to put together a coalition aimed at enacting a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;warrant requirement for Americans and some other critical reforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, but the NSA, FBI and their apologists just rolled Congress with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/dont-fall-intelligence-communitys-monster-week-justifications&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;scary-sounding&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/white-house-wrong-section-702-needs-drastic-change&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;and incorrect&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) stories that a lapse in the spying was imminent. It was a clear dereliction of Congress’s duty to oversee the intelligence community in order to protect all of the rest of us from its long history of abuse. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  252. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;After over 20 years of doing it, we know that rolling back any surveillance authority, especially one as deeply entrenched as Section 702, is an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/jewel&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;uphill fight&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. But we aren’t going anywhere. We had more Congressional support this time than we’ve had in the past, and we’ll be working to build that over the next two years. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  253. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Too many members of Congress (and the Administrations of both parties) don’t see any downside to violating your privacy and your constitutional rights in the name of national security. That needs to change.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  254.  
  255. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  256.     <pubDate>Mon, 22 Apr 2024 20:50:04 +0000</pubDate>
  257. <guid isPermaLink="false">109547 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  258. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
  259. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  260. <dc:creator>Andrew Crocker</dc:creator>
  261. <dc:creator>Cindy Cohn</dc:creator>
  262. <dc:creator>Brendan Gilligan</dc:creator>
  263. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/NSA-eagle-2_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="61481" />
  264.  </item>
  265.  <item>
  266.    <title>Internet Service Providers Plan to Subvert Net Neutrality. Don’t Let Them </title>
  267.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/internet-service-providers-plan-subvert-net-neutrality-dont-let-them</link>
  268.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the absence of strong net neutrality protections, internet service providers (ISPs) have made all sorts of plans that would allow them to capitalize on something called &quot;network slicing.&quot; While this technology has all sorts of promise, what the ISPs have planned would subvert net neutrality—the principle that all data be treated equally by your service provider—by allowing them to recreate the kinds of “fast lanes” we&#039;ve already agreed should not be allowed. If their plans succeed, then the new proposed net neutrality protections will end up doing far less for consumers than the old rules did.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  269. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The FCC released &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-401676A1.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;draft rules&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to reinstate net neutrality, with a vote on adopting the rules to come&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/april-2024-open-commission-meeting&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; the 25th of April&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Overall, the order is a great step for net neutrality. However, to be truly effective the rules &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/fcc-must-clarify-its-rules-prevent-loopholes-will-swallow-net-neutrality-whole&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;must not preempt&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; states from protecting their residents with stronger laws and clearly find the creation of “fast lanes” via positive discrimination and unpaid prioritization of specific applications or services are violations of net neutrality. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  270. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Fast Lanes and How They Could Harm Competition &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  271. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since “fast lanes” aren’t a technical term, what do we mean when we are talking about a fast lane? To understand, it is helpful to think about data traffic and internet networking infrastructure like car traffic and public road systems. As roads connect people, goods, and services across distances, so does network infrastructure allow for data traffic to flow from one place to another. And just as a road with more capacity in the way of more lanes theoretically means the road can support more traffic moving at speed&lt;span&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;see-footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnoteref1_lmyjft8&quot; title=&quot;Urban studies research shows that this isn’t actually the case, still it remains the popular wisdom among politicians and urban planners.&quot; href=&quot;#footnote1_lmyjft8&quot;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;, internet infrastructure with more “lanes” (i.e. bandwidth) should mean that a network can better support applications like streaming services and online gaming. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  272. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Individual ISPs have a maximum network capacity, and speed, of internet traffic they can handle. To continue the analogy, the road leading to your neighborhood has a set number of lanes. This is why the speed of your internet may change throughout the day. At peak hours your internet service may slow down because a slowdown has occurred from too much requested traffic clogging up the lanes. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  273. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s not inherently a bad thing to have specific lanes for certain types of traffic, actual fast lanes on freeways can improve congestion by not making faster moving vehicles compete for space with slower moving traffic, having exit and entry lanes in freeways also allows cars to perform specialized tasks without impeding other traffic. A lane only for buses isn’t a bad thing as long as every bus gets equal access to that lane and everyone has equal access to riding those buses. Where this becomes a problem is if there is a special lane only for Google buses, or for consuming entertainment content instead of participating in video calls. In these scenarios you would be increasing the quality of certain bus rides at the expense of degraded service for everyone else on the road. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  274. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;An internet “fast lane” would be the designation of part of the network with more bandwidth and/or lower latency to only be used for certain services. On a technical level, the physical network infrastructure would be split amongst several different software defined networks with different use cases using network slicing. One network might be optimized for high bandwidth applications such as video streaming, another might be optimized for applications needing low latency (e.g. a short distance between the client and the server), and another might be optimized for IoT devices. The maximum physical network capacity is split among these slices. To continue our tortured metaphor, your original six lane general road is now a four lane general road with two lanes reserved for, say, a select list of streaming services. Think dedicated high speed lanes for Disney+, HBO, and Netflix, but those services only. In a network neutral construction of the infrastructure, all internet traffic shares all lanes, and no specific app or service is unfairly sped up or slowed down. This isn’t to say that we are inherently against network management techniques like quality of service or network slicing. But it’s important that quality of service efforts be undertaken, as much as possible, in an application agnostic manner. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  275. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The fast lanes metaphor isn’t ideal. On the road having fast lanes is a good thing, it can protect more slow and cautious drivers from dangerous driving and improve the flow of traffic. Bike lanes are a good thing because they make cyclists safer and allow cars to drive more quickly and not have to navigate around them. But with traffic lanes it’s the driver, not the road, that decides which lane they belong in (with penalties for doing obviously bad faith things such as driving in the bike lane.) &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  276. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Internet service providers (ISPs) are&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lightreading.com/oss-bss-cx/at-t-tests-gaming-traffic-prioritization-amid-net-neutrality-debate&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; already testing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.t-mobile.com/news/network/t-mobile-expands-worlds-first-network-slicing-beta-nationwide&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;their ability&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wsj.com/articles/carriers-look-to-offer-fast-lane-access-on-5g-networks-0ab57bcc&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; to create these network slices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. They already have plans of creating market offerings where certain applications and services, chosen by them, are given exclusive reserved fast lanes while the rest of the internet must shoulder their way through what is left. This kind of networking slicing is a violation of net neutrality. We aren’t against network slicing as a technology, it could be useful for things like remote surgery or vehicle to vehicle communication which requires low latency connections and is in the public interest, which are separate offerings and not part of the broadband services covered in the draft order. We are against network slicing being used as a loophole to circumvent principles of net neutrality.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  277. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Fast Lanes Are a Clear Violation of Net Neutrality &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  278. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Where net neutrality is the principle that all ISPs should treat all legitimate traffic coming over their networks equally, discriminating between  certain applications or types of traffic is a clear violation of that principle. When fast lanes speed up certain applications or certain classes of applications, they cannot do so without having a negative impact on other internet traffic, even if it’s just by comparison. This is throttling, plain and simple. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  279. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Further, because ISPs choose which applications or types of services get to be in the fast lane, they choose winners and losers within the internet, which has clear harms to both speech and competition. Whether your access to Disney+ is faster than your access to Indieflix because Disney+ is sped up or because Indieflix is slowed down doesn’t matter because the end result is the same: Disney+ is faster than Indieflix and so you are incentivized to use Disney+ over Indieflix.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  280. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;ISPs should not be able to harm competition even by deciding to prioritize incumbent services over new ones, or that one political party’s website is faster than another’s. It is the consumer who should be in charge of what they do online. Fast lanes have no place in a network neutral internet.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  281.  
  282. &lt;ul class=&quot;footnotes&quot;&gt;&lt;li class=&quot;footnote&quot; id=&quot;footnote1_lmyjft8&quot;&gt;&lt;a class=&quot;footnote-label&quot; href=&quot;#footnoteref1_lmyjft8&quot;&gt;1.&lt;/a&gt; Urban studies research shows that this isn’t actually the case, still it remains the popular wisdom among politicians and urban planners.&lt;/li&gt;
  283. &lt;/ul&gt;
  284. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  285.     <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2024 23:54:10 +0000</pubDate>
  286. <guid isPermaLink="false">109540 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  287. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality">Net Neutrality</category>
  288. <dc:creator>Chao Liu</dc:creator>
  289. <dc:creator>Cooper Quintin</dc:creator>
  290. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/og-neutrality-banner.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="772396" />
  291.  </item>
  292.  <item>
  293.    <title>EFF, Human Rights Organizations Call for Urgent Action in Case of Alaa Abd El Fattah</title>
  294.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/eff-human-rights-organizations-call-urgent-action-case-alaa-abd-el-fattah</link>
  295.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Following an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freealaa.net/unwgad-urgent-appeal&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;urgent appeal&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; filed to the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (UNWGAD) on behalf of blogger and activist Alaa Abd El Fattah, EFF has joined 26 free expression and human rights organizations &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.englishpen.org/posts/campaigns/alaa-abd-el-fattah-united-nations-working-group-on-arbitrary-detention/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;calling for immediate action&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  296. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The appeal to the UNWGAD was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/his-42nd-birthday-alaa-abd-el-fattahs-family-files-un-petition-his-release#:~:text=Last%20year%2C%20we%20awarded%20Alaa,Have%20Not%20Yet%20Been%20Defeated.&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;initially filed in November 2023&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; just weeks after Alaa’s tenth birthday in prison. The British-Egyptian citizen is one of the most high-profile prisoners in Egypt and has spent much of the past decade behind bars for his pro-democracy writing and activism following Egypt’s revolution in 2011.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  297. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF and Media Legal Defence Initiative &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/mldi-and-eff-petition-un-working-group-arbitrary-detention-case-alaa-abd-el-fattah&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;submitted a similar petition&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to the UNGWAD on behalf of Alaa in 2014. This led to the Working Group issuing an opinion that Alaa’s detention was arbitrary and called for his release. In 2016, the UNWGAD declared Alaa&#039;s detention (and the law under which he was arrested) a violation of international law, and again called for his release.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  298. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We once again urge the UN Working Group to urgently consider the recent petition and conclude that Alaa’s detention is arbitrary and contrary to international law. We also call for the Working Group to find that the appropriate remedy is a recommendation for Alaa’s immediate release.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  299. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Read our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.englishpen.org/posts/campaigns/alaa-abd-el-fattah-united-nations-working-group-on-arbitrary-detention/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;full letter to the UNWGAD&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and follow &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freealaa.net/take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Free Alaa&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for campaign updates.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  300.  
  301. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  302.     <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2024 16:13:11 +0000</pubDate>
  303. <guid isPermaLink="false">109537 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  304. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/offline">Offline: Imprisoned Bloggers and Technologists</category>
  305. <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
  306. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/offline-alaa.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="27291" />
  307.  </item>
  308.  <item>
  309.    <title>Congress: Don&#039;t Let Anyone Own The Law </title>
  310.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/congress-no-one-should-own-law</link>
  311.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We should all have the freedom to read, share, and comment on the laws we must live by. But yesterday, the House Judiciary Committee voted 19-4 to move forward the PRO Codes Act (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/1631/all-actions&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;H.R. 1631&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;), a bill that would limit those rights in a critical area. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  312. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-access-to-laws-should-be-fully-open&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  313. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;Tell Congress To Reject The Pro Codes Act&lt;/p&gt;
  314. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A few well-resourced private organizations have made a business of charging money for access to building and safety codes, even when those codes have been incorporated into law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  315. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These organizations convene volunteers to develop model standards, encourage regulators to make those standards into mandatory laws, and then sell copies of those laws to the people (and city and state governments) that have to follow and enforce them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  316. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;They’ve claimed it’s their copyrighted material. But &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/10/appeals-court-tells-georgia-state-code-cant-be-copyrighted&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;court&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; after &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/supreme-court-affirms-no-one-owns-law&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;court&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; has said that you can’t use copyright in this way—&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/supreme-court-affirms-no-one-owns-law&quot;&gt;no one “owns” the law&lt;/a&gt;. The Pro Codes Act &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/access-law-should-be-fully-open-tell-congress-not-be-fooled-pro-codes-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;undermines that rule and the public interest&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, changing the law to state that the standards organizations that write these rules “shall retain” a copyright in it, as long as the rules are made “publicly accessible” online. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  317. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That’s not nearly good enough. These organizations already have so-called online reading rooms that aren’t searchable, aren’t accessible to print-disabled people, and condition your ability to read mandated codes on agreeing to onerous terms of use, among many other problems. That’s why the Association of Research Libraries &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.arl.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Pro-Codes-Judiciary.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;sent a letter to Congress last week&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (supported by EFF, disability rights groups, and many others) explaining how the Pro Codes Act would trade away our right to truly understand and educate our communities about the law for cramped public access to it. Congress must not let well-positioned industry associations abuse copyright to control how you access, use, and share the law. Now that this bill has passed committee, we urgently need your help—tell Congress to reject the Pro Codes Act.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  318. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-access-to-laws-should-be-fully-open&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  319. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: No one owns the law&lt;/p&gt;
  320.  
  321. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  322.     <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:27:59 +0000</pubDate>
  323. <guid isPermaLink="false">109534 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  324. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation">Creativity &amp; Innovation</category>
  325. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/open-access">Open Access</category>
  326. <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
  327. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/open-access.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="21841" />
  328.  </item>
  329.  <item>
  330.    <title>Two Years Post-Roe: A Better Understanding of Digital Threats</title>
  331.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/two-years-post-roe-better-understanding-digital-threats</link>
  332.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s been a long two years since the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Dobbs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; decision to overturn &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Roe v. Wade&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Between May 2022 when the Supreme Court accidentally leaked the draft memo and the following June when the case was decided, there was a mad scramble to figure out what the impacts would be. Besides the obvious perils of stripping away half the country’s right to reproductive healthcare, digital surveillance and mass data collection caused a flurry of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/23185081/abortion-data-privacy-roe-v-wade-dobbs-surveillance-period-tracking&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  333. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Although many activists fighting for reproductive justice had been operating under assumptions of little to no legal protections for some time, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Dobbs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; decision was for most a sudden and scary revelation. Everyone implicated in that moment somewhat understood the stark difference between pre-&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Roe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; 1973 and post-&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Roe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; 2022; living under the most sophisticated surveillance apparatus in human history presents a vastly different landscape of threats. Since 2022, some suspicions have been confirmed, new threats have emerged, and overall our risk assessment has grown smarter. Below, we cover the most pressing digital dangers facing people seeking reproductive care, and ways to combat them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  334. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  335. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span&gt;Digital Evidence in Abortion-Related Court Cases: Some Examples&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  336. &lt;h4&gt;Social Media Message Logs&lt;/h4&gt;
  337. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/abortion-charges-nebraska-sentence-36b3dcaadd6b705ca2315bc95b99bdc1&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;A case in Nebraska&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; resulted in a woman, Jessica Burgess, being sentenced to two years in prison for obtaining abortion pills for her teenage daughter. Prosecutors used a Facebook Messenger chat log between Jessica and her daughter as key evidence, bolstering the concerns many had raised about using such privacy-invasive tech products for sensitive communications. At the time, Facebook Messenger did not have end-to-end encryption.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  338. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In response to criticisms about Facebook’s cooperation with law enforcement that landed a mother in prison, a Meta spokesperson issued a frustratingly &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/andymstone/status/1557160456501993472&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;laconic tweet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; stating that “[n]othing in the valid warrants we received from local law enforcement in early June, prior to the Supreme Court decision, mentioned abortion.” They followed this up with a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://about.fb.com/news/2022/08/meta-response-nebraska-abortion-case/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;short statement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; reiterating that the warrants did not mention abortion at all. The lesson is clear: although companies do sometimes push back against data warrants, we have to prepare for the likelihood that they won’t.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  339. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google: Search History &amp;amp; Warrants&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  340. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Well before the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Dobbs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; decision, prosecutors had already used &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fastcompany.com/90468030/how-an-online-search-for-abortion-pills-landed-this-woman-in-jail&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Google Search history&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to indict a woman for her pregnancy outcome. In this case, it was keyword searches for misoprostol (a safe and effective abortion medication) that clinched the prosecutor’s evidence against her. Google acquiesced, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/us-national-security&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;as it so often has&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, to the warrant request.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  341. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Related to this is the ongoing and extremely complicated territory of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/geofence-warrants-and-reverse-keyword-warrants-are-so-invasive-even-big-tech-wants&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;reverse keyword and geolocation warrants&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Google &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/jul/01/google-delete-location-data-abortion-clinic&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;has promised&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that it would remove from user profiles all location data history related to abortion clinic sites. Researchers tested this claim and it was shown&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://accountabletech.org/research/googles-data-collection-and-policies-could-endanger-those-seeking-abortions/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; to be false&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://accountabletech.org/research/as-google-rolls-out-new-privacy-commitments-research-finds-company-is-still-failing-to-protect-privacy-of-abortion-seekers/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;twice&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Late in 2023, Google made a bigger promise: it would soon change how it stores location data to make it much more difficult–if not impossible–for Google to provide mass location data in response to a geofence warrant, a change we’ve been asking Google to implement for years. This would be a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/12/end-geofence-warrants&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;genuinely helpful measure,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; but we’ve been conditioned to approach such claims with caution. We’ll believe it when we see it (and refer to external testing for proof).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  342. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  343. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span&gt;Other Dangers to Consider&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  344. &lt;h4&gt;Doxxing&lt;/h4&gt;
  345. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Sites propped up for doxxing healthcare professionals that offer abortion services are about as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/05/neal-horsley-of-nuremberg-files-died-true-threats-case-reconsidered-by-supreme-court-in-elonis.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;old as the internet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; itself. Doxxing comes in a variety of forms, but a quick and loose definition of it is the weaponization of open source intelligence with the intention of escalating to other harms. There’s been a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8N39E8D3/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;massive increase&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in hate groups abusing public records requests and data broker collections to publish personal information about healthcare workers. Doxxing websites hosting such material are updated frequently. Doxxing has led to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://prochoice.org/our-work/provider-security/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;steadily rising&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; material dangers (targeted harassment, gun violence, arson, just to name a few) for the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://prochoice.org/national-abortion-federation-releases-2021-violence-disruption-report/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;past few years&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  346. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There are some piecemeal attempts at data protection for healthcare workers in more protective states like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://a16.asmdc.org/reproductive-health&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;California&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/how-california-reproductive-health-workers-can-protect-information-they-submit&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;one which we’ve covered&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;). Other states may offer some form of an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sos.ca.gov/registries/safe-home/contact/address-confidentiality-programs-public-contact-information&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;address confidentiality program&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that provides people with proxy addresses. Though these can be effective, they are not comprehensive. Since doxxing campaigns are typically coordinated through a combination of open source intelligence tactics, it presents a particularly difficult threat to protect against. This is especially true for government and medical industry workers whose information may be subjected to exposure through public records requests.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  347. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Data Brokers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  348. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Recently, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-reveals-phone-data-used-to-target-abortion-misinformation-at-visitors-to-hundreds-of-reproductive-health-clinics&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Senator Wyden’s office released a statement&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; about a long investigation into Near Intelligence, a data broker company that sold geolocation data to The Veritas Society, an anti-choice think tank. The Veritas Society then used the geolocation data to target individuals who had traveled near healthcare clinics that offered abortion services and delivered pro-life advertisements to their devices.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  349. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That alone is a stark example of the dangers of commercial surveillance, but it’s still unclear what other ways this type of dataset could be abused. Near Intelligence has filed for bankruptcy, but they are far from the only, or the most pernicious, data broker company out there. This situation bolsters what &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/data-broker-helps-police-see-everywhere-youve-been-click-mouse-eff-investigation&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;we’ve been saying for years&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;: the data broker industry is a dangerously unregulated mess of privacy threats that needs to be addressed. It not only contributes to the doxxing campaigns described above, but essentially creates a backdoor for warrantless surveillance.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  350. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Domestic Terrorist Threat Designation by Federal Agencies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  351. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Midway through 2023, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://theintercept.com/2023/06/15/fbi-abortion-domestic-terrorism/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Intercept published an article&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; about a tenfold increase in federal designation of abortion-rights activist groups as domestic terrorist threats. This projects a massive shadow of risk for organizers and activists at work in the struggle for reproductive justice. The digital surveillance capabilities of federal law enforcement are more sophisticated than that of typical anti-choice zealots. Most people in the abortion access movement may not have to worry about being labeled a domestic terrorist threat, though for some that is a reality, and strategizing against it is vital.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  352. &lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  353. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span&gt;Looming Threats&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  354. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Legal Threats to Medication Abortion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  355. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Last month, the Supreme Court &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/supreme-court-mifepristone-abortion-03-26-24/index.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;heard oral arguments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; challenging the FDA’s approval of and regulations governing mifepristone, a widely available and safe abortion pill. If the anti-abortion advocates who brought this case succeed, access to the most common medication abortion regimen used in the U.S. would end across the country—even in those states where abortion rights are protected.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  356. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Access to abortion medication might also be threatened by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://newrepublic.com/article/180153/alito-thomas-comstock-act-abortion&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;a 150 year old obscenity law&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Many people now recognize the long dormant &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/what-is-comstock-act-supreme-court-abortion-pill-case/story?id=108395444&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Comstock Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; as a potential avenue to criminalize procurement of the abortion pill.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  357. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Although the outcomes of these legal challenges are yet-to-be determined, it’s reasonable to prepare for the worst: if there is no longer a way to access medication abortion legally, there will be even more surveillance of the digital footprints prescribers and patients leave behind. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  358. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Electronic Health Records Systems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  359. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/glossary/electronic-health-record-ehr-or-electronic-medical-record-emr&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Electronic Health Records&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (EHRs) are digital transcripts of medical information meant to be easily stored and shared between medical facilities and providers. Since abortion restrictions are now dictated on a state-by-state basis, the sharing of these records across state lines present a serious matrix of concerns. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  360. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-abortion-interoperability-trap&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;some academics&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and privacy advocates have outlined, the interoperability of EHRs can jeopardize the safety of patients when reproductive healthcare data is shared across state lines. Although the Department of Health and Human Services has &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/04/18/2023-07229/health-data-technology-and-interoperability-certification-program-updates-algorithm-transparency-and&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;proposed a new rule to help protect sensitive EHR data,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; it’s currently possible that data shared between EHRs can lead to the prosecution of reproductive healthcare.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  361.  
  362. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Good Stuff: Protections You Can Take&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  363. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of what we’ve covered thus far is how much is beyond individual control. It’s completely understandable to feel powerless against these monumental threats. That said, you aren’t powerless. Much can be done to protect your digital footprint, and thus, your safety. We don’t propose reinventing the wheel when it comes to digital security and data privacy. Instead, rely on the resources that already exist and re-tool them to fit your particular needs. Here are some good places to start:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  364. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Create a Security Plan&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  365. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s impossible, and generally unnecessary, to implement every privacy and security tactic or tool out there. What’s more important is figuring out the specific risks you face and finding the right ways to protect against them. This process takes some brainstorming around potentially scary topics, so it’s best done well before you are in any kind of crisis. Pen and paper works best. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/your-security-plan&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Here&#039;s a handy guide.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  366. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;After you’ve answered those questions and figured out your risks, it’s time to locate the best ways to protect against them. Don’t sweat it if you’re not a highly technical person; many of the strategies we recommend can be applied in non-tech ways.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  367. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Careful Communications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  368. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Secure communication is as much a frame of mind as it is a type of tech product. When you are able to identify which aspects of your life need to be spoken about more carefully, you can then make informed decisions about who to trust with what information, and when. It’s as much about creating ground rules with others about types of communication as it is about normalizing the use of privacy technologies.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  369. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Assuming you’ve already created a security plan and identified some risks you want to protect against, begin thinking about the communication you have with others involving those things. Set some rules for how you broach those topics, where they can be discussed, and with whom. Sometimes this might look like the careful development of codewords. Sometimes it’s as easy as saying “let’s move this conversation to Signal.” Now that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-use-signal#set-or-change-your-username&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Signal supports usernames&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (so you can keep your phone number private), as well as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-to-use-signal#disappearing-messages&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;disappearing messages&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, it’s an obvious tech choice for secure communication.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  370. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Compartmentalize Your Digital Activity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  371. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As mentioned above, it’s important to know when to compartmentalize sensitive communications to more secure environments. You can expand this idea to other parts of your life. For example, you can designate different web browsers for different use cases, choosing those browsers for the privacy they offer. One might offer significant convenience for day-to-day casual activities (like Chrome), whereas another is best suited for activities that require utmost privacy (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/how-use-tor-windows&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;like Tor&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  372. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Now apply this thought process towards what payment processors you use, what registration information you give to social media sites, what profiles you keep public versus private, how you organize your data backups, and so on. The possibilities are endless, so it’s important that you prioritize only the aspects of your life that most need protection.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  373. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Security Culture and Community Care&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  374. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Both tactics mentioned above incorporate a sense of community when it comes to our privacy and security. We’ve said it before and we’ll say it again: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/module/protecting-yourself-social-networks#privacy-is-a-team-sport&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;privacy is a team sport&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. People live in communities built on trust and care for one another; your digital life is imbricated with others in the same way. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  375. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If a node on a network is compromised, it will likely implicate others on the same network. This principle of computer network security is just as applicable to social networks. Although traditional information security often builds from a paradigm of “zero trust,” we are social creatures and must work against that idea. It’s more about incorporating elements of shared trust pushing for a culture of security. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  376. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Sometimes this looks like setting standards for how information is articulated and shared within a trusted group. Sometimes it looks like choosing privacy-focused technologies to serve a community’s computing needs. The point is to normalize these types of conversations, to let others know that you’re caring for them by attending to your own digital hygiene. For example, when you ask for consent to share images that include others from a protest, you are not only pushing for a culture of security, but normalizing the process of asking for consent. This relationship of community care through data privacy hygiene is reciprocal.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  377. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Help Prevent Doxxing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  378. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As somewhat touched on above in the other dangers to consider section, doxxing can be a frustratingly difficult thing to protect against, especially when it’s public records that are being used against you. It’s worth looking into your state level &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://voterrecords.com&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;voter registration records&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, if that information is public, and how you can request for that information to be redacted (success may &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/17/the-losing-fight-to-keep-your-voter-registration-data-private-00147401&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;vary by state&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;). &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  379. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Similarly, although business registration records are publicly available, you can appeal to websites that mirror that information (like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bizapedia.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Bizapedia&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) to have your personal information taken down. This is of course only a concern if you have a business registration tied to your personal address.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  380. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you work for a business that is susceptible to public records requests revealing personal sensitive information about you, there’s little to be done to prevent it. You can, however, apply for an address confidentiality program if your state has it. You can also do the somewhat tedious work of scrubbing your personal information from other places online (since doxxing is often a combination of information resources). Consider subscribing to a service like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.deleteme.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;DeleteMe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (or follow a free &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://github.com/yaelwrites/Big-Ass-Data-Broker-Opt-Out-List&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;DIY guide&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) for a more thorough process of minimizing your digital footprint. Collaborating with trusted allies to monitor hate forums is a smart way to unburden yourself from having to look up your own information alone. Sharing that responsibility with others makes it easier to do, as well as group planning for what to do in ways of prevention and incident response.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  381. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Take a Deep Breath&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  382. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s natural to feel bogged down by all the thought that has to be put towards privacy and security. Again, don’t beat yourself up for feeling powerless in the face of mass surveillance. You aren’t powerless. You can protect yourself, but it’s reasonable to feel frustrated when there is no comprehensive federal data privacy legislation that would alleviate so many of these concerns. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  383. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Take a deep breath. You’re not alone in this fight. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;There are guides for you&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to learn more about stepping up your privacy and security. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ssd.eff.org/playlist/reproductive-healthcare-service-provider-seeker-or-advocate&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;We&#039;ve even curated a special list&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of them. And there is &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://digitaldefensefund.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Digital Defense Fund&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a digital security organization for the abortion access movement, who we are grateful and proud to boost. And though it can often feel like privacy is getting harder to protect, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/privacy-isnt-dead-far-it&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;in many ways it’s actually improving&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. With all that information, as well as continuing to trust your communities, and pushing for a culture of security within them, safety is much easier to attain. With a bit of privacy, you can go back to focusing on what matters, like healthcare.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  384.  
  385. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  386.     <pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2024 21:14:27 +0000</pubDate>
  387. <guid isPermaLink="false">109533 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  388. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/reproductive-rights">Reproductive Justice</category>
  389. <dc:creator>Daly Barnett</dc:creator>
  390. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/repro-rights-hd-1.jpg" alt="A woman holds an ultrasound with keys" type="image/jpeg" length="383083" />
  391.  </item>
  392.  <item>
  393.    <title>Fourth Amendment is Not For Sale Act Passed the House, Now it Should Pass the Senate </title>
  394.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/fourth-amendment-not-sale-act-passed-house-now-it-should-pass-senate</link>
  395.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/tell-congress-support-fourth-amendment-not-sale-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Fourth Amendment is Not For Sale Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;H.R.4639&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;, originally introduced in the Senate by Senator Ron Wyden in 2021, has now made the important and historic step of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/4639&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;passing the U.S. House of Representatives&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. In an era when it often seems like Congress cannot pass much-needed privacy protections, this is a victory for vulnerable populations, people who want to make sure their location data is private, and the hard-working activists and organizers who have pushed for the passage of this bill. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  396. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Everyday, your personal information is being harvested by your smart phone applications, sold to data brokers, and used by advertisers hoping to sell you things. But what safeguards prevent the government from shopping in that same data marketplace? Mobile data regularly bought and sold, like your geolocation, is information that law enforcement or intelligence agencies would normally have to get a warrant to acquire. But it does not require a warrant for law enforcement agencies to just buy the data. The U.S. government has been using its purchase of this information as a loophole for acquiring personal information on individuals without a warrant. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  397. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Now is the time to close that loophole. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  398. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At EFF, we’ve been talking about the need to close the databroker loophole for years. We even launched a massive investigation into the data broker industry which &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/inside-fog-data-science-secretive-company-selling-mass-surveillance-local-police&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;revealed Fog Data Science&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a company that has claimed in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/22187494-chino_2019-20_attachments#document/p9/a2143079&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;marketing materials&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that it has “billions” of data points about “over 250 million” devices and that its data can be used to learn about where its subjects work, live, and their associates. We found close to 20 law enforcement agents used or were offered this tool. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  399. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s time for the Senate to close this incredibly dangerous and invasive loophole. If police want a person&lt;span&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;or a whole community’s&lt;span&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;location data, they should have to get a warrant to see it. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  400.  
  401. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-the-u-s-senate-stop-risaa-the-fisa-mass-surveillance-expansion&quot;&gt;Take action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  402. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;TELL congress: 702 Needs serious reforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  403.  
  404. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  405.     <pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2024 16:25:38 +0000</pubDate>
  406. <guid isPermaLink="false">109530 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  407. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  408. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/locationdata_v2.mov1_.gif" alt="An animated image showing location pins dropping onto a street map from above, tracing several paths" type="image/gif" length="2071190" />
  409.  </item>
  410.  <item>
  411.    <title>About Face (Recognition) | EFFector 36.5</title>
  412.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/about-face-recognition-effector-365</link>
  413.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;There are a lot of updates in the fight for our freedoms online, from a last-minute reauthorization bill to expand Section 702 (tell your senators to &lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-the-u-s-senate-stop-risaa-the-fisa-mass-surveillance-expansion&quot;&gt;vote NO on the bill here!&lt;/a&gt;), a new federal consumer data privacy law (&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/americans-deserve-more-current-american-privacy-rights-act&quot;&gt;we deserve better!&lt;/a&gt;), and a recent draft from the FCC to reinstate net neutrality (you can &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/fcc-must-clarify-its-rules-prevent-loopholes-will-swallow-net-neutrality-whole&quot;&gt;help clean it up!&lt;/a&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;
  414. &lt;p&gt;It can feel overwhelming to stay up to date, but we&#039;ve got you covered with our EFFector newsletter! You can &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector/36/5&quot;&gt;read the full issue here&lt;/a&gt;, or &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;subscribe&lt;/a&gt; to get the next one in your inbox automatically! You can also listen to the audio version of the newsletter on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/36.5_20240417&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt;, or by clicking the button below:&lt;/p&gt;
  415. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/Qf96vWebvb8&quot;&gt;LISTEN ON YouTube&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  416. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFFECTOR 36.5.- About Face (Recognition)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  417. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since 1990 EFF has published EFFector to help keep readers on the bleeding edge of their digital rights. We know that the intersection of technology, civil liberties, human rights, and the law can be complicated, so EFFector is a great way to stay on top of things. The newsletter is chock full of links to updates, announcements, blog posts, and other stories to help keep readers—and listeners—up to date on the movement to protect online privacy and free expression. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  418. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Thank you to the supporters around the world who make our work possible! If you&#039;re not a member yet, &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effect&quot;&gt;join EFF today&lt;/a&gt; to help us fight for a brighter digital future.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  419.  
  420. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  421.     <pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2024 17:37:24 +0000</pubDate>
  422. <guid isPermaLink="false">109526 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  423. <dc:creator>Christian Romero</dc:creator>
  424. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/effector_banner_5.jpeg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="130379" />
  425.  </item>
  426.  <item>
  427.    <title>How Political Campaigns Use Your Data to Target You </title>
  428.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/how-political-campaigns-use-your-data-target-you</link>
  429.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Data about potential voters—who they are, where they are, and how to reach them—is an extremely valuable commodity during an election year. And while the right to a secret ballot is a cornerstone of the democratic process, your personal information is gathered, used, and sold along the way. It&#039;s not possible to fully shield yourself from all this data processing, but you can take steps to at least minimize and understand it. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  430. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Political campaigns use the same &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;invasive tricks that behavioral ads do&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—pulling in data from a variety of sources online to create a profile—so they can target you. Your digital trail is a critical tool for campaigns, but the process starts in the real world, where longstanding techniques to collect data about you can be useful indicators of how you&#039;ll vote. This starts with voter records.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  431. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;Your IRL Voting Trail Is Still Valuable&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  432. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Politicians have long had access to public data, like voter registration, party registration, address, and participation information (whether or not a voter voted, not who they voted for). Online access to such records has made them easier to get in some states, with unintended consequences, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/17/the-losing-fight-to-keep-your-voter-registration-data-private-00147401&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;like doxing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  433. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Campaigns can purchase this &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/access-to-and-use-of-voter-registration-lists&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;voter information from most states&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. These records provide a rough idea of whether that person will vote or not, and—if they&#039;re registered to a particular party—who they might lean toward voting for. Campaigns use this to put every voter into broad categories, like &quot;supporter,&quot; &quot;non-supporter,&quot; or &quot;undecided.&quot; Campaigns gather such information at in-person events, too, like door-knocking and rallies, where you might sign up for emails or phone calls. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  434. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Campaigns also share information about you with other campaigns, so if you register with a candidate one year, it&#039;s likely that information goes to another in the future. For example, the website for Adam’s Schiff’s campaign to serve as U.S. Senator from California has a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.adamschiff.com/privacy-policy/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;privacy policy with this line&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; under “Sharing of Information”:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  435. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;With organizations, candidates, campaigns, groups, or causes that we believe have similar political viewpoints, principles, or objectives or share similar goals and with organizations that facilitate communications and information sharing among such groups&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  436. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  437. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Similar language can be found on other campaign sites, including those for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://elizabethwarren.com/privacy-policy&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Elizabeth Warren&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.tedcruz.org/privacy-policy-2/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ted Cruz&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. These candidate lists are valuable, and are often shared within the national party. In 2017, the Hillary Clinton campaign gave its email list to the Democratic National Committee, a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.huffpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-dnc-email-list_n_58f278b9e4b0da2ff8613acf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;contribution valued at $3.5 million&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  438. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you live in a state with citizen initiative ballot measures, data collected from signature sheets might be shared or used as well. Signing a petition doesn&#039;t necessarily mean you support the proposed ballot measure—it&#039;s just saying you think it deserves to be put on the ballot. But in most states, these signature pages will remain a part of the public record, and the information you provide may get used for mailings or other targeted political ads. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  439. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;How Those Voter Records, and Much More, Lead to Targeted Digital Ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  440. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;All that real world information is just one part of the puzzle these days. Political campaigns tap into the same intrusive adtech tracking systems used to deliver &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/behind-the-one-way-mirror&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;online behavioral ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. We saw a glimpse into how this worked &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/one-answer-facebook-problem-block-its-tracking-technologies&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;after the Cambridge Analytica scandal&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and the system has only grown &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/es/deeplinks/2016/02/voter-privacy-what-you-need-know-about-your-digital-trail-during-2016-election&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;since then&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  441. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Specific details are often a mystery, as a political advertising profile may be created by combining disparate information—from consumer scoring data brokers like Acxiom or Experian, smartphone data, and publicly available voter information—into a jumble of data points that’s often hard to trace in any meaningful way. A simplified version of the whole process might go something like this: &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  442. &lt;ol&gt;
  443. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;A campaign starts with its voter list, which includes names, addresses, and party affiliation. It may have purchased this from the state or its own national committee, or collected some of it for itself through a website &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/06/21/1004228/trumps-data-hungry-invasive-app-is-a-voter-surveillance-tool-of-extraordinary-scope/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;or app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  444. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;The campaign then turns to a data broker to enhance this list with consumer information. The data broker combines the voter list with its own data, then creates a behavioral profile using inferences based on your shopping, hobbies, demographics, and more. The campaign looks this all over, then chooses some categories of people it thinks will be receptive to its messages in its various targeted ads.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  445. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Finally, the campaign turns to an ad targeting company to get the ad on your device. Some ad companies might use an IP address to target the ad to you. As &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://themarkup.org/privacy/2022/11/08/how-political-campaigns-use-your-phones-location-to-target-you&quot;&gt;The Markup&lt;span&gt; revealed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, other companies might target you based on your phone&#039;s location, which is particularly useful in reaching voters not in the campaign&#039;s files. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  446. &lt;/ol&gt;
  447. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In 2020, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/04/the-third-party-brokers-who-make-millions-selling-your-data-to-political-groups/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Open Secrets found&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; political groups paid 37 different data brokers at least $23 million for access to services or data. These data brokers collect information from browser cookies, web beacons, mobile phones, social media platforms, and more. They found that some companies specialize in more general data, while others, like i360, TargetSmart, and Grassroots Analytics, focus on data useful to campaigns or advocacy. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  448. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/16/screenshot_2024-04-15_at_11.49.23_am.png&quot; width=&quot;733&quot; height=&quot;354&quot; alt=&quot;screenshot of spreadsheet with categories, &amp;quot;Qanon, Rightwing Militias, Right to Repair, Inflation Fault, Electric Vehicle Buyer, Climate Change, and Amazon Worker Treatment&amp;quot;&quot; title=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;A sample of some categories and inferences in a political data broker file that we received through a CCPA request shows the wide variety of assumptions these companies may make.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  449. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These political data brokers make a lot of promises to campaigns. TargetSmart claims to have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://targetsmart.com/data-solutions/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;171 million highly accurate cell phone numbers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and i360 &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.i-360.com/why-i360/data-quality/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;claims&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to have data on 220 million voters. They also tend to offer specialized campaign categories that go beyond the offerings of consumer-focused data brokers. Check out data broker L2’s “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://l2-data.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/L2-Haystaq-Voter.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;National Models &amp;amp; Predictive Analytics” page&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which breaks down interests, demographics, and political ideology—including details like &quot;Voter Fraud Belief,&quot; and &quot;Ukraine Continue.&quot; The &lt;/span&gt;New York Times&lt;span&gt; demonstrated &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/23/technology/voter-targeting-trump-score.html?pgtype=Article&amp;amp;action=click&amp;amp;module=RelatedLinks&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;a particularly novel approach&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to these sorts of profiles where a voter analytics firm created a “Covid concern score” by analyzing cell phone location, then ranked people based on travel patterns during the pandemic. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  450. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Some of these companies target based on location data. For example, El Toro &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://eltoro.com/case_study/ip-targeting-political/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;claims to have once&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; “identified over 130,000 IP-matched voter homes that met the client’s targeting criteria. El Toro served banner and video advertisements up to 3 times per day, per voter household – across all devices within the home.” &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  451. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That “all devices within the home” claim may prove important in the coming elections: as streaming video services integrate more ad-based subscription tiers, that likely means more political ads this year. One company, AdImpact, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://adimpact.com/2024-political-spending-projections-report/#:~:text=AdImpact%20projects%20the%202023%2D2024,the%202019%2D2020%20election%20cycle.&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;projects $1.3 billion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in political ad spending on “connected television” ads in 2024. This may be driven in part by the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2023/12/14/24000451/google-chrome-tracking-protection-launch-third-party-cookies-ads&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;move away from tracking cookies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which makes web browsing data less appealing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  452. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the case of connected televisions, ads can also integrate data based on what you&#039;ve watched, using information collected through automated content recognition (ACR). Streaming device maker and service provider &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://advertising.roku.com/learn/resources/voters-are-streaming-how-2024-political-campaigns-are-adapting-to-a-changed-tv-landscape&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Roku&#039;s pitch to potential political advertisers is straightforward&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;: “there’s an opportunity for campaigns to use their own data like never before, for instance to reach households in a particular district where they need to get out the vote.” Roku claims to have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://newsroom.roku.com/news/2024/02/roku-hits-major-milestones-surpassing-80-million-active-accounts/trl3ay04-1708011505&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;at least 80 million users&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. As a platform for televisions and “streaming sticks,” and especially if you opted into ACR (we’ll detail how to check below), Roku can collect and use a lot of your viewing data ranging from apps, to broadcast TV, or even to video games. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  453. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This is vastly different from traditional broadcast TV ads, which might be targeted broadly based on a city or state, and the show being aired. Now, a campaign can target an ad at one household, but not their neighbor, even if they&#039;re watching the same show. Of the main streaming companies, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.axios.com/2024/02/27/political-ads-streaming-fox-tv-madhive&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;only Amazon and Netflix&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; don’t accept political ads. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  454. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Finally, there are Facebook and Google, two companies that have amassed a mountain of data points about all their users, and which allow campaigns to target based on some of those factors. According to at least one report, political ad spending on Google (mostly through YouTube) is &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-political-ad-spending-soar-2024-with-tv-media-biggest-winner-report-2024-01-11/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;projected to be $552 million&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, while Facebook is projected at $568 million. Unlike the data brokers discussed above, most of what you see on Facebook and Google is derived from the data collected by the company from its users. This may make it easier to understand why you’re seeing a political ad, for example, if you follow or view content from a specific politician or party, or about a specific political topic.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  455. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;What You Can Do to Protect Your Privacy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  456. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Managing the flow of all this data might feel impossible, but you can take a few important steps to minimize what’s out there. The chances you’ll catch everything is low, but minimizing what is accessible is still a privacy win.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  457. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Install Privacy Badger&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Considering how much data is collected just from your day-to-day web browsing, it’s a good idea to protect that first. The simplest way to do so is with our own tracking blocker extension, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://privacybadger.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Privacy Badger&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  458. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Disable Your Phone Advertising ID and Audit Your Location Settings&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Your phone &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/how-disable-ad-id-tracking-ios-and-android-and-why-you-should-do-it-now&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;has an ad identifier&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that makes it simple for advertisers to track and collate everything you do. Thankfully, you can make this much harder for those advertisers by disabling it:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  459. &lt;ul&gt;
  460. &lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On iPhone&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;: Head into &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Privacy &amp;amp; Security&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Tracking&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and make sure “Allow Apps to Request to Track” is disabled. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  461. &lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On Android&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;: Open &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Security &amp;amp; Privacy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Privacy&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Ads&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and select “Delete advertising ID.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  462. &lt;/ul&gt;
  463. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Similarly, as noted above, your location is a valuable asset for campaigns. They can collect your &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;location through data brokers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which usually get it from otherwise unaffiliated apps. This is why it&#039;s a good idea to limit what sorts of apps have access to your location:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  464. &lt;ul&gt;
  465. &lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On iPhone&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;: open &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Privacy &amp;amp; Security&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Location Services&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and disable access for any apps that do not need it. You can also set location for only &quot;While using,&quot; for certain apps where it&#039;s helpful, but unnecessary to track you all the time. Also, consider disabling &quot;Precise Location&quot; for any apps that don&#039;t need your exact location (for example, your GPS navigation app needs precise location, but no weather app does).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  466. &lt;li&gt;&lt;b&gt;On Android&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;: Open &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Settings&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;Location &lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;&amp;gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;App location permissions&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and confirm that no apps are accessing your location that you don&#039;t want to. As with iOS, you can set it to &quot;Allow only while using the app,&quot; for apps that don&#039;t need it all the time, and disable &quot;Use precise location,&quot; for any apps that don&#039;t need exact location access.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  467. &lt;/ul&gt;
  468. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Opt Out of Tracking on Your TV or Streaming Device, and Any Video Streaming Service &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Nearly every brand of TV is connected to the internet these days. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.consumerreports.org/electronics/privacy/how-to-turn-off-smart-tv-snooping-features-a4840102036/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Consumer Reports has a guide&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for disabling what you can on most popular TVs and software platforms. If you use an Apple TV, you can &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.apple.com/en-us/102420&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;disable the ad identifier&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; following the exact same directions as on your phone.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  469. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since the passage of a number of state privacy laws, streaming services, like other sites, have offered a way for users to opt out of the sale of their info. Many have extended this right outside of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/State_Comp_Privacy_Law_Chart.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;states that require it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. You&#039;ll need to be logged into your streaming service account to take action on most of these, but &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.techhive.com/article/1513900/how-to-protect-your-privacy-from-streaming-tv-services.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;TechHive has a list of opt out links&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for popular streaming services to get you started. Select the &quot;Right to Opt Out&quot; option, when offered. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  470. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Don&#039;t Click on Links in (or Respond to) Political Text Messages&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;You&#039;ve likely been receiving political texts for much of the past year, and that&#039;s not going to let up until election day. It is increasingly difficult to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/05/technology/political-text-messages-pelosi-trump.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;decipher whether they&#039;re legitimate or spam&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and with links that often use a URL shortener or odd looking domains, it&#039;s best not to click them. If there&#039;s a campaign you want to donate to, head directly to the site of the candidate or ballot sponsor. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  471. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Create an Alternate Email and Phone Number for Campaign Stuff&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you want to keep updated on campaign or ballot initiatives, consider setting up an email specifically for that, and nothing else. Since a phone number is also often required, it&#039;s a good idea to set up a secondary phone number for these same purposes (you can do so for free through services like Google Voice).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  472. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Keep an Eye Out for Deceptive Check Boxes&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Speaking of signing up for updates, be mindful of when you &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;don&#039;t&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; intend to sign up for emails. Campaigns might use &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/deceptive-checkboxes-should-not-open-our-checkbooks&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;pre-selected options&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for everything from donation amounts to signing up for a newsletter. So, when you sign up with any campaign, keep an eye on any options you might not intend to opt into.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  473. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Mind Your Social Media&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Now&#039;s a great time to take any sort of &quot;privacy checkup&quot; available on whatever social media platforms you use to help minimize any accidental data sharing. Even though you can&#039;t completely opt out of behavioral advertising on Facebook, review your &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.facebook.com/help/247395082112892/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;ad preferences&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and opt out whatever you can. Also be sure to disable &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.facebook.com/help/2207256696182627/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;access to off-site activity&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. You should also &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://myadcenter.google.com/personalizationoff&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;opt out of personalized ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on Google&#039;s services. You &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2021/3/17/22336093/tiktok-mandatory-personalized-ads-privacy-tracking&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;cannot disable behavioral ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on TikTok, but the company doesn&#039;t allow political ads.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  474. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;If you&#039;re curious to learn more about why you&#039;re seeing an ad to begin with, on Facebook you can always click the three-dot icon on an ad, then click &quot;Why am I seeing this ad?&quot; to learn more. For ads on YouTube, you can click the &quot;More&quot; button and then &quot;About this advertiser&quot; to see some information about who placed the ad. Anywhere else you see a Google ad you can click the &quot;Adchoices&quot; button and then &quot;Why this ad?&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  475. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;You shouldn&#039;t need to spend an afternoon jumping through opt out hoops and tweaking privacy settings on every device you own just so you&#039;re not bombarded with highly targeted ads. That’s why EFF supports &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/privacy-first-better-way-address-online-harms&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;comprehensive consumer data privacy legislation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, including a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;ban on online behavioral ads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  476. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Democracy works because we participate, and you should be able to do so without sacrificing your privacy. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  477.  
  478. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  479.     <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 19:49:56 +0000</pubDate>
  480. <guid isPermaLink="false">109517 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  481. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  482. <dc:creator>Thorin Klosowski</dc:creator>
  483. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/vote_1.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="25107" />
  484.  </item>
  485.  <item>
  486.    <title>Speaking Freely: Lynn Hamadallah </title>
  487.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/speaking-freely-lynn-hamadallah</link>
  488.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Lynn Hamadallah is a Syrian-Palestinian-French Psychologist based in London. An outspoken voice for the Palestinian cause, Lynn is interested in the ways in which narratives, spoken and unspoken, shape identity. Having lived in five countries and spent a lot of time traveling, she takes a global perspective on freedom of expression. Her current research project investigates how second-generation British-Arabs negotiate their cultural identity. Lynn works in a community mental health service supporting some of London&#039;s most disadvantaged residents, many of whom are migrants who have suffered extensive psychological trauma.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  489. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What does free speech or free expression mean to you? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  490. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Being Arab and coming from a place where there is much more speech policing in the traditional sense, I suppose there is a bit of an idealization of Western values of free speech and democracy. There is this sense of freedom we grow up associating with the West. Yet recently, we’ve come to realize that the way it works in practice is quite different to the way it is described, and this has led to a lot of disappointment and disillusionment in the West and its ideals amongst Arabs. There’s been a lot of censorship for example on social media, which I’ve experienced myself when posting content in support of Palestine. At a national level, we have witnessed the dehumanization going on around protesters in the UK, which undermines the idea of free speech. For example, the pro-Palestine protests where we saw the then-Home Secretary Suella Braverman &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/oct/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;referring&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to protesters as “hate marchers.” So we’ve come to realize there’s this kind of veneer of free speech in the West which does not really match up to the more idealistic view of freedom we were taught about.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  491. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;With the increased awareness we have gained as a result of the latest aggression going on in Palestine, actually what we’re learning is that free speech is just another arm of the West to support political and racist agendas. It’s one of those things that the West has come up with which only applies to one group of people and oppresses another. It’s the same as with human rights you know - human rights for who? Where are Palestinian’s human rights? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  492. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We’ve seen free speech being weaponized to spread hate and desecrate Islam, for example, in the case of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Charlie Hebdo&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Quran_burnings_in_Sweden&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Quran burning in Denmark and in Sweden&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The argument put forward was that those cases represented instances of free speech rather than hate speech. But actually to millions of Muslims around the world those incidents were very, very hateful. They were acts of violence not just against their religious beliefs but right down to their sense of self. It’s humiliating to have a part of your identity targeted in that way with full support from the West, politicians and citizens alike. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  493. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And then, when we— we meaning Palestinians and Palestine allies—want to leverage this idea of free speech to speak up against the oppression happening by the state of Israel, we see time and time again accusations flying around: hate speech, anti-semitism, and censorship. Heavy, heavy censorship everywhere. So that’s what I mean when I say that free speech in the West is a racist concept, actually. And I don’t know that true free speech exists anywhere in the world really. In the Middle East we don’t have democracies but at least there’s no veneer of democracy— the messaging and understanding is clear. Here, we have a supposed democracy, but in practice it looks very different. And that’s why, for me, I don’t really believe that free speech exists. I’ve never seen a real example of it. I think as long as people are power hungry there’s going to be violence, and as long as there’s violence, people are going to want to hide their crimes. And as long as people are trying to hide their crimes there’s not going to be free speech. Sorry for the pessimistic view!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  494. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: It’s okay, I understand where you’re coming from. And I think that a lot of those things are absolutely true. Yet, from my perspective, I still think it’s a worthy goal even though governments—and organizationally we’ve seen this as well—a lot of times governments do try to abuse this concept. So I guess then I would just as a follow-up, do you feel that despite these issues that some form of universalized free expression is still a worthy ideal? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  495. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Of course, I think it’s a worthy ideal. You know, even with social media – there is censorship. I’ve experienced it and it’s not just my word and an isolated incident. It’s been documented by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Human Rights Watch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—even Meta themselves! They did an internal investigation in 2021—Meta had a nonprofit called Business for Social Responsibility do an investigation and produce a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bsr.org/en/reports/meta-human-rights-israel-palestine&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—and they’ve shown there was systemic censorship of Palestine-related content. And they’re doing it again now. That being said, I do think social media is making free speech more accessible, despite the censorship. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  496. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And I think—to your question—free speech is absolutely worth pursuing. Because we see that despite these attempts at censorship, the truth is starting to come out. Palestine support is stronger than it’s ever been. To the point where we’ve now had South Africa take Israel to trial at the International Court of Justice for genocide, using evidence from social media videos that went viral. So what I’m saying is, free speech has the power to democratize demanding accountability from countries and creating social change, so yes, absolutely something we should try to pursue. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  497. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: You just mentioned two issues close to my heart. One is the issues around speech on social media platforms, and I’ve of course followed and worked on the Palestinian campaigns quite closely and I’m very aware of the BSR report. But also, video content, specifically, that’s found on social media being used in tribunals. So let me shift this question a bit. You have such a varied background around the world. I’m curious about your perspective over the past decade or decade and a half since social media has become so popular—how do you feel social media has shaped people’s views or their ability to advocate for themselves globally? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  498. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So when we think about stories and narratives, something I’m personally interested in, we have to think about which stories get told and which stories remain untold. These stories and their telling is very much controlled by the mass media— BBC, CNN, and the like. They control the narrative. And I guess what social media is doing is it’s giving a voice to those who are often voiceless. In the past, the issue was that there was such a monopoly over mouthpieces. Mass  media were so trusted, to the point where no one would have paid attention to these alternative viewpoints. But what social media has done… I think it’s made people become more aware or more critical of mass media and how it shapes public opinion. There’s been a lot of exposure of their failure for example, like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mva8bOo_Np8&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;that video that went viral&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of Egyptian podcaster and activist Rahma Zain confronting CNN’s Clarissa Ward at the Rafah border about their biased reporting of the genocide in Palestine. I think that confrontation spoke to a lot of people. She was shouting “ You own the narrative, this is our problem. You own the narrative, you own the United Nations, you own Hollywood, you own all these mouthpieces— where are our voices?! Our voices need to be heard!” It was SO powerful and that video really spoke to the sentiment of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gqmiddleeast.com/culture/egyptian-viral-podcaster-rahma-zein&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;many Arabs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; who have felt angry, betrayed and abandoned by the West’s ideals and their media reporting.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  499. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Social media is providing  a voice to more diverse people, elevating them and giving the public more control around narratives. Another example we’ve seen recently is around what’s currently happening in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These horrific events and stories would never have had much of a voice or exposure before at the global stage. And now people all over the world are paying more attention and advocating for Sudanese and Congolese rights, thanks to social media. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  500. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I personally was raised with quite a critical view of mass media, I think in my family there was a general distrust of the West, their policies and their media, so I never really relied personally on the media as this beacon of truth, but I do think that’s an exception. I think the majority of people rely on mass media as their source of truth. So social media plays an important role in keeping them accountable and diversifying narratives.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  501. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What are some of the biggest challenges you see right now anywhere in the world in terms of the climate for free expression for Palestinian and other activism? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  502. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think there’s two strands to it. There’s the social media strand. And there’s the governmental policies and actions. So I think on social media, again, it’s very documented, but it’s this kind of constant censorship. People want to be able to share content that matters to them, to make people more aware of global issues and we see time and time again viewership going down, content being deleted or reports from Meta of alleged hate speech or antisemitism. And that’s really hard. There’ve been random strategies that have popped up to increase social media engagement, like posting random content unrelated to Palestine or creating Instagram polls for example. I used to do that, I interspersed Palestine content with random polls like, “What’s your favorite color?” just to kind of break up the Palestine content and boost my engagement. And it was honestly so exhausting. It was like… I’m watching a genocide in real time, this is an attack on my people and now I’m having to come up with silly polls? Eventually I just gave up and accepted my viewership as it was, which was significantly lower.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  503. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;At a government level, which is the other part of it, there’s this challenge of constant intimidation that we’re witnessing. I just saw recently there was a 17-year-old boy who was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/counter-terror-police-palestine-protests-israel-gaza-airport-recording/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;interviewed by the counterterrorism police&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; at an airport because he was wearing a Palestinian flag. He was interrogated about his involvement in a Palestinian protest. When has protesting become a crime and what does that say about democratic rights and free speech here in the UK? And this is one example, but there are so many examples of policing, there was even talk of banning protests all together at one point. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  504. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The last strand I’d include, actually, that I already touched on, is the mass media. Just recently we’ve seen the BBC reporting on the ICJ hearing, they showed the Israeli defense part, but they didn’t even show the South African side. So this censorship is literally in plain sight and poses a real challenge to the climate of free expression for Palestine activism.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  505. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Who is your free speech hero? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  506. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Off the top of my head I’d probably say &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammed_el-Kurd&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Mohammed El-Kurd&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. I think he’s just been so unapologetic in his stance. Not only that but I think he’s also made us&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.thenation.com/article/world/palestinians-claim-the-right-to-narrate/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; think critically about this idea of narrative and what stories get told&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. I think it was really powerful when he was arguing the need to stop giving the West and mass media this power, and that we need to disempower them by ceasing to rely on them as beacons of truth, rather than working on changing them. Because, as he argues, oppressors who have monopolized and institutionalized violence will never ever tell the truth or hold themselves to account. Instead, we need to turn to Palestinians, and to brave cultural workers, knowledge producers, academics, journalists, activists, and social media commentators who understand the meaning of oppression and view them as the passionate, angry and, most importantly, reliable narrators that they are.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  507.  
  508. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  509.     <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 19:27:19 +0000</pubDate>
  510. <guid isPermaLink="false">109519 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  511. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  512. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/speaking-hamadallah-banner.jpg" alt="Hamadallah portrait, Speaking Freely" type="image/jpeg" length="109786" />
  513.  </item>
  514.  <item>
  515.    <title>Americans Deserve More Than the Current American Privacy Rights Act</title>
  516.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/americans-deserve-more-current-american-privacy-rights-act</link>
  517.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;EFF is concerned that a &lt;a href=&quot;https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/committee-chairs-rodgers-cantwell-unveil-historic-draft-comprehensive-data-privacy-legislation&quot;&gt;new federal bill&lt;/a&gt; would freeze consumer data privacy protections in place, by preempting existing state laws and preventing states from creating &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/07/federal-preemption-state-privacy-law-hurts-everyone&quot;&gt;stronger protections in the future&lt;/a&gt;. Federal law &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/december-2018-preemption-letter&quot;&gt;should be the floor&lt;/a&gt; on which states can build, not a ceiling. &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;We also urge the authors of the American Privacy Rights Act (APRA) to strengthen other portions of the bill. It should be easier to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/01/you-should-have-right-sue-companies-violate-your-privacy&quot;&gt;sue companies&lt;/a&gt; that violate our rights. The bill should limit &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/inside-fog-data-science-secretive-company-selling-mass-surveillance-local-police&quot;&gt;sharing with the government&lt;/a&gt; and expand the definition of sensitive data. And it should narrow exceptions that allow companies to exploit our biometric information, our so-called “de-identified” data, and our data obtained in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/10/why-getting-paid-your-data-bad-deal&quot;&gt;corporate “loyalty” schemes&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Despite our concerns with the APRA bill, we are glad Congress is pivoting the debate to a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/privacy-first-better-way-address-online-harms&quot;&gt;privacy-first&lt;/a&gt; approach to online regulation. Reining in companies’ massive collection, misuse, and transfer of everyone’s personal data should be the unifying goal of those who care about the internet. This debate has been absent at the federal level in the past year, giving breathing room to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/your-states-child-safety-law-unconstitutional-try-comprehensive-data-privacy&quot;&gt;flawed&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/analyzing-kosas-constitutional-problems-depth&quot;&gt;bills&lt;/a&gt; that focus on censorship and content blocking, rather than privacy.&lt;/p&gt;
  518. &lt;p&gt;In general, the APRA would require companies to minimize their processing of personal data to what is necessary, proportionate, and limited to certain enumerated purposes. It would specifically require opt-in consent for the transfer of sensitive data, and most processing of biometric and genetic data. It would also give consumers the right to access, correct, delete, and export their data. And it would allow consumers to universally opt-out of the collection of their personal data from brokers, using a registry maintained by the Federal Trade Commission. &lt;br /&gt; &lt;br /&gt;We welcome many of these privacy protections. Below are a few of our top priorities to correct and strengthen the APRA bill.&lt;/p&gt;
  519. &lt;h3&gt;Allow States to Pass Stronger Privacy Laws&lt;/h3&gt;
  520. &lt;p&gt;The APRA should not preempt existing and future state data privacy laws that are stronger than the current bill. The ability to pass stronger bills at the state and local level is an important tool in the fight for data privacy. We ask that Congress not compromise our privacy rights by undercutting the very state-level action that spurred this compromise federal data privacy bill in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;
  521. &lt;p&gt;Subject to exceptions, the APRA says that no state may “adopt, maintain, enforce, or continue in effect” any state-level privacy requirement addressed by the new bill. APRA would allow many state sectoral privacy laws to remain, but it would still preempt protections for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&amp;amp;ChapterID=57&quot;&gt;biometric data&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclum.org/en/ban-sale-location-data&quot;&gt;location data&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.zwillgen.com/ftc-state-ag/ccpa-first-enforcement-action-global-privacy-controls/&quot;&gt;online ad tracking signals&lt;/a&gt;, and maybe even privacy protections in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/California-Constitutional-Right-to-Privacy.-A-History-and-a-Future-Rooted-in-Intersectional-Justice-and-Integrated-Advocacy-October-DRAFT.pdf&quot;&gt;state constitutions&lt;/a&gt; or some other limits on what private companies can share with the government. At the federal level, the APRA would also wrongly preempt many parts of the federal Communications Act, including provisions that limit a telephone company’s use, disclosure, and access to customer proprietary network information, including location information.&lt;/p&gt;
  522. &lt;p&gt;Just as important, it would prevent states from creating stronger privacy laws in the future. States are &lt;a href=&quot;https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/State_Comp_Privacy_Law_Chart.pdf&quot;&gt;more nimble&lt;/a&gt; at passing laws to address new privacy harms as they arise, compared to Congress which has &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/modernizing-electronic-communications-privacy-act-ecpa&quot;&gt;failed for decades&lt;/a&gt; to update important protections. For example, if lawmakers in Washington state wanted to follow EFF’s advice to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/03/ban-online-behavioral-advertising&quot;&gt;ban online behavioral advertising&lt;/a&gt; or to allow its citizens to sue companies for not minimizing their collection of personal data (provisions where APRA falls short), state legislators would have no power to do so under the new federal bill.&lt;/p&gt;
  523. &lt;h3&gt;Make It Easier for Individuals to Enforce Their Privacy Rights&lt;/h3&gt;
  524. &lt;p&gt;The APRA should prevent coercive &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/04/forced-arbitration-thwarts-legal-challenge-atts-disclosure-customer-location-data&quot;&gt;forced arbitration agreements&lt;/a&gt; and class action waivers, allow people to sue for statutory damages, and allow them to bring their case in state court. These rights would allow for rigorous enforcement and help force companies to prioritize consumer privacy.&lt;/p&gt;
  525. &lt;p&gt;The APRA has a private right of action, but it is a half-measure that still lets companies side-step many legitimate lawsuits. And the private right of action does not apply to some of the most important parts of the law, including the central data minimization requirement.&lt;/p&gt;
  526. &lt;p&gt;The favorite tool of companies looking to get rid of privacy lawsuits is to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/08/fourth-circuit-decision-marriott-data-breach-case-kicks-can-down-road&quot;&gt;bury provision in their terms of service&lt;/a&gt; that force individuals into private arbitration and prevent class action lawsuits. The APRA does not address class action waivers and only prevents forced arbitration for children and people who allege “substantial” privacy harm. In addition, statutory damages and enforcement in state courts is essential, because many times &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/09/will-equifax-data-breach-finally-spur-courts-and-lawmakers-recognize-data-harms&quot;&gt;federal courts still struggle to acknowledge privacy harm as real&lt;/a&gt;—relying instead on a cramped view that does not recognize privacy as a human right. In addition, the bill would allow companies to cure violations rather than face a lawsuit, incentivizing companies to skirt the law until they are caught.&lt;/p&gt;
  527. &lt;h3&gt;Limit Exceptions for Sharing with the Government&lt;/h3&gt;
  528. &lt;p&gt;APRA should close a loophole that may allow data brokers to sell data to the government and should require the government to obtain a court order before compelling disclosure of user data. This is important because corporate surveillance and government surveillance are &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/adtech-surveillance-and-government-surveillance-are-often-same-surveillance&quot;&gt;often the same&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  529. &lt;p&gt;Under the APRA, government contractors do not have to follow the bill’s privacy protections. Those include any “entity that is collecting, processing, retaining, or transferring covered data on behalf of a Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, or local government entity, to the extent that such entity is acting as a service provider to the government entity.” Read broadly, this provision could protect data brokers who sell biometric information and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers&quot;&gt;location information&lt;/a&gt; to the government. In fact, &lt;a href=&quot;https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ilnd.372790/gov.uscourts.ilnd.372790.56.0.pdf&quot;&gt;Clearview AI previously argued&lt;/a&gt; it was exempt from Illinois’ strict biometric law using a similar contractor exception. This is a point that needs revision because other parts of the bill rightly prevent covered entities (government contractors excluded) from selling data to the government for the purpose of fraud detection, public safety, and criminal activity detection.&lt;/p&gt;
  530. &lt;p&gt;The APRA also allows entities to transfer personal data to the government pursuant to a “lawful warrant, administrative subpoena, or other form of lawful process.” EFF urges that the requirement be strengthened to at least a court order or warrant with prompt notice to the consumer. Protections like this are &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2710&quot;&gt;not unique&lt;/a&gt;, and it is &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/06/year-dobbs-fight-reproductive-privacy-and-information-access-continues&quot;&gt;especially important in the wake of the Dobbs decision&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  531. &lt;h3&gt;Strengthen the Definition of Sensitive Data&lt;/h3&gt;
  532. &lt;p&gt;The APRA has heightened protections for sensitive data, and it includes a long list of 18 categories of sensitive data, like: biometrics, precise geolocation, private communications, and an individual’s online activity overtime and across websites. This is a good list that can be added to. We ask Congress to add other categories, like immigration status, union membership, employment history, familial and social relationships, and any covered data processed in a way that would violate a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The sensitivity of data is &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1555&amp;amp;context=nulr&quot;&gt;context specific&lt;/a&gt;—meaning any data can be sensitive depending on how it is used. The bill should be amended to reflect that.&lt;/p&gt;
  533. &lt;h3&gt;Limit Other Exceptions for Biometrics, De-identified Data, and Loyalty Programs&lt;/h3&gt;
  534. &lt;p&gt;An important part of any bill is to make sure the exceptions do not swallow the rule. The APRA’s exceptions on biometric information, de-identified data, and loyalty programs should be narrowed.&lt;/p&gt;
  535. &lt;p&gt;In APRA, biometric information means data “generated from the measurement or processing of the individual’s unique biological, physical, or physiological characteristics that is linked or reasonably linkable to the individual” and excludes “metadata associated with a digital or physical photograph or an audio or video recording that cannot be used to identify an individual.” EFF is concerned this definition will not protect biometric information used for analysis of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/10/face-recognition-isnt-just-face-identification-and-verification&quot;&gt;sentiment, demographics, and emotion&lt;/a&gt;, and could be used to argue hashed biometric identifiers are not covered.&lt;/p&gt;
  536. &lt;p&gt;De-identified data is excluded from the definition of personal data covered by the APRA, and companies and service providers can turn personal data into de-identified data to process it however they want. The problem with de-identified data is that &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/57-6-3.pdf&quot;&gt;many times&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/debunking-myth-anonymous-data&quot;&gt;it is not&lt;/a&gt;. Moreover, many people do not want their private data that they store in confidence with a company to then be used to improve that company’s product or train its algorithm—even if the data has purportedly been de-identified.&lt;/p&gt;
  537. &lt;p&gt;Many companies under the APRA can host loyalty programs and can sell that data with opt-in consent. Loyalty programs are a type of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/07/why-eff-doesnt-support-cal-prop-24&quot;&gt;pay-for-privacy scheme&lt;/a&gt; that pressure people to surrender their privacy rights as if they were a commodity. Worse, because of our society’s glaring economic inequalities, these schemes will unjustly lead to a society of privacy “haves” and “have-nots.” At the very least, the bill should be amended to prevent companies from selling data that they obtain from a loyalty program.&lt;/p&gt;
  538. &lt;p&gt;We welcome Congress&#039; privacy-first approach in the APRA and encourage the authors to improve the bill to ensure privacy is protected for generations to come.&lt;/p&gt;
  539.  
  540. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  541.     <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 19:03:39 +0000</pubDate>
  542. <guid isPermaLink="false">109516 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  543. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  544. <dc:creator>Mario Trujillo</dc:creator>
  545. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/icon-2019-privacy.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="16605" />
  546.  </item>
  547.  <item>
  548.    <title>Tell the FCC It Must Clarify Its Rules to Prevent Loopholes That Will Swallow Net Neutrality Whole</title>
  549.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/fcc-must-clarify-its-rules-prevent-loopholes-will-swallow-net-neutrality-whole</link>
  550.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has released &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-401676A1.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;draft rules&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to reinstate net neutrality, with a vote on adopting the rules to come&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/april-2024-open-commission-meeting&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; on the 25th of April&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The FCC needs to close some loopholes in the draft rules before then. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  551. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;Proposed Rules on Throttling and Prioritization Allow for the Circumvention of Net Neutrality &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  552. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Net neutrality is the principle that all ISPs should treat all traffic coming over their networks without discrimination. The effect of this principle is that customers decide for themselves how they’d like to experience the internet. Violations of this principle include, but are not limited to, attempts to block, speed up, or slow down certain content as means of controlling traffic. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  553. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Net neutrality is critical to ensuring that the internet remains a vibrant place to learn, organize, speak, and innovate, and the FCC recognizes this. The draft mostly reinstates the bright-line rules of the landmark 2015 net neutrality protections to ban blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;It falls short, though, in a critical way: the FCC seems to think that it’s not okay to favor certain sites or services by slowing down other traffic, but it might be okay to favor them by giving them access to so-called fast lanes such as 5G network slices. First of all, in a world with a certain amount of finite bandwidth, favoring some traffic necessarily impairs other traffic. Secondly, the harms to speech and competition would be the same even if an ISP could conjure more bandwidth from thin air to speed up traffic from its business partners. Whether your access to Spotify is faster than your access to Bandcamp because Spotify is sped up or because Bandcamp is slowed down doesn’t matter because the end result is the same: Spotify is faster than Bandcamp and so you are incentivized to use Spotify over Bandcamp.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;The loophole is especially bizarre because the 2015 FCC already got this right, and there has been bipartisan support for net neutrality proposals that explicitly encompass both favoring and disfavoring certain traffic. It’s a distinction that doesn’t make logical sense, doesn’t seem to have partisan significance, and could potentially undermine the rules in the event of a court challenge by drawing a nonsensical distinction between what’s forbidden under the bright-line rules versus what goes through the multi-factor test for other potentially discriminatory conduct by ISPs.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;The FCC needs to close this loophole for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;unpaid&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; prioritization of certain applications or classes of traffic. Customers should be in charge of what they do online, rather than ISPs deciding that, say, it’s more important to consume streaming entertainment products than to participate in video calls or that one political party’s websites should be served faster than another’s.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  554. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;The FCC Should Clearly Rule Preemption to be a Floor, Not a Ceiling &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  555. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When the FCC under the previous administration abandoned net neutrality protections in 2017 with the so-called “Restoring Internet Freedom” order, many states&lt;span class=&quot;BxUVEf ILfuVd&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot; xml:lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;hgKElc&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/victory-california-passes-net-neutrality-bill&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;chief among them California&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;BxUVEf ILfuVd&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot; xml:lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;hgKElc&quot;&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;stepped in to pass state net neutrality laws. Laws more protective than federal net neutrality protections—like California&#039;s should be explicitly protected by the new rule.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  556. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The FCC currently finds that California’s law “generally tracks [with] the federal rules[being] restored. (269)” It goes on to find that state laws are fine so long as they do not “interfere with or frustrate…federal rules,” are not “inconsistent,” or are not “incompatible.” It then reserves the right to revisit any state law if evidence arises that a state policy is found to “interfere or [be] incompatible.” &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  557. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;States should be able to build on federal laws to be more protective of rights, not run into limits to available protections. California’s net neutrality is in some places stronger than the draft rules. Where the FCC means to evaluate &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/zero-rating-what-it-is-why-you-should-care&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;zero-rating&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the practice of exempting certain data from a user’s data cap, on a case-by-case basis, California outright bans the practice of zero rating select apps. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  558. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There is no guarantee that a Commission which finds California to “generally track” today will do the same in two years time. The language as written unnecessarily sets a low bar for a future Commission to find California’s, and other states’, net neutrality laws to be preempted. It also leaves open unnecessary room for the large internet service providers (ISPs) to challenge California’s law once again. After all, when California’s law was first passed, it was immediately taken to court by these same ISPs and only after years of litigation did the courts&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/01/california-prevails-net-neutrality-and-states-can-go-forth&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; reject&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the industry’s arguments and allow enforcement of this gold standard law to begin. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  559. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We urge the Commission to clearly state that, not only is California consistent with the FCC’s rules, but that on the issue of preemption the FCC considers its rules to be  the floor to build on, and that further state protections are not inconsistent simply because they may go further than the FCC chooses to. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  560. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Overall, the order is a great step for net neutrality. Its rules go a distance in protecting internet users. But we need clear rules recognizing that the creation of fast lanes via positive discrimination and unpaid prioritization are violations of net neutrality just the same, and assurance that states will continue to be free to protect their residents even when the FCC won’t.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  561. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tell the FCC to Fix the Net Neutrality Rules:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  562. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;1. Go to this &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filings/express&quot;&gt;link&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;2. For &quot;Proceeding&quot; put 23-320&lt;br /&gt;3. Fill out the form&lt;br /&gt;4. In &quot;brief comments&quot; register your thoughts on net neutrality. We recommend this, which you can copy and paste or edit for yourself:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  563. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;Net neutrality is the principle that all internet service providers treat all traffic coming through their networks without discrimination. The effect of this principle is that customers decide for themselves how they’d like to experience the internet. The Commission’s rules as currently written leave open the door for positive discrimination of content, that is, the supposed creation of fast lanes where some content is sped up relative to others. This isn’t how the internet works, but in any case, whether an ISP is speeding up or slowing down content, the end result is the same: the ISP picks the winners and losers on the internet. As such the Commission must create bright line rules against all forms of discrimination, speeding up or slowing down, against apps or classes of apps on general traffic in the internet.&lt;/p&gt;
  564. &lt;p&gt;Further, while the Commission currently finds state net neutrality rules, like California’s, to not be preempted because they “generally track” its own rules, it makes it easy to rule otherwise at a future date. But just as we received net neutrality in 2015 only to have it taken away in 2017, there is no guarantee that the Commission will continue to find state net neutrality laws passed post-2017 to be consistent with the rules. To safeguard net neutrality, the Commission must find that California’s law is wholly consistent with their rules and that preemption is taken as a floor, not a ceiling, so that states can go above and beyond the federal standard without it being considered inconsistent with the federal rule.&lt;/p&gt;
  565. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  566. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filings/express&quot;&gt;Take Action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  567. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/filings/express&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tell the FCC to Fix the Net Neutrality Rules&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  568.  
  569. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  570.     <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 18:53:09 +0000</pubDate>
  571. <guid isPermaLink="false">109515 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  572. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/net-neutrality">Net Neutrality</category>
  573. <dc:creator>Chao Liu</dc:creator>
  574. <dc:creator>Kit Walsh</dc:creator>
  575. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/og-neutrality-banner.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="772396" />
  576.  </item>
  577.  <item>
  578.    <title>S.T.O.P. is Working to ‘Ban The Scan’ in New York</title>
  579.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/stop-working-ban-scan-new-york</link>
  580.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/10/resisting-menace-face-recognition&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Facial recognition&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; is a threat to privacy, racial justice, free expression, and information security. EFF &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sls.eff.org/technologies/face-recognition&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;supports strict restrictions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on face recognition use by private companies, and total bans on government use of the technology. Face recognition in all of its forms, including face scanning and real-time tracking, pose threats to civil liberties and individual privacy. “False positive” error rates are significantly higher for women, children, and people of color, meaning face recognition has an unfair discriminatory impact. Coupled with the fact that cameras are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2022/02/14/new-york-facial-recognition-surveillance-puts-minorities-at-risk-says-amnesty/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;over-deployed in neighborhoods&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; with immigrants and people of color, spying technologies like face surveillance serve to amplify existing disparities in the criminal justice system. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  581. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/movement-ban-government-use-face-recognition&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Across the nation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; local communities from San Francisco to Boston have moved to ban government use of facial recognition. In New York, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/fight&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Electronic Frontier Alliance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; member&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.stopspying.org/&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Surveillance Technology Oversight Project (S.T.O.P.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; is at the forefront of this movement. Recently we got the chance to speak with them about their efforts and what people can do to help advance the cause. S.T.O.P. is a New York-based civil rights and privacy organization that does research, advocacy, and litigation around issues of surveillance technology abuse. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  582. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;What does “Ban The Scan” mean?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  583. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When we say scan, we are referring to the “face scan” component of facial recognition technology. Surveillance, and more specifically facial recognition, disproportionately targets Black, Brown, Indigenous, and immigrant communities, amplifying the discrimination that has defined New York’s policing for as long as our state has had police. Facial recognition is notoriously biased and often abused by law enforcement. It is a threat to free speech, freedom of association, and other civil liberties. Ban the Scan is a campaign and coalition built around passing two packages of bills that would ban facial recognition in a variety of contexts in New York City and New York State.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  584. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  585. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;Are there any differences with the State vs City version?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  586. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The City and State packages are largely similar. The main differences are that the State package contains a bill banning law enforcement use of facial recognition, whereas the City package has a bill that bans all government use of the technology (although this bill has yet to be introduced). The State package also contains an additional bill banning facial recognition use in schools, which would codify an existing regulatory ban that currently applies to schools. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  587. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  588. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;What hurdles exist to its passage?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  589. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; For the New York State package, the coalition is newly coming together, so we are still gathering support from legislators and the public. For the City package, we are lucky to have a lot of support already, and we are waiting to have a hearing conducted on the residential ban bills and move them into the next phase of legislation. We are also working to get the bill banning government use introduced at the City level. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  590. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  591. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;What can people do to help this good legislation? How to get involved? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  592. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We recently launched a campaign website for both City and State packages (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://banthescan.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;banthescan.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;). If you’re a New York City or State resident, you can look up your legislators (links below!) and contact them to ask them to support these bills or thank them for their support if they are already signed on. We also have social media toolkits with graphics and guidance on how to help spread the word!  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  593. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Find your NYS Assemblymember:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nyassembly.gov/mem/search/&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;https://nyassembly.gov/mem/search/&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  594. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Find your NYS Senator:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nysenate.gov/find-my-senator&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;https://www.nysenate.gov/find-my-senator&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  595. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Find your NYC Councilmember:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://council.nyc.gov/map-widget/&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;https://council.nyc.gov/map-widget/&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  596. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  597.  
  598. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  599.     <pubDate>Sat, 13 Apr 2024 01:46:37 +0000</pubDate>
  600. <guid isPermaLink="false">109512 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  601. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/efa">EFA</category>
  602. <dc:creator>Christopher Vines</dc:creator>
  603. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/whyfacebanner.png" alt="The angular outline of three faces as a computer might see them, colored like a rainbow" type="image/png" length="864443" />
  604.  </item>
  605.  <item>
  606.    <title>EFF Submits Comments on FRT to Commission on Civil Rights</title>
  607.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/eff-submits-comments-frt-commission-civil-rights</link>
  608.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Our faces are often exposed and, unlike passwords or pin numbers, cannot be remade. Governments and businesses, often working in partnership, are increasingly using our faces to track our whereabouts, activities, and associations. This is why EFF &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2024/04/12/2024-04-05_-_electronic_frontier_foundation_-_comments_on_frt_0.pdf&quot;&gt;recently submitted comments&lt;/a&gt; to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which is preparing a report on face recognition technology (FRT).   &lt;/p&gt;
  609. &lt;p&gt;In our submission, we &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/enough-enough-tell-congress-ban-federal-use-face-recognition&quot;&gt;reiterated&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/stop-dangerous-bill-would-normalize-face-surveillance-california&quot;&gt;our&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/movement-ban-government-use-face-recognition&quot;&gt;stance&lt;/a&gt; that there should be a ban on governmental use of FRT and strict regulations on private use because it: (1) is not reliable enough to be used in determinations affecting constitutional and statutory rights or social benefits; (2) is a menace to social justice as its errors are far more pronounced when applied to people of color, members of the LGBTQ+ community, and other marginalized groups; (3) threatens privacy rights; (4) chills and deters expression; and (5) creates information security risks.&lt;/p&gt;
  610. &lt;p&gt;Despite these grave concerns, FRT is being used by the government and law enforcement agencies with increasing frequency, and sometimes with devastating effects. At least one Black woman and five Black men have been wrongfully arrested due to misidentification by FRT: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/06/business/facial-recognition-false-arrest.html&quot;&gt;Porcha Woodruff&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/07/10/facial-recognition-detroit-michael-oliver-robertwilliams/5392166002/&quot;&gt;Michael Oliver&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/29/tech/nijeer-parks-facial-recognition-police-arrest/index.html&quot;&gt;Nijeer Parks&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/mistaken-arrests-facial-recognition-technology-lawsuits-b613161c56472459df683f54320d08a7&quot;&gt;Randal Reid&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/face-recognition-software-led-to-his-arrest-it-was-dead-wrong/&quot;&gt;Alonzo Sawyer&lt;/a&gt;, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/13/facial-recognition-false-arrest-lawsuit/&quot;&gt;Robert Williams&lt;/a&gt;. And &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/01/22/facial-recognition-wrongful-identification-assault/&quot;&gt;Harvey Murphy Jr.&lt;/a&gt;, a white man, was wrongfully arrested due to FRT misidentification, and then sexually assaulted while in jail.&lt;/p&gt;
  611. &lt;p&gt;Even if FRT was accurate, or at least equally inaccurate across demographics, it would still severely impact our privacy and security. We cannot change our face, and we expose it to the mass surveillance networks already in place every day we go out in public. But doing that should not be license for the government or private entities to make imprints of our face and retain that data, especially when that data may be breached by hostile actors.&lt;/p&gt;
  612. &lt;p&gt;The government should ban its own use of FRT, and strictly limit private use, to protect us from the threats posed by FRT. &lt;/p&gt;
  613.  
  614.  
  615. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  616.     <pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2024 22:06:09 +0000</pubDate>
  617. <guid isPermaLink="false">109511 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  618. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/face-surveillance">Face Surveillance</category>
  619. <dc:creator>Hannah Zhao</dc:creator>
  620. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/face-recognition-banner_0_0.jpg" alt="This image shows a person&amp;#039;s face with layers of pixelation throughout. " type="image/jpeg" length="182336" />
  621.  </item>
  622.  <item>
  623.    <title>What Does EFF Mean to You?</title>
  624.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/what-does-eff-mean-you</link>
  625.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We could go on for days talking about all the work EFF does to ensure that technology supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world. In fact, we DO go on for days talking about it — but we’d rather hear from you. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  626. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;What does EFF mean to you?&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt; We’d love to know why you support us, how you see our mission, or what issue or area we address that affects your life the most. It’ll help us make sure we keep on being the EFF you want us to be.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  627. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So if you’re willing to go on the record, please send us a few sentences, along with your first name and current city of residence, to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;mailto:testimonials@eff.org&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;testimonials@eff.org&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;; we’ll pick some every now and then to share with the world here on our blog, in our emails, and on our social media.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  628.  
  629. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  630.     <pubDate>Fri, 12 Apr 2024 18:26:45 +0000</pubDate>
  631. <guid isPermaLink="false">109510 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  632. <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
  633. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/EFF-work-icons.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="16356" />
  634.  </item>
  635.  <item>
  636.    <title>Bad Amendments to Section 702 Have Failed (For Now)—What Happens Next? </title>
  637.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/bad-amendments-section-702-have-failed-now-what-happens-next</link>
  638.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yesterday, the House of Representatives voted against considering a largely bad bill that would have unacceptably expanded the tentacles of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/702-spying&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, along with reauthorizing it and introducing some minor fixes. Section 702 is Big Brother’s favorite mass surveillance law that EFF has been fighting since it was first passed in 2008. The law is currently set to expire on April 19.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  639. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yesterday’s decision not to decide is good news, at least temporarily. Once again, a bipartisan coalition of law makers—led by Rep. Jim Jordan and Rep. Jerrold Nadler—has staved off the worst outcome of expanding 702 mass surveillance in the guise of “reforming” it. But the fight continues and we need all Americans to make their voices heard.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  640. &lt;h5&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Use this handy tool to tell your elected officials: No reauthorization of 702 without drastic reform: &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h5&gt;
  641. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-absent-major-changes-702-should-not-be-renewed&quot;&gt;Take action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  642. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;TELL congress: 702 Needs serious reforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  643. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Yesterday’s vote means the House also will not consider amendments to Section 702 surveillance introduced by members of the House Judiciary Committee (HJC) and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). As we discuss below, while the HJC amendments would contain necessary, minimum protections against Section 702’s warrantless surveillance, the HPSCI amendments would impose no meaningful safeguards upon Section 702 and would instead increase the threats Section 702 poses to Americans’ civil liberties. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  644. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 expressly authorizes the government to collect foreign communications inside the U.S. for a wide range of purposes, under the umbrellas of national security and intelligence gathering. While that may sound benign for Americans, foreign communications include a massive amount of Americans’ communications with people (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.odni.gov/files/documents/RG/dni_comment_jmayer.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;or&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/ashkan-soltani-declaration&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;services&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) outside the United States. Under the government’s view, intelligence agencies and even domestic law enforcement should have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoor-search&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;backdoor, warrantless access&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to these “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/Incidental-collection&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;incidentally collected&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” communications, instead of having to show a judge there is a reason to query Section 702 databases for a specific American&#039;s communications. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  645. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Many amendments to Section 702 have recently been introduced. In general, amendments from members of the HJC aim at actual reform (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;although we would go further in many instances&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;). In contrast, members of HPSCI have proposed bad amendments that would expand Section 702 and undermine necessary oversight. Here is our analysis of both HJC’s decent reform amendments and HPSCI’s bad amendments, as well as the problems the latter might create if they return.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  646. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;House Judiciary Committee’s Amendments Would Impose Needed Reforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  647. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The most important &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/BIGGS_169_xml%20warrant240409091944047.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; HJC members have introduced would require the government to obtain court approval before querying Section 702 databases for Americans’ communications, with exceptions for exigency, consent, and certain queries involving malware. As &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/white-house-wrong-section-702-needs-drastic-change&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;we recently wrote&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; regarding a different Section 702 bill, because Section 702’s warrantless surveillance lacks the safeguards of probable cause and particularity, it is essential to require the government to convince a judge that there is a justification before the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/06/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-has-made-mockery-constitutional-right&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;“separate Fourth Amendment event”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of querying for Americans’ communications. This is a necessary, minimum protection and any attempts to renew Section 702 going forward should contain this provision. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  648. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Another important &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/RepealAmend_xml%20(002)240408144246397.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; would prohibit the NSA from resuming “abouts” collection. Through &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/about-collection&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;abouts collection&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the NSA collected communications that were neither to nor from a specific surveillance target but merely &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;mentioned&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; the target. While the NSA voluntarily ceased abouts collection following &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/october-3-2011-fisc-opinion-holding-nsa-surveillance-unconstitutional&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/51117/2016_Cert_FISC_Memo_Opin_Order_Apr_2017.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;rulings&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that called into question the surveillance’s lawfulness, the NSA left the door open to resume abouts collection if it felt it could &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/liveblogging-todays-senate-intelligence-hearing-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;“work that technical solution in a way that generates greater reliability.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; Under current law, the NSA need only notify Congress when it resumes collection. This amendment would instead require the NSA to obtain Congress’s express approval before it can resume abouts collection, which―given this surveillance&#039;s past abuses—would be notable. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  649. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The other HJC &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/ROYTX_268_xml240408180428338.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; Congress should accept would require the FBI to give a quarterly report to Congress of the number of queries it has conducted of Americans’ communications in its Section 702 databases and would also allow high-ranking members of Congress to attend proceedings of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/victory-government-finally-releases-secretive-court-rulings-sought-eff&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;notoriously secretive&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; FISC. More congressional oversight of FBI queries of Americans’ communications and FISC proceedings would be good. That said, even if Congress passes this amendment (which it should), both Congress and the American public deserve much greater transparency about Section 702 surveillance.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  650. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s Amendments Would Expand Section 702&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  651. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Instead of much-needed reforms, the HPSCI amendments expand Section 702 surveillance. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  652. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One HPSCI &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/CN_xml240408190155111.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; would add “counternarcotics” to FISA’s definition of “foreign intelligence information,” expanding the scope of mass surveillance even further from the antiterrorism goals that most Americans associate with FISA. In truth, FISA’s definition of “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1801&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;foreign intelligence information&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” already goes beyond terrorism. But this counternarcotics amendment would further expand “foreign intelligence information” to allow FISA to be used to collect information relating to not only the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths” but also to any of their precursors. Given the massive amount of Americans’ communications the government already collects under Section 702 and the government’s history of abusing Americans’ civil liberties through searching these communications, the expanded collection this amendment would permit is unacceptable. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  653. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Another &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/VET_xml240408190418800.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; would authorize using Section 702 to vet immigrants and those seeking asylum. According to a FISC &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2023/FISC_2023_FISA_702_Certifications_Opinion_April11_2023.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; released last year, the government has sought some version of this authority for years, and the FISC repeatedly denied it—finally approving it for the first time in 2023. The FISC opinion is very redacted, which makes it impossible to know either the current scope of immigration and visa-related surveillance under Section 702 or what the intelligence agencies have sought in the past. But regardless, it’s deeply concerning that HPSCI is trying to formally lower Section 702 protections for immigrants and asylum seekers. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/5663283/harvard-student-visa-ismail-ajjawi-lebanon/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;We’ve already seen&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the government revoke people’s visas based upon their political opinions—this amendment would put this kind of thing on steroids. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  654. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The last HPSCI &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/ECSP_xml240408185822057.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amendment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; tries to make more companies subject to Section 702’s required turnover of customer information in more instances. In 2023, the FISC Court of Review &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2023_FISC-R_ECSP_Opinion.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;rejected&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the government’s argument that an unknown company was subject to Section 702 for some circumstances. While we don’t know the details of the secret proceedings because the FISC Court of Review opinion is heavily redacted, this is an ominous attempt to increase the scope of providers subject to 702. With this amendment, HPSCI is attempting to legislatively overrule a court already famously friendly to the government. HPSCI Chair Mike Turner acknowledged as much in a House Rules Committee hearing earlier this week, stating that this amendment “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://rules.house.gov/video/rules-committee-hearing-hr-529-hr-7888-h-res-1112-h-res-1117&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;responds&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” to the FISC Court of Review’s decision.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  655. &lt;h2&gt;&lt;span&gt;What’s Next &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h2&gt;
  656. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This hearing was unlikely to be the last time Congress considers Section 702 before April 19—we expect another attempt to renew this surveillance authority in the coming days. We’ve been very clear: Section 702 must not be renewed without essential reforms that protect privacy, improve transparency, and keep the program within the confines of the law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  657.  
  658. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-absent-major-changes-702-should-not-be-renewed&quot;&gt;Take action&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  659. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;TELL congress: 702 Needs serious reforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  660.  
  661.  
  662. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  663.     <pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 13:40:19 +0000</pubDate>
  664. <guid isPermaLink="false">109505 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  665. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
  666. <dc:creator>Brendan Gilligan</dc:creator>
  667. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  668. <dc:creator>Cindy Cohn</dc:creator>
  669. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/nationalsecurity_banner-2_0.png" alt="An NSA employee sits at a screen monitoring international communications" type="image/png" length="125179" />
  670.  </item>
  671.  <item>
  672.    <title>Virtual Reality and the &#039;Virtual Wall&#039;</title>
  673.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/virtual-reality-and-virtual-wall</link>
  674.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When EFF set out to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/cbp-expanding-its-surveillance-tower-program-us-mexico-border-and-were-mapping-it&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;map surveillance technology&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; along the U.S.-Mexico border, we weren&#039;t exactly sure how to do it. We started with public records—procurement documents, environmental assessments, and the like—which allowed us to find the GPS coordinates of scores of towers. During a series of in-person trips, we were able to find even more. Yet virtual reality ended up being one of the key tools in not only discovering surveillance at the border, but also in educating people about Customs &amp;amp; Border Protection&#039;s so-called &quot;virtual wall&quot; through &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/virtual-reality-tour-surveillance-tech-border-conversation-dave-maass-electronic&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;VR tours&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  675. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF Director of Investigations Dave Maass recently gave a lightning talk at University of Nevada, Reno&#039;s annual XR Meetup explaining how virtual reality, perhaps ironically, has allowed us to better understand the reality of border surveillance. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  676. &lt;p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;mytube&quot; style=&quot;width: 560px;&quot;&gt;
  677.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetrigger&quot; tabindex=&quot;0&quot;&gt;
  678.  
  679.    &lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/sites/all/modules/custom/mytube/play.png&quot; class=&quot;mytubeplay&quot; alt=&quot;play&quot; style=&quot;top: 127.5px; left: 250px;&quot; /&gt;
  680.    &lt;div hidden class=&quot;mytubeembedcode&quot;&gt;%3Ciframe%20width%3D%22560%22%20height%3D%22315%22%20src%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fwww.youtube.com%2Fembed%2FwEolW4-b6Dw%3Fsi%3DfeR80hnnRLET4VpX%26autoplay%3D1%26mute%3D1%22%20title%3D%22YouTube%20video%20player%22%20frameborder%3D%220%22%20allow%3D%22accelerometer%3B%20autoplay%3B%20clipboard-write%3B%20encrypted-media%3B%20gyroscope%3B%20picture-in-picture%3B%20web-share%22%20referrerpolicy%3D%22strict-origin-when-cross-origin%22%20allowfullscreen%3D%22%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E&lt;/div&gt;
  681.  &lt;/div&gt;
  682.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetext&quot;&gt;
  683.    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  684.    &lt;span&gt;This embed will serve content from &lt;em&gt;&lt;a rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; href=&quot;https://www.youtube.com/embed/wEolW4-b6Dw?si=feR80hnnRLET4VpX&quot;&gt;youtube.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  685.  &lt;/div&gt;
  686. &lt;/div&gt;
  687. &lt;/p&gt;
  688.  
  689. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  690.     <pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2024 22:32:47 +0000</pubDate>
  691. <guid isPermaLink="false">109504 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  692. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/border-surveillance-technology">Border Surveillance Technology</category>
  693. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-human-rights">Surveillance and Human Rights</category>
  694. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/border-searches">Border Searches</category>
  695. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  696. <dc:creator>Dave Maass</dc:creator>
  697. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/spying-wall-vr_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="69881" />
  698.  </item>
  699.  <item>
  700.    <title>The Motion Picture Association Doesn’t Get to Decide Who the First Amendment Protects</title>
  701.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/mpa-doesnt-get-decide-who-first-amendment-protects</link>
  702.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;Twelve years ago, internet users &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill&quot;&gt;spoke up&lt;/a&gt; with one voice to reject a law that would build censorship into the internet at a fundamental level. This week, the Motion Picture Association (MPA), a group that represents six giant movie and TV studios, announced that it hoped we’d all forgotten how dangerous this idea was. The MPA is wrong. We remember, and the internet remembers.&lt;/p&gt;
  703. &lt;p&gt;What the MPA wants is the power to block entire websites, everywhere in the U.S., using the same tools as repressive regimes like China and Russia. To it, instances of possible copyright infringement should be played like a trump card to shut off our access to entire websites, regardless of the other legal speech hosted there. It is not simply calling for the ability to take down instances of infringement—a power they already have, without even having to ask a judge—but for the keys to the internet. Building new architectures of censorship would hurt everyone, and doesn’t help artists.&lt;/p&gt;
  704. &lt;p&gt;The bills known as SOPA/PIPA would have created a new, rapid path for copyright holders like the major studios to use court orders against sites they accuse of infringing copyright. Internet service providers (ISPs) receiving one of those orders would have to block all of their customers from accessing the identified websites. The orders would also apply to domain name registries and registrars, and potentially other companies and organizations that make up the internet’s basic infrastructure. To comply, all of those would have to build new infrastructure dedicated to site-blocking, inviting over-blocking and all kinds of abuse that would censor lawful and important speech.&lt;/p&gt;
  705. &lt;p&gt;In other words, the right to choose what websites you visit would be taken away from you and given to giant media companies and ISPs. And the very shape of the internet would have to be changed to allow it.&lt;/p&gt;
  706. &lt;p&gt;In 2012, it seemed like SOPA/PIPA, backed by major corporations used to getting what they want from Congress, was on the fast track to becoming law. But a grassroots movement of diverse Internet communities came together to fight it. Digital rights groups like EFF, Public Knowledge, and many more joined with editor communities from sites like Reddit and Wikipedia to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill&quot;&gt;speak up&lt;/a&gt;. Newly formed grassroots groups like Demand Progress and Fight for the Future added their voices to those calling out the dangers of this new form of censorship. In the final days of the campaign, giant tech companies like Google and Facebook (now Meta) joined in opposition as well.&lt;/p&gt;
  707. &lt;p&gt;What resulted was one of the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/nternet-spoke-and-finally-congress-listened&quot;&gt;biggest protests&lt;/a&gt; ever seen against a piece of legislation. Congress was flooded with calls and emails from ordinary people concerned about this steamroller of censorship. Members of Congress raced one another to withdraw their support for the bills. The bills died, and so did site blocking legislation in the US. It was, all told, a success story for the public interest.&lt;/p&gt;
  708. &lt;p&gt;Even the MPA, one of the biggest forces behind SOPA/PIPA, claimed to have moved on. But we never believed it, and they proved us right time and time again. The MPA backed site-blocking laws in other countries. Rightsholders continued to ask US courts for site-blocking orders, often winning them without a new law. Even the lobbying of Congress for a new law never really went away. It’s just that today, with MPA president Charles Rivkin openly &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.motionpictures.org/remarks/charles-rivkin-state-of-the-industry-address-at-cinemacon-2024/&quot;&gt;calling on Congress&lt;/a&gt; “to enact judicial site-blocking legislation here in the United States,” the MPA is taking its mask off.&lt;/p&gt;
  709. &lt;p&gt;Things have changed since 2012. Tech platforms that were once seen as innovators have become behemoths, part of the establishment rather than underdogs. The Silicon Valley-based video streamer Netflix illustrated this when it joined MPA in 2019. And the entertainment companies have also tried to pivot into &lt;a href=&quot;https://defector.com/the-writers-are-striking-for-the-future-of-entertainment&quot;&gt;being tech companies&lt;/a&gt;. Somehow, they are adopting each other’s worst aspects.&lt;/p&gt;
  710. &lt;p&gt;But it’s important not to let those changes hide the fact that those hurt by this proposal are not Big Tech but regular internet users. Internet platforms big and small are still where ordinary users and creators find their voice, connect with audiences, and participate in politics and culture, mostly in legal—and legally protected—ways. Filmmakers who can’t get a distribution deal from a giant movie house still reach audiences on YouTube. Culture critics still reach audiences through zines and newsletters. The typical users of these platforms don’t have the giant megaphones of major studios, record labels, or publishers. Site-blocking legislation, whether called SOPA/PIPA, “no fault injunctions,” or by any other name, still threatens the free expression of all of these citizens and creators.&lt;/p&gt;
  711. &lt;p&gt;No matter what the MPA wants to claim, this does not help artists. Artists want their work seen, not locked away for &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/film/2022/aug/03/batgirl-directors-respond-to-surprise-axing-of-film-we-still-cant-believe-it&quot;&gt;a tax write-off&lt;/a&gt;. They wanted a fair deal, not nearly &lt;a href=&quot;https://defector.com/the-hollywood-writers-strike-proved-that-collective-action-works&quot;&gt;five months of strikes&lt;/a&gt;. They want studios to make &lt;a href=&quot;https://lamag.com/awards-watch/cord-jefferson-oscars-win-mid-budget-films&quot;&gt;more small and midsize films and to take a chance on new voices.&lt;/a&gt; They have been incredibly clear about what they want, and this is not it.&lt;/p&gt;
  712. &lt;p&gt;Even if Rivkin’s claim of an “unflinching commitment to the First Amendment” was credible from a group that seems to think it has a monopoly on free expression—and which &lt;em&gt;just &lt;/em&gt;tried to consign the future of its own artists to the gig economy—a site-blocking law would not be used only by Hollywood studios. Anyone with a copyright and the means to hire a lawyer could wield the hammer of site-blocking. And here’s the thing: we &lt;em&gt;already know &lt;/em&gt;that copyright claims are used as tools of censorship.&lt;/p&gt;
  713. &lt;p&gt;The notice-and-takedown system created by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for example, is abused &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/takedowns&quot;&gt;time and again&lt;/a&gt; by people who claim to be enforcing their copyrights, and also by folks who simply want to make speech they don’t like disappear from the Internet. Even without a site-blocking law, major record labels and US Immigration and Customs Enforcement &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/05/unsealed-court-records-confirm-riaa-delays-were-behind-year-long-seizure-hip-hop&quot;&gt;shut down a popular hip hop music blog&lt;/a&gt; and kept it off the internet for over a year without ever showing that it infringed copyright. And unscrupulous characters use accusations of infringement to extort money from website owners, or even &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.404media.co/a-law-firm-of-ai-generated-lawyers-is-sending-fake-threats-as-an-seo-scam/&quot;&gt;force them into carrying spam links&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  714. &lt;p&gt;This censorious abuse, whether intentional or accidental, is far more damaging when it targets the internet’s infrastructure. Blocking entire websites or groups of websites is imprecise, inevitably bringing down lawful speech along with whatever was targeted. For example, suits by Microsoft intended to shut down malicious botnets caused thousands of legitimate users to &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/07/microsoft-and-noip-what-were-they-thinking&quot;&gt;lose access to the domain names&lt;/a&gt; they depended on. There is, in short, no effective safeguard on a new censorship power that would be the internet’s version of police seizing printing presses.&lt;/p&gt;
  715. &lt;p&gt;Even if this didn’t endanger free expression on its own, once new tools exist, they can be used for more than copyright. Just as malfunctioning copyright filters were adapted into the malfunctioning filters used for “adult content” on &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/tossedout/tumblr-ban-adult-content&quot;&gt;tumblr&lt;/a&gt;, so can means of site blocking. The major companies of a single industry should not get to dictate the future of free speech online.&lt;/p&gt;
  716. &lt;p&gt;Why the MPA is announcing this now is anyone’s guess. They might think no one cares anymore. They’re wrong. Internet users rejected site blocking in 2012 and they reject it today.&lt;/p&gt;
  717.  
  718. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  719.     <pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2024 17:08:34 +0000</pubDate>
  720. <guid isPermaLink="false">109500 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  721. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/innovation">Creativity &amp; Innovation</category>
  722. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/coica-internet-censorship-and-copyright-bill">SOPA/PIPA: Internet Blacklist Legislation</category>
  723. <dc:creator>Mitch Stoltz</dc:creator>
  724. <dc:creator>Katharine Trendacosta</dc:creator>
  725. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/dmca-copyright-1_0.png" alt="Copyright" type="image/png" length="9133" />
  726.  </item>
  727.  <item>
  728.    <title>Speaking Freely: Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso </title>
  729.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/speaking-freely-mary-aileen-diez-bacalso</link>
  730.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;This interview has been edited for length and clarity.*&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  731. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forum-asia.org/welcoming-forum-asia-new-executive-director-mary-aileen-diez-bacalso/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Mary Aileen Diez-Bacalso&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; is the executive director of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forum-asia.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;FORUM-Asia&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;. She has worked for many years in human rights organizations in the Philippines and internationally, and is best known for her work on enforced disappearances. She has received several human rights awards at home and abroad, including the Emilio F. Mignone International Human Rights Prize conferred by the Government of Argentina and the Franco-German Ministerial Prize for Human Rights and Rule of Law. In addition to her work at FORUM-Asia, she currently serves as the president of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Coalition_against_Enforced_Disappearances&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;International Coalition Against Enforced Disappearances&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; (ICAED) and is a senior lecturer at the Asian Center of the University of the Philippines.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  732. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What does free expression mean to you? And can you tell me about an experience, or experiences, that shaped your views on free expression?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  733. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;To me, free speech or free expression means the exercise of the right to express oneself and to seek and receive information as an individual or an organization. I’m an individual, but I’m also representing an organization, so it means the ability to express thoughts, ideas, or opinions without threats or intimidation or fear of reprisals. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  734. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Free speech is expressed in various avenues, such as in a community where one lives or in an organization where one belongs at the national, regional, or international levels. It is the right to express these ideas, opinions, and thoughts for different purposes, for instance; influencing behaviors, opinions, and policy decisions; giving education; addressing, for example, historical revisionism—which is historically common in my country, the Philippines. Without freedom of speech people will be kept in the dark in terms of access to information, in understanding and analyzing information, and deciding which information to believe and which information is incorrect or inaccurate or is meant to misinform people. So without freedom of speech people cannot exercise their other basic human rights, like the right of suffrage and, for example, religious organizations who are preaching will not be able to fulfill their mission of preaching if freedom of speech is curtailed. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  735. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I have worked for years with families of the disappeared—victims of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enforced_disappearance&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;enforced disappearance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—in many countries. And this forced disappearance is a consequence of the absence of free speech. These disappeared people are forcibly disappeared because of their political beliefs, because of their political affiliations, and because of their human rights work, among other things. And they were deprived of the right to speech. Additionally, in the Philippines and many other Asian countries, rallies, for example, and demonstrations on various legitimate issues of the people are being dispersed by security forces in the name of peace. That’s depriving legitimate protesters from the rights to speech and to peaceful assembly. So these people are named as enemies of the state, as subversives, as troublemakers, and in the process they’re tear-gassed, arrested, detained, etcetera. So allowing these people to exercise their constitutional rights is a manifestation of free speech. But in many Asian countries—and many other countries in other regions also—such rights, although provided for by the Constitution, are not respected. Free speech in whatever country you are in, wherever you go, is freedom to study the situation of that country to give your opinion of that situation and share your ideas with others. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  736. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you share some experiences that helped shape your views on freedom of expression? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  737. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;During my childhood years, when martial law was imposed, I’d heard a lot of news about detention, arrest and detention of journalists because of their protest against martial law that was imposed by the dictator &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ferdinand_Marcos&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ferdinand Marcos, Sr&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, who was the father of the present President of the Philippines. So I read a lot about violations of human rights of activists from different sectors of society. I read about farmers, workers, students, church people, who were arrested, detained, tortured, disappeared, and killed because of martial law. Because they spoke against the Marcos administration. So during those years when I was so young, this actually formed my mind and also my commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of association. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  738. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Once, I was arrested during the first Marcos administration, and that was a very long time ago. That is a manifestation of the curtailment of the right of free speech. I was together with other human rights defenders—I was very young at the time. We were rallying because there was a priest who was made to disappear forcibly. So we were arrested and detained. Also, I was deported by the government of India on my way to Kashmir. I was there three times, but on my third time I was not allowed to go to Kashmir because of our human rights work there. So even now, I am banned in India and I can not go back there. It was because of those reports we made on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_rights_abuses_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;enforced disappearances and mass graves in Kashmir&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. So free speech means freedom without thread, intimidation, or retaliation. And it means being able to use all avenues in various contexts to speak in whatever forms—verbal speeches, written speeches, videos, and all forms of communication.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  739. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Also, the enforced disappearance of my husband informed my views on free expression. Two weeks after we got married he was briefly forcibly disappeared. He was tortured, he was not fed, and he was forced to confess that he was a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines. He was together with one other person he did not know and did not see, and they were forced to dig a grave for themselves to be buried alive inside. Another person who was disappeared then escaped and informed us of where my husband was. So we told the military that we knew where my husband was. They were afraid that the other person might testify so they released my husband in a cemetery near his parent’s house.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  740. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And that made an impact on me, that’s why I work a lot with families of enforced disappearances both in the Philippines and in many other countries. I believe that the experience of enforced disappearance of my husband, and other family members of the disappeared and their experience of having family members disappeared until now, is a consequence of the violation of freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of speech. And also my integration or immersion with families of the disappeared has contributed a lot to my commitment to human rights and free speech. I’m just lucky to have my husband back. And he’s lucky. But the way of giving back, of being grateful for the experience we had—because they are very rare cases where victims of enforced disappearances surfaced alive—so I dedicate my whole life to the cause of human rights. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  741. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What do you feel are some of the qualities that make you passionate about protecting free expression for others?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  742. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Being brought up by my family, my parents, we were taught about the importance of speaking for the truth, and the importance of uprightness. It was also because of our religious background. We were taught it is very important to tell the truth. So this passion for truth and uprightness is one of the qualities that make me passionate about free expression. And the sense of moral responsibility to rectify wrongs that are being committed. My love of writing, also. I love writing whenever I have the opportunity to do it, the time to do it. And the sense of duty to make human rights a lifetime commitment. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  743. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What should we know about the role of social media in modern Philippine society? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  744. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I believe social media contributed a lot to what we are now. The current oppressive &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presidency_of_Bongbong_Marcos&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;administration&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; invested a lot in misinformation, in revising history, and that’s why a lot of young people think of martial law as the years of glory and prosperity. I believe one of the biggest factors of the administration getting the votes was their investment in social media for at least a decade. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  745. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What are your feelings on how online speech should be regulated? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  746. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I’m not very sure it should be regulated. For me, as long as the individuals or the organizations have a sense of responsibility for what they say online, there should be no regulation. But when we look at free speech on online platforms these online platforms have the responsibility to ensure that there are clear guidelines for content moderation and must be held accountable for content posted on their platforms. So fact-checking—which is so important in this world of misinformation and “fake news”—and complaints mechanisms have to be in place to ensure that harmful online speech is identified and addressed. So while freedom of expression is a fundamental right, it is important to recognize that this can be exploited to spread hate speech and harmful content all in the guise of online freedom of speech—so this could be abused. This is being abused. Those responsible for online platforms must be accountable for their content. For example, from March 2020 to July 2020 our organization, FORUM-Asia and its partners, including freedom of expression group &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://disappeared-asia.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;AFAD&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forum-asia.org/pervasive-hate-speech-and-the-role-of-facebook-in-myanmar-a-briefing-paper-by-athan-and-forum-asia/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;documented&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; around 40 cases of hate speech and dangerous speech on Facebook. And the study scope is limited as it only covered posts and comments in Burmese. The researchers involved also reported that many other posts were reported and subsequently removed prior to being documented. So the actual amount of hate speech is likely to be significantly higher. I recommend taking a look at the report. So while FORUM-Asia acknowledges the efforts of Facebook to promote policies to curb hate speech on the platform, it still needs to update and constantly review all these things, like the community guidelines, including those on political advertisements and paid or sponsored content, with the participation of the Facebook Oversight Board. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  747. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you tell me about a personal experience you’ve had with censorship, or perhaps the opposite, an experience you have of using freedom of expression for the greater good?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  748. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In terms of censorship, I don’t have personal experience with censorship. I wrote some opinion pieces in the Union of Catholic Asian News and other online platforms, but I haven’t had any experience of censorship. Although I did experience negative comments because of the content of what I wrote. There are a lot of trolls in the Philippines and they were and are very supportive of the previous administration of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rodrigo_Duterte&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Duterte&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, so there was negative feedback when I wrote a lot on the war on drugs and the killings and impunity. But that’s also part of freedom of speech! I just had to ignore it, but, to be honest, I felt bad. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  749. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Thank you for sharing that. Do you have a free expression hero? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  750. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I believe we have so many unsung heroes in terms of free speech and these are the unknown persecuted human rights defenders. But I also answer that during this week we are commemorating the Holy Week [editor’s note: this interview took place on March 28, 2024] so I would like to say that I would like to remember Jesus Christ. Whose passion, death, and resurrection Christians are commemorating this week. So, during his time, Jesus spoke about the ills of society, he was enraged when he witnessed how defenseless poor were violated of their rights and he was angry when authority took advantage of them. And he spoke very openly about his anger, about his defense for the poor. So I believe that he is my hero. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  751. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Also, in contemporary times, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%93scar_Romero&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Óscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, who was canonized as a Saint in 2018, I consider him as my free speech hero also. I visited the chapel where he was assassinated, the Cathedral of San Salvador, where his mortal remains were buried. And the international community, especially the Salvadoran people, celebrated the 44th anniversary of his assassination last Sunday the 24th of March, 2024. Seeing the ills of society, the consequent persecution of the progressive segment of the Catholic church and the churches in El Salvador, and the indiscriminate killings of the Salvadoran people in his communities San Romero courageously spoke on the eve of his assassination. I’d like to quote what he said. He said:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  752. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;“I would like to make a special appeal to the men of the army, and specifically to the ranks of the National Guard, the police and the military. Brothers, you come from our own people. You are killing your own brother peasants when any human order to kill must be subordinate to the law of God which says, ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ No soldier is obliged to obey an order contrary to the law of God. No one has to obey an immoral law. It is high time you recovered your consciences and obeyed your consciences rather than a sinful order. The church, the defender of the rights of God, of the law of God, of human dignity, of the person, cannot remain silent before such an abomination. We want the government to face the fact that reforms are valueless if they are to be carried out at the cost of so much blood. In the name of God, in the name of this suffering people whose cries rise to heaven more loudly each day, I implore you, I beg you, I order you in the name of God: stop the repression.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  753. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  754. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So as a fitting tribute to Saint Romero of the Americas the United Nations has dedicated the 24th of March as the International Day for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-repetition. So he is my hero. Of course, Jesus Christ being the most courageous human rights defender during these times, continues to be my hero. Which I’m sure was the model of Monsignor Romero. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  755.  
  756.  
  757. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  758.     <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 18:43:12 +0000</pubDate>
  759. <guid isPermaLink="false">109498 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  760. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  761. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/aileen-banner-1_0.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="110988" />
  762.  </item>
  763.  <item>
  764.    <title>Podcast Episode: Antitrust/Pro-Internet</title>
  765.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/podcast-episode-antitrustpro-internet</link>
  766.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Imagine an internet in which economic power is more broadly distributed, so that more people can build and maintain small businesses online to make good livings. In this world, the behavioral advertising that has made the internet into a giant surveillance tool would be banned, so people could share more equally in the riches without surrendering their privacy.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  767. &lt;div class=&quot;mytube&quot; style=&quot;width: 100%px;&quot;&gt;
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  769.  
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  777. &lt;/div&gt;
  778.  
  779. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  780. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/4UAplFpPDqE4hWlwsjplgt&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effs-how-to-fix-the-internet/id1539719568&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.ca/podcasts/bf81f00f-11e1-431f-918d-374ab6ad07cc/how-to-fix-the-internet?ref=dmm_art_us_HTFTI&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/howtofixtheinternet&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  781. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;(You can also find this episode on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/htfti-s5e4-tim-wu-mix-vfinal&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt; and on &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/y-4-gxUMvus?feature=shared&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;YouTube&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  782. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;That’s the world Tim Wu envisions as he teaches and shapes policy on the revitalization of American antitrust law and the growing power of big tech platforms. He joins EFF’s Cindy Cohn and Jason Kelley to discuss using the law to counterbalance the market’s worst instincts, in order to create an internet focused more on improving people’s lives than on meaningless revenue generation.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  783. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In this episode you’ll learn about:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  784. &lt;ul&gt;
  785. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Getting a better “deal” in trading some of your data for connectedness.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  786. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Building corporate structures that do a better job of balancing the public good with private profits.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  787. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Creating a healthier online ecosystem with corporate “quarantines” to prevent a handful of gigantic companies from dominating the entire internet.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  788. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Nurturing actual innovation of products and services online, not just newer price models.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  789. &lt;/ul&gt;
  790. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://www.timwu.org/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Timothy Wu&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; is the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/timothy-wu&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Julius Silver Professor of Law, Science and Technology&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; at Columbia Law School, where he has served on the faculty since 2006. First known for coining the term “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Net_neutrality#Etymology&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;net neutrality&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” in 2002, he served in President Joe Biden’s White House as special assistant to the President for technology and competition policy from 2021 to 2023; he also had worked on competition policy for the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.whitehouse.gov/nec/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;National Economic Council&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; during the last year of President Barack Obama’s administration. Earlier, he worked in antitrust enforcement at the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ftc.gov/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Federal Trade Commission&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and served as enforcement counsel in the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ag.ny.gov/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;New York Attorney General’s Office&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. His books include “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://globalreports.columbia.edu/books/the-curse-of-bigness/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Curse of Bigness: Antitrust in the New Gilded Age&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2018), &quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/234876/the-attention-merchants-by-tim-wu/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2016), “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/194417/the-master-switch-by-tim-wu/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2010), and “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.amazon.com/Who-Controls-Internet-Illusions-Borderless/dp/0195340647&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2006).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  791. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Resources: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  792. &lt;ul&gt;
  793. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Columbia Law School: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/archive/how-change-40-years-policy-22-months-professor-wu-washington&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;How to Change 40 Years of Policy in 22 Months: Professor Wu in Washington&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;&quot; (Feb. 8. 2023) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  794. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;New York Times: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/07/opinion/biden-ai-regulation.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;In Regulating A.I., We May Be Doing Too Much. And Too Little.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” (Nov. 7, 2023) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  795. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;New York Times: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/18/opinion/contributors/google-antitrust-trial.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Google Trial Is Going to Rewrite Our Future&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” (Sept. 18, 2023) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  796. &lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;CNBC: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/R6lj239qOo4?si=Nmw_Vw2m-P3Et-Ry&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tech companies have exploited human tendencies to maintain their monopolies, says Columbia&#039;s Tim Wu&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” (Oct. 3, 2023)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  797. &lt;/ul&gt;
  798. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What do you think of “How to Fix the Internet?” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forms.office.com/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=qalRy_Njp0iTdV3Gz61yuZZXWhXf9ZdMjzPzrVjvr6VUNUlHSUtLM1lLMUNLWE42QzBWWDhXU1ZEQy4u&amp;amp;web=1&amp;amp;wdLOR=c90ABD667-F98F-9748-BAA4-CA50122F0423&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Share your feedback here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  799. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;Transcript&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  800. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I think with advertising we need a better deal. So advertising is always a deal. You trade your attention and you trade probably some data, in exchange you get exposed to advertising and in exchange you get some kind of free product.&lt;/p&gt;
  801. &lt;p&gt;You know, that&#039;s the deal with television, that&#039;s been the deal for a long time with radio. But because it&#039;s sort of an invisible bargain, it&#039;s hard to make the bargain, and the price can be increased in ways that you don&#039;t necessarily notice. For example, we had one deal with Google in, let&#039;s say, around the year 2010 - if you go on Google now, it&#039;s an entirely different bargain.&lt;/p&gt;
  802. &lt;p&gt;It&#039;s as if there&#039;s been a massive inflation in these so-called free products. In terms of how much data has been taken, in terms of how much you&#039;re exposed to, how much ad load you get. It&#039;s as if sneakers went from 30 dollars to 1,000 dollars!&lt;/p&gt;
  803. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;That&#039;s Tim Wu – author, law professor, White House advisor. He’s something of a swiss army knife for technology law and policy. He spent two years on the National Economic Council, working with the Biden administration as an advisor on competition and tech policy. He worked on antitrust legislation to try and check some of the country’s biggest corporations, especially, of course, the tech giants.&lt;/p&gt;
  804. &lt;p&gt;I’m Cindy Cohn - executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.&lt;/p&gt;
  805. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And I’m Jason Kelley - EFF’s Activism Director. This is our podcast, How to Fix the Internet. Our guest today is Tim Wu. His stint with the Biden administration was the second White House administration he advised. And in between, he ran for statewide office in New York. And that whole thing is just a sideline from his day job as a law professor at Columbia University. Plus, he coined the term net neutrality!&lt;/p&gt;
  806. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On top of that, Tim basically writes a book every few years that I read in order to tell me what&#039;s going to happen next in technology. And before that he&#039;s been a programmer and a more traditional lab based scientist. So he&#039;s kind of got it all.&lt;/p&gt;
  807. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Sounds like I&#039;m a dilettante.&lt;/p&gt;
  808. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Well, I think you&#039;ve got a lot of skills in a lot of different departments, and I think that in some ways, I&#039;ve heard you call yourself a translator, and I think that that&#039;s really what all of that experience gives you as a superpower is the ability to kind of talk between these kinds of spaces in the rest of the world.&lt;/p&gt;
  809. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Well, I guess you could say that. I&#039;ve always been inspired by Wilhelm Humboldt, who had this theory that in order to have a full life, you had to try to do a lot of different stuff. So somehow that factors into it somewhere.&lt;/p&gt;
  810. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;That&#039;s wonderful. We want to talk about a lot of things in this conversation, but I kind of wanted to start off with the central story of the podcast, which is, what does the world look like if we get this right? You know, you and I have spent a lot of years talking about all the problems, trying to lift up obstacles and get rid of obstacles.&lt;/p&gt;
  811. &lt;p&gt;But if we reach this end state where we get a lot of these problems right, in Tim Wu&#039;s world, what, what does it look like? Like, what does your day look like? What do people&#039;s experience of technology look like?&lt;/p&gt;
  812. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I think it looks like a world in which economic power surrounding the internet and surrounding the platforms is very much more distributed. And, you know, what that means practically is it means a lot of people are able to make a good living, I guess, based on being a small producer or having a service based skill in a way that feels sustainable and where the sort of riches of the Internet are more broadly shared.&lt;/p&gt;
  813. &lt;p&gt;So that&#039;s less about what kind of things you click on or, you know, what kind of apps you use and more about, I guess, the economic structure surrounding the Internet, which I think, you know, um, I don&#039;t think I&#039;m the only person who thinks this, you know, the structure could be fairer and could work for more people.&lt;/p&gt;
  814. &lt;p&gt;It does feel like the potential and, you know, we&#039;ve all lived through that potential starting in the 90s of this kind of economically liberating force that would be the basis for a lot of people to make a decent living has seemed to turn into something more where a lot of money aggregates in a few places.&lt;/p&gt;
  815. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I remember, people still talk about the long tail, right, as a way in which the digitization of materials created a revenue stream that&#039;s more than just, you know, the flavor of the week that a movie studio or a book publisher might want us to pay attention to on kind of the cultural side, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  816. &lt;p&gt;That there was space for this. And that also makes me think of a conversation we just had with the folks in the right to repair movement talking about like their world includes a place where there&#039;s mom and pop shops that will help you fix your devices all over the place. Like this is another way in which we have centralized economic power.&lt;/p&gt;
  817. &lt;p&gt;We&#039;ve centralized power and if we decentralize this or, or, or spread it more broadly, uh, we&#039;re going to create a lot of jobs and opportunities for people, not just as users of technology, but as the people who help build and offer it to us.&lt;/p&gt;
  818. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I&#039;m writing a new book, um, working title, Platform Capitalism, that has caused me to go back and look at the, you know, the early promise of the internet. And I went back and I was struck by a book, some of you may remember, called &quot;An Army of Davids,&quot; by Glenn Reynolds the Instapundit.&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, and he wrote a book and he said, you know, the future of the American economy is going to be all these kind of mom and pop sellers who, who take over everything – he wrote this about 2006 – and he says, you know, bloggers are already competing with news operations, small sellers on eBay are already competing with retail stores, and so on, journalists, so on down the line that, uh, you know, the age of the big, centralized Goliath is over and the little guys are going to rule the future.&lt;/p&gt;
  819. &lt;p&gt;Kind of dovetailed, I went back and read Yochai Benkler&#039;s early work about a production commons model and how, you know, there&#039;ll be a new node of production. Those books have not aged all that well. In fact, I think the book that wins is Blitzscaling. That somewhere along the line, instead of the internet favoring small business, small production, things went in the exact opposite direction.&lt;/p&gt;
  820. &lt;p&gt;And when I think about Yochai Benkler&#039;s idea of sort of production-based commons, you know, Waze was like that, the mapping program, until one day Waze was just bought by Google. So, I was just thinking about those as I was writing that chapter of the book.&lt;/p&gt;
  821. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I think that&#039;s right. I think that identifying and, and you&#039;ve done a lot of work on this, identify the way in which we started with this promise and we ended up in this other place can help us figure out, and Cory Doctorow, our colleague and friend has been doing a lot of work on this with choke point capitalism and other work that he&#039;s done for EFF and elsewhere.&lt;/p&gt;
  822. &lt;p&gt;And I also agree with him that, like, we don&#039;t really want to create the good old days. We want to create the good new days, right? Like, we want to experience the benefits of an Internet post-1990s, but also have those, those riches decentralized or shared a little more broadly, or a lot more broadly, honestly.&lt;/p&gt;
  823. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I think that&#039;s right, and so I think part of what I&#039;m saying, you know, what would fix the internet, or what would make it something that people feel excited about. You know, I think people are always excited about apps and videos, but also people are excited about their livelihood and making money.&lt;/p&gt;
  824. &lt;p&gt;And if we can figure out the kind of structure that makes capitalism more distributed surrounding platforms, you know, it&#039;s not abandoning the idea of you have to have a good site or a product or something to, to gain customers. It&#039;s not a total surrender of that idea, but a return to that idea working for more people.&lt;/p&gt;
  825. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I mean, one of the things that you taught me in the early days is how kind of ‘twas ever so, right? If you think about radio or broadcast medium or other previous mediums, they kind of started out with this promise of a broader impact and broader empowerment and, and didn&#039;t end up that way as much as well.&lt;/p&gt;
  826. &lt;p&gt;And I know that&#039;s something you&#039;ve thought about a lot.&lt;/p&gt;
  827. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, the first book I wrote by myself, The Master Switch, had that theme and at the time when I wrote it, um, I wrote a lot of it in the, ‘09, ‘08, ‘07 kind of period, and I think at that point I had more optimism that the internet could hold out, that it wouldn&#039;t be subject to the sort of monopolizing tendencies that had taken over the radio, which originally was thousands of radio stations, or the telephone system – which started as this ‘go west young man and start your own telephone company’ kind of technology – film industry and and many others. I was firmly of the view that things would be different. Um, I think I thought that, uh, because of the CCP IP protocol, because of the platforms like HTML that were, you know, the center of the web, because of net neutrality, lasting influence. But frankly, I was wrong. I was wrong, at least when I was writing the book.&lt;/p&gt;
  828. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As you&#039;ve been talking about the sort of almost inevitable funneling of the power that these technologies have into a single or, or a few small platforms or companies, I wonder what you think about newer ideas around decentralization that have sort of started over the last few years, in particular with platforms like Mastodon or something like that, these kinds of APIs or protocols, not platforms, that idea. Do you see any promise in that sort of thing? Because we see some, but I&#039;m wondering what you think.&lt;/p&gt;
  829. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I do see some promise. I think that In some ways, it&#039;s a long overdue effort. I mean, it&#039;s not the first. I can&#039;t say it&#039;s the first. Um, and part of me wishes that we had been, you know, the idealistic people. Even the idealistic people at some of these companies, such as they were, had been a bit more careful about their design in the first place.&lt;/p&gt;
  830. &lt;p&gt;You know, I guess what I would hope … the problem with Mastodon on some of these is they&#039;re trying to compete with entities that already are operating with all the full benefits of scale and which are already tied to sort of a Delaware private corporate model. Uh, now this is a little bit, I&#039;m not saying that hindsight is 20/20, but when I think about the major platforms and entities the early 21st century, it&#039;s really only Wikipedia that got it right in my view by structurally insulating themselves from certain forces and temptations.&lt;/p&gt;
  831. &lt;p&gt;So I guess what I&#039;m trying to say is that, uh, part of me wishes we&#039;d done more of this earlier. I do think there&#039;s hope in them. I think it&#039;s very challenging in current economics to succeed. And sometimes you&#039;d have to wonder if you go in a different, you know, that it might be, I don&#039;t want to say impossible, very challenging when you&#039;re competing with existing structures. And if you&#039;re starting something new, you should start it right.&lt;br /&gt;That said, AI started in a way structurally different and we&#039;ve seen how that&#039;s gone recently.&lt;/p&gt;
  832. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oh, say more, say more!&lt;/p&gt;
  833. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah. Yeah. Keep, keep talking about AI.&lt;/p&gt;
  834. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I&#039;m very curious about your thinking about that.&lt;/p&gt;
  835. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Well, you know, I said that, The Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire. And OpenAI is now no longer open, nor non-profit, nor anything else. You know, it&#039;s kind of, uh, been extraordinary that the circuit breakers they tried to install have just been blown straight through. Um, and I think there&#039;s been a lot of negative coverage of the board. Um, because, you know, the business press is kind of narrow on these topics. But, um, you know, OpenAI, I guess, at some point, tried to structure itself more carefully and, um, and, uh, you know, now the board is run by people whose main experience has been, um, uh, taking good organizations and making them worse, like Quora, so, yeah, I, I, that is not exactly an inspiring story, uh, I guess of OpenAI in the sense of it&#039;s trying to structure itself a little differently and, and it, uh, failing to hold.&lt;/p&gt;
  836. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I mean, I think Mozilla has managed to have a structure that has a, you know, kind of complicated for profit/not-for-profit strategy that has worked a little better, but II hear you. I think that if you do a power analysis, right, you know, a nonprofit is going to have a very hard time up against all the money in the world.&lt;/p&gt;
  837. &lt;p&gt;And I think that that seems to be what happened for OpenAI. Uh, once all the money in the world showed up, it was pretty hard to, uh, actually impossible for the public interest nonprofit side to hold sway.&lt;/p&gt;
  838. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;When I think about it over and over, I think engineers and the people who set up these, uh, structures have been repeatedly very naive about, um, the power of their own good intentions. And I agree. Mozilla is a good example. Wikipedia is a good example. Google, I remember when they IPO&#039;d, they had some set up, and they said, ‘We&#039;re not going to be an ordinary company,’ or something like that. And they sort of had preferred stock for some of the owners. You know, Google is still in some ways an impressive company, but it&#039;s hard to differentiate them from any other slightly money grubbing, non-innovative colossus, um, of the kind they were determined not to become.&lt;/p&gt;
  839. &lt;p&gt;And, you know, there was this like, well, it&#039;s not going to be us, because we&#039;re different. You know, we&#039;re young and idealistic, and why would we want to become, I don&#039;t know, like Xerox or IBM, but like all of us, you begin by saying, I&#039;m never going to become like my parents, and then next thing you know, you&#039;re yelling at your kids or whatever.&lt;/p&gt;
  840. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, it&#039;s, it&#039;s the, you know, meet the new boss the same as the old boss, right? When we, what we were hoping was that we would be free of some of the old bosses and have a different way to approach, but, but the forces are pretty powerful that stick people back in line, I think.&lt;/p&gt;
  841. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And some of the old structures, you know, look a little better. Like, I&#039;m not going to say newspapers are perfect, but a structure like the New York Times structure, for example, basically is better than Google&#039;s. And I just think there was this sense that, Well, we can solve that problem with code and good vibes. And that turned out to be the great mistake.&lt;/p&gt;
  842. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;One of the conversations that you and I have had over the years is kind of the role of regulation on, on the internet. I think the fight about whether to regulate or not to regulate the Internet was always a little beside the point. The question is how. And I&#039;m wondering what you&#039;re thinking now. You&#039;ve been in the government a couple times. You&#039;ve tried to push some things that were pretty regulatory. How are you thinking now about something like a centralized regulatory agency or another approach to, you know, regulating the Internet?&lt;/p&gt;
  843. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I, you know, I continue to have mixed feelings about something like the central internet commission, mostly for some of the reasons you said, but on the other hand, sometimes, if I want to achieve what I mentioned, which is the idea of platforms that are an input into a lot of people being able to operate on top of them and run businesses-like, you know, at times, the roads have been, or the electric system, or the phone network, um, it&#039;s hard to get away from the idea of having some hard rules, sometimes I think my sort of platonic form of, of government regulation or rules was the 1956 AT&amp;amp;T consent decree, which, for those who are not as deep in those weeds as I am, told AT&amp;amp;T that it could do nothing but telecom, and therefore not do computing and also force them to license every single one of their patents for free. And the impact of that was more than one -  one is because they were out of computing. They were not able to dominate it and you had companies then new to computing like IBM and others that got into that space and developed the American computing industry completely separate from AT&amp;amp;T.&lt;/p&gt;
  844. &lt;p&gt;And you also ended up, semiconductor companies start that time with the transistor patent and other patents they used for free. So you know, I don&#039;t know exactly how you achieve that, but I&#039;m drawn to basically keeping the main platforms in their lane. I would like there to be more competition.&lt;br /&gt;The antitrust side of me would love it. And I think that in some areas we are starting to have it, like in social media, for better or for worse. But maybe for some of the more basic fundamentals, online markets and, you know, as much competition as we can get – but some rule to stay out of other businesses, some rule to stop eating the ecosystem. I do think we need some kind of structural separation rules. Who runs those is a little bit of a harder question.&lt;/p&gt;
  845. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, we&#039;re not opposed to structural separation at EFF. I think we, we think a lot more about interoperability to start with as a way to, you know, help people have other choices, but we haven&#039;t been opposed to structural separation, and I think there are situations in which it might make a lot of good sense, especially, you know, in the context of mergers, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  846. &lt;p&gt;Where the company has actually swallowed another company that did another thing. That&#039;s, kind of the low hanging fruit, and EFF has participated a lot in commenting on potential mergers.&lt;/p&gt;
  847. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I&#039;m not opposed the idea of pushing interoperability. I think that it&#039;s based on the experience of the last 100 years. It is a tricky thing to get right. I&#039;m not saying it&#039;s impossible. We do have examples: Phone network, in the early 20th century, and interconnection was relatively successful. And right now, you know, when you change between, let&#039;s say, T-Mobile and Verizon, there&#039;s only three left, but you get to take your phone number with you, which is a form of interoperability.&lt;/p&gt;
  848. &lt;p&gt;But it has the risk of being something you put a lot of effort into and it not necessarily working that well in terms of actually stimulating competition, particularly because of the problem of sabotage, as we saw in the ‘96 Act. So it&#039;s actually not about the theory, it&#039;s about the practice, the legal engineering of it. Can you find the right thing where you&#039;ve got kind of a cut point where you could have a good interoperability scheme?&lt;/p&gt;
  849. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let’s take a quick moment to say thank you to our sponsor. “How to Fix the Internet” is supported by The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Program in Public Understanding of Science and Technology. Enriching people’s lives through a keener appreciation of our increasingly technological world and portraying the complex humanity of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians.&lt;/p&gt;
  850. &lt;p&gt;And now back to our conversation with Tim Wu. I was intrigued by what he said about keeping platforms in their lane. I wanted to hear him speak more about how that relates to antitrust – is that spreading into other ecosystems what sets his antitrust alarm bells off? How does he think about that?&lt;/p&gt;
  851. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I guess the phrase I might use is quarantine, is you want to quarantine businesses, I guess, from others. And it&#039;s less of a traditional antitrust kind of remedy, although it, obviously, in the ‘56 consent decree, which was out of an antitrust suit against AT&amp;amp;T, it can be a remedy.&lt;/p&gt;
  852. &lt;p&gt;And the basic idea of it is, it&#039;s explicitly distributional in its ideas. It wants more players in the ecosystem, in the economy. It&#039;s almost like an ecosystem promoting a device, which is you say, okay, you know, you are the unquestioned master of this particular area of commerce. Maybe we&#039;re talking about Amazon and it&#039;s online shopping and other forms of e-commerce, or Google and search.&lt;/p&gt;
  853. &lt;p&gt;We&#039;re not going to give up on the hope of competition, but we think that in terms of having a more distributed economy where more people have their say, um, almost in the way that you might insulate the college students from the elementary school students or something. We&#039;re going to give other, you know, room for other people to develop their own industries in these side markets. Now, you know, there&#039;s resistance say, well, okay, but Google is going to do a better job in, uh, I don&#039;t know, shopping or something, you know, they might do a good job. They might not, but you know, they&#039;ve got their returns and they&#039;re always going to be an advantage as a platform owner and also as a monopoly owner of having the ability to cross-subsidize and the ability to help themselves.&lt;/p&gt;
  854. &lt;p&gt;So I think you get healthier ecosystems with quarantines. That&#039;s basically my instinct. And, you know, we do quarantines either legally or de facto all the time. As I said, the phone network has long been barred from being involved in a lot of businesses. Banking is kept out of a lot of businesses because of obvious problems of corruption. The electric network, I guess they could make toasters if they want, but it was never set up to allow them to dominate the appliance markets.&lt;/p&gt;
  855. &lt;p&gt;And, you know, if they did dominate the appliance markets, I think it would be a much poorer world, a lot less interesting innovation, and frankly, a lot less wealth for everyone. So, yeah, I have strong feelings. It&#039;s more of my net neutrality side that drives this thinking than my antitrust side, I’ll put it that way.&lt;/p&gt;
  856. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;You specifically worked in both the Obama and Biden administration sort of on these issues. I&#039;m wondering if your thinking on this has changed. In experiencing those things from from the sort of White House perspective and also just how different those two, sort of, experiences were, obviously the moments are different in time and and and everything like that, but they&#039;re not so far apart – maybe light years in terms of technology, but what was your sort of experience between those two, and how do you think we&#039;re doing now on this issue?&lt;/p&gt;
  857. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I want to go back to a slightly earlier time in government, not the Obama, actually it was the Obama administration, but my first job in the, okay, sorry, my third job in the federal government, uh, I guess I&#039;m a, one of these recidivists or something, was at the Federal Trade Commission.&lt;/p&gt;
  858. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Oh yeah, I remember.&lt;/p&gt;
  859. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Taking the first hard look at big tech and, in fact, we&#039;re investigating Google for the first time for antitrust possible offenses, and we also did the first privacy remedy on Facebook, which I will concede was a complete and absolute failure of government, one of the weakest remedies, I think. We did that right before Cambridge Analytica. And obviously had no effect on Facebook&#039;s conduct at all. So, one of the failed remedies. I think that when I think back about that period, the main difference was that the tech platforms were different in a lot of ways.&lt;/p&gt;
  860. &lt;p&gt;I believe that, uh, monopolies and big companies have, have a life cycle. And they were relatively early in that life cycle, maybe even in a golden age. A company like Amazon seemed to be making life possible for a lot of sellers. Google was still in its early phase and didn&#039;t have a huge number of verticals. Still had limited advertising. Most searches still didn&#039;t turn up that many ads.&lt;/p&gt;
  861. &lt;p&gt;You know, they were in a different stage of their life. And they also still felt somewhat, they were still already big companies. They still felt relatively in some sense, vulnerable to even more powerful economic forces. So they hadn&#039;t sort of reached that maturity. You know, 10 years later, I think the life cycle has turned. I think companies have largely abandoned innovation in their core products and turned to defense and trying to improve – most of their innovations are attempting to raise more revenue and supposed to make the product better. Uh, kind of reminds me of the airline industry, which stopped innovating somewhere in the seventies and started making, trying to innovate in, um, terms of price structures and seats being smaller, that kind of thing.&lt;/p&gt;
  862. &lt;p&gt;You know, there&#039;s, you reach this end point, I think the airlines are the end point where you take a high tech industry at one point and just completely give up on anything other than trying to innovate in terms of your pricing models.&lt;/p&gt;
  863. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I mean, I, you know, our, our, we, Cory keeps coming up, but of course Cory calls it the “enshittification” of, uh, of services, and I think that is, uh, in typical Corrie way captures, this stage of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
  864. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I just to speak more broadly. I you know, I think there&#039;s a lot of faith and belief that the, uh, company like Google, you know, in its heart meant well, and I do still think the people working there mean well, but I feel that, you know, the structure they set up, which requires showing increasing revenue and profit every quarter began to catch up with it much more and we’re at a much later stage of the process.&lt;/p&gt;
  865. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yep.&lt;/p&gt;
  866. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Or the life cycle. I guess I&#039;d put it.&lt;/p&gt;
  867. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;And then for you, kind of coming in as a government actor on this, like, what did that mean in terms of, like, was it, I&#039;m assuming, I kind of want to finish the sentence for you. And that, you know, that meant it was harder to get them to do the right thing. It meant that their defenses were better against trying to do the right thing.&lt;/p&gt;
  868. &lt;p&gt;Like how did that impact the governmental interventions that you were trying to help make happen?&lt;/p&gt;
  869. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I think it was both. I think there was both, in terms of government action, a sense that the record was very different. The Google story in 2012 is very different than 2023. And the main difference is in 2023 Google is paying out 26.3 billion a year to other companies to keep its search engine where it is, and arguably to split the market with Apple.&lt;/p&gt;
  870. &lt;p&gt;You know, there wasn&#039;t that kind of record back in 2012. Maybe we still should have acted, but there wasn&#039;t that much money being so obviously spent on pure defensive monopoly. But also people were less willing. They thought the companies were great. They overall, I mean, there&#039;s a broader ideological change that people still felt, many people from the Clinton administration felt the government was the problem. Private industry was the solution. Had kind of a sort of magical thinking about the ability of this industry to be different in some fundamental way.&lt;/p&gt;
  871. &lt;p&gt;So the chair of the FCC wasn&#039;t willing to pull the trigger. The economists all said it was a terrible idea. You know, they failed to block over a thousand mergers that big tech did during that period, which it&#039;s, I think, very low odds that none of those thousands were anti-competitive or in the aggregate that maybe, you know, that was a way of building up market power.&lt;/p&gt;
  872. &lt;p&gt;Um, it did enrich a lot of small company people, but I, I think people at companies like Waze really regret selling out and, you know, end up not really building anything of their own but becoming a tiny sub-post of the Google empire.&lt;/p&gt;
  873. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, the “acquihire” thing is very central now and what I hear from people in the industry is that like, if that&#039;s not your strategy to get acquired by one of the ones, it&#039;s very hard to get funded, right? It feeds back into the VC and how you get funded to get something built.&lt;/p&gt;
  874. &lt;p&gt;If it&#039;s not something that one of the big guys is going to buy, you&#039;re going to have a hard time building it and you&#039;re going to have a hard time getting the support to get to the place where you might actually even be able to compete with them.&lt;/p&gt;
  875. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;And I think sometimes people forget we had different models. You know, some of your listeners might forget that, you know, in the ‘70s, ‘80s, and ‘90s, and early 2000s, people did build companies not just to be bought...&lt;/p&gt;
  876. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Right.&lt;/p&gt;
  877. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;...but to build fortunes, or because they thought it was a good company. I mean, the people who built Sun, or Apple, or, you know, Microsoft, they weren&#039;t saying, well, I hope I&#039;m gonna be bought by IBM one day. And they made real fortunes. I mean, look, being acquired, you can obviously become a very wealthy person, but you don&#039;t become a person of significance. You can go fund a charity or something, but you haven&#039;t really done something with your life.&lt;/p&gt;
  878. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I&#039;m going to flip it around again. And so we get to the place where the Tim Wu vision that the power is spread more broadly. We&#039;ve got lots of little businesses all around. We&#039;ve got many choices for consumers. What else, what else do you see in this world? Like what role does the advertising business model play in this kind of a better future. That&#039;s just one example there of many, that we could give.&lt;/p&gt;
  879. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, no, I like your vision of a different future. I think, uh, just like focus on it goes back to the sense of opportunity and, you know, you could have a life where you run a small business that&#039;s on the internet that is a respectable business and you&#039;re neither a billionaire nor you&#039;re impoverished, but you know, you just had to have your own business the way people have, like, in New York or used to run like stores and in other parts of the country, and in that world, I mean, in my ideal world, there is advertising, but advertising is primarily informational, if that makes sense.&lt;/p&gt;
  880. &lt;p&gt;It provides useful information. And it&#039;s a long way to go between here and there, but where, um, you know, it&#039;s not the default business model for informational sources such that it, it has much less corrupting effects. Um, you know, I think that advertising obviously everyone&#039;s business model is going to affect them, but advertising has some of the more, corrupting business models around.&lt;/p&gt;
  881. &lt;p&gt;So, in my ideal world, we would not, it&#039;s not that advertising will go away, people want information, but we&#039;d strike a better bargain. Exactly how you do that. I guess more competition helps, you know, lower advertising, um, sites you might frequent, better privacy protecting sites, but, you know, also passing privacy legislation might help too.&lt;/p&gt;
  882. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I think that’s right, I think EFF has taken a position that we think we should ban behavioral ads. That&#039;s a pretty strong position for us and not what we normally do, um, to, to say, well, we need to ban something. But also that we need, of course, comprehensive privacy law, which is, you know, kind of underlines so many of the harms that we&#039;re seeing online right now is this, this lack of a baseline privacy protection.&lt;/p&gt;
  883. &lt;p&gt;I don&#039;t know if you see it the same way, but it&#039;s certainly it seems to be the through line for a lot of harms that are coming up as things people are concerned about. Yeah.&lt;/p&gt;
  884. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I mean, absolutely, and I, you know, don&#039;t want to give EFF advice on their views, but I would say that I think it&#039;s wise to see the totally unregulated collection of data from, you know, millions, if not billions of people as a source of so many of the problems that we have.&lt;/p&gt;
  885. &lt;p&gt;It drives unhealthy business models, it leads to real-world consequences, in terms of identity theft and, and so many others, but I think I, I&#039;d focus first on what, yeah, the kind of behavior that encourages the kind of business model is encourages, which are ones that just don&#039;t in the aggregate, feel very good for the businesses or for, for us in particular.&lt;/p&gt;
  886. &lt;p&gt;So yeah, my first priority legislatively, I think if I were acting at this moment would be starting right there with, um, a privacy law that is not just something that gives supposed user rights to take a look at the data that&#039;s collected, but that meaningfully stops the collection of data. And I think we&#039;ll all just shrug our shoulders and say, oh, we&#039;re better off without that. Yes, it supported some, but we will still have some of the things – it&#039;s not as if we didn&#039;t have friends before Facebook.&lt;/p&gt;
  887. &lt;p&gt;It&#039;s not as if we didn&#039;t have video content before YouTube, you know, these things will survive with less without behavioral advertising. I think your stance on this is entirely, uh, correct.&lt;/p&gt;
  888. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Great. Thank you, I always love it when Tim agrees with me and you know, it pains me when we disagree, but one of the things I know is that you are one of the people who was inspired by Larry Lessig and we cite Larry a lot on the show because we like to think about things or organize them in terms of the four levels of, um, You know, digital regulation, you know, laws, norms, markets, and code as four ways that we could control things online. And I know you&#039;ve been focusing a lot on laws lately and markets as well.&lt;/p&gt;
  889. &lt;p&gt;How do you think about, you know, these four levers and where we are and, and how we should be deploying them?&lt;/p&gt;
  890. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Good question. I regard Larry as a prophet. He was my mentor in law school, and in fact, he is responsible for most of my life direction. Larry saw that there was a force arising through code that already was somewhat, in that time, 90s, early 2000s, not particularly subject to any kind of accountability, and he saw that it could take forms that might not be consistent with the kind of liberties you would like to have or expect and he was right about that.&lt;/p&gt;
  891. &lt;p&gt;You know, you can say whatever you want about law or government and there are many examples of terrible government, but at least the United States Constitution we think well, there is this problem called tyranny and we need to do something about it.&lt;/p&gt;
  892. &lt;p&gt;There&#039;s no real equivalent for the development of abusive technologies unless you get government to do something about it and government hasn&#039;t done much about it. You know, I think the interactions are what interests me about the four forces. So if we agree that code has a certain kind of sovereignty over our lives in many ways and most of us on a day-to-day basis are probably more affected by the code of the devices we use than by the laws we operate under.&lt;/p&gt;
  893. &lt;p&gt;And the question is, what controls code? And the two main contenders are the market and law. And right now the winner by far is just the market, which has led codemakers in directions that even they find kind of unfortunate and disgraceful.&lt;/p&gt;
  894. &lt;p&gt;I don&#039;t remember who had that quote, but it was some Facebook engineer that said the greatest minds of our generation are writing code to try to have people click on random ads, and we have sort of wasted a generation of talent on meaningless revenue generation when they could be building things that make people&#039;s lives better.&lt;/p&gt;
  895. &lt;p&gt;So, you know, the answer is not easy is to use law to counter the market. And that&#039;s where I think we are with Larry&#039;s four factors.&lt;/p&gt;
  896. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I think that that&#039;s right, and I agree that it&#039;s a little ro-sham-bo, right, that you can control code with laws and, and markets and you can control markets with code, which is kind of where interoperability comes in sometimes and laws and you know, norms play a role in kind of a slightly different whammy role in all of these things, but I do think that those interactions are really important and we&#039;ve, again, I&#039;ve always thought it was a somewhat phony conversation about, you know, &quot;to regulate or not to regulate, that is the question&quot; because that&#039;s not actually particularly useful in terms of thinking about things because we were embedded in a set of laws. It&#039;s just the ones we pay attention to and the ones that we might not notice, but I do think we&#039;re in a time when we have to think a lot harder about how to make laws that will be flexible enough to empower people and empower competition and not lock in the winners of today&#039;s markets. And we spend a lot of time thinking about that issue.&lt;/p&gt;
  897. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;TIM WU&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Well, let me say this much. This might sound a little contradictory in my life story, but I&#039;m not actually a fan of big government, certainly not overly prescriptive government. Having been in government, I see government&#039;s limits, and they are real. But I do think the people together are powerful.&lt;/p&gt;
  898. &lt;p&gt;I think laws can be powerful, but what they most usefully do is balance out the market. You know what I&#039;m saying? And create different incentives or different forces against it. I think trying to have government decide exactly how tech should run is usually a terrible idea. But to cut off incentives – you talked about behavioral advertising. So let&#039;s say you ban behavioral advertising just the way we ban child labor or something. You know, you can live without it. And, yeah, maybe we&#039;re less productive because we don&#039;t let 12 year olds work in factories. There&#039;s a marginal loss of revenue, but I frankly think it&#039;s worth it.&lt;/p&gt;
  899. &lt;p&gt;And, you know, and some of the other practices that have shown up are in some ways the equivalent. And we can live without them. And that&#039;s the, you know, it&#039;s sort of easy to say. we should ban child labor. But when you look for those kind of practices, that&#039;s where we need law to be active.&lt;/p&gt;
  900. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Well, Cindy, I came away from that with a reading list. I&#039;m sure a lot of people are familiar with those authors and those books, but I am going to have to catch up. I think we&#039;ll put some of them, maybe all the books, in the, in the show notes so that people who are wondering can, can catch up on their end.&lt;/p&gt;
  901. &lt;p&gt;You, as someone who&#039;s already read all those books, probably have different takeaways from this conversation than me.&lt;/p&gt;
  902. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You know what I really, I really like how Tim thinks he&#039;s, you know, he comes out of this, especially most recently from an economics perspective. So his future is really an economics one.&lt;/p&gt;
  903. &lt;p&gt;It&#039;s about an internet that has lots of spaces for people to make a reasonable living as opposed to the few people make a killing, or sell their companies to the big tech giants. And I think that that vision dovetails a lot with a lot of the people that we&#039;ve talked. to on this show that, you know, in some ways we&#039;ve got to think about how do we redistribute the internet and that includes redistributing the economic benefits.&lt;/p&gt;
  904. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah. And thinking about, you know, something you&#039;ve said many times, which is this idea of rather than going backwards to the internet we used to have, or the world we used to have, we&#039;re really trying to build a better world with the one we do have.&lt;/p&gt;
  905. &lt;p&gt;So another thing he did mention that I really pulled away from this conversation was when antitrust makes sense. And that sort of idea of, well, what do you do when companies start spreading into other ecosystems? That&#039;s when you really have to start thinking about the problems that they&#039;re creating for competition.&lt;/p&gt;
  906. &lt;p&gt;And I think the word he used was quarantine. Is that right?&lt;/p&gt;
  907. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah I love that image.&lt;/p&gt;
  908. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, that was just a helpful, I think, way for people to think about how antitrust can work. And that was something that I&#039;ll take away from this probably forever.&lt;/p&gt;
  909. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I also liked his vision of what kind of deal we have with a lot of these free tools or AKA free tools, which is, you know, at one time when we signed up for, you know, a Gmail account, it&#039;s, you know, the, the deal was that it was going to look at what you searched on and what you wrote and then place you ads based on the context and what you did.&lt;/p&gt;
  910. &lt;p&gt;And now that deal is much, much worse. And I think he, he&#039;s right to likening that to something that, you know, has secretly gotten much more expensive for us, that the deal for us as consumers has gotten worse and worse. And I really like that framing because again, it kind of translates out from the issues that where we live, which is, you know, privacy and free speech and fairness and turns it into something that is actually kind of an economic framing of some of the same points.&lt;/p&gt;
  911. &lt;p&gt;I think that the kind of upshot of Tim and, and honestly, some of the other people we&#039;ve talked to is this idea of ‘blitzscaling’, um, and growing gigantic platforms is really at the heart of a lot of the problems that we&#039;re seeing in free speech and in privacy and also in economic fairness. And I think that&#039;s a point that Tim makes very well.&lt;/p&gt;
  912. &lt;p&gt;I think that from, you know, The Attention Merchants, The Curse of Bigness, Tim has been writing in this space for a while, and he, what I appreciate is Tim is really a person, um, who came up in the Internet, he understands the Internet, he understands a lot of the values, and so he&#039;s, he&#039;s not writing as an outsider throwing rocks as much as an insider who is kind of dismayed at how things have gone and looking to try to unpack all of the problems. And I think his observation, which is shared by a lot of people, is that a lot of the problems that we&#039;re seeing inside tech are also problems we&#039;re seeing outside tech. It&#039;s just that tech is new enough that they really took over pretty fast.&lt;/p&gt;
  913. &lt;p&gt;But I think that it&#039;s important for us to both recognize the problems inside tech and it doesn&#039;t let tech off the hook. To note that these are broader societal problems, but it may help us in thinking about how we get out of them.&lt;/p&gt;
  914. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thanks for joining us for this episode of How to Fix the Internet. If you have feedback or suggestions, we&#039;d love to hear from you. Visit EFF. org slash podcast and click on listener feedback. While you&#039;re there, you can become a member, donate, maybe pick up some merch and just see what&#039;s happening in digital rights this week and every week.&lt;/p&gt;
  915. &lt;p&gt;We’ve got a newsletter, EFFector, as well as social media accounts on many, many, many platforms you can follow&lt;/p&gt;
  916. &lt;p&gt;This podcast is licensed Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, and includes music licensed Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported by their creators.&lt;/p&gt;
  917. &lt;p&gt;In this episode you heard Perspectives *** by J.Lang featuring Sackjo22 and Admiral Bob, and Warm Vacuum Tube by Admiral Bob featuring starfrosch.&lt;/p&gt;
  918. &lt;p&gt;You can find links to their music in our episode notes, or on our website at eff.org/podcast.&lt;/p&gt;
  919. &lt;p&gt;Our theme music is by Nat Keefe of BeatMower with Reed Mathis&lt;/p&gt;
  920. &lt;p&gt;How to Fix the Internet is supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation&#039;s program in public understanding of science and technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  921. &lt;p&gt;We’ll talk to you again soon.&lt;/p&gt;
  922. &lt;p&gt;I’m Jason Kelley&lt;/p&gt;
  923. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And I’m Cindy Cohn.&lt;/p&gt;
  924. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  925. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  926. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  927. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  928. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  929.  
  930. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  931.     <pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2024 07:06:00 +0000</pubDate>
  932. <guid isPermaLink="false">109487 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  933. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/how-to-fix-the-internet-podcast">How to Fix the Internet: Podcast</category>
  934. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/competition">Competition</category>
  935. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  936. <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
  937. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/htfi-wu-blog.png" alt="How to Fix the Internet - Tim Wu - Antitrust/Pro-Internet" type="image/png" length="182822" />
  938.  </item>
  939.  <item>
  940.    <title>&quot;Infrastructures of Control&quot;: Q&amp;A with the Geographers Behind University of Arizona&#039;s Border Surveillance Photo Exhibition</title>
  941.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/infrastructures-control-qa-geographers-behind-university-arizonas-border</link>
  942.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Guided by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/cbp-expanding-its-surveillance-tower-program-us-mexico-border-and-were-mapping-it&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF&#039;s map of Customs &amp;amp; Border Protection surveillance towers,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; University of Arizona geographers Colter Thomas and Dugan Meyer have been methodologically traversing the U.S.-Mexico border and photographing the infrastructure that comprises the so-called &quot;virtual wall.&quot; &lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/05/anduril_and_armed_vehicle.jpg&quot; width=&quot;1500&quot; height=&quot;1224&quot; alt=&quot;An amrored vehicle next to a surveillance tower along the Rio Grande River&quot; title=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;Anduril Sentry tower beside the Rio Grande River. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  943. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;From April 12-26, their outdoor exhibition &quot;&lt;a href=&quot;https://colterthomas.com/exhibition&quot;&gt;Infrastructures of Control&lt;/a&gt;&quot; will be on display on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.google.com/maps?ll=32.228559,-110.955304&amp;amp;z=20&amp;amp;t=h&amp;amp;hl=en&amp;amp;gl=US&amp;amp;mapclient=embed&amp;amp;cid=15580877754903105817&quot;&gt;University of Arizona campus&lt;/a&gt; in Tucson, featuring more than 30 photographs of surveillance technology, a replica surveillance tower, and a blow up map based on EFF&#039;s data. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  944. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Locals can join the researchers and EFF staff for an opening night tour at 5pm on April 12, followed by an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/speakeasy-tucson&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF Speakeasy/Meetup&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. There will also be a panel discussion at 5pm on April 19, moderated by journalist Yael Grauer, co-author of EFF&#039;s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sls.eff.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Street-Level Surveillance hub&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. It will feature a variety of experts on the border, including Isaac Esposto (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nomoredeaths.org/en/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;No More Deaths&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;), Dora Rodriguez (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://salvavision.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Salvavision&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;), Pedro De Velasco (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.kinoborderinitiative.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Kino Border Initiative&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;), Todd Miller (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theborderchronicle.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Border Chronicle&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;), and Daniel Torres (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100085020905116&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Daniel Torres Reports&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  945. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the meantime, we chatted with Colter and Dugan about what their project means to them. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  946. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;MAASS: Tell us what you hope people will take away from this project? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  947. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;MEYER: We think of our work as a way for us to contribute to a broader movement for border justice that has been alive and well in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands for decades. Using photography, mapping, and other forms of research, we are trying to make the constantly expanding infrastructure of U.S. border policing and surveillance more visible to public audiences everywhere. Our hope is that doing so will prompt more expansive and critical discussions about the extent to which these infrastructures are reshaping the social and environmental landscapes throughout this region and beyond. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  948. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;THOMAS: The diversity of landscapes that make up the borderlands can make it hard to see how these parts fit together, but the common thread of surveillance is an ominous sign for the future and we hope that the work we make can encourage people from different places and experiences to find common cause for looking critically at these infrastructures and what they mean for the future of the borderlands.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  949. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/05/ift_valley.jpg&quot; width=&quot;4718&quot; height=&quot;3932&quot; alt=&quot;A surveillance tower in a valley.&quot; title=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;An Integrated Fixed Tower in Southern Arizona. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  950. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;MAASS: So much is written about border surveillance by researchers working off documents, without seeing these towers first hand. How did your real-world exploration affect your understanding of border technology?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  951. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;THOMAS: Personally I’m left with more questions than answers when doing this fieldwork. We have driven along the border from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and it is surprising just how much variation there is within this broad system of U.S. border security. It can sometimes seem like there isn’t just one border at all, but instead a patchwork of infrastructural parts—technologies, architecture, policy, etc.—that only looks cohesive from a distance. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  952. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/04/05/ift.jpg&quot; width=&quot;836&quot; height=&quot;1000&quot; alt=&quot;A surveillance tower on a hill&quot; title=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;An Integrated Fixed Tower in Southern Arizona. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  953. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;MAASS: That makes me think of Trevor Paglen, an artist known for his work documenting surveillance programs. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/podcast-episode-making-invisible-visible&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;He often talks about the invisibility of surveillance technology&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;b&gt;. Is that also what you encountered? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  954. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;MEYER: The scale and scope of U.S. border policing is dizzying, and much of how this system functions is hidden from view. But we think many viewers of this exhibition might be surprised—as we were when we started doing this work—just how much of this infrastructure is hidden in plain sight, integrated into daily life in communities of all kinds.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  955. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This is one of the classic characteristics of infrastructure: when it is working as intended, it often seems to recede into the background of life, taken for granted as though it always existed and couldn’t be otherwise. But these systems, from surveillance programs to the border itself, require tremendous amounts of labor and resources to function, and when you look closely, it is much easier to see the waste and brutality that are their real legacy. As Colter and I do this kind of looking, I often think about a line from the late David Graeber, who wrote that “the ultimate hidden truth of the world is that it is something that we make, and could just as easily make differently.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  956. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;THOMAS: Like Dugan said, infrastructure rarely draws direct attention. As artists and researchers, then, our challenge has been to find a way to disrupt this banality visually, to literally reframe the material landscapes of surveillance in ways that sort of pull this infrastructure back into focus. We aren’t trying to make this infrastructure beautiful, but we are trying to present it in a way that people will look at it more closely. I think this is also what makes Paglen’s work so powerful—it aims for something more than simply documenting or archiving a subject that has thus far escaped scrutiny. Like Paglen, we are trying to present our audiences with images that demand attention, and to contextualize those images in ways that open up opportunities and spaces for viewers to act collectively with their attention. For us, this means collaborating with a range of other people and organizations—like the EFF—to invite viewers into critical conversations that are already happening about what these technologies and infrastructures mean for ourselves and our neighbors, wherever they are coming from.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  957.  
  958. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  959.     <pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 19:50:21 +0000</pubDate>
  960. <guid isPermaLink="false">109495 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  961. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/border-surveillance-technology">Border Surveillance Technology</category>
  962. <dc:creator>Dave Maass</dc:creator>
  963. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ioc_header_.png" alt="Infrastructures of Control" type="image/png" length="267019" />
  964.  </item>
  965.  <item>
  966.    <title>Federal Court Dismisses X&#039;s Anti-Speech Lawsuit Against Watchdog</title>
  967.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/federal-court-dimisses-xs-anti-speech-lawsuit-against-watchdog</link>
  968.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This post was co-written by EFF legal intern Melda Gurakar.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  969. &lt;p&gt;Researchers, journalists, and everyone else has a First Amendment right to criticize social media platforms and their content moderation practices without fear of being targeted by retaliatory lawsuits, a federal court recently ruled.&lt;/p&gt;
  970. &lt;p&gt;The decision by a federal court in California to dismiss a lawsuit brought by Elon Musk’s X against the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), a nonprofit organization dedicated to fighting online hate speech and misinformation, is a win for greater transparency and accountability of social media companies. The court’s ruling in &lt;em&gt;X Corp. v. Center for Countering Digital Hate Ltd&lt;/em&gt;. shows that X had no legitimate basis to bring its case in the first place, as the company used the lawsuit to penalize the CCDH for criticizing X and to deter others from doing so.&lt;/p&gt;
  971. &lt;p&gt;Vexatious cases like these are known as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs. These lawsuits chill speech because they burden speakers who engaged in protected First Amendment activity with the financial costs and stress of having to fight litigation, rather than seeking to vindicate legitimate legal claims. The goal of these suits is not to win, but to inflict harm on the opposing party for speaking. We are grateful that the court saw X’s lawsuit was a SLAPP and dismissed it, ruling that the claims lacked legal merit and that the suit violated California’s anti-SLAPP statute.&lt;/p&gt;
  972. &lt;p&gt;The lawsuit filed in July 2023 accused the CCDH of unlawfully accessing and scraping data from its platform, which X argued CCDH used in order to harm X Corp.&#039;s reputation and, by extension, its business operations, leading to lost advertising revenue and other damages. X argued that CCDH had initiated this calculated “scare campaign” aimed at deterring advertisers from engaging with the platform, supposedly resulting in a significant financial loss for X. Moreover, X claimed that the CCDH breached its Terms of Service contract as a user of X.&lt;/p&gt;
  973. &lt;p&gt;The court ruled that X’s accusations were insufficient to bypass the protective shield of California&#039;s anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the court&#039;s decision to dismiss X Corp.&#039;s claims, including those related to breach of contract and alleged infringements of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, stemmed from X Corp.&#039;s inability to convincingly allege or demonstrate significant losses attributable to CCDH&#039;s activities. This outcome not only is a triumph for CCDH, but also validates the anti-SLAPP statute&#039;s role in safeguarding critical research efforts against baseless legal challenges. Thankfully, the court also rejected X’s claim under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). X had argued that the CFAA barred CCDH’s scraping of public tweets—a erroneous reading of the law. The court found that regardless of that argument, the X had not shown a “loss” of the type protected by the CFAA, such as technological harms to data or computers.&lt;/p&gt;
  974. &lt;p&gt;EFF, alongside the ACLU of Northern California and the national ACLU, filed an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/documents/amicus-brief_-x-v-ccdh&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; in support of CCDH, arguing that X Corp.&#039;s lawsuit mischaracterized a nonviable defamation claim as a breach of contract to retaliate against CCDH. The brief supported CCDH&#039;s motion to dismiss, arguing that the term of service against CCDH as it pertains to data scraping should be deemed void, and is contrary to the public interest. It also warned of a potential chilling effect on research and activism that rely on digital platforms to gather information.&lt;/p&gt;
  975. &lt;p&gt;The ramifications of &lt;em&gt;X Corp v. CCDH &lt;/em&gt;reach far beyond this decision. &lt;em&gt;X Corp v. CCDH &lt;/em&gt;affirms the Center for Countering Digital Hate&#039;s freedom to conduct and publish research that critiques X Corp., and sets precedent that protects critical voices from being silenced online. We are grateful that the court reached this correct result and affirmed that people should not be targeted by lawsuits for speaking critically of powerful institutions.&lt;/p&gt;
  976.  
  977. &lt;ul&gt;
  978. &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/documents/amicus-brief_-x-v-ccdh&quot;&gt;EFF and ACLU Amicus Brief&lt;/a&gt; in Support of CCDH  &lt;/li&gt;
  979. &lt;/ul&gt;
  980.  
  981. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  982.     <pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2024 13:01:46 +0000</pubDate>
  983. <guid isPermaLink="false">109492 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  984. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  985. <dc:creator>Aaron Mackey</dc:creator>
  986. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/icon-2019-freespeech.png" alt="A multi-colored bullhorn icon surrounded by grey-blue hexagons" type="image/png" length="14323" />
  987.  </item>
  988.  <item>
  989.    <title>The White House is Wrong: Section 702 Needs Drastic Change</title>
  990.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/white-house-wrong-section-702-needs-drastic-change</link>
  991.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;With &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/702-spying&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; set to expire later this month, the White House recently released a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/702-white-house-4-pager&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;memo&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; objecting to the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/3961/text?s=9&amp;amp;r=2&amp;amp;q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22safe+act%22%7D&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;SAFE Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—legislation introduced by Senators Dick Durbin and Mike Lee that would reauthorize Section 702 with some reforms. The White House is wrong. SAFE is a bipartisan bill that may be our most realistic chance of reforming a dangerous NSA mass surveillance program that even &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/federal-governments-privacy-watchdog-concedes-702-must-change&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;the federal government’s privacy watchdog&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/world/us/white-house-recommends-scaling-back-fbi-authority-under-intelligence-act-2023-07-31/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;the White House itself&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; have acknowledged needs reform. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  992. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/safe-act-two-steps-forward-one-step-back&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;As we’ve written&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, the SAFE Act does not go nearly far enough in protecting us from the warrantless surveillance the government now conducts under Section 702. But, with surveillance hawks in the government pushing for a reauthorization of their favorite national security law without &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;any &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;meaningful reforms, the SAFE Act might be privacy and civil liberties advocates’ best hope for imposing some checks upon Section 702.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  993. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 is a serious threat to the privacy of those in the United States. It authorizes the collection of overseas communications for national security purposes, and, in a globalized world, this allows the government to collect a massive amount of Americans’ communications. As Section 702 is currently written, intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoor-search&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;backdoor, warrantless access&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to millions of communications from people with clear constitutional rights. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  994. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The White House objects to the SAFE Act’s two major reforms. The first requires the government to obtain court approval before accessing the content of communications for people in the United States which have been hoovered up and stored in Section 702 databases—just like police have to do to read your letters or emails. The SAFE Act’s second reform closes the “data broker loophole” by largely prohibiting the government from purchasing personal data they would otherwise need a warrant to collect. While the White House memo is just the latest attempt to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/dont-fall-intelligence-communitys-monster-week-justifications&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;scare lawmakers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; into reauthorizing Section 702, it omits important context and distorts the key SAFE Act amendments’ effects&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  995. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/07/deja-vu-fbi-proves-again-it-cant-be-trusted-section-702&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;government&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/internal-documents-show-how-little-fbi-did-correct-misuse-section-702-databases&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;has&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;repeatedly&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/october-3-2011-fisc-opinion-holding-nsa-surveillance-unconstitutional&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;abused&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; Section 702 by searching its databases for Americans’ communications. Every time, the government claims it has learned from its mistakes and won’t repeat them, only for another abuse to come to light years later. The government asks you to&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-matthew-g-olsen-delivers-remarks-brookings-institution-section&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;trust it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; with the enormously powerful surveillance tool that is Section 702—but it has proven unworthy of that trust.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  996. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Government Should Get Judicial Approval Before Accessing Americans’ Communications&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  997. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Requiring the government to obtain judicial approval before it can access the communications of Americans and those in the United States is a necessary, minimum protection against Section 702’s warrantless surveillance. Because Section 702 does not require safeguards of particularity and probable cause when the government initially collects communications, it is essential to require the government to at least convince a judge that there is a justification before the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/06/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-has-made-mockery-constitutional-right&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;“separate Fourth Amendment event”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of the government accessing the communications of Americans it has collected. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  998. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The White House’s memo claims that the government shouldn’t need to get court approval to access communications of Americans that were “lawfully obtained” under Section 702. But this ignores the fundamental differences between Section 702 and other surveillance. Intelligence agencies and law enforcement don’t get to play “finders keepers” with our communications just because they have a pre-existing program that warrantlessly vacuums them all up.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  999. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act has exceptions from its general requirement of court approval for emergencies, consent, and—for malicious software—“defensive cybersecurity queries.” While the White House memo claims these are “dangerously narrow,” exigency and consent are longstanding, well-developed exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. And the SAFE Act gives the government even more leeway than the Fourth Amendment ordinarily does in also excluding “defensive cybersecurity queries” from its requirement of judicial approval. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1000. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;The Government Shouldn’t Be Able to Buy What It Would Otherwise Need a Warrant to Collect&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1001. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act properly imposes broad restrictions upon the government’s ability to purchase data—because way too much of our data is available for the government to purchase. Both the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2023/03/fbi-finally-admits-to-buying-location-data-on-americans-horrifying-experts/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;FBI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/25/us/politics/nsa-internet-privacy-warrant.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;NSA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; have acknowledged knowingly buying data on Americans. As we’ve written many times, the commercially available information that the government purchases &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/location-data-brokers&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;can&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/inside-fog-data-science-secretive-company-selling-mass-surveillance-local-police&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;be&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/what-fog-data-science-why-surveillance-company-so-dangerous&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;very&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/fog-revealed-guided-tour-how-cops-can-browse-your-location-data&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;revealing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/data-brokers-are-problem&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;about&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/safegraphs-disingenuous-claims-about-location-data-mask-dangerous-industry&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;our&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/07/congress-probes-how-location-data-brokers-threaten-reproductive-privacy&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;most&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/sen-wyden-exposes-data-brokers-selling-location-data-anti-abortion-groups-target&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;intimate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/illinois-bought-invasive-phone-location-data-banned-broker-safegraph&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;private&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/01/grindr-and-okcupid-sell-your-data-twitters-mopub-real-problem&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;communications&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/how-ad-tech-became-cop-spy-tech&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;and&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/11/data-broker-veraset-gave-bulk-device-level-gps-data-dc-government&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;associations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ODNI-Declassified-Report-on-CAI-January2022.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Director of National Intelligence’s own report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on government purchases of commercially available information recognizes this data can be “misused to pry into private lives, ruin reputations, and cause emotional distress and threaten the safety of individuals.” This report also recognizes that this data can “disclose, for example, the detailed movements and associations of individuals and groups, revealing political, religious, travel, and speech activities.” &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1002. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act would go a significant way towards closing the “data broker loophole” that the government has been exploiting. Contrary to the White House’s argument that Section 702 reauthorization is “not the vehicle” for protecting Americans’ data privacy, closing the “data broker loophole” goes hand-in-hand with putting crucial guardrails upon Section 702 surveillance: the necessary reform of requiring court approval for government access to Americans’ communications is undermined if the government is able to warrantlessly collect revealing information about Americans some other way.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1003. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The White House further objects that the SAFE Act does not address data purchases by other countries and nongovernmental entities, but this misses the point. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/06/effs-recommendations-consumer-data-privacy-laws&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The best way Congress can protect Americans’ data privacy from these entities and others is to pass comprehensive data privacy regulation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. But, in the context of Section 702 reauthorization, the government is effectively asking for special surveillance permissions for itself, that its surveillance continue to be subjected to minimal oversight while other other countries’ surveillance practices are regulated. (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/5-big-unanswered-questions-about-tiktok-bill&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;This has been a pattern as of late&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;.) The Fourth Amendment prohibits intelligence agencies and law enforcement from giving themselves the prerogative to invade our privacy.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1004.  
  1005. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1006.     <pubDate>Thu, 04 Apr 2024 17:13:58 +0000</pubDate>
  1007. <guid isPermaLink="false">109489 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1008. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
  1009. <dc:creator>Brendan Gilligan</dc:creator>
  1010. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  1011. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/NSA-eagle-2_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="61481" />
  1012.  </item>
  1013.  <item>
  1014.    <title>In Historic Victory for Human Rights in Colombia, Inter-American Court Finds State Agencies Violated Human Rights of Lawyers Defending Activists </title>
  1015.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/historic-victory-human-rights-colombia-inter-american-court-finds-state-agencies</link>
  1016.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;In a landmark ruling for fundamental freedoms in Colombia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that for over two decades the state government harassed, surveilled, and persecuted members of a lawyer’s group that defends human rights defenders, activists, and indigenous people, putting the attorneys’ lives at risk.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1017. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/historico-corte-interamericana-encuentra-responsable-internacionalmente-a-colombia-por-violar-el-derecho-a-defender-derechos-humanos/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The ruling&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; is a major victory for civil rights in Colombia, which has a long history of abuse and violence against human rights defenders, including murders and death threats. The case involved the unlawful and arbitrary surveillance of members of the Jose Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Collective (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;CAJAR&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;), a Colombian human rights organization defending victims of political persecution and community activists for over 40 years.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1018. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court found that since at least 1999, Colombian authorities carried out a constant campaign of pervasive secret surveillance of CAJAR members and their families. That state violated their rights to life, personal integrity, private life, freedom of expression and association, and more, the Court said. It noted the particular impact experienced by women defenders and those who had to leave the country amid threat, attacks, and harassment for representing victims. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1019. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The decision is the first by the Inter-American Court to find a State responsible for violating the right to defend human rights. The court is a human rights tribunal that interprets and applies the American Convention on Human Rights, an international treaty ratified by over 20 states in Latin America and the Caribbean.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1020. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In 2022, EFF, Article 19, Fundación Karisma, and Privacy International, represented by Berkeley Law’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.berkeley.edu/experiential/clinics/international-human-rights-law-clinic/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;International Human Rights Law Clinic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, filed an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/eff-inter-american-court-human-rights-colombias-surveillance-human-rights&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; in the case. EFF and partners urged the court to rule that Colombia’s legal framework regulating intelligence activity and the surveillance of CAJAR and their families violated a constellation of human rights and forced them to limit their activities, change homes, and go into exile to avoid violence, threats, and harassment.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1021. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Colombia&#039;s intelligence network was behind abusive surveillance practices in violation of the American Convention and did not prevent authorities from unlawfully surveilling, harassing, and attacking CAJAR members, EFF told the court. Even after Colombia enacted a new intelligence law, authorities continued to carry out unlawful communications surveillance against CAJAR members, using an expansive and invasive spying system to target and disrupt the work of not just CAJAR &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;but other &lt;a href=&quot;http://human rights defenders&quot;&gt;human rights defenders&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://journalists/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;journalists&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1022. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In examining Colombia’s intelligence law and surveillance actions, the court elaborated on key Inter-American and other international human rights standards, and advanced significant conclusions for the protection of privacy, freedom of expression, and the right to defend human rights.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1023. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The court delved into criteria for intelligence gathering powers, limitations, and controls. It highlighted the need for independent oversight of intelligence activities and effective remedies against arbitrary actions. It also elaborated on standards for the collection, management, and access to personal data held by intelligence agencies, and recognized the protection of informational self-determination by the American Convention. We highlight some of the most important conclusions below.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1024. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Prior Judicial Order for Communications Surveillance and Access to Data&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1025. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court noted that actions such as covert surveillance, interception of communications, or collection of personal data constitute undeniable interference with the exercise of human rights, requiring precise regulations and effective controls to prevent abuse from state authorities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. Its ruling recalled &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;European Court of Human Rights’ case law establishing that&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;the mere existence of legislation allowing for a system of secret monitoring […] constitutes a threat to &#039;freedom of communication among users of telecommunications services and thus amounts in itself to an interference with the exercise of rights&#039;.”  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1026. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Building on its ruling in the case &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://jurisprudencia.corteidh.or.cr/vid/883977150&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Escher et al. vs Brazil&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, the Inter-American Court stated that&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1027. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;“[t]he effective protection of the rights to privacy and freedom of thought and expression, combined with the extreme risk of arbitrariness posed by the use of surveillance techniques […] of communications, especially in light of existing new technologies, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;leads this Court to conclude that any measure in this regard&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; (including interception, surveillance, and monitoring of all types of communication […]) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;requires a judicial authority to decide on its merits&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, while also defining its limits, including the manner, duration, and scope of the authorized measure.” (emphasis added) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;720}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1028. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1029. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;According to the court, judicial authorization is needed when intelligence agencies intend to request personal information from private companies that, for various legitimate reasons, administer or manage this data. Similarly, prior judicial order is required for “surveillance and tracking techniques concerning specific individuals that entail access to non-public databases and information systems that store and process personal data, the tracking of users on the computer network, or the location of electronic devices.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1030. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court said that “techniques or methods involving access to sensitive telematic metadata and data, such as email and metadata of OTT applications, location data, IP address, cell tower station, cloud data, GPS and Wi-Fi, also require prior judicial authorization.” Unfortunately&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, the court missed the opportunity to clearly differentiate between targeted and mass surveillance to explicitly condemn the latter.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1031. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The court had already recognized in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Escher&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; that the American Convention protects not only the content of communications but also any related information like the origin, duration, and time of the communication. But legislation across the region provides less protection for metadata compared to content. We hope the court&#039;s new ruling helps to repeal measures allowing state authorities to access metadata without a previous judicial order.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1032. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Indeed, the court emphasized that the need for a prior judicial authorization &quot;is consistent with the role of guarantors of human rights that corresponds to judges in a democratic system, whose necessary independence enables the exercise of objective control, in accordance with the law, over the actions of other organs of public power.”  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1033. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;To this end, the judicial authority is responsible for evaluating the circumstances around the case and conducting a proportionality assessment. The judicial decision must be well-founded and weigh all constitutional, legal, and conventional requirements to justify granting or denying a surveillance measure.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1034. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Informational Self-Determination Recognized as an Autonomous Human Right &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1035. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In a landmark outcome, the court asserted that individuals are entitled to decide when and to what extent aspects of their private life can be revealed, which involves defining what type of information, including their personal data, others may get to know. This relates to the right of informational self-determination, which the court recognized as an autonomous right protected by the American Convention.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1036. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;“In the view of the Inter-American Court, the foregoing elements give shape to an autonomous human right: the right to informational self-determination, recognized in various legal systems of the region, and which finds protection in the protective content of the American Convention, particularly stemming from the rights set forth in Articles 11 and 13, and, in the dimension of its judicial protection, in the right ensured by Article 25.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1037. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1038. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The protections that Article 11 grant to human dignity and private life safeguard a person&#039;s autonomy and the free development of their personality. Building on this provision, the court affirmed individuals’ self-determination regarding their personal information. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In combination with the right to access information enshrined in Article 13, the court determined that people have the right to access and control their personal data held in databases.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1039. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The court has explained that the scope of this right includes several components. First, people have the right to know what data about them are contained in state records, where the data came from, how it got there, the purpose for keeping it, how long it’s been kept, whether and why it’s being shared with outside parties, and how it’s being processed. Next is the right to rectify, modify, or update their data if it is inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated. Third is the right to delete, cancel, and suppress their data in justified circumstances. Fourth is the right to oppose the processing of their data also in justified circumstances, and fifth is the right to data portability as regulated by law.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1040. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;According to the court, any exceptions to the right of informational self-determination must be legally established, necessary, and proportionate for intelligence agencies to carry out their mandate. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In elaborating on the circumstances for full or partial withholding of records held by intelligence authorities, the court said any restrictions must be compatible with the American Convention. Holding back requested information is always exceptional, limited in time, and justified according to specific and strict cases set by law. The protection of national security cannot serve as a blanket justification for denying access to personal information. “It is not compatible with Inter-American standards to establish that a document is classified simply because it belongs to an intelligence agency and not on the basis of its content,” the court said. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;16777215}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1041. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The court concluded that Colombia violated CAJAR members’ right to informational self -determination by arbitrarily restricting their ability to access and control their personal data within public bodies’ intelligence files.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1042. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The Vital Protection of the Right to Defend Human Rights&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1043. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The court emphasized the autonomous nature of the right to defend human rights, finding that States must ensure people can freely, without limitations or risks of any kind, engage in activities aimed at the promotion, monitoring, dissemination, teaching, defense, advocacy, or protection of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms. The ruling recognized that Colombia violated the CAJAR members&#039; right to defend human rights.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1044. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;For over a decade, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Defensores/defensoresindice.htm&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;human rights&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://dds.cepal.org/redesoc/publicacion?id=1873&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;bodies&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2021/05/AMR0100032014SPANISH.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;organizations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.amnesty.org/es/documents/amr01/6211/2017/es/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;have&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; raised alarms and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/48791-report-first-annual-forum-human-rights-defenders-environmental-matters-latin&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;documented&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; the deep challenges and perils that human rights defenders constantly face in the Americas. In this ruling, the court importantly reiterated their fundamental role in strengthening democracy. It emphasized that this role justifies a special duty of protection by States, which must establish adequate guarantees and facilitate the necessary means for defenders to freely exercise their activities.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1045. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Therefore, proper respect for human rights requires States’ special attention to actions that limit or obstruct the work of defenders. The court has emphasized that threats and attacks against human rights defenders, as well as the impunity of perpetrators, have not only an individual but also a collective effect, insofar as society is prevented from knowing the truth about human rights violations under the authority of a specific State.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1046. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Colombia’s Intelligence Legal Framework Enabled Arbitrary Surveillance Practices &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1047. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In our &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/06/eff-inter-american-court-human-rights-colombias-surveillance-human-rights&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, we argued that Colombian intelligence agents carried out unlawful communications surveillance of CAJAR members under a legal framework that failed to meet international human rights standards. As EFF and allies elaborated a decade ago on the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://necessaryandproportionate.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Necessary and Proportionate principles&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, international human rights law provides an essential framework for ensuring robust safeguards in the context of State communications surveillance, including intelligence activities.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1048. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In the brief, we bolstered criticism made by CAJAR, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;(&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://cejil/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;CEJIL&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, challenging Colombia’s claim that the Intelligence Law enacted in 2013 (Law n. 1621) is clear and precise, fulfills the principles of legality, proportionality, and necessity, and provides sufficient safeguards. EFF and partners highlighted that even after its passage, intelligence agencies have systematically surveilled, harassed, and attacked CAJAR members in violation of their rights.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1049. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;As we argued, that didn’t happen despite Colombia’s intelligence legal framework, rather it was enabled by its flaws. We emphasized that the Intelligence Law gives authorities wide latitude to surveil human rights defenders, lacking provisions for prior, well-founded, judicial authorization for specific surveillance measures, and robust independent oversight. We also pointed out that Colombian legislation failed to provide the necessary means for defenders to correct and erase their data unlawfully held in intelligence records.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1050. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The court ruled that, as reparation, Colombia must adjust its intelligence legal framework to reflect Inter-American human rights standards. This means that intelligence norms must be changed to clearly establish the legitimate purposes of intelligence actions, the types of individuals and activities subject to intelligence measures, the level of suspicion needed to trigger surveillance by intelligence agencies, and the duration of surveillance measures.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1051. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The reparations also call for Colombia to keep files and records of all steps of intelligence activities, “including the history of access logs to electronic systems, if applicable,” and deliver periodic reports to oversight entities. The legislation must also subject communications surveillance measures to prior judicial authorization, except in emergency situations. Moreover, Colombia needs to pass regulations for mechanisms ensuring the right to informational self-determination in relation to intelligence files&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1052. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;These are just some of the fixes the ruling calls for, and they represent a major win. Still, the court missed the opportunity to vehemently condemn state mass surveillance (which can occur under an ill-defined measure in Colombia’s Intelligence Law enabling spectrum monitoring), although Colombian courts will now have the chance to rule it out.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1053. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In all, the court ordered the state to take 16 reparation measures, including implementing a system for collecting data on violence against human rights defenders and investigating acts of violence against victims. The government must also publicly acknowledge responsibility for the violations.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1054. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The Inter-American Court&#039;s ruling in the CAJAR case sends an important message to Colombia, and the region, that intelligence powers are only lawful and legitimate when there are solid and effective controls and safeguards in place. Intelligence authorities cannot act as if international human rights law doesn&#039;t apply to their practices. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1055. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;When they do, violations must be fiercely investigated and punished. The ruling elaborates on crucial standards that States must fulfill to make this happen. Only time will tell how closely Colombia and other States will apply the court&#039;s findings to their intelligence activities. What’s certain is the dire need to fix a system that helped Colombia become the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-03-06/colombia-the-deadliest-country-in-the-americas-for-human-rights-defenders.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;deadliest country in the Americas&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; for human rights defenders last year, with 70 murders, more than half of all such murders in Latin America.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1056.  
  1057. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1058.     <pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2024 19:22:00 +0000</pubDate>
  1059. <guid isPermaLink="false">109481 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1060. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
  1061. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/necessary-and-proportionate">Necessary and Proportionate</category>
  1062. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/surveillance-human-rights">Surveillance and Human Rights</category>
  1063. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  1064. <dc:creator>Karen Gullo</dc:creator>
  1065. <dc:creator>Veridiana Alimonti</dc:creator>
  1066. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/np-logo-banner.png" alt="Necessary &amp;amp; Proportionate logo" type="image/png" length="18895" />
  1067.  </item>
  1068.  <item>
  1069.    <title>Speaking Freely: Emma Shapiro</title>
  1070.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/04/speaking-freely-emma-shapiro</link>
  1071.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;http://emma-shapiro.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Emma Shapiro&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; is an American artist, writer, and activist who is based in Valencia, Spain. She is the Editor-At-Large for the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dontdelete.art/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Don’t Delete Art&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; campaign and the founder of the international art project and movement &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://exposuretherapypro.wixsite.com/mysite&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Exposure Therapy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Her work includes the use of video, collage, performance, and photography, while primarily using her own body and image. Through her use of layered video projection, self portraiture, and repeated encounters with her own image, Emma deconstructs and questions the meaning of our bodies, how we know them, and what they could be.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1072. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Regular censorship of her artwork online and IRL has driven Emma to dedicate herself to advocacy for freedom of expression. Emma sat down with EFF’s Jillian York to discuss the need for greater protection of artistic expression across platforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;,&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; how the adult body is regulated in the digital world, the role of visual artists as defenders of cultural and digital rights, and more. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1073. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What does free expression mean to you? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1074. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Free expression, to me, as primarily an artist—I’ve now also become an arts writer and an advocate for artistry things including censorship and suppression online of those who make art —but, primarily, I’m an artist. So for me free expression is my own ability to make my work and see the artwork of others. That is what is, baseline, the most important thing to me. And whenever I encounter obstacles to those things is when I know I’m facing issues with free expression. Besides that, how free we are to express ourselves is kind of the barometer for what kind of society we’re living in. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1075. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you tell me about an experience that shaped your views on freedom of expression? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1076. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The first times I encountered suppression and erasure of my own art work, which is probably the most pivotal moment that I personally had that shaped my views around this in that I became indignant and that led me down a path of meeting other artists and other people who were expressing themselves and facing the exact same problem. Especially in the online space. The way it operates is, if you’re being censored, you’re being suppressed. You’re effectively not being seen. So unless you’re seeking out this conversation – and that’s usually because it’s happened to you – you’re easily not going to encounter this problem. You’re not going to be able to interact with the creators this is happening to. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1077. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That was a completely ground-shifting and important experience for me when I first started experiencing this kind of suppression and erasure of my artwork online. I’ve always experienced misunderstanding of my work and I usually chalked that up to a puritan mindset or sexism in that I use my own body in my artwork. Even though I’m not dealing with sexual themes – I’m not even dealing with feminist themes – those topics are unavoidable as soon as you use a body. Especially a female-presenting body in your artwork. As soon as I started posting my artwork online that was when the experience of censorship became absolutely clear to me. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1078. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Tell me about your project Exposure Therapy. We’ve both done a lot of work around how female-presenting bodies are allowed to exist on social media platforms. I would love to hear your take on this and what brought you to that project. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1079. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;I’d be happy to talk about Exposure Therapy! Exposure Therapy came out of one of the first major instances of censorship that I experienced. Which was something that happened in real life. It happened at a WalMart in rural Virginia where I couldn’t get my work printed. They threatened me with the police and they destroyed my artwork in front of me. The reason they gave me was that it showed nipples. So I decided to put my nipples everywhere. Because I was like… this is so arbitrary. If I put my nipple on my car is my car now illicit and sexy or whatever you’re accusing me of? So that’s how Exposure Therapy started. It started as a physical offline intervention. And it was just my own body that I was using. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1080. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Then when I started &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.instagram.com/nipeople/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;an Instagram account&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to explore it a little further I, of course, faced online censorship of the female-presenting nipple. And so it became a more complex conversation after that. Because the online space and how we judge bodies online was a deep and confusing world. I ended up meeting a lot of other activists online who are dealing with the same topic and incorporating other bodies into the project. Out of that, I’ve grown nearly everything I’ve done since as having to do with online spaces, the censorship of bodies, and particularly censorship of female-presenting bodies. And it’s been an extremely rewarding experience. It’s been very interesting to monitor the temperature shifts over the last few years since I began the project, and to see how some things have remained the same. I mean, even when I go out and discuss the topic of censorship of the female-presenting nipple, the baseline understanding people often have is they think that female nipples are genitalia and they’re embarrassed by them. And that’s a lot of people in the world – even people who would attend a lecture of mine feel that way!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1081. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: If you were to be the CEO of a social media platform tomorrow how would you construct the rules when it comes to the human body? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1082. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;When it comes to the adult human body. The adult consenting human body. I’m interested more in user choice in online spaces and social media platforms. I like the idea of me, as a user, going into a space with the ability to determine what I don’t want to see or what I do want to see. Instead of the space dictating what’s allowed to be on the space in the first place. And I also am interested in some models that I’ve seen where the artist or the person posting the content is labeling the images themselves, like self-tagging. And those tags end up creating their own sub-tags. And that is very interactive – it could be a much more interactive and user-experience based space rather than the way social media is operating right now which is completely dictated from the top down. There basically is no user choice now. There might be some toggles that you can say that you want to see or that you don’t want to see “sensitive content,” but they’re still the ones labeling what “sensitive content” is. I’m mostly interested in the user choice aspect. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lips.social/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Lips social media&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; run by Annie Brown I find to be a fascinating experiment. Something that she is proving is that there is a space that can be created that is LGBTQ and feminist-focused where it does put the user first. It puts the creator first. And there’s a sort of social contract that you’re a part of being in that space. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1083. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Let me ask you about the Don’t Delete Art Campaign. What prompted that and what’s been a success story from that campaign? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1084. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I’m not a founding member of Don’t Delete Art. My fellow co-curators, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.spencertunick.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Spencer Tunick&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.savannahspirit.photography/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Savannah Spirit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, were there in the very beginning when this was created with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ncac.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;NCAC&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (National Coalition Against Censorship) and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freemuse.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Freemuse&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://artistsatriskconnection.org/about-arc&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;ARC&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (Artists at Risk Connection), and there were also some others involved at the beginning. But now it is those three organizations and three of us artists/ activists. Since its inception in 2020, I believe, or the end of 2019, we had seen a shift in the way that certain things were happening at Meta. We mostly are dealing with Meta platforms because they’re mostly image-based. Of course there are things that happen on other social media platforms, but visual artists are usually using these visual platforms. So most of our work has had to do with Meta platforms, previously Facebook platforms. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1085. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;And since the inception of Don’t Delete Art we actually have seen shifts in the way that they deal with the appeals processes and the way that there might be more nuance in how lens-based work is assessed. We can’t necessarily claim those as victories because no one has told us, “This is thanks to you, Don’t Delete Art, that we made this change!” Of course, they’re never going to do that. But we’re pretty confident that our input – our contact with them, the data that we gathered to give them – helps them hear a little more of our artistic perspectives and integrate that into their content moderation design. So that’s a win. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1086. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;For me personally, since I came on board – and I’m the Editor at Large of Don’t Delete Art – I have been very pleased with our interaction with artists and other groups including digital rights groups and free expression groups who really value what we do. And that we are able to collaborate with them, take part in events that they’re doing, and spread the message of Don’t Delete Art. And just let artists know that when this happens to them – this suppression or censorship – they’re not alone. Because it’s an extremely isolating situation. People feel ashamed. It’s hard to know you’re now inaugurated into a community when this happens to you. So I feel like that’s a win. The more I can educate my own community, the artist community, on this issue and advance the conversation and advance the cause. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1087. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: What would you say to someone who says nudity isn’t one of the most important topics in the discussion around content moderation?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1088. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;That is something that I encounter a lot. And basically it’s that there’s a lot of aspects to being an artist online—and then especially an artist who uses the body online—that faces suppression and censorship that people tend to think our concerns are frivolous. This also goes hand in hand with  the “free the nipple” movement and body equality. People tend to look upon those conversations—especially when they’re online—as being frivolous secondary concerns. And what I have to say to that is… my body is your body. If my body is not considered equal for any reason at all and not given the respect it deserves then no body is equal. It doesn’t matter what context it’s in. It doesn’t matter if I’m using my body or using the topic of female nipples or me as an artist. The fact that art using the body is so suppressed online means that there’s a whole set of artists who just aren’t being seen, who are unable to access the same kinds of tools as other artists who choose a different medium. And the medium that we choose to express ourselves with shouldn’t be subject to those kinds of restrictions. It shouldn’t be the case that artists have to change their entire practice just to get access to the same tools that other artists have. Which has happened. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1089. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Many artists, myself included, [and] Savannah Spirit, especially, speak to this: people have changed their entire practice or they don’t show entire bodies of work or they even stop creating because they’re facing suppression and censorship and even harassment online. And that extends to the offline space. If a gallery is showing an artist who faces censorship online, they would be less likely to include that artist’s work in their promotional material where they might have otherwise. Or, if they do host that artist’s work and the gallery faces suppression and censorship of their presence online because of that artist’s work, then in the future they might choose not to work with an artist who works with the body. Then we’re losing an entire field of art in which people are discussing body politics and identity and ancestry and everything that has to do with the body. I mean there’s a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;reason&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; artists are working with the body. It’s important commentary, an important tool, and important visibility. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1090. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Is there anything else you’d like to share about your work that I haven’t asked you about? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1091. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;I do want to have the opportunity to say that—and it relates to the way people might not take some artists seriously or take this issue seriously—and I think that extends to the digital rights conversation and artists. I think it’s a conversation that isn’t being had in art communities. But it’s something that affects visual artists completely. Visual artists aren’t necessarily—well, it’s hard to group us as a community because we don’t have unions for ourselves, it’s a pretty individualistic practice, obviously—but artists don’t tend to realize that they are cultural rights defenders. And that they need to step in and occupy their digital rights space. Digital rights conversations very rarely include the topic of visual art. For example, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://santaclaraprinciples.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Santa Clara Principles&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; is a very important document that doesn’t mention visual art at all. And that’s a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;both sides &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;problem. That artists don’t recognize the importance of digital art in their practice, and digital rights groups don’t realize that they should be inviting visual artists to the table. So in my work, especially in the writing I do for arts journals, I have very specifically focused on and tried to call this out. That artists need to step into the digital rights space and realize this is a conversation that needs to be had in our own community. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1092. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: That is a fantastic call to action to have in this interview, thank you. Now my final question- who, if anyone, is your free expression hero? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1093. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I feel somewhat embarrassed by it because it comes from a very naive place, but when I was a young kid I saw &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ragtime_(musical)&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Ragtime&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on Broadway and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emma_Goldman&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Emma Goldman&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; became my icon as a very young child. And of course I was drawn to her probably because we have the same name! Just her character in the show, and then learning about her life, became very influential to me. I just loved the idea of a strong woman spending her life and her energy advocating for people, activating people, motivating people to fight for their rights and make sure the world is a more equal place. And that has always been a sort of model in my mind and it’s never really gone away. I feel like I backed into what I’m doing now and ended up being where I want to be. Because I, of course, pursued art and I didn’t anticipate that I would be encountering this issue. I didn’t anticipate that I’d become part of the Don’t Delete Campaign, I didn’t know any of that. I didn’t set out for that. I just always had Emma Goldman in the back of my mind as this strong female figure whose life was dedicated to free speech and equality. So that’s my biggest icon. But it also is one that I had as a very young kid who didn’t know much about the world. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1094. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Those are the icons that shape us! Thank you so much for this interview. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1095. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1096.  
  1097. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1098.     <pubDate>Tue, 02 Apr 2024 20:38:31 +0000</pubDate>
  1099. <guid isPermaLink="false">109486 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1100. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  1101. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/emma-banner-1.jpg" alt="Emma Shapiro photo" type="image/jpeg" length="99809" />
  1102.  </item>
  1103.  <item>
  1104.    <title>Ola Bini Faces Ecuadorian Prosecutors Seeking to Overturn Acquittal of Cybercrime Charge</title>
  1105.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/ola-bini-faces-ecuadorian-prosecutors-seeking-overturn-acquittal-cybercrime-charge</link>
  1106.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Ola Bini, the software developer &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/aftermath-ola-binis-unanimous-acquittal-ecuadorian-court&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;acquitted last year&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; of cybercrime charges in a unanimous verdict in Ecuador, was back in court last week in Quito as prosecutors, using the same evidence that helped clear him, asked an appeals court to overturn the decision with bogus allegations of unauthorized access of a telecommunications system.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Armed with a grainy image of a telnet session—which the lower court already ruled was not proof of criminal activity—and testimony of an expert witness to the lower court—who never had access to the devices and systems involved in the alleged intrusion—prosecutors presented the theory that, by connecting to a router, Bini made partial unauthorized access in an attempt to break into a  system  provided by Ecuador’s national telecommunications company (CNT) to a presidency&#039;s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;contingency center.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If this all sounds familiar, that’s because it is. In an unfounded criminal case plagued by irregularities, delays, and due process violations, Ecuadorian prosecutors have for the last five years sought to prove Bini violated the law by allegedly accessing an information system without authorization.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;Bini, who resides in Ecuador, was arrested at the Quito airport in 2019 without being told why. He first learned about the charges from a TV news report depicting him as a criminal trying to destabilize the country. He spent 70 days in jail and cannot leave Ecuador or use his bank accounts.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1107. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;Bini prevailed in a trial last year before a three-judge panel. The core evidence the Prosecutor’s Office and CNT’s lawyer presented to support the accusation of unauthorized access to a computer, telematic, or telecommunications system was a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/telnet-not-crime-unconvincing-prosecution-screenshot-leaked-ola-bini-case&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;printed image&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; of a telnet session allegedly taken from Bini’s mobile phone.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;The image shows the user requesting a telnet connection to an open server using their computer’s command line. The open server warns that unauthorized access is prohibited and asks for a username. No username is entered. The connection then times out and closes. Rather than demonstrating that Bini intruded into the Ecuadorean telephone network system, it shows the trail of someone who paid a visit to a publicly accessible server—and then politely obeyed the server&#039;s warnings about usage and access.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;Bini’s acquittal was a major victory for him and the work of security researchers. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;By assessing the evidence presented, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.labarraespaciadora.com/ddhh/ola-bini-es-inocente/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;court concluded&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that both the Prosecutor’s Office and CNT failed to demonstrate a crime had occurred. There was no evidence that unauthorized access had ever happened, nor anything to sustain the malicious intent that article 234 of Ecuador’s Penal Code requires to characterize the offense of unauthorized access.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;The court emphasized the necessity of proper evidence to prove that an alleged computer crime occurred and found that the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/08/telnet-not-crime-unconvincing-prosecution-screenshot-leaked-ola-bini-case&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;image&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;telnet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; session presented in Bini’s case is not fit for this purpose. The court explained that graphical representations, which can &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;be altered, do not constitute evidence of cybercrime&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; since an image cannot verify whether the commands illustrated in it were &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;actually executed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Building on technical experts&#039; testimonies, the court said that what does not emerge, or what can&#039;t be verified from digital forensics, is not proper digital evidence.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;Prosecutors appealed the verdict and are back in court using the same image that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;didn’t&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; prove any crime was committed. At the March &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;2&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;6 hearing, prosecutors said their expert witness’s analysis of the telnet image shows there was connectivity to the router. The witness compared it to entering the yard of someone’s property to see if the gate to the property is open or closed. Entering the yard is analogous to connecting to the router, the witness said.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Actually, no.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; Our interpretation of the image, which was leaked to the media before Bini’s trial, is&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;it’s&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; the internet equivalent of seeing an open gate, walking up to it, seeing a “NO TRESPASSING” sign, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;walking away&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;If this image could prove anything it &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;i&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;s that no unauthorized access happened.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;Yet, no expert analysis was conducted in the systems allegedly affected. The &lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;expert witness’s testimony&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; was based on his analysis of a CNT report—he &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;didn’t&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; have access to the CNT router to verify its configuration. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;He didn’t digitally validate whether what was shown in the report &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;actually happened&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; and he was never asked to verify the existence of an IP address owned or managed by CNT.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;That’s&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; not the only problem with the appeal proceedings. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Deciding the appeal is a panel of three judges, two of whom ruled to keep Bini in detention after his arrest in 2019 because there were allegedly sufficient elements to establish a suspicion against him. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;The detention was later considered illegal and arbitrary because of a lack of such elements. Bini filed a lawsuit against the Ecuadorian state, including the two judges, for violating his rights. Bini’s defense team has sought to remove these two judges from the appeals case, but his requests were denied. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt;The appeals court panel is expected to issue a final ruling in the coming days. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;true}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1108.  
  1109. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1110.     <pubDate>Mon, 01 Apr 2024 16:21:42 +0000</pubDate>
  1111. <guid isPermaLink="false">109478 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1112. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/bloggers">Blogger and Other Creator Rights</category>
  1113. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/security">Security</category>
  1114. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
  1115. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/coders">Coders&#039; Rights Project</category>
  1116. <dc:creator>Karen Gullo</dc:creator>
  1117. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/offline-main.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="62377" />
  1118.  </item>
  1119.  <item>
  1120.    <title>U.S. Supreme Court Does Not Go Far Enough in Determining When Government Officials Are Barred from Censoring Critics on Social Media</title>
  1121.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/us-supreme-court-does-not-go-far-enough-determining-when-government-officials-are</link>
  1122.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;After several years of litigation across the federal appellate courts, the U.S. Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion has finally &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/03/public-officials-can-be-held-liable-for-blocking-critics-on-social-media/&quot;&gt;crafted a test&lt;/a&gt; that lower courts can use to determine whether a government official engaged in “state action” such that censoring individuals on the official’s social media page—even if also used for personal purposes—would violate the First Amendment.&lt;/p&gt;
  1123. &lt;p&gt;The case, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lindke-v-freed/&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Lindke v. Freed,&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; came out of the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8089212394121592057&quot;&gt;Sixth Circuit&lt;/a&gt; and involves a city manager, while a companion case called &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/oconnor-ratcliff-v-garnier/&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;O&#039;Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; came out of the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14510432651192764660&quot;&gt;Ninth Circuit&lt;/a&gt; and involves public school board members.&lt;/p&gt;
  1124. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;A Two-Part Test&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1125. &lt;p&gt;The First Amendment prohibits the government from censoring individuals’ speech in public forums based on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/viewpoint-discrimination/&quot;&gt;viewpoints&lt;/a&gt; that individuals express. In the age of social media, where people in government positions use public-facing social media for both personal, campaign, and official government purposes, it can be unclear whether the interactive parts (e.g., comments section) of a social media page operated by someone who works in government amount to a government-controlled &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/forums&quot;&gt;public forum&lt;/a&gt; subject to the First Amendment’s prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. Another way of stating the issue is whether a government official who uses a social media account for personal purposes is engaging in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/state_action_requirement&quot;&gt;state action&lt;/a&gt; when they also use the account to speak about government business.  &lt;/p&gt;
  1126. &lt;p&gt;As the Supreme Court states in the &lt;em&gt;Lindke&lt;/em&gt; opinion, “Sometimes … the line between private conduct and state action is difficult to draw,” and the question is especially difficult “in a case involving a state or local official who routinely interacts with the public.”&lt;/p&gt;
  1127. &lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court announced a fact-intensive test to determine if a government official’s speech on social media counts as state action under the First Amendment. The test includes two required elements:&lt;/p&gt;
  1128. &lt;ul&gt;
  1129. &lt;li&gt;the official “possessed actual authority to speak” on the government’s behalf, and&lt;/li&gt;
  1130. &lt;li&gt;the official “purported to exercise that authority when he spoke on social media.”&lt;/li&gt;
  1131. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1132. &lt;p&gt;Although the court’s opinion isn’t as generous to internet users as &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-urges-supreme-court-make-clear-government-officials-have-first-amendment&quot;&gt;we had asked for in our amicus brief&lt;/a&gt;, it does provide guidance to individuals seeking to vindicate their free speech rights against government officials who delete their comments or block them outright.&lt;/p&gt;
  1133. &lt;p&gt;This issue has been percolating in the courts since at least 2016. Perhaps most famously, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University and others &lt;a href=&quot;https://knightcolumbia.org/cases/knight-institute-v-trump&quot;&gt;sued then-president Donald Trump&lt;/a&gt; for blocking many of the plaintiffs on Twitter. In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court’s holding that President Trump’s practice of blocking critics from his Twitter account violated the First Amendment. EFF has also represented PETA in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/peta-v-texas-am&quot;&gt;two&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/eff-sues-texas-am-university-once-again-end-censorship-against-peta-facebook-and&quot;&gt;cases&lt;/a&gt; against Texas A&amp;amp;M University.&lt;/p&gt;
  1134. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Element One: Does the official possess actual authority to speak on the government’s behalf?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1135. &lt;p&gt;There is some ambiguity as to &lt;em&gt;what&lt;/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;specific &lt;/em&gt;authority the Supreme Court believes the government official must have. The opinion is unclear whether the authority is simply the general authority to speak officially on behalf of the public entity, or instead the specific authority to speak officially &lt;em&gt;on social media&lt;/em&gt;. On the latter framing, the opinion, for example, discusses the authority “to &lt;strong&gt;post city updates&lt;/strong&gt; and register citizen concerns,” and the authority “to speak for the [government]” that includes “the authority to do so on &lt;strong&gt;social media&lt;/strong&gt;….” The broader authority to generally speak on behalf of the government would be easier to prove for plaintiffs and should always include any authority to speak on social media.&lt;/p&gt;
  1136. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Element One Should Be Interpreted Broadly&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1137. &lt;p&gt;We will urge the lower courts to interpret the first element broadly. As we emphasized in our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-urges-supreme-court-make-clear-government-officials-have-first-amendment&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt;, social media is so widely used by government agencies and officials at all levels that a government official’s authority &lt;em&gt;generally&lt;/em&gt; to speak on behalf of the public entity they work for must include the right to use social media to do so. Any other result does not reflect the reality we live in.&lt;/p&gt;
  1138. &lt;p&gt;Moreover, plaintiffs who are being censored on social media are not typically commenting on the social media pages of low-level government employees, say, the clerk at the county tax assessor’s office, whose authority to speak publicly on behalf of their agency may be questionable. Plaintiffs are instead commenting on the social media pages of people in leadership positions, who are often agency heads or in elected positions and who surely &lt;em&gt;should&lt;/em&gt; have the general authority to speak for the government.&lt;/p&gt;
  1139. &lt;p&gt;“At the same time,” the Supreme Court cautions, “courts must not rely on ‘excessively broad job descriptions’ to conclude that a government employee is authorized to speak” on behalf of the government. But under what circumstances would a court conclude that a government official in a leadership position does &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; have such authority? We hope these circumstances are few and far between for the sake of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their First Amendment rights.&lt;/p&gt;
  1140. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;When Does the Use of a New Communications Technology Become So “Well Settled” That It May Fairly Be Considered Part of a Government Official’s Public Duties?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1141. &lt;p&gt;If, on the other hand, the lower courts interpret the first element &lt;em&gt;narrowly&lt;/em&gt; and require plaintiffs to provide evidence that the government official who censored them had authority to speak on behalf of the agency on &lt;em&gt;social media&lt;/em&gt; specifically, this will be more difficult to prove.&lt;/p&gt;
  1142. &lt;p&gt;One helpful aspect of the court’s opinion is that the government official’s authority to speak (however that’s defined) need &lt;em&gt;not&lt;/em&gt; be written explicitly in their job description. This is in contrast to what the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8089212394121592057&quot;&gt;Sixth Circuit&lt;/a&gt; had, essentially, held. The authority to speak on behalf of the government, instead, may be based on “persistent,” “permanent,” and “well settled” “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1983&quot;&gt;custom or usage&lt;/a&gt;.”  &lt;/p&gt;
  1143. &lt;p&gt;We remain concerned, however, that if there is a narrower requirement that the authority must be to speak on behalf of the government via a &lt;em&gt;particular communications technology&lt;/em&gt;—in this case, social media—then at what point does the use of a new technology become so “well settled” for government officials that it is fair to conclude that it is within their public duties?&lt;/p&gt;
  1144. &lt;p&gt;Fortunately, the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=133216297451375798&quot;&gt;case law&lt;/a&gt; on which the Supreme Court relies does not require an extended period of time for a government practice to be deemed a legally sufficient “custom or usage.” It would not make sense to require an ages-old custom and usage of social media when the widespread use of social media within the general populace is only a decade and a half old. Ultimately, we will urge lower courts to avoid this problem and broadly interpret element one.&lt;/p&gt;
  1145. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Government Officials May Be Free to Censor If They Speak About Government Business Outside Their Immediate Purview&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1146. &lt;p&gt;Another problematic aspect of the Supreme Court’s opinion within element one is the additional requirement that “[t]he alleged censorship must be connected to speech on a matter within [the government official’s] bailiwick.”&lt;/p&gt;
  1147. &lt;p&gt;The court explains:&lt;/p&gt;
  1148. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;For example, imagine that [the city manager] posted a list of local restaurants with health-code violations and deleted snarky comments made by other users. If public health is not within the portfolio of the city manager, then neither the post nor the deletions would be traceable to [his] state authority—because he had none.&lt;/p&gt;
  1149. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1150. &lt;p&gt;But the average constituent may not make such a distinction—nor should they. They would simply see a government official talking about an issue generally within the government’s area of responsibility. Yet under this interpretation, the city manager would be within his right to delete the comments, as the constituent could not prove that the issue was within that &lt;em&gt;particular government official’s purview&lt;/em&gt;, and they would thus fail to meet element one.&lt;/p&gt;
  1151. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Element Two: Did the official purport to exercise government authority when speaking on social media?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1152. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Plaintiffs Are Limited in How a Social Media Account’s “Appearance and Function” Inform the State Action Analysis&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1153. &lt;p&gt;In our brief, we argued for a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-urges-supreme-court-make-clear-government-officials-have-first-amendment&quot;&gt;functional test&lt;/a&gt;, where state action would be found if a government official were using their social media account in furtherance of their public duties, even if they also used that account for personal purposes. This was essentially the standard that the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14510432651192764660&quot;&gt;Ninth Circuit&lt;/a&gt; adopted, which included looking at, in the words of the Supreme Court, “whether the account’s appearance and content look official.” The Supreme Court’s two-element test is more cumbersome for plaintiffs. But the upside is that the court agrees that a social media account’s “appearance and function” is relevant, even if &lt;em&gt;only&lt;/em&gt; with respect to element two.&lt;/p&gt;
  1154. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Reality of Government Officials Using Both Personal and Official Accounts in Furtherance of Their Public Duties Is Ignored&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1155. &lt;p&gt;Another problematic aspect of the Supreme Court’s discussion of element two is that a government official’s social media page would amount to state action if the page is the “only” place where content related to government business is located. The court provides an example: “a mayor would engage in state action if he hosted a city council meeting online by streaming it &lt;strong&gt;only&lt;/strong&gt; on his personal Facebook page” and it wasn’t also available on the city’s official website. The court further discusses a new city ordinance that “is &lt;strong&gt;not available elsewhere,&lt;/strong&gt;” except on the official’s personal social media page. By contrast, if “the mayor merely repeats or shares otherwise available information … it is &lt;strong&gt;far less likely&lt;/strong&gt; that he is purporting to exercise the power of his office.”&lt;/p&gt;
  1156. &lt;p&gt;This limitation is divorced from reality and will hamstring plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their First Amendment rights. As we showed extensively in &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/press/releases/eff-urges-supreme-court-make-clear-government-officials-have-first-amendment&quot;&gt;our brief&lt;/a&gt; (see Section I.B.), government officials regularly use both official office accounts &lt;em&gt;and&lt;/em&gt; “personal” accounts for the same official purposes, by posting the same content and soliciting constituent feedback—and constituents often do not understand the difference.&lt;/p&gt;
  1157. &lt;p&gt;Constituent confusion is particularly salient when government officials continue to use “personal” campaign accounts &lt;em&gt;after&lt;/em&gt; they enter office. The court’s conclusion that a government official “might post job-related information for any number of &lt;strong&gt;personal &lt;/strong&gt;reasons, from a desire to raise public awareness to &lt;strong&gt;promoting his prospects for reelection&lt;/strong&gt;” is thus highly problematic. The court is correct that government officials have their own First Amendment right to speak as private citizens online. However, their constituents should not be subject to censorship when a campaign account functions the same as a clearly official government account.&lt;/p&gt;
  1158. &lt;h4&gt;&lt;strong&gt;An Upside: Supreme Court Denounces the Blocking of Users Even on Mixed-Use Social Media Accounts&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/h4&gt;
  1159. &lt;p&gt;One very good aspect of the Supreme Court’s opinion is that if the censorship amounted to the &lt;em&gt;blocking&lt;/em&gt; of a plaintiff from engaging with the government official’s social media page as a whole, then the plaintiff must merely show that the government official “had engaged in state action with respect to &lt;strong&gt;any post&lt;/strong&gt; on which [the plaintiff] wished to comment.”  &lt;/p&gt;
  1160. &lt;p&gt;The court further explains:&lt;/p&gt;
  1161. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;The bluntness of Facebook’s blocking tool highlights the cost of a “mixed use” social-media account: If page-wide blocking is the only option, a public of­ficial might be unable to prevent someone from commenting on his personal posts without risking liability for also pre­venting comments on his official posts. A public official who fails to keep personal posts in a clearly designated per­sonal account therefore exposes himself to greater potential liability.&lt;/p&gt;
  1162. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1163. &lt;p&gt;We are pleased with this language and hope it discourages government officials from engaging in the most egregious of censorship practices.&lt;/p&gt;
  1164. &lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court also makes the point that if the censorship was the &lt;em&gt;deletion&lt;/em&gt; of a plaintiff’s individual comments under a government official’s posts, then those posts must each be analyzed under the court’s new test to determine whether a particular post was official action and whether the interactive spaces that accompany it are government forums. As the court states, “it is crucial for the plaintiff to show that the official is purporting to exercise state authority in specific posts.” This is in contrast to the &lt;a href=&quot;https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8089212394121592057&quot;&gt;Sixth Circuit&lt;/a&gt;, which held, “When analyzing social-media activity, we look to a page or account as a whole, not each individual post.”&lt;/p&gt;
  1165. &lt;p&gt;The Supreme Court’s new test for state action unfortunately puts a thumb on the scale in favor of government officials who wish to censor constituents who engage with them on social media. However, the test does chart a path forward on this issue and should be workable if lower courts apply the test with an eye toward maximizing constituents’ First Amendment rights online.&lt;/p&gt;
  1166.  
  1167. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1168.     <pubDate>Fri, 29 Mar 2024 21:45:52 +0000</pubDate>
  1169. <guid isPermaLink="false">109479 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1170. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  1171. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/content-blocking">Content Blocking</category>
  1172. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/government-social-media-blocking">Government Social Media Blocking</category>
  1173. <dc:creator>Sophia Cope</dc:creator>
  1174. <dc:creator>David Greene</dc:creator>
  1175. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/social-media-2023-1b.gif" alt="" type="image/gif" length="3513532" />
  1176.  </item>
  1177.  <item>
  1178.    <title>Restricting Flipper is a Zero Accountability Approach to Security: Canadian Government Response to Car Hacking</title>
  1179.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/restricting-flipper-zero-accountability-approach-security-canadian-government</link>
  1180.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;On February 8, François-Philippe Champagne, the Canadian Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.canada.ca/en/public-safety-canada/news/2024/02/government-of-canada-hosts-national-summit-on-combatting-auto-theft.html?ref=blog.flipper.net&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;announced Canada would ban devices&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; used in keyless car theft. The only device mentioned by name was the Flipper Zero—the multitool device that can be used to test, explore, and debug different wireless protocols such as RFID, NFC, infrared, and Bluetooth.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1181. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption caption-center&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-width-container&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;caption-inner&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;/files/2024/03/28/20240328_132125-animation.gif&quot; width=&quot;227&quot; height=&quot;403&quot; alt=&quot;&quot; title=&quot;&quot; /&gt;&lt;p class=&quot;caption-text&quot;&gt;EFF explores toilet hacking &lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1182. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While it is useful as a penetration testing device, Flipper Zero is &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.flipper.net/response-to-canadian-government/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;impractical in comparison&lt;/a&gt; to other, more specialized devices for car theft. It’s possible social media hype around the Flipper Zero has led people to believe that this device offers easier hacking opportunities for car thieves*. But government officials are also consuming such hype. That leads to policies that don’t secure systems, but rather impedes important research that exposes potential vulnerabilities the industry should fix. Even with Canada &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pcmag.com/news/canada-walks-back-ban-of-flipper-zero-targets-illegitimate-use-cases&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;walking back on&lt;/a&gt; the original statement outright banning the devices, restricting devices and sales to “move forward with measures to restrict the use of such devices to legitimate actors only” is troublesome for security researchers.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1183. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This is not the first government seeking to limit access to Flipper Zero, and we have &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/03/flipper-zero-devices-being-seized-brazils-telecom-agency&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;explained before&lt;/a&gt; why this approach is not only harmful to security researchers but also leaves the general population more vulnerable to attacks. Security researchers may not have the specialized tools car thieves use at their disposal, so more general tools come in handy for catching and protecting against vulnerabilities. Broad purpose devices such as the Flipper have a wide range of uses: penetration testing to facilitate hardening of a home network or organizational infrastructure, hardware research, security research, protocol development, use by radio hobbyists, and many more. Restricting access to these devices will hamper development of strong, secure technologies.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1184. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When Brazil’s national telecoms regulator &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gov.br/anatel/pt-br&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Anatel&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; refused to certify the Flipper Zero and as a result prevented the national postal service from delivering the devices, they were responding to media hype. With a display and controls reminiscent of portable video game consoles, the compact form-factor and range of hardware (including an infrared transceiver, RFID reader/emulator, SDR and Bluetooth LE module) made the device an easy target to demonize. While conjuring imagery of point-and-click car theft was easy, citing examples of this actually occurring proved impossible. Over a year later, you’d be hard-pressed to find a single instance of a car being stolen with the device. The number of cars stolen with the Flipper seems to amount to, well, zero (pun intended). It is the same media hype and pure speculation that has led Canadian regulators to err in their judgment to ban these devices.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1185. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Still worse, law enforcement in other countries have signaled their own intentions to place owners of the device under greater scrutiny. The Brisbane Times &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/police-email-warns-new-device-can-emulate-car-fobs-garage-door-remotes-20240325-p5ff1e.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;quotes police&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; in Queensland, Australia: “We’re aware it can be used for criminal means, so if you’re caught with this device we’ll be asking some serious questions about why you have this device and what you are using it for.” We assume other tools with similar capabilities, as well as Swiss Army Knives and Sharpie markers, all of which “can be used for criminal means,” will not face this same level of scrutiny. Just owning this device, whether as a hobbyist or professional—or even just as a curious customer—should &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;not&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; make one the subject of overzealous police suspicions.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1186. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It wasn’t too long ago that proficiency with the command line was seen as a dangerous skill that warranted intervention by authorities. And just as with those fears of decades past, the small grain of truth embedded in the hype and fears gives it an outsized power. Can the command line be used to do bad things? Of course. Can the Flipper Zero assist criminal activity? Yes. Can it be used to steal cars? Not nearly as well as many other (and better, from the criminals’ perspective) tools. Does that mean it should be banned, and that those with this device should be placed under criminal suspicion? Absolutely not. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1187. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1188. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We hope Canada wises up to this logic, and comes to view the device as just one of many in the toolbox that can be used for good or evil, but mostly for good.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1189. &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;span&gt;*Though concerns have been raised about Flipper Devices&#039; connection to the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://simovits.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Flipper-Zero-Zero-Trust-or-Beware-of-Geek-Bearing-Gifts-2023.pdf&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Russian state apparatus&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, no unexpected data has been observed escaping to Flipper Devices&#039; servers, and much of the dedicated security and pen-testing hardware which hasn&#039;t been banned also suffers from similar problems.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1190.  
  1191. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1192.     <pubDate>Fri, 29 Mar 2024 03:30:16 +0000</pubDate>
  1193. <guid isPermaLink="false">109475 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1194. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa">Computer Fraud And Abuse Act Reform</category>
  1195. <dc:creator>Bill Budington</dc:creator>
  1196. <dc:creator>Alexis Hancock</dc:creator>
  1197. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/tinker-tech_0.png" alt="Tinker Repair" type="image/png" length="9559" />
  1198.  </item>
  1199.  <item>
  1200.    <title>EFF Asks Oregon Supreme Court Not to Limit Fourth Amendment Rights Based on Terms of Service</title>
  1201.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/eff-asks-oregon-supreme-court-not-limit-fourth-amendemtn-rights-based-terms</link>
  1202.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This post was drafted by EFF legal intern Alissa Johnson.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1203. &lt;p&gt;EFF signed on to an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/state-v-simons-eff-nacdl-amicus-brief&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; drafted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers earlier this month&lt;/span&gt; petitioning the Oregon Supreme Court &lt;span&gt;to &lt;/span&gt;review &lt;em&gt;State v. Simons&lt;/em&gt;, a case involving law enforcement surveillance of over a year’s worth of private internet activity. We ask that the Court join the &lt;span&gt;Ninth &lt;/span&gt;Circuit in recognizing that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their browsing histories, and that checking a box to access public Wi-Fi does not waive Fourth Amendment rights.&lt;/p&gt;
  1204. &lt;p&gt;Mr. Simons was convicted of downloading child pornography after police warrantlessly captured his browsing history on an A&amp;amp;W restaurant’s public Wi-Fi network, which he accessed from his home across the street. The network was not password&lt;span&gt;-&lt;/span&gt;protected but did require users to agree to a&lt;span&gt;n acceptable&lt;/span&gt; use policy, which noted that while web activity would not be actively monitored under normal circumstances, A&amp;amp;W “&lt;span&gt;may cooperate with legal authorities.” &lt;/span&gt;A private consultant hired by the restaurant noticed a device on the network accessing child pornography sites and turned over logs of all of the device’s unencrypted internet activity, both illegal and benign, to law enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;
  1205. &lt;p&gt;The Court of Appeals assert&lt;span&gt;ed&lt;/span&gt; that Mr. Simons had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his browsing history on A&amp;amp;W’s free Wi-Fi network. &lt;span&gt;We&lt;/span&gt; disagree.&lt;/p&gt;
  1206. &lt;p&gt;Browsing history reveals some of the most sensitive personal information that exists—the very privacies of life that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. It can allow police to uncover political and religious affiliation, medical history, sexual orientation, or immigration status, among other personal details. Internet users know how much of their private information is exposed through browsing data, take steps to protect it, and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance/&quot;&gt;expect it to remain private&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  1207. &lt;p&gt;Courts have also recognized that browsing history offers an extraordinarily detailed picture of someone’s private life. In &lt;em&gt;Riley v. California&lt;/em&gt;, the Supreme Court cited browsing history as an example of the deeply private information that can be found on a cell phone. The&lt;span&gt; Ninth&lt;/span&gt; Circuit went a step further in &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2020/04/09/17-17486.pdf&quot;&gt;holding&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their browsing histories.&lt;/p&gt;
  1208. &lt;p&gt;People’s expectation of privacy in browsing history doesn’t disappear when tapping “I Agree” on a long scroll of Terms of Service to access public Wi-Fi. Private businesses monitoring internet activity to protect their commercial interests does not license the government to sidestep a warrant requirement, or otherwise waive constitutional rights.&lt;/p&gt;
  1209. &lt;p&gt;The price of participation in public society cannot be the loss of Fourth Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable government infringement on our privacy. As the Supreme Court noted in &lt;em&gt;Carpenter v. United States&lt;/em&gt;, “A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.” People cannot negotiate the terms under which they use public Wi-Fi, and in practicality have no choice but to accept the terms dictated by the network provider.&lt;/p&gt;
  1210. &lt;p&gt;The&lt;span&gt; Oregon&lt;/span&gt; Court of Appeals’ assertion that access to public Wi-Fi is convenient but not necessary for participation in modern life ignores &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/06/22/digital-divide-persists-even-as-americans-with-lower-incomes-make-gains-in-tech-adoption/&quot;&gt;well-documented inequalities&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/podcast-episode-why-does-my-internet-suck&quot;&gt;in internet access&lt;/a&gt; across race and class. Fourth Amendment rights are for everyone, not just those with private residences and a Wi-Fi budget.&lt;/p&gt;
  1211. &lt;p&gt;Allowing private businesses’ Terms of Service to dictate our constitutional rights threatens to make a “crazy quilt” of the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in &lt;em&gt;Smith v. Maryland&lt;/em&gt;. Pinning constitutional protection to the contractual provisions of private parties is absurd and impracticable. Almost all of us rely on Wi-Fi outside of our homes, and that access should be protected against government surveillance.&lt;/p&gt;
  1212. &lt;p&gt;We hope that the Oregon Supreme Court accepts Mr. Simons’ petition for review to address the important constitutional questions at stake in this case.&lt;/p&gt;
  1213.  
  1214. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1215.     <pubDate>Thu, 28 Mar 2024 00:26:10 +0000</pubDate>
  1216. <guid isPermaLink="false">109471 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1217. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  1218. <dc:creator>Andrew Crocker</dc:creator>
  1219. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/mobile-privacy.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="23559" />
  1220.  </item>
  1221.  <item>
  1222.    <title>Meta Oversight Board’s Latest Policy Opinion a Step in the Right Direction </title>
  1223.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/meta-oversight-boards-latest-policy-opinion-step-right-direction</link>
  1224.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF welcomes the latest and long-awaited &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://oversightboard.com/news/950390256664030-oversight-board-publishes-policy-advisory-opinion-on-referring-to-designated-dangerous-individuals-as-shaheed/?_hsmi=299851086&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;policy advisory opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; from Meta’s Oversight Board calling on the company to end its blanket ban on the use of the Arabic-language term “shaheed” when referring to individuals listed under Meta’s policy on dangerous organizations and individuals and calls on Meta to fully implement the Board’s recommendations.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1225. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since the Meta Oversight Board was &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://about.fb.com/news/2020/05/welcoming-the-oversight-board/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;created in 2020&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; as an appellate body designed to review select contested content moderation decisions made by Meta, we’ve watched with interest as the Board has considered a diverse set of cases and issued expert opinions aimed at reshaping Meta’s policies. While our views on the Board&#039;s efficacy in creating long-term policy change have been mixed, we have been happy to see the Board issue policy recommendations that seek to maximize free expression on Meta properties.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1226. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://oversightboard.com/news/950390256664030-oversight-board-publishes-policy-advisory-opinion-on-referring-to-designated-dangerous-individuals-as-shaheed/?_hsmi=299851086&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;policy advisory opinion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, issued Tuesday, addresses posts referring to individuals as &#039;shaheed&#039; an Arabic term that closely (though not exactly) translates to &#039;martyr,&#039; when those same individuals have previously been designated by Meta as &#039;dangerous&#039; under its dangerous organizations and individuals policy. The Board found that Meta’s approach to moderating content that contains the term to refer to individuals who are designated by the company’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://transparency.fb.com/policies/community-standards/dangerous-individuals-organizations/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;policy on “dangerous organizations and individuals”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/12/facebooks-secret-dangerous-organizations-and-individuals-list-creates-problems&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;policy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that covers both government-proscribed organizations and others selected by the company— substantially and disproportionately restricts free expression.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1227. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Oversight Board first issued a call for comment in early 2023, and in April of last year, EFF partnered with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ecnl.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/de/deeplinks/2023/04/eff-and-ecnls-comment-meta-oversight-board-term-shaheed&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;submit comment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; for the Board’s consideration. In our joint comment, we wrote:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1228. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The automated removal of words such as ‘shaheed’ fail to meet the criteria for restricting users’ right to freedom of expression. They not only lack necessity and proportionality and operate on shaky legal grounds (if at all), but they also fail to ensure access to remedy and violate Arabic-speaking users’ right to non-discrimination.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1229. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In addition to finding that Meta’s current approach to moderating such content restricts free expression, the Board noted thate importance of any restrictions on freedom of expression that seek to prevent violence must be necessary and proportionate, “given that undue removal of content may be ineffective and even counterproductive.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1230. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We couldn’t agree more. We have long been concerned about the impact of corporate policies and government regulations designed to limit violent extremist content on &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/caught-net-impact-extremist-speech-regulations-human-rights-content&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;human rights and evidentiary content&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, as well as journalism and art. We have worked directly with companies and with multi stakeholder initiatives such as the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://gifct.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://techagainstterrorism.org/home&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Tech Against Terrorism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.christchurchcall.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Christchurch Call&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to ensure that freedom of expression remains a core part of policymaking.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1231. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In its policy recommendation, the Board acknowledges the importance of Meta’s ability to take action to ensure its platforms are not used to incite violence or recruit people to engage in violence, and that the term “shaheed” is sometimes used by extremists “to praise or glorify people who have died while committing violent terrorist acts.” However, the Board also emphasizes that Meta’s response to such threats must be guided by respect for all human rights, including freedom of expression. Notably, the Board’s opinion echoes our previous demands for policy changes, as well as those of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://stopsilencingpalestine.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Stop Silencing Palestine&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; campaign initiated by nineteen digital and human rights organizations, including EFF.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1232. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;We call on Meta to implement the Board’s recommendations and ensure that future policies and practices respect freedom of expression.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1233.  
  1234. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1235.     <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 19:11:38 +0000</pubDate>
  1236. <guid isPermaLink="false">109469 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1237. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  1238. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/corporate-speech-controls">Corporate Speech Controls</category>
  1239. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
  1240. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  1241. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/terror-3a-big.png" alt="Caught in the Net Report" type="image/png" length="61818" />
  1242.  </item>
  1243.  <item>
  1244.    <title>Speaking Freely: Robert Ssempala</title>
  1245.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/speaking-freely-robert-ssempala</link>
  1246.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;*This interview has been edited for length and clarity. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1247. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Robert Ssempala is a longtime press freedom and social justice advocate. He serves as Executive Director at Human Rights Network for Journalists-&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Uganda&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, a network of journalists in Uganda working towards enhancing the promotion, protection, and respect of human rights through defending and building the capacities of journalists, to effectively exercise their constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms for collective campaigning through the media. Under his leadership, his organization has supported hundreds of journalists who have been assaulted, imprisoned, and targeted in the course of their work. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1248. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: What does free speech or free expression mean to you?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1249. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; It means being able to give one’s opinions and ideas freely without fear of reprisals or without fearing facing criminal sanctions, and without being concerned about how another feels about their ideas or opinions. Sometimes even if it’s offensive, it’s one’s opinion. For me, it’s entirely how one wants to express themselves that is all about having the liberty to speak freely.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1250. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: What are the qualities that make you passionate about free expression?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1251. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;For me, it is the light for everyone when they’re able to give their ideas and opinions. It is having a sense of liberty to have an idea. I am very passionate about listening to ideas, about everyone getting to speak what they feel is right. The qualities that make me passionate about it are that, first, I’m from a media background. So, during that time I learned that we are going to receive the people’s ideas and opinions, disseminate them to the wider public, and there will be feedback from the public about what has come out from one side to the other. And that quality is so dear to my heart. And second, it is a sense of freedom that is expressed at all levels, in any part of the country or the world, being the people’s eyes and ears, especially at their critical times of need.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1252. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: I want to ask you more about Uganda. Can you give us a short overview of what the situation for speech is like in the country right now?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1253. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;The climate in Uganda is partly free and partly not free, depending on the nature of the issues at hand. Those that touch civil and political rights are very highly restricted and it has attracted so many reprisals for those that seek to express themselves that way. I work for the Human Rights Network for Journalists-Uganda (HRNJ-Uganda) which is a non-governmental media rights organization, so we monitor and document annually the incidents, trends, and patterns touching freedom of expression and journalists’ rights. Most of the cases that we have received, documented, and worked on are stemming from civil and political rights. We receive less of those that touch economic, social, and cultural rights. So depending on where you’re standing, those media houses and journalists that are critically independent and venture into investigative practices are highly targeted. They have been attacked physically, their gadgets have been confiscated and sometimes even damaged deliberately. Some have lost their jobs under duress because a majority of media ownership in this country is by the political class or lean toward the ruling political party. As such, they want to be seen to be supportive of the regime, so they kind of tighten the noose on all freedom of expression spaces within media houses and prevail over their journalists. This by any measure has led to heightened self-censorship.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1254. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;But also, those journalists that seem to take critical lines are targeted. Some are even blacklisted. We can say that from the looks of things that times around political campaigns and elections are the tightest for freedom of expression in this country, and most cases have been reported around such times. We normally have elections every five years. So every three years after an election electioneering starts. And that’s when we see a lot of restrictions coming from the government through its regulation bodies like the Uganda Communications Commission, which is the communications regulator in my country. Also from the Media Council of Uganda, which was put in place by an act of Parliament to oversee the practices of media. And from the police or security apparatus in this country. So it’s a very fragile environment within which to practice. The journalists operate under immense fear and there are very high levels of censorship. The law has increasingly been used to criminalize free speech. That’s how I’d describe the current environment.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1255. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: I understand that the Computer Misuse Act as well as cybercrime legislation have been used to target journalists. Have you or any of your clients experienced censorship through abuse of computer crime laws?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1256. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;We have a very Draconian law called the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-01-05/uganda-computer-misuse-amendment-act-enacted/?loclr=ealln&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Computer Misuse Amendment Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. It was amended just last year to make it even worse. It has been now the walking stick of the proponents of the regime that don’t want to be subjected to public scrutiny, that don’t want to be held accountable politically in their offices. So abuses of public trust and power of their offices are hidden under the Computer Misuse Amendment Act. And most journalists, most editors, most managers have been, from time to time, interrogated at the Criminal Investigations Directorate of the police over what they have written about the powerful personalities especially in the political class – sometimes even from the business class – but mainly it’s from the political class. So it is used to insulate the powerful from being held accountable. Sadly, most of these cases are politically motivated. Most of them have not even ended up in courts of law, but have been used to open up charges against the media practitioners who have, from time to time, kept reporting and answering to the police for a long time without being presented to court or that are presented at a time when they realize that the journalists in question are becoming a bit unruly. So these laws are used to contain the journalists.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1257. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; Since most of the stories that have been at the highlight of the regime have been factual, they have not had reason to run to Court, but the effect of this is very counterproductive to the journalists’ independence, to their ability to concentrate on more stories – because they’re always thinking about these cases pending before them. Also, media houses now become very fearful and learn how to behave to not be in many cases of that nature. So the Computer Misuse Act, criminal defamation and now the most recent one, the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/30/ugandas-president-signs-repressive-anti-lgbt-law&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Anti-Homosexuality Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; (AHA) – which was passed by Parliament with very drastic clauses– are clawback legislation for press freedom in Uganda. The AHA in itself fundamentally affected the practice of journalism. The legislation falls short of drawing a clear distinction between what amounts to promotion or education [with regards to sharing material related to homosexuality]. Yet one of the crucial roles of the media is to educate the population about many things, but here, it’s not clear when the media is promoting and when it is educating. So it wants to slap a blackout completely on when you’re discussing the LGBTQI+ issues in the country. So, this law is very ambiguous and therefore susceptible to abuse at the expense of freedom speech&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1258. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; And it also introduces very drastic sanctions. For instance, if one writes about homosexuality their media operating license is revoked for ten years. And I’m sure no media house can stand up again after ten years of closure and can still breathe life. Also, the AHA generalizes the practice of an individual journalist. If, for instance, one of your journalists writes something that the law looks at as against it, the entire media house license is revoked for ten years, but also you’re imprisoned for five years – you as the writer. In addition, you receive a hefty fine of the equivalent of 1 billion Uganda shillings, that’s about 250,000 euros. Which is really too much for any media house operating in Uganda.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1259. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt; So that alone has created a lot of fear to discuss these issues, even when the law was passed in such a rushed manner with total disregard for the input of key stakeholders like the media, among others. As a media rights organization, we had looked at the draft bill and we were planning to make a presentation before the Parliamentary Committee. But within a week they closed all public hearings opinions, which limited the space for engagement. Within a few days the law had been written, presented again, and then assented to by the President. No wonder it’s being challenged in the Constitutional Court. This is the second time actually that such a law has been challenged. Of course, there are many other laws, like the Anti-Terrorism Act, which has not clearly defined the role of a journalist who speaks to a person who engages in subversive activities as terrorism. Where the law presupposes that before interviewing a person or before hosting them in your shows, you must have done a lot of background checks to make sure they have not engaged in such terrorism acts. So if you do not, the law here presses a criminal liability on the talk show host for promoting and abetting terrorism. And if there’s a conviction, the ultimate punishment is being sentenced to death. So these couple of laws are really used to curtail freedom of expression.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1260. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: Wow, that’s incredible. I understand how this impacts media houses, but what would you say the impact is on ordinary citizens or individual activists, for example?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1261. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;Under the Computer Misuse Amendment Act, the amended Act is restrictive and inhibitive to freedom of expression in regards to citizen journalism. It introduces such stringent conditions, like, if I’m going to record a video of you, say that I’m a journalist, citizen journalist or an activist who is not working for a media house, I must seek your permission before I record you in case you’re committing a crime. The law presupposes that I have no right to record you and later on disseminate the video without your explicit permission. Notably, the law is silent on the nature of the admissible permission, whether it is an email, SMS, WhatsApp, voice note, written note, etc. Also, the law presupposes that before I send you such a video, I must seek for your permission as the intended recipient of the said message. For instance, if I send you an email and you think you don’t need it, you can open a case against me for sending you unsolicited information. Unsolicited information – that’s the word that’s used.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1262. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;So the law is so amorphous in this nature that it completely closes out the liberty of a free society where citizens can engage in discussions, dialogues, or give opinions or ideas. For instance, I could be a very successful farmer, and I think the public could benefit from my farming practices, and I record a lot of what I do and I disseminate those videos. Somebody who receives this, wherever they are, can run to court and use this amended Computer Misuse Act to open up charges against me. And the fines are also very hefty compared to the crimes that the law talks about. So it is so evident that the law is killing citizen journalism, dissent, and activism at all levels. The law does not seem to cater to a free society where the individual citizens can express themselves at any one time, can criticize their leaders, and can hold them accountable. In the presence of this law, we do not have a society that can hold anyone accountable or that can keep the powerful in check. So the spirit of the law is bad. The powerful fence themselves off from the ordinary citizens that are out there watching and not able to track their progress of things or raise red flags through the different social media platforms. But we have tried to challenge this law. There is a group of us, 13 individual activists and CSOs that have gone to the Constitutional Court to say, “this law is counterproductive to freedom of expression, democracy, rule of law and a free society.” We believe that the court will agree with us given its key function of promoting human rights, good governance, democracy, and the rule of law.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1263. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: That was my next question- I was going to ask how are people fighting against these laws?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1264. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;People are very active in terms of pushing back and to that extent we have many petitions that are in court. For instance, the Computer Misuse Amendment is being challenged. We had the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.article19.org/resources/uganda-court-declares-anti-pornography-law-unconstitutional/&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Anti-pornographic Act of 2014&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; which was so amorphous in its nature that it didn’t clearly define what actually amounts to pornography. For instance, if I went around people in a swimming pool in their swimming trunks and took photos and carried those in the newspaper or on TV, that would be promoting pornography. So that was counterproductive to journalism so we went to court. And, fortunately, a court ruled in our favor. So the citizens are really up in arms to fight back because that’s the only way we can have civic engagements that are not restricted through a litany of such laws. There has been civic participation and engagement through mass media, dialogues with key actors, among others. However, many fear to speak out due to fear of reprisals, having seen the closure of media houses, the arrest and detention of activists and journalists, and the use of administrative sanctions to curtail free expression.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1265. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: Are there ways in which international groups and activists can stand in solidarity with those of you who are fighting back against these laws?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1266. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;There’s a lot of backlash on organizations, especially local ones, that tend to work a lot with international organizations. The government seems to be so threatened by the international eye as compared to local eyes, because recently it &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/uganda-united-nations-human-rights-office-529397518bc76acd346b1e93522dceb9&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;banned the UN Human Rights Office&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. They had to wind up business and leave the country. Also, the offices of the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://freedomhouse.org/article/uganda-suspension-democratic-governance-facility-highlights-growing-concerns&quot;&gt; &lt;span&gt;Democratic Governance Facility (DGF)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which was a basket of embassies and the EU that were the biggest funding entity for the civil society. And actually for the government, too, because they were empowering citizens, you know, empowering the demand side to heighten its demand for services from the supply side. The government said no and they had to wind up their offices and leave. This has severely crippled the work of civil society, media, and, generally, governance.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1267. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The UN played an important role before they left and we now have that gap. Yet this comes at a time when our national Uganda Human Rights Commission is at its weakest due to a number of structural challenges characterizing it. The current leadership of the Commission is always up in arms against the political opposition for accusing government of committing human rights excesses against its members. So we do our best to work with international organizations through sharing our voices. We have an African Hub, like the African IFEX, where the members try to replicate voices from here. In that nature we do try a lot, but it’s not very easy for them to come here and do their practices. Just like you will realize a lot of foreign correspondents, foreign journalists, who work in Uganda are highly restricted. It’s a tug of war to have their licenses renewed. Because it’s politically handled. It was taken away from the professional body of the Media Council of Uganda to the Media Centre of Uganda, which is a government mouthpiece.  So for the critical foreign correspondents their licenses are rarely renewed. When it comes to election times most of them are blocked from even coming here to cover the elections. The international media development bodies can help to build capacities of our media development organizations, facilitate research, provide legal aid support, and engage the government on the excesses of the security forces and some emergency responses for victims, among others.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1268. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; York: Is there anything that I didn’t ask that you’d like to share with our readers?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1269. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;span&gt;One thing I was to add is about trying to have an international focus on Uganda in the build up to elections. There’s a lot of havoc that happens to the citizens, but most importantly, to the activists and human rights defenders. Either cultural activists or media activists- a lot happens. And most of these things are not captured well because it is prior to the peak of campaigns or there is fear by the local media of capturing such situations. So by the time we get international attention, sometimes the damage is really too irreparable and a lot has happened. As opposed to if there was that international focus from the world. To me, that should really be captured because it would mitigate a lot that has happened. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1270. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt; &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1271.  
  1272. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1273.     <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 18:07:26 +0000</pubDate>
  1274. <guid isPermaLink="false">109468 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1275. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  1276. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ssempala-banner1.jpg" alt="Robert Ssempala" type="image/jpeg" length="104662" />
  1277.  </item>
  1278.  <item>
  1279.    <title>Podcast Episode: About Face (Recognition)</title>
  1280.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/podcast-episode-about-face-recognition</link>
  1281.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Is your face truly your own, or is it a commodity to be sold, a weapon to be used against you? A company called Clearview AI has scraped the internet to gather (without consent) 30 billion images to support a tool that lets users identify people by picture alone. Though it’s primarily used by law enforcement, should we have to worry that the eavesdropper at the next restaurant table, or the creep who’s bothering you in the bar, or the protestor outside the abortion clinic can surreptitiously snap a pic of you, upload it, and use it to identify you, where you live and work, your social media accounts, and more?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1282. &lt;p&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;mytube&quot; style=&quot;width: 100%px;&quot;&gt;
  1283.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetrigger&quot; tabindex=&quot;0&quot;&gt;
  1284.  
  1285.    &lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/sites/all/modules/custom/mytube/play.png&quot; class=&quot;mytubeplay&quot; alt=&quot;play&quot; style=&quot;top: -4px; left: 20px;&quot; /&gt;
  1286.    &lt;div hidden class=&quot;mytubeembedcode&quot;&gt;%3Ciframe%20height%3D%2252px%22%20width%3D%22100%25%22%20frameborder%3D%22no%22%20scrolling%3D%22no%22%20seamless%3D%22%22%20src%3D%22https%3A%2F%2Fplayer.simplecast.com%2F8d50564d-31d3-45bb-b0ab-4b9704d85c8a%3Fdark%3Dtrue%26amp%3Bcolor%3D000000%22%20allow%3D%22autoplay%22%3E%3C%2Fiframe%3E&lt;/div&gt;
  1287.  &lt;/div&gt;
  1288.  &lt;div class=&quot;mytubetext&quot;&gt;
  1289.    &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2008/02/embedded-video-and-your-privacy&quot; rel=&quot;noreferrer&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot;&gt;Privacy info.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  1290.    &lt;span&gt;This embed will serve content from &lt;em&gt;&lt;a rel=&quot;nofollow&quot; href=&quot;https://player.simplecast.com/8d50564d-31d3-45bb-b0ab-4b9704d85c8a?dark=true&amp;amp;color=000000&quot;&gt;simplecast.com&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;
  1291.  &lt;/div&gt;
  1292. &lt;/div&gt;
  1293. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;i&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://open.spotify.com/show/4UAplFpPDqE4hWlwsjplgt&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/spotify-podcast-badge-blk-wht-330x80.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Spotify Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;198&quot; height=&quot;48&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/effs-how-to-fix-the-internet/id1539719568&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/applebadge2.png&quot; alt=&quot;Listen on Apple Podcasts Badge&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; height=&quot;47&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://music.amazon.ca/podcasts/bf81f00f-11e1-431f-918d-374ab6ad07cc/how-to-fix-the-internet?ref=dmm_art_us_HTFTI&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;img height=&quot;47&quot; width=&quot;195&quot; src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/styles/kittens_types_wysiwyg_small/public/2024/02/15/us_listenon_amazonmusic_button_charcoal.png?itok=YFXPE4Ii&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://feeds.eff.org/howtofixtheinternet&quot;&gt;&lt;img src=&quot;https://www.eff.org/files/2021/11/01/subscriberss.png&quot; alt=&quot;Subscribe via RSS badge&quot; width=&quot;194&quot; height=&quot;50&quot; /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1294. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;(You can also find this episode on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/htfti-s5e3-kashmir-hill-vfinal&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt; and on &lt;a href=&quot;https://youtu.be/nd3v7jOejdg?feature=shared&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;YouTube&lt;/a&gt;.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1295. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;New York Times reporter Kashmir Hill has been writing about the intersection of privacy and technology for well over a decade; her book about Clearview AI’s rise and practices was published last fall. She speaks with EFF’s Cindy Cohn and Jason Kelley about how face recognition technology’s rapid evolution may have outpaced ethics and regulations, and where we might go from here.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1296. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In this episode, you’ll learn about:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1297. &lt;ul&gt;
  1298. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;7&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The difficulty of anticipating how information that you freely share might be used against you as technology advances.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1299. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;7&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;How the all-consuming pursuit of “technical sweetness” — the alluring sensation of neatly and functionally solving a puzzle — can blind tech developers to the implications of that tech’s use.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1300. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;7&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The racial biases that were built into many face recognition technologies. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1301. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;7&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;How one state&#039;s 2008 law has effectively curbed how face recognition technology is used there, perhaps creating a model for other states or Congress to follow.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1302. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1303. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Kashmir Hill is a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/by/kashmir-hill&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;New York Times tech reporter&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; who writes about the unexpected and sometimes ominous ways technology is changing our lives, particularly when it comes to our privacy. Her book, “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/691288/your-face-belongs-to-us-by-kashmir-hill/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Your Face Belongs To Us&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (2023), details how Clearview AI gave facial recognition to law enforcement, billionaires, and businesses, threatening to end privacy as we know it. She joined The Times in 2019 after having worked at Gizmodo Media Group, Fusion, Forbes Magazine and Above the Law. Her writing has appeared in The New Yorker and The Washington Post. She has degrees from Duke University and New York University, where she studied journalism.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1304. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Resources:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1305. &lt;ul&gt;
  1306. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The New Yorker: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/01/22/a-facial-recognition-tour-of-new-york&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;A Facial-Recognition Tour of New York&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (Jan. 15, 2024)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1307. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/01/clearview-ai-yet-another-example-why-we-need-ban-law-enforcement-use-face&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“Clearview AI—Yet Another Example of Why We Need A Ban on Law Enforcement Use of Face Recognition Now”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; (Jan. 31, 2020)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1308. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/aboutface&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF on Face Recognition Technology&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1309. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Testimony of EFF’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/testimony-jennifer-lynch-face-recognition-house-oversight-committee&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Jennifer Lynch&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; on Face Recognition to the House Oversight Committee (March 2017)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1310. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-clearview-ai&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;ACLU v. Clearview AI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, a 2020 lawsuit alleging violation of Illinois residents’ privacy rights under the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3004&amp;amp;ChapterID=57&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1311. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/amicus-brief-43&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; in&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; ACLU v. Clearview AI &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;(Nov. 5, 2020)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1312. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/2021-07-09-re-clearview-nd-ill-amicus-brief-eff&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; in consolidated federal litigation against Clearview AI (July 9, 2021)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1313. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;8&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Frankenbook: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.frankenbook.org/pub/the-bitter-aftertaste-of-technical-sweetness/release/3&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The Bitter Aftertaste of Technical Sweetness&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;” (May 17, 2018)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1314. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1315. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What do you think of “How to Fix the Internet?” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://forms.office.com/pages/responsepage.aspx?id=qalRy_Njp0iTdV3Gz61yuZZXWhXf9ZdMjzPzrVjvr6VUNUlHSUtLM1lLMUNLWE42QzBWWDhXU1ZEQy4u&amp;amp;web=1&amp;amp;wdLOR=c90ABD667-F98F-9748-BAA4-CA50122F0423&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Share your feedback here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1316. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;Transcript&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1317. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Madison Square Garden, the big events venue in New York City, installed facial recognition technology in 2018, originally to address security threats. You know, people they were worried about who&#039;d been violent in the stadium before, or Or perhaps the Taylor Swift model of, you know, known stalkers wanting to identify them if they&#039;re trying to come into concerts.&lt;/p&gt;
  1318. &lt;p&gt;But then in the last year, they realized, well, we&#039;ve got this system set up. This is a great way to keep out our enemies, people that the owner, James Dolan, doesn&#039;t like, namely lawyers who work at firms that have sued him and cost him a lot of money.&lt;/p&gt;
  1319. &lt;p&gt;And I saw this, I actually went to a Rangers game with a banned lawyer and it&#039;s, you know, thousands of people streaming into Madison Square Garden. We walk through the door, put our bags down on the security belt, and by the time we go to pick them up, a security guard has approached us and told her she&#039;s not welcome in.&lt;/p&gt;
  1320. &lt;p&gt;And yeah, once you have these systems of surveillance set up, it goes from security threats to just keeping track of people that annoy you. And so that is the challenge of how do we control how these things get used?&lt;/p&gt;
  1321. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;That&#039;s Kashmir Hill. She&#039;s a tech reporter for the New York Times, and she&#039;s been writing about the intersection of privacy and technology for well over a decade.&lt;/p&gt;
  1322. &lt;p&gt;She&#039;s even worked with EFF on several projects, including security research into pregnancy tracking apps. But most recently, her work has been around facial recognition and the company Clearview AI.&lt;/p&gt;
  1323. &lt;p&gt;Last fall, she published a book about Clearview called Your Face Belongs to Us. It&#039;s about the rise of facial recognition technology. It’s also about a company that was willing to step way over the line. A line that even the tech giants abided by. And it did so in order to create a facial search engine of millions of innocent people to sell to law enforcement.&lt;/p&gt;
  1324. &lt;p&gt;I&#039;m Cindy Cohn, the Executive Director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.&lt;/p&gt;
  1325. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And I&#039;m Jason Kelley, EFF’s Activism Director. This is our podcast series How to Fix the Internet.&lt;/p&gt;
  1326. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The idea behind this show is that we&#039;re trying to make our digital lives BETTER. At EFF we spend a lot of time envisioning the ways things can go wrong — and jumping into action to help when things DO go wrong online. But with this show, we&#039;re trying to give ourselves a vision of what it means to get it right.&lt;/p&gt;
  1327. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;It&#039;s easy to talk about facial recognition as leading towards this sci-fi dystopia, but many of us use it in benign - and even helpful - ways every day. Maybe you just used it to unlock your phone before you hit play on this podcast episode.&lt;/p&gt;
  1328. &lt;p&gt;Most of our listeners probably know that there&#039;s a significant difference between the data that&#039;s on your phone and the data that Clearview used, which was pulled from the internet, often from places that people didn&#039;t expect. Since Kash has written several hundred pages about what Clearview did, we wanted to start with a quick explanation.&lt;/p&gt;
  1329. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Clearview AI scraped billions of photos from the internet -&lt;/p&gt;
  1330. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Billions with a B. Sorry to interrupt you, just to make sure people hear that.&lt;/p&gt;
  1331. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Billions of photos from, the public internet and social media sites like Facebook, Instagram, Venmo, LinkedIn. At the time I first wrote about them in January, 2020, they had 3 billion faces in their database.&lt;/p&gt;
  1332. &lt;p&gt;They now have 30 billion and they say that they&#039;re adding something like 75 million images every day. So a lot of faces, all collected without anyone&#039;s consent and, you know, they have paired that with a powerful facial recognition algorithm so that you can take a photo of somebody, you know, upload it to Clearview AI and it will return the other places on the internet where that face appears along with a link to the website where it appears.&lt;/p&gt;
  1333. &lt;p&gt;So it&#039;s a way of finding out who someone is. You know, what their name is, where they live, who their friends are, finding their social media profiles, and even finding photos that they may not know are on the internet, where their name is not linked to the photo but their face is there.&lt;/p&gt;
  1334. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1335. &lt;p&gt;Wow. Obviously that&#039;s terrifying, but is there an example you might have of a way that this affects the everyday person. Could you talk about that a little bit?&lt;/p&gt;
  1336. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1337. &lt;p&gt;Yeah, so with a tool like this, um, you know, if you were out at a restaurant, say, and you&#039;re having a juicy conversation, whether about your friends or about your work, and it kind of catches the attention of somebody sitting nearby, you assume you&#039;re anonymous. With a tool like this, they could take a photo of you, upload it, find out who you are, where you work, and all of a sudden understand the context of the conversation. You know, a person walking out of an abortion clinic, if there&#039;s protesters outside, they can take a photo of that person. Now they know who they are and the health services they may have gotten.&lt;/p&gt;
  1338. &lt;p&gt;I mean, there&#039;s all kinds of different ways. You know, you go to a bar and you&#039;re talking to somebody. They&#039;re a little creepy. You never want to talk to them again. But they take your picture. They find out your name. They look up your social media profiles. They know who you are.&lt;br /&gt;On the other side, you know, I do hear about people who think about this in a positive context, who are using tools like this to research people they meet on dating sites, finding out if they are who they say they are, you know, looking up their photos.&lt;/p&gt;
  1339. &lt;p&gt;It&#039;s complicated, facial recognition technology. There are positive uses, there are negative uses. And right now we&#039;re trying to figure out what place this technology should have in our lives and, and how authorities should be able to use it.&lt;/p&gt;
  1340. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I think Jason&#039;s, like, ‘this is creepy’ is very widely shared, I think, by a lot of people. But you know the name of this is How to Fix the Internet. I would love to hear your thinking about how facial recognition might play a role in our lives if we get it right. Like, what would it look like if we had the kinds of law and policy and technological protections that would turn this tool into something that we would all be pretty psyched about on the main rather than, you know, worried about on the main.&lt;/p&gt;
  1341. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I mean, so some activists feel that facial recognition technology should be banned altogether. Evan Greer at Fight for the Future, you know, compares it to nuclear weapons and that there&#039;s just too many possible downsides that it&#039;s not worth the benefits and it should be banned altogether. I kind of don&#039;t think that&#039;s likely to happen just because I have talked to so many police officers who really appreciate facial recognition technology, think it&#039;s a very powerful tool that when used correctly can be such an important part of their tool set. I just don&#039;t see them giving it up.&lt;/p&gt;
  1342. &lt;p&gt;But when I look at what&#039;s happening right now, you have these companies like not just Clearview AI, but PimEyes, Facecheck, Eye-D. There&#039;s public face search engines that exist now. While Clearview is limited to police use, these are on the internet. Some are even free, some require a subscription.  And right now in the U. S., we don&#039;t have much of a legal infrastructure, certainly at the national level about whether they can do that or not. But there&#039;s been a very different approach in Europe where they say, that citizens shouldn&#039;t be included in these databases without their consent. And, you know, after I revealed the existence of Clearview AI, privacy regulators in Europe, in Canada, in Australia, investigated Clearview AI and said that what it had done was illegal, that they needed people&#039;s consent to put them in the databases.&lt;/p&gt;
  1343. &lt;p&gt;So that&#039;s one way to handle facial recognition technology is you can&#039;t just throw everybody&#039;s faces into a database and make them searchable, you need to get permission first. And I think that is one effective way of handling it. Privacy regulators actually inspired by Clearview AA actually issued a warning to other AI companies saying, hey, just because there&#039;s all these, there&#039;s all this information that&#039;s public on the internet, it doesn&#039;t mean that you&#039;re entitled to it. There can still be a personal interest in the data, and you may violate our privacy laws by collecting this information.&lt;/p&gt;
  1344. &lt;p&gt;We haven&#039;t really taken that approach, in the U. S. as much, with the exception of Illinois, which has this really strong law that&#039;s relevant to facial recognition technology. When we have gotten privacy laws at the state level, it says you have the right to get out of the databases. So in California, for example, you can go to Clearview AI and say, hey, I want to see my file. And if you don&#039;t like what they have on you, you can ask them to delete you. So that&#039;s a very different approach, uh, to try to give people some rights over their face. And California also requires that companies say how many of these requests they get per year. And so I looked and in the last two years fewer than a thousand Californians have asked to delete themselves from Clearview&#039;s database and you know, California&#039;s population is very much bigger than that, I think, you know 34 million people or so and so I&#039;m not sure how effective those laws are at protecting people at large.&lt;/p&gt;
  1345. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Here’s what I hear from that. Our world where we get it right is one where we have a strong legal infrastructure protecting our privacy. But it’s also one where if the police want something, it doesn’t mean that they get it. It’s a world where control of our faces and faceprints rests with us, and any use needs to have our permission. That’s the Illinois law called BIPA - the Biometric Privacy Act, or the foreign regulators you mention. &lt;br /&gt;It also means that a company like Venmo cannot just put our faces onto the public internet, and a company like Clearview cannot just copy them. Neither can happen without our affirmative permission.&lt;/p&gt;
  1346. &lt;p&gt;I think of technologies like this as needed to have good answers to two questions. Number one, who is the technology serving - who benefits if the technology gets it right? And number two, who is harmed if the technology DOESN’T get it right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1347. &lt;p&gt;For police use of facial recognition, the answers to both of these questions are bad. Regular people don’t benefit from the police having their faces in what has been called a perpetual line-up. And if the technology doesn’t work, people can pay a very heavy price of being wrongly arrested - as you document in your book, Kash.&lt;/p&gt;
  1348. &lt;p&gt;But for facial recognition technology allowing me to unlock my phone and manipulate apps like digital credit cards, I benefit by having an easy way to lock and use my phone. And if the technology doesn’t work, I just use my password, so it’s not catastrophic. But how does that compare to your view of a fixed facial recognition world, Kash?&lt;/p&gt;
  1349. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Well, I&#039;m not a policymaker. I am a journalist. So I kind of see my job as, as here&#039;s what has happened. Here&#039;s how we got here. And here&#039;s how different, you know, different people are dealing with it and trying to solve it. One thing that&#039;s interesting to me, you brought up Venmo, is that Venmo was one of the very first places that the kind of technical creator of Clearview AI, Hoan Ton-That, one of the first places he talked about getting faces from.&lt;/p&gt;
  1350. &lt;p&gt;And this was interesting to me as a privacy reporter because I very much remembered this criticism that the privacy community had for Venmo that, you know, when you&#039;ve signed up for the social payment site, they made everything public by default, all of your transactions, like who you were sending money to.&lt;/p&gt;
  1351. &lt;p&gt;And there was such a big pushback saying, Hey, you know, people don&#039;t realize that you&#039;re making this public by default. They don&#039;t realize that the whole world can see this. They don&#039;t understand, you know, how that could come back to be used against them. And, you know, some of the initial uses were, you know, people who were sending each other Venmo transactions and like putting syringes in it and you know, cannabis leaves and how that got used in criminal trials.&lt;/p&gt;
  1352. &lt;p&gt;But what was interesting with Clearview is that Venmo actually had this iPhone on their homepage on Venmo.com and they would show real transactions that were happening on the network. And it included people&#039;s profile photos and a link to their profile. So Hoan Ton-That sent this scraper to Venmo.com and it would just, he would just hit it every few seconds and pull down the photos and the links to the profile photos and he got, you know, millions of faces this way, and he says he remembered that the privacy people were kind of annoyed about Venmo making everything public, and he said it took them years to change it, though.&lt;/p&gt;
  1353. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;We were very upset about this.&lt;/p&gt;
  1354. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, we had them on our, we had a little list called Fix It Already in 2019. It wasn&#039;t a little, it was actually quite long for like kind of major privacy and other problems in tech companies. And the Venmo one was on there, right, in 2019, I think was when we launched it. In 2021, they fixed it, but that was right in between there was right when all that scraping happened.&lt;/p&gt;
  1355. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;And Venmo is certainly not alone in terms of forcing everyone to make their profile photos public, you know, Facebook did that as well, but it was interesting when I exposed Clearview AI and said, you know, here are some of the companies that they scraped from Venmo and also Facebook and LinkedIn, Google sent Clearview cease and desist letters and said, Hey, you know, you, you violated our terms of service in collecting this data. We want you to delete it, and people often ask, well, then what happened after that? And as far as I know, Clearview did not change their practices. And these companies never did anything else beyond the cease and desist letters.&lt;/p&gt;
  1356. &lt;p&gt;You know, they didn&#039;t sue Clearview. Um, and so it&#039;s clear that the companies alone are not going to be protecting our data, and they&#039;ve pushed us to, to be more public and now that is kind of coming full circle in a way that I don&#039;t think people, when they are putting their photos on the internet were expecting this to happen.&lt;/p&gt;
  1357. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I think we should start from the source, which is, why are they gathering all these faces in the first place, the companies? Why are they urging you to put your face next to your financial transactions? There&#039;s no need for your face to be next to a financial transaction, even in social media and other kinds of situations, there&#039;s no need for it to be public. People are getting disempowered because there&#039;s a lack of privacy protection to begin with, and the companies are taking advantage of that, and then turning around and pretending like they&#039;re upset about scraping, which I think is all they did with the Clearview thing.&lt;/p&gt;
  1358. &lt;p&gt;Like there&#039;s problems all the way down here. But I don&#039;t think that, from our perspective, the answer isn&#039;t to make scraping, which is often over limited, even more limited. The answer is to try to give people back control over these images.&lt;/p&gt;
  1359. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;And I get it, I mean, I know why Venmo wants photos. I mean, when I use Venmo and I&#039;m paying someone for the first time, I want to see that this is the face of the person I know before I send it to, you know, @happy, you know, nappy on Venmo. So it&#039;s part of the trust, but it does seem like you could have a different architecture. So it doesn&#039;t necessarily mean that you&#039;re showing your face to the entire, you know, world. Maybe you could just be showing it to the people that you&#039;re doing transactions with.&lt;/p&gt;
  1360. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;What we were pushing Venmo to do was what you mentioned was make it NOT public by default. And what I think is interesting about that campaign is that at the time, we were worried about one thing, you know, that the ability to sort of comb through these financial transactions and get information from people. We weren&#039;t worried about, or at least I don&#039;t think we talked much about, the public photos being available. And it&#039;s interesting to me that there are so many ways that public defaults, and that privacy settings can impact people that we don&#039;t even know about yet, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1361. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I do think this is one of the biggest challenges for people trying to protect their privacy is, it&#039;s so hard to anticipate how information that, you know, kind of freely give at one point might be used against you or weaponized in the future as technology improves.&lt;/p&gt;
  1362. &lt;p&gt;And so I do think that&#039;s really challenging. And I don&#039;t think that most people, when they&#039;re kind of freely putting Photos on the internet, their face on the internet were anticipating that the internet would be reorganized to be searchable by face.&lt;/p&gt;
  1363. &lt;p&gt;So that&#039;s where I think regulating the use of the information can be very powerful. It&#039;s kind of protecting people from the mistakes they&#039;ve made in the past.&lt;/p&gt;
  1364. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Let’s take a quick moment to say thank you to our sponsor. “How to Fix the Internet” is supported by The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Program in Public Understanding of Science and Technology. Enriching people’s lives through a keener appreciation of our increasingly technological world and portraying the complex humanity of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. And now back to our conversation with Kashmir Hill.&lt;/p&gt;
  1365. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;So a supporter asked a question that I&#039;m curious about too. You dove deep into the people who built these systems, not just the Clearview people, but people before them. And what did you find? Are these like Dr. Evil, evil geniuses who intended to, you know, build a dystopia? Or are there people who were, you know, good folks trying to do good things who either didn&#039;t see the consequences of what they&#039;re looking at or were surprised at the consequences of what they were building&lt;/p&gt;
  1366. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;The book is about Clearview AI, but it&#039;s also about all the people that kind of worked to realize facial recognition technology over many decades. &lt;br /&gt;The government was trying to get computers to be able to recognize human faces in Silicon Valley before it was even called Silicon Valley. The CIA was, you know, funding early engineers there to try to do it with those huge computers which, you know, in the early 1960s weren&#039;t able to do it very well.&lt;/p&gt;
  1367. &lt;p&gt;But I kind of like went back and asked people that were working on this for so many years when it was very clunky and it did not work very well, you know, were you thinking about what you are working towards? A kind of a world in which everybody is easily tracked by face, easily recognizable by face. And it was just interesting. I mean, these people working on it in the ‘70s, ‘80s, ‘90s, they just said it was impossible to imagine that because the computers were so bad at it, and we just never really thought that we&#039;d ever reach this place where we are now, where we&#039;re basically, like, computers are better at facial recognition than humans.&lt;/p&gt;
  1368. &lt;p&gt;And so this was really striking to me, that, and I think this happens a lot, where people are working on a technology and they just want to solve that puzzle, you know, complete that technical challenge, and they&#039;re not thinking through the implications of what if they&#039;re successful. And so this one, a philosopher of science I talked to, Heather Douglas, called this technical sweetness.&lt;/p&gt;
  1369. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I love that term.&lt;/p&gt;
  1370. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;This kind of motivation where it&#039;s just like, I need to solve this, the kind of Jurassic Park, the Jurassic Park dilemma where it&#039;s like,it&#039;d be really cool if we brought the dinosaurs back.&lt;/p&gt;
  1371. &lt;p&gt;So that was striking to me and all of these people that were working on this, I don&#039;t think any of them saw something like Clearview AI coming and when I first heard about Clearview, this startup that had scraped the entire internet and kind of made it searchable by face. I was thinking there must be some, you know, technological mastermind here who was able to do this before the big companies, the Facebooks, the Googles. How did they do it first?&lt;/p&gt;
  1372. &lt;p&gt;And what I would come to figure out is that. You know, what they did was more of an ethical breakthrough than a technological breakthrough. Companies like Google and Facebook had developed this internally and shockingly, you know, for these companies that have released many kind of unprecedented products, they decided facial recognition technology like this was too much and they held it back and they decided not to release it.&lt;/p&gt;
  1373. &lt;p&gt;And so Clearview AI was just willing to do what other companies hadn&#039;t been willing to do. Which I thought was interesting and part of why I wrote the book is, you know, who are these people and why did they do this? And honestly, they did have, in the early days, some troubling ideas about how to use facial recognition technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  1374. &lt;p&gt;So one of the first deployments was of, of Clearview AI, before it was called Clearview AI, was at the Deploraball, this kind of inaugural event around Trump becoming president and they were using it because It was going to be this gathering of all these people who had had supported Trump, the kind of MAGA crowd, O=of which some of the Clearview AI founders were part of. And they were worried about being infiltrated by Antifa, which I think is how they pronounce it, and so they wanted to run a background check on ticket buyers and find out whether any of them were from the far left.&lt;/p&gt;
  1375. &lt;p&gt;And apparently this smartchecker worked for this and they identified two people who kind of were trying to get in who shouldn&#039;t have. And I found out about this because they included it in a PowerPoint presentation that they had developed for the Hungarian government. They were trying to pitch Hungary on their product as a means of border control. And so the idea was that you could use this background check product, this facial recognition technology, to keep out people you didn&#039;t want coming into the country.&lt;/p&gt;
  1376. &lt;p&gt;And they said that they had fine tuned it so it would work on people that worked with the Open Society Foundations and George Soros because they knew that Hungary&#039;s leader, Viktor Orban, was not a fan of the Soros crowd.&lt;/p&gt;
  1377. &lt;p&gt;And so for me, I just thought this just seemed kind of alarming that you would use it to identify essentially political dissidents, democracy activists and advocates, that that was kind of where their minds went to for their product when it was very early, basically still at the prototype stage.&lt;/p&gt;
  1378. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I think that it&#039;s important to recognize these tools, like many technologies, they&#039;re dual use tools, right, and we have to think really hard about how they can be used and create laws and policies around there because I&#039;m not sure that you can use some kind of technological means to make sure only good guys use this tool to do good things and that bad guys don&#039;t.&lt;/p&gt;
  1379. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;One of the things that you mentioned about sort of government research into facial recognition reminds me that shortly after you put out your first story on Clearview in January of 2020, I think, we put out a website called Who Has Your Face, which we&#039;d been doing research for for, I don&#039;t know, four to six months or something before that, that was specifically trying to let people know which government entities had access to your, let&#039;s say, DMV photo or your passport photo for facial recognition purposes, and that&#039;s one of the great examples, I think, of how sort of like Venmo, you put information somewhere that&#039;s, even in this case, required by law, and you don&#039;t ever expect that the FBI would be able to run facial recognition on that picture based on like a surveillance photo, for example.&lt;/p&gt;
  1380. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;So it makes me think of two things, and one is, you know, as part of the book I was looking back at the history of the US thinking about facial recognition technology and setting up guardrails or for the most part NOT setting up guardrails.&lt;/p&gt;
  1381. &lt;p&gt;And there was this hearing about it more than a decade ago. I think actually Jen Lynch from the EFF testified at it. And it was like 10 years ago when facial recognition technology was first getting kind of good enough to get deployed. And the FBI was starting to build a facial recognition database and police departments were starting to use these kind of early apps.&lt;/p&gt;
  1382. &lt;p&gt;It troubles me to think about just knowing the bias problems that facial recognition technology had at that time that they were kind of actively using it. But lawmakers were concerned and they were asking questions about whose photo is going to go in here? And the government representatives who were there, law enforcement, at the time they said, we&#039;re only using criminal mugshots.&lt;/p&gt;
  1383. &lt;p&gt;You know, we&#039;re not interested in the goings about of normal Americans. We just want to be able to recognize the faces of people that we know have already had encounters with the law, and we want to be able to keep track of those people. And it was interesting to me because in the years to come, that would change, you know, they started pulling in state driver&#039;s license photos in some places, and it, it ended up not just being criminals that were being tracked or people, not always even criminals, just people who&#039;ve had encounters with law enforcement where they ended up with a mugshot taken.&lt;/p&gt;
  1384. &lt;p&gt;But that is the the kind of frog boiling of ‘well we&#039;ll just start out with some of these photos and then you know we&#039;ll actually we&#039;ll add in some state driver&#039;s license photos and then we&#039;ll start using a company called Clearview AI that&#039;s scraped the entire internet Um, you know everybody on the planet in this facial recognition database.&lt;/p&gt;
  1385. &lt;p&gt;So it just speaks to this challenge of controlling it, you know,, this kind of surveillance creep where once you start setting up the system, you just want to pull in more and more data and you want to surveil people in more and more ways.&lt;/p&gt;
  1386. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;And you tell some wonderful stories or actually horrific stories in the book about people who were misidentified. And the answer from the technologists is, well, we just need more data then. Right? We need everybody&#039;s driver&#039;s licenses, not just mugshots. And then that way we eliminate the bias that comes from just using mugshots. Or you tell a story that I often talk about, which is, I believe the Chinese government was having a hard time with its facial recognition, recognizing black faces, and they made some deals in Africa to just wholesale get a bunch of black faces so they could train up on it.&lt;/p&gt;
  1387. &lt;p&gt;And, you know, to us, talking about bias in a way that doesn&#039;t really talk about comprehensive privacy reform and instead talks only about bias ends up in this technological world in which the solution is more people&#039;s faces into the system.&lt;/p&gt;
  1388. &lt;p&gt;And we see this with all sorts of other biometrics where there&#039;s bias issues with the training data or the initial data.&lt;/p&gt;
  1389. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah. So this is something, so bias has been a huge problem with facial recognition technology for a long time. And really a big part of the problem was that they were not getting diverse training databases. And, you know, a lot of the people that were working on facial recognition technology were white people, white men, and they would make sure that it worked well on them and the other people they worked with.&lt;/p&gt;
  1390. &lt;p&gt;And so we had, you know, technologies that just did not work as well on other people. One of those early facial recognition technology companies I talked to who was in business, you know, in 2000, 2001, actually used at the Super Bowl in Tampa in 2000 and in 2001 to secretly scan the faces of football fans looking for pickpockets and ticket scalpers.&lt;/p&gt;
  1391. &lt;p&gt;That company told me that they had to pull out of a project in South Africa because they found the technology just did not work on people who had darker skin. But the activist community has brought a lot of attention to this issue that there is this problem with bias and the facial recognition vendors have heard it and they have addressed it by creating more diverse training sets.&lt;/p&gt;
  1392. &lt;p&gt;And so now they are training their algorithms to work on different groups and the technology has improved a lot. It really has been addressed and these algorithms don&#039;t have those same kind of issues anymore.&lt;/p&gt;
  1393. &lt;p&gt;Despite that, you know, the handful of wrongful arrests that I&#039;ve covered. where, um, people are arrested for the crime of looking like someone else. Uh, they&#039;ve all involved people who are black. One woman so far, a woman who was eight months pregnant, arrested for carjacking and robbery on a Thursday morning while she was getting her two kids ready for school.&lt;/p&gt;
  1394. &lt;p&gt;And so, you know, even if you fix the bias problem in the algorithms, you&#039;re still going to have the issue of, well, who is this technology deployed on? Who is this used to police? And so yeah, I think it&#039;ll still be a problem. And then there&#039;s just these bigger questions of the civil liberty questions that still need to be addressed. You know, do we want police using facial recognition technology? And if so, what should the limitations be?&lt;/p&gt;
  1395. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I think, you know, for us in thinking about this, the central issue is who&#039;s in charge of the system and who bears the cost if it&#039;s wrong. The consequences of a bad match are much more significant than just, oh gosh, the cops for a second thought I was the wrong person. That&#039;s not actually how this plays out in people&#039;s lives.&lt;/p&gt;
  1396. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I don&#039;t think most people who haven&#039;t been arrested before realize how traumatic the whole experience can be. You know, I talk about Robert Williams in the book who was arrested after he got home from work, in front of all of his neighbors, in front of his wife and his two young daughters, spent the night in jail, you know, was charged, had to hire a lawyer to defend him.&lt;/p&gt;
  1397. &lt;p&gt;Same thing, Portia Woodruff, the woman who was pregnant, taken to jail, charged, even though the woman who they were looking for had committed the crime the month before and was not visibly pregnant, I mean it was so clear they had the wrong person. And yet, she had to hire a lawyer, fight the charges, and she wound up in the hospital after being detained all day because she was so stressed out and dehydrated.&lt;/p&gt;
  1398. &lt;p&gt;And so yeah, when you have people that are relying too heavily on the facial recognition technology and not doing proper investigations, this can have a very harmful effect on, on individual people&#039;s lives.&lt;/p&gt;
  1399. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I mean, one of my hopes is that when, you know, that those of us who are involved in tech trying to get privacy laws passed and other kinds of things passed can have some knock on effects on trying to make the criminal justice system better. We shouldn&#039;t just be coming in and talking about the technological piece, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1400. &lt;p&gt;Because it&#039;s all a part of a system that itself needs reform. And so I think it&#039;s important that we recognize, um, that as well and not just try to extricate the technological piece from the rest of the system and that&#039;s why I think EFF&#039;s come to the position that governmental use of this is so problematic that it&#039;s difficult to imagine a world in which it&#039;s fixed.&lt;/p&gt;
  1401. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;In terms of talking about laws that have been effective We alluded to it earlier, but Illinois passed this law in 2008, the Biometric Information Privacy Act, rare law that moved faster than the technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  1402. &lt;p&gt;And it says if you want to use somebody&#039;s biometrics, like their face print or their fingerprint to their voice print, You need to get their consent, or as a company, or you&#039;ll be fined. And so Madison Square Garden is using facial recognition technology to keep out security threats and lawyers at all of its New York City venues: The Beacon Theater, Radio City Music Hall, Madison Square Garden.&lt;/p&gt;
  1403. &lt;p&gt;The company also has a theater in Chicago, but they cannot use facial recognition technology to keep out lawyers there because they would need to get their consent to use their biometrics that way. So it is an example of a law that has been quite effective at kind of controlling how the technology is used, maybe keeping it from being used in a way that people find troubling.&lt;/p&gt;
  1404. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;I think that&#039;s a really important point. I think sometimes people in technology despair that law can really ever do anything, and they think technological solutions are the only ones that really work. And, um, I think it&#039;s important to point out that, like, that&#039;s not always true. And the other point that you make in your book about this that I really appreciate is the Wiretap Act, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1405. &lt;p&gt;Like the reason that a lot of the stuff that we&#039;re seeing is visual and not voice, // you can do voice prints too, just like you can do face prints, but we don&#039;t see that.&lt;/p&gt;
  1406. &lt;p&gt;And the reason we don&#039;t see that is because we actually have very strong federal and state laws around wiretapping that prevent the collection of this kind of information except in certain circumstances. Now, I would like to see those circumstances expanded, but it still exists. And I think that, you know, kind of recognizing where, you know, that we do have legal structures that have provided us some protection, even as we work to make them better, is kind of an important thing for people who kind of swim in tech to recognize.&lt;/p&gt;
  1407. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Laws work is one of the themes of the book.&lt;/p&gt;
  1408. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thank you so much, Kash, for joining us. It was really fun to talk about this important topic.&lt;/p&gt;
  1409. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;KASHMIR HILL&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;br /&gt;Thanks for having me on. It&#039;s great. I really appreciate the work that EFF does and just talking to you all for so many stories. So thank you.&lt;/p&gt;
  1410. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;That was a really fun conversation because I loved that book. The story is extremely interesting and I really enjoyed being able to talk to her about the specific issues that sort of we see in this story, which I know we can apply to all kinds of other stories and technical developments and technological advancements that we&#039;re thinking about all the time at EFF.&lt;/p&gt;
  1411. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I think that it&#039;s great to have somebody like Kashmir dive deep into something that we spend a lot of time talking about at EFF and, you know, not just facial recognition, but artificial intelligence and machine learning systems more broadly, and really give us the, the history of it and the story behind it so that we can ground our thinking in more reality. And, you know, it ends up being a rollicking good story.&lt;/p&gt;
  1412. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I mean, what surprised me is that I think most of us saw that facial recognition sort of exploded really quickly, but it didn&#039;t, actually. A lot of the book, she writes, is about the history of its development and, um, You know, we could have been thinking about how to resolve the potential issues with facial recognition decades ago, but no one sort of expected that this would blow up in the way that it did until it kind of did.&lt;/p&gt;
  1413. &lt;p&gt;And I really thought it was interesting that her explanation of how it blew up so fast wasn&#039;t really a technical development as much as an ethical one.&lt;/p&gt;
  1414. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, I love that perspective, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1415. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I mean, it’s a terrible thing, but it is helpful to think about, right?&lt;/p&gt;
  1416. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yeah, and it reminds me again of the thing that we talk about a lot, which is Larry Lessig&#039;s articulation of the kind of four ways that you can control behavior online. There&#039;s markets, there&#039;s laws, there&#039;s norms, and there&#039;s architecture. In this system, you know, we had. norms that were driven across.&lt;/p&gt;
  1417. &lt;p&gt;The thing that Clearview did that she says wasn&#039;t a technical breakthrough, it was an ethical breakthrough. I think it points the way towards, you know, where you might need laws. &lt;br /&gt;There&#039;s also an architecture piece though. You know, if Venmo hadn&#039;t set up its system so that everybody&#039;s faces were easily made public and scrapable, you know, that architectural decision could have had a pretty big impact on how vast this company was able to scale and where they could look.&lt;/p&gt;
  1418. &lt;p&gt;So we&#039;ve got an architecture piece, we&#039;ve got a norms piece, we&#039;ve got a lack of laws piece. It&#039;s very clear that a comprehensive privacy law would have been very helpful here.&lt;/p&gt;
  1419. &lt;p&gt;And then there&#039;s the other piece about markets, right? You know, when you&#039;re selling into the law enforcement market, which is where Clearview finally found purchase, that&#039;s an extremely powerful market. And it ends up distorting the other ones.&lt;/p&gt;
  1420. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Exactly.&lt;/p&gt;
  1421. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once law enforcement decides they want something, I mean, when I asked Kash, you know, like, what do you think about ideas about banning facial recognition? Uh, she said, well, I think law enforcement really likes it. And so I don&#039;t think it&#039;ll be banned. And what that tells us is this particular market. can trump all the other pieces, and I think we see that in a lot of the work we do at EFF as well.&lt;/p&gt;
  1422. &lt;p&gt;You know, we need to carve out a better space such that we can actually say no to law enforcement, rather than, well, if law enforcement wants it, then we&#039;re done in terms of things, and I think that&#039;s really shown by this story.&lt;/p&gt;
  1423. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;JASON KELLEY&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thanks for joining us for this episode of how to fix the internet.&lt;br /&gt;If you have feedback or suggestions, we&#039;d love to hear from you. Visit EFF. org slash podcast and click on listener feedback. While you&#039;re there, you can become a member, donate, maybe pick up some merch, and just see what&#039;s happening in digital rights this week and every week.&lt;/p&gt;
  1424. &lt;p&gt;This podcast is licensed Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, and includes music licensed Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported by their creators.&lt;/p&gt;
  1425. &lt;p&gt;In this episode, you heard Cult Orrin by Alex featuring Starfrosh and Jerry Spoon.&lt;/p&gt;
  1426. &lt;p&gt;And Drops of H2O, The Filtered Water Treatment, by Jay Lang, featuring Airtone.&lt;/p&gt;
  1427. &lt;p&gt;You can find links to their music in our episode notes, or on our website at eff.org/podcast.&lt;/p&gt;
  1428. &lt;p&gt;Our theme music is by Nat Keefe of BeatMower with Reed Mathis&lt;/p&gt;
  1429. &lt;p&gt;How to Fix the Internet is supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation&#039;s program in public understanding of science and technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  1430. &lt;p&gt;We’ll see you next time.&lt;/p&gt;
  1431. &lt;p&gt;I’m Jason Kelley.&lt;/p&gt;
  1432. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;CINDY COHN&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And I’m Cindy Cohn.&lt;/p&gt;
  1433.  
  1434.  
  1435. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1436. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1437. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;259}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1438.  
  1439. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1440.     <pubDate>Tue, 26 Mar 2024 07:05:23 +0000</pubDate>
  1441. <guid isPermaLink="false">109452 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1442. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/how-to-fix-the-internet-podcast">How to Fix the Internet: Podcast</category>
  1443. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/face-surveillance">Face Surveillance</category>
  1444. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  1445. <dc:creator>Josh Richman</dc:creator>
  1446. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/htfi-hill-blog.png" alt="How to Fix the Internet - Kashmir Hill - About Face (Recognition)" type="image/png" length="209578" />
  1447.  </item>
  1448.  <item>
  1449.    <title>No KOSA, No TikTok Ban | EFFector 36.4</title>
  1450.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/no-kosa-no-tiktok-ban-effector-364</link>
  1451.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;
  1452. &lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;
  1453. &lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;
  1454. &lt;p&gt;Want to hear about the latest news in digital rights? Well, you&#039;re in luck! EFFector 36.4 is out now and covers the latest topics, including our stance on the unconstitutional TikTok ban (spoiler: it&#039;s bad), a victory helping Indybay resist an unlawful search warrant and gag order, and thought-provoking comments we got from thousands of young people regarding the Kids Online Safety Act.&lt;/p&gt;
  1455. &lt;p&gt;You can &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector/36/4&quot;&gt;read the full newsletter here&lt;/a&gt;, or &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/effector&quot;&gt;subscribe&lt;/a&gt; to get the next issue in your inbox automatically! You can also listen to the audio version of the newsletter on the &lt;a href=&quot;https://archive.org/details/36.4_20240325&quot;&gt;Internet Archive&lt;/a&gt;, or by clicking the button below:&lt;/p&gt;
  1456. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kp1EhhH0YQE&quot;&gt;LISTEN ON YouTube&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1457. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFFector 36.4 | No KOSA, No TikTok Ban&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1458. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since 1990 EFF has published EFFector to help keep readers on the bleeding edge of their digital rights. We know that the intersection of technology, civil liberties, human rights, and the law can be complicated, so EFFector is a great way to stay on top of things. The newsletter is chock full of links to updates, announcements, blog posts, and other stories to help keep readers—and listeners—up to date on the movement to protect online privacy and free expression. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1459. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Thank you to the supporters around the world who make our work possible! If you&#039;re not a member yet, &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/effect&quot;&gt;join EFF today&lt;/a&gt; to help us fight for a brighter digital future.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1460. &lt;/div&gt;
  1461. &lt;/div&gt;
  1462. &lt;/div&gt;
  1463.  
  1464. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1465.     <pubDate>Mon, 25 Mar 2024 17:32:09 +0000</pubDate>
  1466. <guid isPermaLink="false">109461 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1467. <dc:creator>Christian Romero</dc:creator>
  1468. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/effector_banner_5.jpeg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="130379" />
  1469.  </item>
  1470.  <item>
  1471.    <title> Responding to ShotSpotter, Police Shoot at Child Lighting Fireworks</title>
  1472.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/responding-shotspotter-police-shoot-child-lighting-fireworks</link>
  1473.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This post was written by Rachel Hochhauser, an EFF legal intern&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1474. &lt;p&gt;We’ve written &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/cities-should-act-now-ban-predictive-policingand-stop-using-shotspotter-too&quot;&gt;multiple&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;times&lt;/a&gt; about the inaccurate and dangerous “gunshot detection” tool, Shotspotter. A recent near-tragedy in Chicago adds to the growing pile of evidence that cities should drop the product.&lt;/p&gt;
  1475. &lt;p&gt;On January 25, while responding to a ShotSpotter alert, a Chicago police officer opened fire on an unarmed “&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2024/02/27/chicago-police-officer-shotspotter-alert-opened-fire-boy-lighting-fireworks&quot;&gt;maybe 14 or 15&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;” year old child in his backyard. Three officers approached the boy’s house, with one asking “&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://chicago.suntimes.com/crime/2024/02/27/chicago-police-officer-shotspotter-alert-opened-fire-boy-lighting-fireworks&quot;&gt;What you doing bro, you good?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;” They heard a loud bang, later determined to be fireworks, and shot at the child. Fortunately, no physical injuries were recorded. In initial reports, police falsely claimed that they fired at a “&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/2024/1/27/24053056/chicago-officer-fires-shots-man-gresham&quot;&gt;man&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;” who had fired on officers.&lt;/p&gt;
  1476. &lt;p&gt;In a subsequent assessment of the event, the Chicago Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) concluded that “&lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://abc7chicago.com/chicago-shooting-auburn-gresham-police-cpd/14474021/&quot;&gt;a firearm was not used against the officers&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;.” Chicago Police Superintendent Larry Snelling placed all attending officers on administrative duty for 30 days and is investigating whether the officers violated department policies.&lt;/p&gt;
  1477. &lt;p&gt;ShotSpotter is the largest company which produces and distributes &lt;span&gt;audio gunshot detection&lt;/span&gt; for U.S. cities and police departments. Currently, it is used by &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/cities-should-act-now-ban-predictive-policingand-stop-using-shotspotter-too&quot;&gt;100 law enforcement agencies&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. The system relies on sensors positioned on buildings and lamp posts, which purportedly detect the &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;acoustic signature&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; of a gunshot. The information is then forwarded to humans who purportedly have the expertise to verify whether the sound was gunfire (and not, for example, a car backfiring), and whether to deploy officers to the scene.&lt;/p&gt;
  1478. &lt;p&gt;ShotSpotter claims that its technology is “&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.soundthinking.com/press-releases/shotspotter-responds-to-false-and-misleading-allegations-by-vice-news/&quot;&gt;97% accurate&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;” a figure produced by the &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;marketing department and not engineers&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. The recent Chicago shooting shows this is not accurate. Indeed, a 2021 study in Chicago found that, in a period of 21 months, &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;ShotSpotter resulted in police acting on dead-end reports over 40,000 times&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. Likewise, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s office concluded that ShotSpotter had “minimal return on investment” and only resulted in arrest for 1% of proven shootings, according to a recent &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/copa-body-camera-video-auburn-gresham-shots-fired-fireworks-shotspotter/&quot;&gt;CBS&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; report. The technology is predominantly used in Black and Latinx neighborhoods, contributing to the over-policing of these areas. Police responding to ShotSpotter arrive at the scenes expecting gunfire and are on edge and therefore more likely to draw their firearms.&lt;/p&gt;
  1479. &lt;p&gt;Finally, these sensors invade the right to privacy. Even in public places, people often have a &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;reasonable expectation of privacy&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt; and therefore a legal right not to have their voices recorded. But these sound sensors risk the capture and leaking of private conversation. In &lt;span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/its-time-police-stop-using-shotspotter&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;People v. Johnson&lt;/em&gt; in California&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;, a court held such recordings from ShotSpotter to be admissible evidence.&lt;/p&gt;
  1480. &lt;p&gt;In February, Chicago’s Mayor announced that the city would &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2024/02/15/1231394334/shotspotter-gunfire-detection-chicago-mayor-dropping&quot;&gt;not be renewing its contract&lt;/a&gt; with Shotspotter. &lt;a href=&quot;https://cancelshotspotter.com/#contracts&quot;&gt;Many other cities&lt;/a&gt; have cancelled or are considering cancelling use of the tool.&lt;/p&gt;
  1481. &lt;p&gt;This technology endangers lives, disparately impacts communities of color, and encroaches on the privacy rights of individuals. It has a history of false positives and poses clear dangers to pedestrians and residents. It is urgent that these inaccurate and harmful systems be removed from our streets.&lt;/p&gt;
  1482.  
  1483. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1484.     <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2024 23:10:28 +0000</pubDate>
  1485. <guid isPermaLink="false">109460 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1486. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
  1487. <dc:creator>Adam Schwartz</dc:creator>
  1488. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/shotspotter.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="173136" />
  1489.  </item>
  1490.  <item>
  1491.    <title>Cops Running DNA-Manufactured Faces Through Face Recognition Is a Tornado of Bad Ideas</title>
  1492.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/cops-running-dna-manufactured-faces-through-face-recognition-tornado-bad-ideas</link>
  1493.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In keeping with law enforcement’s grand tradition of taking &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://slate.com/technology/2020/02/rogues-gallery-facial-recognition-technology-history.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;antiquated, invasive, and oppressive technologies, making them digital, and then calling it innovation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, police in the U.S. recently combined two existing dystopian technologies in a brand new way to violate civil liberties. A police force in California recently employed the new practice of taking a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.fsigenetics.com/article/S1872-4973(23)00045-5/fulltext&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;DNA sample&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; from a crime scene, running this through a service provided by US company &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://parabon-nanolabs.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Parabon NanoLabs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that guesses what the perpetrators face looked like, and plugging &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/parabon-nanolabs-dna-face-models-police-facial-recognition/#:~:text=Parabon%20NanoLabs%20ran%20the%20suspect&#039;s,using%20only%20crime%20scene%20evidence&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;this rendered image into face recognition software&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to build a suspect list. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1494. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Parts of this process aren&#039;t &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.vice.com/en/article/xwngn3/police-are-feeding-celebrity-photos-into-facial-recognition-software-to-solve-crimes&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;entirely new&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. On more than one occasion, police forces have been found to have fed &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.vice.com/en/article/xwngn3/police-are-feeding-celebrity-photos-into-facial-recognition-software-to-solve-crimes&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;images of celebrities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; into face recognition software to generate suspect lists. In one case from 2017, the New York Police Department decided its suspect looked like Woody Harrelson and ran the actor’s image through the software to generate hits. Further, software provided by US company &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.motorolasolutions.com/en_us/products/command-center-software/public-safety-software/analysis-and-investigation.html?utm_source=vigilantsolutions.com&amp;amp;utm_medium=referral&amp;amp;utm_campaign=vigilantsolutions_redirect&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Vigilant Solutions&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; enables law enforcement to create “a proxy image from a sketch artist or artist rendering” to enhance images of potential suspects so that face recognition software can match these more accurately. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1495. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Since 2014, law enforcement have also sought the assistance of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://parabon-nanolabs.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Parabon NanoLabs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—a company that alleges it can create an image of the suspect’s face from their DNA. Parabon NanoLabs &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/parabon-nanolabs-dna-face-models-police-facial-recognition/#:~:text=Parabon%20NanoLabs%20ran%20the%20suspect&#039;s,using%20only%20crime%20scene%20evidence&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;claim&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to have built this system by training machine learning models on the DNA data of thousands of volunteers with 3D scans of their faces. It is currently the only company offering phenotyping and only in concert with a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/forensic-genetic-genealogy-searches-what-defense-attorneys-need-know&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;forensic genetic genealogy investigation&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The process is yet to be independently audited, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://senseaboutscience.org/activities/making-sense-of-forensic-genetics/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;scientists have affirmed&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that predicting face shapes—particularly from DNA samples—is not possible. But this has not stopped law enforcement officers from seeking to use it, or from running these fabricated images through face recognition software. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1496. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Simply put: police are using DNA to create a hypothetical and not at all accurate face, then using that face as a clue on which to base investigations into crimes. Not only is this full dice-roll policing, it also threatens the rights, freedom, or even the life of whoever is unlucky enough to look a little bit like that artificial face. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1497. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But it gets worse. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1498. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In 2020, a detective from the East Bay Regional Park District Police Department in California &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.wired.com/story/parabon-nanolabs-dna-face-models-police-facial-recognition/#:~:text=Parabon%20NanoLabs%20ran%20the%20suspect&#039;s,using%20only%20crime%20scene%20evidence&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;asked&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to have a rendered image from Parabon NanoLabs run through face recognition software. This 3D rendering, called a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Snapshot Phenotype Report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, predicted that—among other attributes—the suspect was male, had brown eyes, and fair skin. Found in police records published by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://ddosecrets.com/wiki/Distributed_Denial_of_Secrets&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Distributed Denial of Secrets&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, this appears to be the first reporting of a detective running an algorithmically-generated rendering based on crime-scene DNA through face recognition software. This puts a second layer of speculation between the actual face of the suspect and the product the police are using to guide investigations and make arrests. Not only is the artificial face a guess, now face recognition (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/texas-macys-sunglass-hut-facial-recognition-software-wrongful-arrest-sacramento-alibi/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;a technology known to misidentify people&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;)  will create a “most likely match” for that face. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1499. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;These technologies, and their reckless use by police forces, are an inherent threat to our individual privacy, free expression, information security, and social justice. Face recognition tech alone has an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/aboutface&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;egregious history&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of misidentifying &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;people of color&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, especially &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Black women&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, as well as failing to correctly identify &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://qz.com/1726806/facial-recognition-ai-from-amazon-microsoft-and-ibm-misidentifies-trans-and-non-binary-people/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;trans and nonbinary people&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The algorithms are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0364021302000848&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;not always reliable&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and even if the technology somehow had 100% accuracy, it would still be an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/aboutface&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;unacceptable tool&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; of invasive surveillance capable of identifying and tracking people on a massive scale. Combining this with fabricated 3D renderings from crime-scene DNA exponentially increases the likelihood of false arrests, and exacerbates &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmonton-police-issue-apology-for-controversial-use-of-dna-phenotyping-1.6608457&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;existing harms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on communities that are already disproportionately over-surveilled by face recognition technology and discriminatory policing.  &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1500. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There are no federal rules that prohibit police forces from undertaking these actions. And despite the detective’s request violating Parabon NanoLabs’ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://web.archive.org/web/20160507204509/https://snapshot.parabon-nanolabs.com/terms&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;terms of service&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, there is seemingly no way to ensure compliance. Pulling together criteria like skin tone, hair color, and gender does not give an accurate face of a suspect, and deploying these untested algorithms without any oversight places people at risk of being a suspect for a crime they didn’t commit. In one case from Canada, Edmonton Police Service &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/edmonton-police-issue-apology-for-controversial-use-of-dna-phenotyping-1.6608457&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;issued an apology&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; over its failure to balance the harms to the Black community with the potential investigative value after &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://globalnews.ca/news/9175041/edmonton-police-dna-phenotyping-sexual-assault-suspect/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;using&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; Parabon’s DNA phenotyping services to identify a suspect. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1501. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF continues to call for a complete ban on government use of face recognition—because otherwise these are the results. How much more evidence do law markers need that police cannot be trusted with this dangerous technology? How many more people need to be falsely arrested and how many more reckless schemes like this one need to be perpetrated before legislators realize this is not a sustainable method of law enforcement? &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/movement-ban-government-use-face-recognition&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Cities across the United States&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; have already taken the step to ban government use of this technology, and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/08/montanas-new-genetic-privacy-law-caps-ten-years-innovative-state-privacy&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Montana&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; has specifically recognized a privacy interest in phenotype data. Other cities and states need to catch up or Congress needs to act before more people are hurt and our rights are trampled. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1502.  
  1503. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1504.     <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2024 15:52:12 +0000</pubDate>
  1505. <guid isPermaLink="false">109458 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1506. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
  1507. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/genetic-information-privacy">Genetic Information Privacy</category>
  1508. <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
  1509. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  1510. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/dna-spying2.png" alt="DNA and spying eyes" type="image/png" length="134327" />
  1511.  </item>
  1512.  <item>
  1513.    <title>EFF and 34 Civil Society Organizations Call on Ghana’s President to Reject the Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill </title>
  1514.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/eff-and-34-civil-society-organizations-call-ghanas-president-reject-anti-lgbtq</link>
  1515.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;MPs in Ghana’s Parliament &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ghana-anti-lgbtq-legislation-passed-by-parliament/&quot;&gt;voted to pass&lt;/a&gt; the country’s draconian ‘&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.parliament.gh/epanel/docs/bills/Promotion%20of%20Proper%20Human%20Sexual%20Rights%20and%20Ghanaian%20Family%20Values%20Bill,%202021.pdf#viewer.action=download&quot;&gt;Promotion of Proper Human Sexual Rights and Ghanaian Family Values Bill&lt;/a&gt;’ on February 28th. The bill now heads to Ghana’s President Nana Akufo-Addo to be signed into law. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1516. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF has joined 34 civil society organizations to demand that President Akufo-Addo vetoes the Family Values Bill.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1517. &lt;p&gt;The legislation criminalizes being LGBTQ+ or an ally of LGBTQ+ people, and also imposes custodial sentences for users and social media companies in punishment for vague, ill-defined offenses like promoting “change in public opinion of prohibited acts” on social media. This would effectively ban all speech and activity online and offline that even remotely supports LGBTQ+ rights.&lt;/p&gt;
  1518. &lt;p&gt;The &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-letter-reject-ghana-anti-lgbtq-bill/&quot;&gt;letter&lt;/a&gt; concludes:&lt;/p&gt;
  1519. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;“We also call on you to reaffirm Ghana’s obligation to prevent acts that violate and undermine LGBTQ+ people’s fundamental human rights, including the rights to life, to information, to free association, and to freedom of expression.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1520. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1521. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Read the full letter &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.accessnow.org/press-release/open-letter-reject-ghana-anti-lgbtq-bill/&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1522.  
  1523. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1524.     <pubDate>Fri, 22 Mar 2024 12:42:29 +0000</pubDate>
  1525. <guid isPermaLink="false">109457 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1526. <dc:creator>Paige Collings</dc:creator>
  1527. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/rainbow-1_0_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="18730" />
  1528.  </item>
  1529.  <item>
  1530.    <title>Disinformation and Elections: EFF and ARTICLE 19 Submit Key Recommendations to EU Commission</title>
  1531.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/disinformation-and-elections-eff-and-article-19-submit-key-recommendations-eu</link>
  1532.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;h2&gt;Global Elections and Platform Responsibility&lt;/h2&gt;
  1533. &lt;p&gt;This year is a major one for elections around the world, with pivotal races in the U.S., the UK, the European Union, Russia, and India, to name just a few. Social media platforms play a crucial role in democratic engagement by enabling users to participate in public discourse and by providing access to information, especially as public figures increasingly engage with voters directly. Unfortunately elections also attract a sometimes dangerous amount of &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/09/business/media/election-disinformation-2024.html&quot;&gt;disinformation&lt;/a&gt;, filling users&#039; news feed with ads touting conspiracy theories about candidates, false news stories about stolen elections, and so on.&lt;/p&gt;
  1534. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Online election disinformation and misinformation can have &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/&quot;&gt;real world consequences&lt;/a&gt; in the &lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/elections-voting-misinformation-race-immigration-712a5c5a9b72c1668b8c9b1eb6e0038a&quot;&gt;U.S.&lt;/a&gt; and all over the world. The EU Commission and other regulators are therefore formulating measures platforms could take to address disinformation related to elections. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1535. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Given their dominance over the online information space, p&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;roviders of Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs), as sites with over 45 million users in the EU are called, have unique power to influence outcomes.  Platforms are driven by economic incentives that may not align with democratic values, and that disconnect  may be embedded in the design of their systems. For example, features like engagement-driven recommender systems may prioritize and amplify disinformation, divisive content, and incitement to violence. That effect, combined with a significant lack of transparency and targeting techniques, can too easily undermine free, fair, and well-informed electoral processes.&lt;/p&gt;
  1536. &lt;h2&gt;Digital Services Act and EU Commission Guidelines&lt;/h2&gt;
  1537. &lt;p&gt;The EU Digital Services Act (DSA) contains a set of &lt;span&gt;sweeping regulations about online-content governance and responsibility for digital services that make X, Facebook, and other platforms subject in many ways to the European Commission and national authorities. It focuses on content moderation processes on platforms, limits targeted ads, and enhances transparency for users. However, the DSA also grants &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;considerable power to authorities to flag content and investigate anonymous users - powers that they may be tempted to mis-use with elections looming. The DSA also &lt;/span&gt;obliges VLOPs to assess and mitigate systemic risks, but it is unclear what those obligations mean in practice. Much will depend on how social media platforms interpret their obligations under the DSA, and how European Union authorities enforce the regulation.&lt;/p&gt;
  1538. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;strong&gt;We therefore support the initiative by the EU Commission to &lt;a href=&quot;https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-gathering-views-draft-dsa-guidelines-election-integrity#:~:text=The%20exploratory%20consultation%20is%20open,apply%20since%20end%2DAugust%202023.&quot;&gt;gather views&lt;/a&gt; about what measures the Commission should call on platforms to take to mitigate specific risks linked to disinformation and electoral processes.&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1539. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Together with &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.article19.org/&quot;&gt;ARTICLE 19&lt;/a&gt;, we have submitted &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/joint-submission-euelections&quot;&gt;comments&lt;/a&gt; to the EU Commission on future guidelines for platforms. In our response, we&lt;/span&gt; recommend that the guidelines prioritize best practices, instead of policing speech. Furthermore, &lt;span&gt;DSA risk assessment and mitigation compliance evaluations&lt;/span&gt; should focus primarily on e&lt;span&gt;nsuring respect for fundamental rights. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1540. &lt;p&gt;We further argue &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/01/ai-watermarking-wont-curb-disinformation&quot;&gt;against using watermarking&lt;/a&gt; of AI content to curb disinformation, and caution against the draft guidelines’ broadly phrased recommendation that platforms should exchange information with national authorities. Any such exchanges should take care to respect human rights, beginning with a transparent process.  We also recommend that the guidelines pay particular attention to attacks against minority groups or online harassment and abuse of female candidates, lest such attacks further silence those parts of the population who are already often denied a voice.&lt;/p&gt;
  1541. &lt;p&gt;EFF and ARTICLE 19 Submission: &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/joint-submission-euelections&quot;&gt;https://www.eff.org/document/joint-submission-euelections&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1542.  
  1543. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1544.     <pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2024 18:35:20 +0000</pubDate>
  1545. <guid isPermaLink="false">109431 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1546. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/eff-europe">European Union</category>
  1547. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/international">International</category>
  1548. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/eu-policy">EU Policy</category>
  1549. <dc:creator>Christoph Schmon</dc:creator>
  1550. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/eu-flag-11.png" alt="EU-flag-circuits" type="image/png" length="48177" />
  1551.  </item>
  1552.  <item>
  1553.    <title>EFF Seeks Greater Public Access to Patent Lawsuit Filed in Texas</title>
  1554.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/eff-seeks-greater-public-access-patent-lawsuit-filed-texas</link>
  1555.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;You’re not supposed to be able to litigate in secret in the U.S. That’s especially true in a patent case dealing with technology that most internet users rely on every day.&lt;/p&gt;
  1556. &lt;p&gt; Unfortunately, that’s exactly what’s happening in a case called &lt;em&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/cases/entropic-communications-llc-v-charter-communications-inc&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Entropic Communications, LLC v. Charter Communications, Inc&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/em&gt;. The parties have made so much of their dispute secret that it is hard to tell how the patents owned by Entropic might affect the Data Over Cable Service Interface Specifications (DOCSIS) standard, a key technical standard that ensures cable customers can access the internet.&lt;/p&gt;
  1557. &lt;p&gt;In &lt;em&gt;Entropic&lt;/em&gt;, both sides are experienced litigants who should know that this type of sealing is improper. Unfortunately, overbroad secrecy is common in patent litigation, particularly in cases filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.&lt;/p&gt;
  1558. &lt;p&gt;EFF has sought to ensure public access to lawsuits in this district for years. In 2016, EFF intervened in another patent case in this very district, arguing that the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/05/victory-sliver-light-be-shed-patent-case&quot;&gt;heavy sealing by a patent owner called Blue Spike&lt;/a&gt; violated the public’s First Amendment and common law rights. A judge ordered the case unsealed.&lt;/p&gt;
  1559. &lt;p&gt;As &lt;em&gt;Entropic &lt;/em&gt;shows, however, parties still believe they can shut down the public’s access to presumptively public legal disputes. This secrecy has to stop. That’s why EFF, represented by the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.columbia.edu/academics/experiential/clinics/science-health-and-information-clinic&quot;&gt;Science, Health &amp;amp; Information Clinic&lt;/a&gt; at Columbia Law School, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/entropic-motion-intervene-and-unseal&quot;&gt;filed a motion today&lt;/a&gt; seeking to intervene in the case and unseal a variety of legal briefs and evidence submitted in the case. EFF’s motion argues that the legal issues in the case and their potential implications for the DOCSIS standard are a matter of public concern and asks the district court judge hearing the case to provide greater public access.&lt;/p&gt;
  1560. &lt;h3&gt;Protective Orders Cannot Override The Public’s First Amendment Rights&lt;/h3&gt;
  1561. &lt;p&gt;As EFF’s motion describes, the parties appear to have agreed to keep much of their filings secret via what is known as a protective order. These court orders are common in litigation and prevent the parties from disclosing information that they obtain from one another during the fact-gathering phase of a case. Importantly, protective orders set the rules for information exchanged between the parties, not what is filed on a public court docket.&lt;/p&gt;
  1562. &lt;p&gt;The parties in &lt;em&gt;Entropic&lt;/em&gt;, however, are claiming that the protective order permits them to keep secret both legal arguments made in briefs filed with the court as well as evidence submitted with those filings. EFF’s motion argues that this contention is incorrect as a matter of law because the parties cannot use their agreement to abrogate the public’s First Amendment and common law rights to access court records. More generally, relying on protective orders to limit public access is problematic because parties in litigation often have little interest or incentive to make their filings public.&lt;/p&gt;
  1563. &lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, parties in patent litigation too often seek to seal a variety of information that should be public. EFF continues to push back on these claims. In addition to our work in Texas, we have also intervened in a California patent case, where we also &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/09/victory-court-unseals-records-showing-patent-trolls-shakedown-efforts&quot;&gt;won an important transparency ruling&lt;/a&gt;. The court in that case prevented Uniloc, a company that had filed hundreds of patent lawsuits, from keeping the public in the dark as to its licensing activities.&lt;/p&gt;
  1564. &lt;p&gt;That is why part of EFF’s motion asks the court to clarify that parties litigating in the Texas district court cannot rely on a protective order for secrecy and that they must instead seek permission from the court and justify any claim that material should be filed under seal.&lt;/p&gt;
  1565. &lt;p&gt;On top of clarifying that the parties’ protective orders cannot frustrate the public’s right to access federal court records, we hope the motion in &lt;em&gt;Entropic&lt;/em&gt; helps shed light on the claims and defenses at issue in this case, which are themselves a matter of public concern. The DOCSIS standard is used in virtually all cable internet modems around the world, so the claims made by Entropic may have broader consequences for anyone who connects to the internet via a cable modem.&lt;/p&gt;
  1566. &lt;p&gt;It’s also impossible to tell if Entropic might want to sue more cable modem makers. So far, Entropic has sued five big cable modem vendors—Charter, Cox, Comcast, DISH TV, and DirecTV—in more than a dozen separate cases. EFF is hopeful that the records will shed light on how broadly Entropic believes its patents can reach cable modem technology.&lt;/p&gt;
  1567. &lt;p&gt;EFF is extremely grateful that Columbia Law School’s &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.law.columbia.edu/academics/experiential/clinics/science-health-and-information-clinic&quot;&gt;Science, Health &amp;amp; Information Clinic&lt;/a&gt; could represent us in this case. We especially thank the student attorneys who worked on the filing, including Sean Hong, Gloria Yi, Hiba Ismail, and Stephanie Lim, and the clinic’s director, Christopher Morten.&lt;/p&gt;
  1568.  
  1569. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-field-related-cases field--type-node-reference field--label-above&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__label&quot;&gt;Related Cases:&amp;nbsp;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;/cases/entropic-communications-llc-v-charter-communications-inc&quot;&gt;Entropic Communications, LLC v. Charter Communications, Inc.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1570.     <pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2024 19:26:03 +0000</pubDate>
  1571. <guid isPermaLink="false">109451 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1572. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency">Transparency</category>
  1573. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/patents">Patents</category>
  1574. <dc:creator>Aaron Mackey</dc:creator>
  1575. <dc:creator>Joe Mullin</dc:creator>
  1576. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/icon-2019-transparency.png" alt="A magnifying glass examines a folder marked &amp;quot;secret&amp;quot;" type="image/png" length="17340" />
  1577.  </item>
  1578.  <item>
  1579.    <title>The Tech Apocalypse Panic is Driven by AI Boosters, Military Tacticians, and Movies</title>
  1580.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/how-avoid-ai-apocalypse-one-easy-step</link>
  1581.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;There has been a tremendous amount of hand wringing and nervousness about how so-called artificial intelligence &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/6898967/ai-extinction-national-security-risks-report/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;might end up destroying the world&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The fretting has only gotten worse as a result of a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.gladstone.ai/action-plan&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;U.S. State Department-commissioned report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; on the security risk of weaponized AI.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1582. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Whether these messages come from popular films like a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TQUsLAAZuhU&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;War Games &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Terminator&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;, reports that in digital simulations AI supposedly &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.semafor.com/article/02/09/2024/ai-models-consistently-opt-for-nuclear-weapons-in-war-games&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;favors the nuclear option&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;more than it should, or the idea that &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nextgov.com/artificial-intelligence/2023/11/ai-can-help-predict-nuclear-threats-also-develop-others-faster-state-report-warns/392214/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;AI could assess nuclear threats quicker than humans&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;—all of these scenarios have one thing in common: they end with nukes (almost) being launched because a computer either had the ability to pull the trigger or convinced humans to do so by simulating imminent nuclear threat. The purported risk of AI comes not just from yielding “control&quot; to computers, but also the ability for advanced algorithmic systems to breach cybersecurity measures or manipulate and social engineer people with realistic voice, text, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/01/ai-watermarking-wont-curb-disinformation&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;images, video&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, or &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/01/worried-about-ai-voice-clone-scams-create-family-password&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;digital impersonations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1583. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But there is one easy way to avoid a lot of this and prevent a self-inflicted doomsday: don’t give computers the capability to launch devastating weapons. This means both denying algorithms ultimate decision making powers, but it also means building in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/dr-james-johnson-on-how-ai-is-transforming-nuclear-deterrence/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;protocols and safeguards&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; so that some kind of generative AI cannot be used to impersonate or simulate the orders capable of launching attacks. It’s really simple, and we’re by far &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2023/06/ai-warfare-nuclear-weapons-strike/673780/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;not the only (or the first) people to suggest the radical idea&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;that we just not integrate computer decision making into many important decisions–from &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://copout.tech/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;deciding a person’s freedom&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to launching first or retaliatory strikes with nuclear weapons.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1584. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;First, let’s define terms. To start, I am using &quot;Artificial Intelligence&quot; purely for expediency and because it is the term most commonly used by vendors and government agencies to describe automated algorithmic decision making despite the fact that it is a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://medium.com/center-on-privacy-technology/artifice-and-intelligence%C2%B9-f00da128d3cd&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;problematic term that shields human agency from criticism&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. What we are talking about here is an algorithmic system, fed a tremendous amount of historical or hypothetical information, that leverages probability and context in order to choose what outcomes are expected based on the data it has been fed. It’s how training algorithmic chatbots on posts from social media &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;resulted in the chatbot regurgitating the racist rhetoric&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; it was trained on. It’s also how &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/technology-cant-predict-crime-it-can-only-weaponize-proximity-policing&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;predictive policing algorithms reaffirm racially biased policing&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; by sending police to neighborhoods where the police already patrol and where they make a majority of their arrests. From the vantage of the data it looks as if that is the only neighborhood with crime because police don’t typically arrest people in other neighborhoods. As AI expert and technologist &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2023/11/28/1215529902/unmasking-ai-facial-recognition-technology-joy-buolamwini&quot;&gt;Joy Buolamwini has said&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;/span&gt;&quot;With the adoption of AI systems, at first I thought we were looking at a mirror, but now I believe we&#039;re looking into a kaleidoscope of distortion... Because the technologies we believe to be bringing us into the future are actually taking us back from the progress already made.&lt;em&gt;&quot;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1585. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Military Tactics Shouldn’t Drive AI Use &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1586. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;As &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/08/eff-white-paper-how-militaries-should-use-ai&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF wrote in 2018&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, “Militaries must make sure they don&#039;t buy into the machine learning hype while missing the warning label. There&#039;s much to be done with machine learning, but plenty of reasons to keep it away from things like target selection, fire control, and most command, control, and intelligence (C2I) roles in the near future, and perhaps beyond that too.” (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/cautious-path-strategic-advantage-how-militaries-should-plan-ai&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;You can read EFF’s whole 2018&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;white paper:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; The Cautious Path to Advantage: How Militaries Should Plan for AI&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1587. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Just like in policing, in the military there must be a compelling directive (not to mention the marketing from eager companies hoping to get rich off defense contracts) to constantly be innovating in order to claim technical superiority. But integrating technology for innovation’s sake alone creates a great risk of unforeseen danger. AI-enhanced targeting is liable to get things wrong. AI can be fooled or tricked. It can be hacked. And giving AI the power to escalate armed conflicts, especially on a global or nuclear scale, might just bring about the much-feared AI apocalypse that can be avoided just by keeping a human finger on the button. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1588. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;We’ve &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/07/dont-let-police-arm-autonomous-or-remote-controlled-robots-and-drones&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;written before&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; about how necessary it is to ban attempts for police to arm robots (either remote controlled or autonomous) in a domestic context for the same reasons. The idea of so-called autonomy among machines and robots creates the false sense of agency–the idea that only the computer is to blame for falsely targeting the wrong person or misreading signs of incoming missiles and launching a nuclear weapon in response–obscures who is really at fault. Humans put computers in charge of making the decisions, but humans also train the programs which make the decisions. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1589. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;AI Does What We Tell It To&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1590. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In the words of linguist Emily Bender,  “AI” and especially its text-based applications, is a “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://nymag.com/intelligencer/article/ai-artificial-intelligence-chatbots-emily-m-bender.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;stochastic parrot&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;” meaning that it echoes back to us things we taught it with as “determined by random, probabilistic distribution.” In short, we give it the material it learns, it learns it, and then draws conclusions and makes decisions based on that historical dataset. If you teach an algorithmic model that 9 times out of 10 a nation will launch a retaliatory strike when missiles are fired at them–the first time that model mistakes a flock of birds for inbound missiles, that is exactly what it will do. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1591. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;To that end, AI scholar &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Kate Crawford argues&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, “AI is neither &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;artificial &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;nor &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;intelligent&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;. Rather, artificial intelligence is both embodied and material, made from natural resources, fuel, human labor, infrastructures, logistics, histories, and classifications. AI systems are not autonomous, rational, or able to discern anything without extensive datasets or predefined rules and rewards. In fact, artificial intelligence as we know it depends entirely on a much wider set of political and social structures. And due to the capital required to build AI at scale and the ways of seeing that it optimizes AI systems are ultimately designed to serve existing dominant interests.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1592. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;AI does what we teach it to. It mimics the decisions it is taught to make either through hypotheticals or historical data. This means that, yet again, we are not powerless to a coming AI doomsday. We teach AI how to operate. We give it control of escalation, weaponry, and military response. We could just not. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1593. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Governing AI Doesn’t Mean Making it More Secret–It Means Regulating Use &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1594. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Part of the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/6898967/ai-extinction-national-security-risks-report/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;recent report&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; commissioned by the U.S. Department of State on the weaponization of AI included one troubling recommendation: making the inner workings of AI more secret. In order to keep algorithms from being tampered with or manipulated, the full report (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://time.com/6898967/ai-extinction-national-security-risks-report/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;as summarized by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Time&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;) &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;suggests that a new governmental regulatory agency responsible for AI should &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;criminalize&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; and make potentially punishable by jail time publishing the inner workings of AI. This means that how AI functions in our daily lives, and how the government uses it, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/01/open-data-and-ai-black-box&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;could never be open source and would always live inside a black box&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;where we could never learn the datasets informing its decision making. So much of our lives is already being governed by automated decision making, from the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://copout.tech/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;criminal justice system&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2024/mar/06/ai-interviews-job-applications&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;employment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, to criminalize the only route for people to know how those systems are being trained seems counterproductive and wrong. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1595. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Opening up the inner workings of AI puts more eyes on how a system functions and makes it more easy, not less, to spot manipulation and tampering… not to mention it might mitigate the biases and harms that skewed training datasets create in the first place. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1596. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;Conclusion&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1597. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Machine learning and algorithmic systems are useful tools whose potential we are only just beginning to grapple with&lt;span&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;but we have to understand what these technologies are and what they are not. They are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://yalebooks.yale.edu/book/9780300264630/atlas-of-ai/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;neither “artificial” or “intelligent”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;span&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;they do not represent an alternate and spontaneously-occurring way of knowing independent of the human mind. People build these systems and train them to get a desired outcome. Even when outcomes from AI are unexpected, usually one can find their origins somewhere in the data systems they were trained on. Understanding this will go a long way toward responsibly shaping how and when AI is deployed, especially in a defense contract, and will hopefully alleviate some of our collective sci-fi panic.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1598. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;This doesn’t mean that people won’t weaponize AI&lt;span&gt;—&lt;/span&gt;and already are in the form of political disinformation or realistic impersonation. But the solution to that is not to outlaw AI entirely, nor is it handing over the keys to a nuclear arsenal to computers. We need a common sense system that respects innovation, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/congress-must-exercise-caution-ai-regulation&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;regulates uses rather than the technology itself&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, and does not let panic, AI boosters, or military tacticians dictate how and when important systems are put under autonomous control. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1599.  
  1600. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1601.     <pubDate>Wed, 20 Mar 2024 14:36:29 +0000</pubDate>
  1602. <guid isPermaLink="false">109437 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1603. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/ai">Artificial Intelligence &amp; Machine Learning</category>
  1604. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  1605. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/ai-soldiers-3b.png" alt="AI Military" type="image/png" length="8125" />
  1606.  </item>
  1607.  <item>
  1608.    <title>Lucy Parsons Labs Takes Police Foundation to Court for Open Records Requests</title>
  1609.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/lucy-parsons-labs-takes-police-foundation-court-open-records-requests</link>
  1610.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The University of Georgia (UGA) School of Law’s First Amendment Clinic has filed an &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/uga1stamclinic/status/1762138235634119041?s=46&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Open Records Request lawsuit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/09/atlanta-police-foundation-records-requests-cop-city&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;demand public records&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; from the private Atlanta Police Foundation (APF). The lawsuit, filed at the behest of the Atlanta Community Press Collective and Electronic Frontier Alliance-member &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://lucyparsonslabs.com/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Lucy Parsons Labs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, is seeking records relating to the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, which activists refer to as Cop City. While the facility will be used for public law enforcement and emergency services agencies, including training on surveillance technologies, the lease is held by the APF. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1611. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;The argument is that the Atlanta Police Foundation, as the nonprofit holding the lease for facilities intended for&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;use by government agencies, should be subject to the same state Open Records Act as &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;to&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;s&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; functions &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;that are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;on behalf of law enforcement agencies. Beyond the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center, the APF also manages the Atlanta Police Department’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://atlantapolicefoundation.org/programs/operation-shield/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Video Surveillance Center&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, which integrates footage from over 16,000 public and privately-held surveillance cameras across the city.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1612. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;According to UGA School of Law’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/UGA1stAmClinic/status/1762138699717026267&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;First Amendment Clinic&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, “The Georgia Supreme Court has held that records in the custody of a private entity that relate to services or functions the entity performs for or on behalf of the government are public records under the Georgia Open Records Act.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1613. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/09/how-police-fund-surveillance-technology-part-problem&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Police foundations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; frequently operate in this space. They are private, non-profit organizations with boards made up of corporations and law firms that receive monetary or equipment donations that they then gift to their local law enforcement agencies. These gifts often bypass council hearings or other forms of public oversight.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1614. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Lucy Parsons Labs’ Ed Vogel said, “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;At the core of the struggle over the Atlanta Public Safety Training Center is democratic practice. Decisions regarding this facility should not be made behind closed doors. This lawsuit is just one piece of that. The people have a right to know.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1615. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;You can read the lawsuit &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/document/lpl-v-apf&quot;&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;0}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1616.  
  1617. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1618.     <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2024 22:55:17 +0000</pubDate>
  1619. <guid isPermaLink="false">109434 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1620. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/efa">EFA</category>
  1621. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
  1622. <dc:creator>José Martinez</dc:creator>
  1623.  </item>
  1624.  <item>
  1625.    <title>Speaking Freely: Maryam Al-Khawaja </title>
  1626.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/speaking-freely-maryam-al-khawaja</link>
  1627.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;*This interview has been edited for length and clarity.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1628. &lt;p&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maryam_al-Khawaja&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;Maryam Al-Khawaja&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; is a Bahraini Woman Human Rights Defender who works as a consultant and trainer on Human Rights. She is a leading voice for human rights and political reform in Bahrain and the Gulf region. She has been influential in shaping official responses to human rights atrocities in Bahrain and the Gulf region by leading campaigns and engaging with prominent policymakers around the world. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1629. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;She played an instrumental role in the pro-democracy protests in Bahrain’s Pearl Roundabout in February 2011. These protests triggered a government response of widespread extra judicial killings, arrests, and torture, which she documented extensively over social media. Due to her human rights work, she was subjected to assault, threats, defamation campaigns, imprisonment and an unfair trial. She was arrested on illegitimate charges in 2014 and sentenced in absentia to one year in prison. She currently has an outstanding arrest warrant and four pending cases, one of which could carry a life sentence. She serves on the Boards of the International Service for Human Rights, Urgent Action Fund, CIVICUS and the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy. She also previously served as Co-Director at the Gulf Center for Human Rights and Acting President of the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1630. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Can you introduce yourself and tell us a little about your work? Maybe provide us a brief outline of your history as a free expression advocate going back as far as you’d like. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1631. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Maryam: Sure, so my name is Maryam Al-Khawaja. I’m a Bahraini-Danish human rights defender and advocate. I’ve worked in many different spaces around human rights and on many different thematic issues. Of course freedom of expression is an intricate part of nearly any kind of human rights advocacy work. And it’s one of the issues that is critical to the work that we do and critical to the civil society space because it not only affects people who live in dictatorships, but also people who live in democracies or pseudodemocracies. A lot of times there’s not necessarily an agreement around what freedom of expression is or a definition of what falls under the scope of freedom of expression. And also to who and how that applies. So while some things for some people might be considered free expression, for others it might be considered not as free expression and therefore it’s not protected. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1632. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think it’s something that I’ve both experienced having done the work and having taken part in the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Bahraini_uprising&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;revolution in Bahrain&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; and watching the difference between how we went from self-censorship prior to the uprising and then how people took to the streets and started saying whatever they wanted. That moment of just breaking down that wall and feeling almost like you could breathe again because you suddenly could express yourself. Not necessarily without fear – because the consequences were still there – but more so that you were doing it anyway, despite the fear. I think that’s one of the strongest memories I have of the importance of speech and that shift that happens even internally because, yes, there’s censorship in Bahrain, but censorship then creates self-censorship for protection and self preservation.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1633. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;It’s interesting because I then left Bahrain and came to Denmark and I started seeing how, as a Brown, Muslim woman, my right to free expression doesn’t look the same as someone who is White living in Europe. So I also had to learn those intricacies and how that works and how we stand up to that or fight against that. It’s… been a long struggle, to keep it short. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1634. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: That’s a really strong answer and I want to come back to something you said, and that’s that censorship creates self-censorship. I think we both know the moment we’re living in right now, and I’m seeing a lot of self-censorship even from people who typically are very staunch in standing up for freedom of expression. I’m curious, in the past decade, how has the idea that censorship creates self-censorship impacted you and the people around you or the activists that you know? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1635. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One part of it is when you’re an advocate and you look how I look – especially when I was wearing the headscarf – you learn very quickly that there are things that people find acceptable coming from you, and things they find not acceptable. There are judgements and stereotypes that are applied to you and therefore what you can and cannot say actually has to also be taken into that context. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1636. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Like to give you a small example, one of the things that I faced a lot during my advocacy and my work on Bahrain was I was constantly put in a space where I had to explain or… not justify – because I don’t support the use of violence generally – but I was put in a defensive position of “Why are you as civil society not telling these youth not to use Molotov cocktails on the street of Bahrain?” And I would try to explain that while I don’t justify the use of violence generally, it’s important to understand the context. And to understand that a small group of youth in Bahrain started using Molotov cocktails as a way to defend themselves, to try and get the riot police out of their villages when the riot police would come in in the middle of the night and basically go on a rampage, break into people’s homes, beat people to a pulp, and then take people and disappear them or torture them and so on. And so one of the ways for them to try and fight back was to use Molotov cocktails to at least get the riot police to stop coming into their villages. Of course this was always taken as me justifying violence or me supporting terrorism. Unfortunately, it wasn’t surprising, but it was such a clarifying moment. Then I watched those very same people at the very same media outlets literally put out tutorials on how to make Molotov cocktails for people in Ukraine fighting back against Russia. It’s not surprising because I know that’s how the world works, I know that in the world that we live in and the societies that we live in, my life is not equal to that of others – specific others. I very quickly learned that my work as a person of color – and I don’t really like that term – but as a person of the global majority, it’s my proximity to whiteness that decides my value as a human being. Unfortunately. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1637. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So that’s one layer of it. Another layer of it is here in Europe. I live in Copenhagen. I travel in the West quite often. I’ve also seen the difference of how we’re positioned as – especially Muslims with the incredible amounts of Islamophobia especially in Copenhagen – and seeing how politicians can come out and say incredibly Islamophobic and racist things and be written off as freedom of expression. But if someone of the global majority were to do that they would immediately be dubbed as extremist or a radical. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1638. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There is this extreme double standard when it comes to what freedom of expression looks like and how it’s implemented. And I’ll end with this example, with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charlie_Hebdo&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Charlie Hebdo &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;example. There was such a huge international solidarity movement when the attack on Charlie Hebdo happened in France. And obviously the killing that happened, there doesn’t even need to be a conversation around that, of course everyone should condemn that. What I find lacking in the conversation around freedom of expression when it comes to Charlie Hebdo is that Charlie Hebdo targets Muslim minorities that are already under attack, that are already discriminated against, and, in my mind, it actually incites violence against them when it does so. Because they’re already so targeted, because they’re vilified already in the media by politicians and so on. So my approach isn’t to say, “we should start censoring these media publications” or “we should start censoring people from being able to say what they say.” I’m saying that when we’re going to implement rules or understandings around freedom of expression it needs to be implemented equally. It needs to be implemented without double standards. Without picking and choosing who gets to have freedom of expression versus who doesn’t. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1639. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: That’s such a great point. And I’m glad you brought up Charlie Hebdo. Coming back to that, it reminded me about the different governments that we saw, from my perspective, &lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;i&gt;pretending&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;b&gt; to march for free expression when that happened. We saw a number of states that ranked fairly poorly on press freedom at the time. My recollection is we saw a number of countries that don’t have a great track record on freedom of expression, I think including Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, take a stance at that time. What that evokes for me is the hypocrisy of various states. We think about censorship as a potent tool for those in power to maintain power and then of course that sort of political posturing is also a very potent tool. So what are your thoughts on that? How does that inform your advocacy? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1640. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Like I said, we’ve already seen it throughout Europe and throughout the United States. Right now with the Gaza situation we’re seeing this with even more clarity – and it’s not like it was hidden before, those of us that work in these spaces already knew this – but I think right now it’s just so in-your-face where people are literally getting fired from their jobs and called into HR for liking posts, for posting things basically standing against an ongoing genocide. And I think, again, it brings to the surface the double standard and the hypocrisy that exists within the spaces that talk about freedom of expression. France is actually a great example. Even when we’re talking about Charlie Hebdo; Charlie Hebdo did the cover of the magazine before they were attacked. It was mocking the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rabaa_massacre&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Rabaa Massacre&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, which was one of the largest massacres to happen in Egypt in recent history. Regardless of what you think of the Muslim Brotherhood, that was a massacre, it was wrong, it should be condemned. And they poked fun at that. They had this man with a long beard who looked like the Muslim Brotherhood holding up a Quran with bullets going through the Quran and hitting him, saying, “your Quran won’t protect you.” This was considered freedom of expression even though it was mocking a literal massacre that happened in Egypt. Which, in my opinion, the Egyptian regime should be considered as committing terrorist acts for that massacre. And so in some ways that could be considered as supporting terrorism. Just like I consider what is happening to the Palestinians as a form of terrorism. The same thing with Syria and so on. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1641. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;But, unfortunately, it’s the people who own the discourse that get to decide what phrases and what terminologies can be applied and used where. But the point that I was making about Charlie Hebdo is that not much later after the attack on Charlie Hebdo, there was a 16 year old in France who made a cartoon cover where he mocks the attack on Charlie Hebdo. He basically used the exact same type of cartoon that they had used around the Rabaa massacre. Where there’s a guy from Charlie Hebdo holding up a copy of Charlie Hebdo and being struck by bullets and saying “your magazine doesn’t stop bullets.” And he was arrested! This 16 year old kid does this cartoon – exactly the same as the magazine had done after the massacre – and he was arrested and charged with advocating terrorism. And I think this is one of the clearest examples of how freedom of expression is not implemented on an equal level when it comes to who’s practicing it. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1642. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I think it’s the same thing as what we’re seeing right now happening with Palestine. When you look at what’s happening in Germany with the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dw.com/en/berlin-174-arrested-at-unauthorized-pro-palestinian-events/a-67145837&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;amount of people being arrested&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; [for unauthorized protests] and now we’re even hearing about &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dw.com/en/german-police-raid-suspected-hamas-and-samidoun-properties/a-67497037&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;raids on people’s homes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. I’ve spoken to some of my friends in Germany who say that they’re literally trying to hide and get rid of any pro-Palestinian flyers or flags that they have just in case their home gets raided. It’s interesting because quite a few Arabs in Germany now are referring to Germany as Assad’s Germany. Because a lot of what’s happening in Germany right now, to them, is reminiscent of what it was like to live in Syria under Assad. I think that tells you almost everything you need to know about the double standards of how these things are implemented. I think this is where the problem comes in. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1643. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;You can not talk about free expression and freedom of speech without talking about how it’s related to colonialism. About how it’s related to movements for freedom. About how it’s related to the fact that much of our human rights movements in civil society are currently based on institutionalized human rights – and I’m talking specifically about the West, obviously, because there are a lot of grassroots movements in the global majority countries. But we can not talk about these things without talking about the need and importance of decolonizing our activism.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1644. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;My thinking right now is very much inspired by Fanon’s &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Wretched_of_the_Earth&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;The Wretched of the Earth&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, where he talks about how when colonizers colonized, they didn’t just colonize the country and the institutions and education and all these different things. They even colonized and decided for us and dictated for us how we’re allowed to fight back. How we’re allowed to resist. And I think that’s incredibly true. There’s a very rigid understanding of the space that you’re allowed to exist in or have to exist in to be regarded as a credible human rights activist. Whether it’s for free speech or for any other human right. And so, in my mind, what we need right now is to decolonize our activism. And to step away from that idea that it’s the West that decides for us what “appropriate” or “acceptable” activism actually looks like. And start deciding for ourselves what our activism needs to look like. Because we know now that none of these people that have supported the genocide in Gaza can in any way shape or form try to dictate what humans rights look like or what activism looks like. I’ve seen this over social media over the past period and people have been saying this over and over again that what died in Gaza is that pretense. That the West gets to tell the rest of us what human rights are and what freedoms are and how we should fight for them. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1645. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: Let’s change directions for a moment. What do you think of the control that corporations have over deciding what speech parameters look like right now? &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1646. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt;[Laughs] Where do I start? I think it’s a struggle for a lot of us.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1647. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I want to first acknowledge that I have a lot of privileges that other activists don’t. When I left Bahrain in 2011 I already had Danish citizenship. Which meant that I could travel. I already had a strong command of English. Which meant that I could do meetings without the need for a translator. That I could attend and be in certain spaces. And that’s not necessarily the case for so many other activists. And so I do have a lot of privileges that have put me in the position that I am in. And I believe that part of having privileges like that means that I need to use them to be also a loud speaker for others. And to try and make this world a better place, in whatever shape and form that I can. That being said, I think that for many of us even who have had privileges that other activists don’t, it’s been a real struggle to watch the mediums and tools that we have been using for the past, over a decade, as a means of raising pressure, communicating with the world, connecting, and so on, be taken away from us. In ways that we can’t control and in ways that we don’t have a say on. I think that for a lot of – and I know especially for myself – but I think for a lot of activists who really found their voices in 2011 as part of activism especially on platforms like Twitter. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1648. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;When Elon Musk bought Twitter and decided to remove the verification status from all of us activists who had that for a reason. I remember I received my verification status because of the amount of fake accounts that the Bahraini government was creating at that time to impersonate me to try to discredit me. And also because I was receiving death threats and rape threats and all kinds of threats, over and over again. I received that verification status as an acknowledgement that I need support against those attacks that I was being subjected to. And it was gone overnight. It’s not just about that blue tick. It’s that people don’t see my Tweets the way that they used to. It’s about the fact that my message can’t go as far as it used to go. It’s not just because we no longer show up in people’s feeds, but also because so many people have left the platform because of how problematic it’s become. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1649. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;In some ways I spent 13 years focused on Twitter, building a following—obviously, my work is so much more than Twitter—but Twitter has been a tool for the work that I do. And really building a following and making sure that people trusted me and the information that I shared and that I was a trusted and credible source of information. Not just on Bahrain, but on all of the different types of work that I do. And then suddenly overnight, at the age of 35, 36 having to recreate that all over again on Instagram. And on TikTok. And the thing is… we’re tired. We’re exhausted. We’re burnt out. We’re not doing well. Almost everyone I know is either depressed or sick or dealing with some form of health issue. Thirteen years after the uprisings we’re not doing well and we’re not okay. What’s happening with Gaza right now is hitting all of us. I think it’s incredibly triggering and hurtful. I think the idea that we now have to make that effort to rebuild platforms to be able to reach people, it’s not just “Oh my god, I don’t have the energy for it.” It’s like someone tore a limb from us and we have to try to regrow that limb. And how do you regrow a limb, right? It’s incredibly painful. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1650. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Obviously, it’s nice to have a large following and for people to recognize you and know who you are and so on—and it’s hard work not letting that get to your head—but, for me, losing my voice is not about the follower count or how much people know who I am. It’s the fact that I can no longer get the same kind of attention for my father’s case. I can no longer get the same kind of attention for the hundreds of people who no one knows their names or their faces who are sitting in prison cells in Bahrain who are still being tortured. For the children who are still being arrested for protesting. For Palestine and Bahrain. I can no longer make sure that I’m a loudspeaker so that people know these things are happening.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1651. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;A lot of people talked about and wrote about the damage that Elon Musk did to Twitter and to that “public square” that we have. Twitter has always had its problems. And Meta has always had its problems. But it was a problem where we at least had a voice. We weren’t always heard and we weren’t always able to influence things, but at least it felt like we had a voice. Now it doesn’t feel like we have a voice. There was a lot of conversation around this, around the taking away of the public square, but there are these intricacies and details that affect us on such a personal level that I don’t think people outside of these circles can really understand or even think about. And how it affects when I need to make noise because my father might die from a heart attack because they’re refusing to give him medical treatment. And I can’t get retweets or I can’t get people to re-post. Or only 100 people are seeing the videos I’m posting on Instagram. It’s not that I care about having that following, it’s about literally being able to save my father’s life. So it takes such a toll on you on a personal level as well. I think that’s the part of the conversation that I think is missing when we talk about these things. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1652. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I can’t imagine—but in some ways I can imagine—how it feels for Palestinians right now. To watch their family members, their people being subjected to an ongoing genocide and then have their voices taken away from them, to be subjected to shadowbans, to have their accounts shut down. It’s insult added to injury. You’re already hurting. You’re already in pain. You’re already not doing well. You’re already struggling just to survive another day and the only thing you have is your voice and then even that is taken away from you. I don’t think we can even begin to imagine the kind of damage on mental health and even physical health that that’s going to have in the coming years and in the coming generations because, of course, we pass down our trauma to the people around us as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1653. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: I’m going to take a slight step back and a slight segue because I want to be able to use this interview for you to talk about your father’s case as well. Can you tell us about your father’s case and where it stands today?&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1654. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;My father, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abdulhadi_al-Khawaja&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, dedicated his entire life to human rights activism. Which is why he spent half his life, if not more than that, in exile. And it’s why he spent the last thirteen years in prison. My father is the only Danish prisoner of conscience in the world today. And I very strongly believe that if my father was not a Brown, Muslim man he would not have spent this long as an EU citizen in a prison cell based on freedom of expression charges. And this is one of those cases where you really get to recognize those double standards. Where Denmark prides itself on being one of the countries that is the biggest protector of freedom of expression. And yet the entire case against my father – and my father was one of the human rights leaders of the uprising in 2011 – and he led the protests and he talked about human rights and freedom and he talked about the importance of us doing things the right way. And I think that’s why he was seen as such a threat. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1655. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;One of his speeches was about how even if we are able to change the government in Bahrain, we are not going to torture. We’re not going to be like them. We’re going to make sure that people who were perpetrators receive due process and fair trials. He always focused on the importance of people fighting for justice and fighting for change to do things the right way and from a human rights framework. He was arrested very violently from my sister’s home in front of my friends and family. He was beaten unconscious in front of my family. And he repeatedly said as he was being beaten, “I can’t breathe.” And every time I think of what happened with my father I think of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Killing_of_Eric_Garner&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Eric Garner&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; as well – where he said over and over again “I can’t breathe” when he was basically killed by the United States police. Then my father was taken away. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1656. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Interestingly enough, especially because we’re talking about freedom of expression, my father was charged with terrorism. In Bahrain, the terrorism law is so vague that even the work of a human rights defender can be regarded as terrorism. So even criticizing the police for committing violations can be seen as inciting terrorism. So my father was arrested and tried under the terrorism law, and they said he was trying to overthrow the government. But &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/10/bahrain-why-abdulhadi-al-khawaja-should-be-free&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Human Rights Watch actually dissected&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; the case that was brought against my father and the “evidence” that he was of course forced to sign under torture. He was subjected to very severe psychological and sexual torture for over two months during which he was disappeared as well – held in incommunicado detention. When they did that dissection of the case they found that all of the charges against my father were based on freedom of expression issues. It was all based on things that he had said during the protests around calling for democracy, around calling for representative government, the right to self determination, and more. It’s very much a freedom of expression issue. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1657. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;What I find horrifying – but also it says a lot about the case against my father and why he’s in prison today – is that one of the first things they did to my dad was they hit him with a hard object on his jaw and they broke his jaw. Even my father says that he feels they did that on purpose because they were hoping that he would never be able to speak again. They broke his jaw in six different places, or four different places. He had to undergo a four hour surgery where they reattached his jaw. They had to use more than twenty metal plates and screws to put his jaw back together. And he, of course, still has chronic pain and issues because of what they did. He was subjected to so much else like electrocutions and more, but that was a very specific intentional first blow that he received when he was arrested. To the face and to the mouth. As punishment, as retaliation, for having used his right to free expression to speak up and criticize the government. I think this tells you pretty much everything you need to know about what the situation of freedom of expression is in Bahrain. But it should also tell you a lot about the EU and the West and how they regard the importance of freedom of expression when the fact that my father is an EU citizen has not actually protected him. And 13 years later he continues to sit in a prison cell serving a life sentence because he practiced his right to free expression and because he practiced his right to freedom of assembly. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1658. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Last year, my father decided to do a one-person protest in the prison yard. Both in solidarity with Palestine, but also because of the consistent and systematic denial of adequate medical treatment to prisoners of conscience in Bahrain. Because of that, and because he was again using his right to free expression inside prison, he was denied medical treatment for over a year. And my father had developed a heart condition. So a few months ago his condition started to get really bad, the doctors told us he might have a heart attack or a stroke at any time given that he was being denied access to a cardiologist. So I had to put myself and my freedom at risk. I’m already sentenced to one year in prison in Bahrain, I have four pending cases – basically, going back to Bahrain means that I am very likely to spend the rest of my life in prison, if not be subjected to torture. Which I have been in the past as well. But I decided to try and go back to Bahrain because the Danish government was refusing to step up. The West was refusing to step up. I mean we were asking for the bare minimum, which was access to a cardiologist. So I had to put myself at risk to try and bring attention. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1659. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;I ended up being denied boarding because there was too much international attention around my trip. So they denied me boarding because they didn’t want international coverage around me being arrested at the Bahrain airport again. I managed to get several very high profile human rights personalities to go with me on the trip. Because of that, and because we were able to raise so much international attention around my dad’s case, they actually ended up taking him to the cardiologist and now he’s on heart medication. But he’s never out of the danger zone, with Bahrain being what it is and because he’s still sitting in a prison cell. We’re still working hard on getting him out, but I think for my dad it’s always about his principles and his values and his ethics. For him, being a human rights defender, being in prison doesn’t mean the end of his activism. And that’s why he’s gone on more than seven hunger strikes in prison, that’s why he’s done multiple one-person protests in the prison yard. For him, his activism is an ongoing thing even from inside his prison cell. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1660. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;York: That’s an incredible story and I appreciate you sharing it with our readers—your father is incredibly brave. Last question- who is your free speech hero? &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1661. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Of course my dad, for sure. He always taught us the importance of using our voice not just to speak up for ourselves but for others especially. There’s so many that I’m drawing a blank! I can tell you that my favorite quote is by Edward Snowden. “Saying that you don’t care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is like saying you don’t care about freedom of speech because you have nothing to say.” I think that really brings things to the point.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1662. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;There’s also an indigenous activist in the US who has been doing such a tremendous job using her voice to bring attention to what’s happening to the indigenous communities in the US. And I know it comes at a cost and it comes at great risk. There’s several Syrian activists and Palestinian activists. &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.instagram.com/motaz_azaiza/&quot;&gt;Motaz Azaiza&lt;/a&gt; and his reporting on what’s happening now in Gaza and the price that he’s paying for it, same thing with &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.instagram.com/wizard_bisan1/?hl=en&quot;&gt;Bisan&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.instagram.com/byplestia/?hl=en&quot;&gt;Plestia&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. She’s also a Palestinian journalist who’s been reporting on Gaza. There’s just so many free expression heroes. People who have really excelled in understanding how to use their voice to make this world a better place. Those are my heroes. The everyday people who choose to do the right thing when it’s easier not to.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1663.  
  1664. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1665.     <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2024 18:35:41 +0000</pubDate>
  1666. <guid isPermaLink="false">109432 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1667. <dc:creator>Jillian C. York</dc:creator>
  1668. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/maryam.jpg" alt="Maryam Al-khawaja Speaking Freely Project" type="image/jpeg" length="102572" />
  1669.  </item>
  1670.  <item>
  1671.    <title>Decoding the California DMV&#039;s Mobile Driver&#039;s License</title>
  1672.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/decoding-california-dmvs-mobile-drivers-license</link>
  1673.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The State of California is currently rolling out a “mobile driver’s license” (mDL), a form of digital identification that raises significant &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/digital-identification-must-be-designed-privacy-and-equity-10&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;privacy and equity concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. This post explains the new smartphone application, explores the risks, and calls on the state and its vendor to focus more on protection of the users.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1674. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What is the California DMV Wallet?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1675. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/ca-dmv-wallet/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;California DMV Wallet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; app came out in app stores &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/california-mobile-drivers-license-pilot-program/3216602/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;last year&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; as a pilot, offering the ability to store and display your mDL on your smartphone, without needing to carry and present a traditional physical document. Several features in this app replicate how we currently present the physical document with key information about our identity—like address, age, birthday, driver class, etc. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1676. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;However, other features in the app provide new ways to present the data on your driver’s license. Right now, we only take out our driver’s license occasionally throughout the week. However, with the app’s QR Code and “add-on” features, the incentive for frequency may grow. This concerns us, given the rise of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/eff-opposes-california-initiative-would-cause-mass-censorship&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;age&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/dont-fall-latest-changes-dangerous-kids-online-safety-act&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;verification laws&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; that burden everyone’s access to the internet, and the lack of comprehensive consumer data privacy laws that keep businesses from harvesting and selling identifying information and sensitive personal information. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1677. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;For now, you can use the California DMV Wallet app with TSA in airports, and with select stores that have opted in to an age verification feature called &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/ca-dmv-wallet/truage/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;TruAge&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. That feature generates a separate QR Code for age verification on age-restricted items in stores, like alcohol and tobacco. This is not simply a one-to-one exchange of going from a physical document to an mDL. Rather, this presents a wider scope of possible usage of mDLs that needs expanded protections for those who use them.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; While California is &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.govtech.com/biz/data/digital-ids-are-here-but-where-are-they-used-and-accepted&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;not the first state&lt;/a&gt; to do this, this app will be used as an example to explain the current landscape.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1678. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1679. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What’s the QR Code?&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1680. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;There are two ways to present your information on the mDL: 1) a human readable presentation, or 2) a QR code.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1681. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;The QR code with a normal QR code scanner will display an alphanumeric string of text that starts with “mdoc:”. For example:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1682. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;code&gt; “mdoc:owBjMS4wAY...&quot;&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt; [shortened for brevity]&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1683. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;This “mobile document” (mdoc) text is defined by the International Organization for Standardization’s ISO/IEC18013-5. The string of text afterwards details driver’s license data that has been signed by the issuer (i.e., the California DMV), encrypted, and encoded. This data sequence includes technical specifications and standards, open and enclosed. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1684. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;In the digital identity space, including mDLs, the most referenced and utilized are the ISO standard above, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) standard, and the W3C’s Verified Credentials (VC). These standards are often not siloed, but rather used together since they offer directions on data formats, security, and methods of presentation that aren’t completely covered by just one. However, ISO and AAMVA are not open standards and are decided internally. VCs were created for digital credentials generally, not just for mDLs. These standards are relatively new and still need time to mature to address potential gaps. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1685. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;The decrypted data could possibly look like this JSON blob: &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1686. &lt;div&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;code&gt;         {&quot;family_name&quot;:&quot;Doe&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;given_name&quot;:&quot;John&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;birth_date&quot;:&quot;1980-10-10&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;issue_date&quot;:&quot;2020-08-10&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;expiry_date&quot;:&quot;2030-10-30&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;issuing_country&quot;:&quot;US&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;issuing_authority&quot;:&quot;CA DMV&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;document_number&quot;:&quot;I12345678&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;portrait&quot;:&quot;../../../../test/issuance/portrait.b64&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;driving_privileges&quot;:[&lt;br /&gt;            {&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;vehicle_category_code&quot;:&quot;A&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;issue_date&quot;:&quot;2022-08-09&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;expiry_date&quot;:&quot;2030-10-20&quot;&lt;br /&gt;            },&lt;br /&gt;            {&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;vehicle_category_code&quot;:&quot;B&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;issue_date&quot;:&quot;2022-08-09&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;               &quot;expiry_date&quot;:&quot;2030-10-20&quot;&lt;br /&gt;            }&lt;br /&gt;          ],&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;un_distinguishing_sign&quot;:&quot;USA&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          {&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;weight&quot;:70,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;eye_colour&quot;:&quot;hazel&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;hair_colour&quot;:&quot;red&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;birth_place&quot;:&quot;California&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;resident_address&quot;:&quot;2415 1st Avenue&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;portrait_capture_date&quot;:&quot;2020-08-10T12:00:00Z&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;age_in_years&quot;:42,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;age_birth_year&quot;:1980,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;age_over_18&quot;:true,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;age_over_21&quot;:true,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;issuing_jurisdiction&quot;:&quot;US-CA&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;nationality&quot;:&quot;US&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;resident_city&quot;:&quot;Sacramento&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;resident_state&quot;:&quot;California&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;resident_postal_code&quot;:&quot;95818&quot;,&lt;br /&gt;          &quot;resident_country&quot;: &quot;US&quot;}&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;code&gt;}&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
  1687. &lt;div&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;
  1688. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1689. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Application Approach and Scope Problems&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1690. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;California decided to contract a vendor to build a wallet app rather than use Google Wallet or Apple Wallet (not to be conflated with Google and Apple Pay). A handful of other states use &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://support.google.com/wallet/answer/12436402?hl=en&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Google&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://learn.wallet.apple/id#states-list&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Apple&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, perhaps because many people have one or the other. There are concerns about large companies being contracted by the states to deliver mDLs to the public, such as their controlling the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/14/22781570/apple-making-states-pay-digital-id-service&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;public image of digital identity and device compatibility&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1691. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;This isn’t the first time a state contracted with a vendor to build a digital credential application without much public input or consensus. For example, New York State contracted with IBM to roll out the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/vaccine-passport-missteps-we-should-not-repeat&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Excelsior app&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; during the beginning of COVID-19 vaccination availability. At the time, EFF raised &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/vaccine-passport-missteps-we-should-not-repeat&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;privacy and other concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; about this form of digital proof of vaccination. The state ultimately paid the vendor a staggering &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://apnews.com/article/excelsior-pass-covid-pandemic-new-york-afac2e1d97e0488b179a815c689584b9&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;$64 million&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. While initially proprietary, the application later opened to the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/06/decoding-californias-new-digital-vaccine-records-and-potential-dangers&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;SMART Health Card&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; standard, which is based on the W3C’s VCs. The app was sunset last year. It’s not clear what effect it had on public health, but it’s good that it wound down as social distancing measures relaxed. The infrastructure should be dismantled, and the persistent data should be discarded. If another health crisis emerges, at least &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/01/two-steps-forward-one-step-back-vaccine-privacy-new-york&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;a law in New York&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; now partially protects the privacy of this kind of data. NY state legislature &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and-telecom-law/mobile-drivers-licenses-face-privacy-scrutiny-ahead-of-ny-pilot&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;is currently working&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; on a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/A1018&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;bill&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; around mDLs after a round-table on their potential pilot. However, the New York DMV has already entered into a $1.75 million dollar contract with the digital identity vendor &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://homelandprepnews.com/countermeasures/government-countermeasures/80351-tsa-awards-128m-contract-to-idemia-for-new-airport-security-checkpoint-credential-authentication-systems/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;IDEMIA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. It will be a race to see if protections will be established prior to pilot deployment.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1692. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;Scope is also a concern with California’s mDL. The state contracted with &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://spruceid.com/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Spruce ID&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to build this app. The company states that its purpose is to empower “organizations to manage the entire lifecycle of digital credentials, such as mobile driver’s licenses, software audit statements, professional certifications, and more.” In the “add-ons” section of the app, TruAge’s age verification QR code is available. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1693. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;Another issue is selective disclosure, meaning the technical ability for the identity credential holder to choose which information to disclose to a person or entity asking for information from their credential. This is a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.newamerica.org/future-land-housing/reports/nail-finds-hammer/the-case-for-self-sovereign-identity/&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;long-time promise&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; from enthusiasts of digital identity. The most used example is verification that the credential holder is over 21, without showing anything else about the holder, such as their name and address that appear on the face of their traditional driver’s license. But the California DMV wallet app, has a lack of options for selective disclosure:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1694. &lt;ul&gt;
  1695. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;-&quot; data-font=&quot;Aptos&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The holder has to agree to TruAge’s terms and service and generate a separate TruAge QR Code. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1696. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;-&quot; data-font=&quot;Aptos&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;There is already an mDL reader option for age verification for the QR Code of an mDL.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1697. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;-&quot; data-font=&quot;Aptos&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;There is no current option for the holder to use selective disclosure for their mDL. But it is planned for future release, according to the California DMV via email.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1698. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;-&quot; data-font=&quot;Aptos&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Lastly, if selective disclosure is coming, this makes the TruAge add-on redundant.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1699. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1700. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The over-21 example is only as meaningful as its implementation; including the convenience, privacy, and choice given to the mDL holder.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1701. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;TruAge appears to be &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.mytruage.org/find-locations.html&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;piloting its product in at least 6 states&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. With “add-ons”, the scope of the wallet app indicates expansion beyond simply presenting your driver’s license. According to the California DMV’s Office of Public Affairs via email:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1702. &lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;“&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The DMV is exploring the possibility of offering additional services including disabled person parking placard ID, registration card, vehicle ownership and occupational license in the add-ons in the coming months.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1703. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;This clearly displays how the scope of this pilot may expand and how the mDL could eventually be housed within an entire ecosystem of identity documentation. There are privacy preserving ways to present mDLs, like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-integrity/#unlinkability&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;unlinkable proofs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. These mechanisms help mitigate &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/08/digital-identification-must-be-designed-privacy-and-equity-10&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;verifier-issuer collusion&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; from establishing if the holder was in different places with their mDL.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1704. &lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Privacy and Equity First&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1705. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot; lang=&quot;EN-US&quot; class=&quot;TextRun SCXW31146344 BCX2&quot; xml:lang=&quot;EN-US&quot;&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;NormalTextRun SCXW31146344 BCX2&quot;&gt;At the time of &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;NormalTextRun SCXW31146344 BCX2&quot;&gt;this&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;NormalTextRun SCXW31146344 BCX2&quot;&gt; post, about &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/could-mobile-driver-s-licenses-become-permanent-in-california-here-s-what-the-dmv-says/ar-BB1jHlYD&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;325,000 California residents&lt;/a&gt; have the pilot app.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt; We urge states to take their time with creating mDLs, and even wait for &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://w3c.github.io/vc-data-integrity/#privacy-considerations&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;verification methods that are more privacy considerate&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to mature. Deploying mDLs should prioritize holder control, privacy, and transparency. The speed of these pilots is possibly influenced by other factors, like the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/10/privacy-advocates-tsa-slow-down-plans-mdls&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;push for mDLs&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1706. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;Digital wallet initiatives like &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://epicenter.works/en/content/potential-risks-of-the-european-eid&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;eIDAS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; in the European Union are forging conversations on what user control mechanisms might look like. These might include, for example, “bringing your own wallet” and using an “open wallet” that is secure, private, interoperable, and portable. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1707. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;We also need governance that properly limits law enforcement access to information collected by mDLs, and to other information in the smartphones where holders place their mDLs. Further, we need safeguards against these state-created wallets being wedged into problematic realms like age verification mandates as a condition of accessing the internet.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1708. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;We should be speed running privacy and provide better access for all to public services and government-issued documentation. That includes a right to stick with traditional paper or plastic identification, and accommodation of cases where a phone may not be accessible. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1709. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;We urge the state to implement selective disclosure and other privacy preserving tools. The app is not required anywhere. It should remain that way no matter how cryptographically secure the system purports to be, or how robust the privacy policies. We also urge all governments to remain transparent and cautious about how they sign on vendors during pilot programs. If a contract takes away the public’s input on future protections, then that is a bad start. If a state builds a pilot without much patience for privacy and public input, then that is also turbulent ground for protecting users going forward. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1710. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;Just because digital identity may feel inevitable, doesn’t mean the dangers have to be.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1711.  
  1712. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1713.     <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2024 01:16:20 +0000</pubDate>
  1714. <guid isPermaLink="false">109429 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1715. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/national-ids">Mandatory National IDs and Biometric Databases</category>
  1716. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/real-id">Real ID</category>
  1717. <dc:creator>Alexis Hancock</dc:creator>
  1718. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/digitallicense_mobileid.png" alt="Mobile ID digital license" type="image/png" length="58596" />
  1719.  </item>
  1720.  <item>
  1721.    <title>EFF to California Appellate Court: Reject Trial Judge’s Ruling That Would Penalize Beneficial Features and Tools on Social Media</title>
  1722.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/eff-california-appellate-court-reject-trial-judges-ruling-would-penalize</link>
  1723.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;EFF legal intern Jack Beck contributed to this post.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1724. &lt;p&gt;A California trial court recently departed from wide-ranging precedent and held that Snap, Inc., the maker of Snapchat, the popular social media app, had created a “defective” product by including features like disappearing messages, the ability to connect with people through mutual friends, and even the well-known “Stories” feature. We filed an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/eff-amicus-brief-neville-v-snap-cal-app&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; in the appeal, &lt;em&gt;Neville v. Snap, Inc&lt;/em&gt;., at the California Court of Appeal, and are calling for the reversal of the earlier decision, which jeopardizes protections for online intermediaries and thus the free speech of all internet users.&lt;/p&gt;
  1725. &lt;p&gt;At issue in the case is &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230&quot;&gt;Section 230&lt;/a&gt;, without which the free and open internet as we know it would not exist. Section 230 provides that online intermediaries are generally not responsible for harmful user-generated content. Rather, responsibility for what a speaker says online falls on the person who spoke.&lt;/p&gt;
  1726. &lt;p&gt;The plaintiffs are a group of parents whose children overdosed on fentanyl-laced drugs obtained through communications enabled by Snapchat. Even though the harm they suffered was premised on user-generated content—messages between the drug dealers and their children—the plaintiffs argued that Snapchat is a “defective product.” They highlighted various features available to all users on Snapchat, including disappearing messages, arguing that the features facilitate illegal drug deals.&lt;/p&gt;
  1727. &lt;p&gt;Snap sought to have the case dismissed, arguing that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Section 230. The &lt;a href=&quot;https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3828&amp;amp;context=historical&quot;&gt;trial court disagreed&lt;/a&gt;, narrowly interpreting Section 230 and erroneously holding that the plaintiffs were merely trying to hold the company responsible for its own “independent tortious conduct—independent, that is, of the drug sellers’ posted content.” In so doing, the trial court departed from congressional intent and wide-ranging California and federal court precedent.&lt;/p&gt;
  1728. &lt;p&gt;In a petition for a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/snap-writ-petition-neville-v-snap-cal-app&quot;&gt;writ of mandate&lt;/a&gt;, Snap urged the appellate court to correct the lower court’s distortion of Section 230. The petition rightfully contends that the plaintiffs are trying to sidestep Section 230 through creative pleading. The petition argues that Section 230 protects online intermediaries from liability not only for hosting third-party content, but also for crucial editorial decisions like what features and tools to offer content creators and how to display their content.&lt;/p&gt;
  1729. &lt;p&gt;We made two arguments in our brief supporting Snap’s appeal.&lt;/p&gt;
  1730. &lt;p&gt;First, we explained that the features the plaintiffs targeted—and which the trial court gave &lt;a href=&quot;https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2024/01/judge-goes-rogue-and-rejects-snaps-section-230-defense-for-reasons-neville-v-snap.htm&quot;&gt;no detailed analysis&lt;/a&gt; of—are regular parts of Snapchat’s functionality with numerous legitimate uses. Take Snapchat’s option to have messages disappear after a certain period of time. There are times when the option to make messages disappear can be crucial for protecting someone’s safety—for example, dissidents and journalists operating in repressive regimes, or domestic violence victims reaching out for support. It’s also an important privacy feature for everyday use. Simply put: the ability for users to exert control over who can see their messages and for how long, advances internet users’ privacy and security under legitimate circumstances.&lt;/p&gt;
  1731. &lt;p&gt;Second, we highlighted in our brief that this case is about more than concerned families challenging a big tech company. Our modern communications are mediated by private companies, and so any weakening of Section 230 immunity for internet platforms would stifle everyone’s ability to communicate. Should the trial court’s ruling stand, Snapchat and similar platforms will be incentivized to remove features from their online services, resulting in bland and sanitized—and potentially more privacy invasive and less secure—communications platforms. User experience will be degraded as internet platforms are discouraged from creating new features and tools that facilitate speech. Companies seeking to minimize their legal exposure for harmful user-generated content will also drastically increase censorship of their users, and smaller platforms trying to get off the ground will fail to get funding or will be forced to shut down.&lt;/p&gt;
  1732. &lt;p&gt;There’s no question that what happened in this case was tragic, and people are right to be upset about some elements of how big tech companies operate. But Section 230 is the &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/sh/deeplinks/2020/11/dont-blame-section-230-big-techs-failures-blame-big-tech&quot;&gt;wrong target&lt;/a&gt;. We &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/12/section-230-good-actually&quot;&gt;strongly advocate&lt;/a&gt; for Section 230, yet when a tech company does something legitimately irresponsible, the statute still allows for them to be liable—as Snap knows from a &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/05/lawsuit-against-snapchat-rightfully-goes-forward-based-speed-filter-not-user&quot;&gt;lawsuit&lt;/a&gt; that put an &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.npr.org/2021/06/17/1007385955/snapchat-ends-speed-filter-that-critics-say-encouraged-reckless-driving&quot;&gt;end to its speed filter&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
  1733. &lt;p&gt;If the trial court’s decision is upheld, internet platforms would not have a reliable way to limit liability for the services they provide and the content they host. They would face too many lawsuits that cost too much money to defend. They would be unable to operate in their current capacity, and ultimately the internet would cease to exist in its current form. Billions of internet users would lose.&lt;/p&gt;
  1734.  
  1735. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1736.     <pubDate>Mon, 18 Mar 2024 23:22:57 +0000</pubDate>
  1737. <guid isPermaLink="false">109428 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1738. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230">Section 230</category>
  1739. <dc:creator>Sophia Cope</dc:creator>
  1740. <dc:creator>Aaron Mackey</dc:creator>
  1741. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/section-230-3_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="22142" />
  1742.  </item>
  1743.  <item>
  1744.    <title>Lawmakers: Ban TikTok to Stop Election Misinformation! Same Lawmakers: Restrict How Government Addresses Election Misinformation!</title>
  1745.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/lawmakers-ban-tiktok-stop-election-misinformation-same-lawmakers-restrict-how</link>
  1746.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;In a case being heard Monday at the Supreme Court, 45 Washington lawmakers have argued that government communications with social media sites about possible election interference misinformation are illegal.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Agencies can&#039;t even pass on information about websites state election officials have identified as disinformation, even if they don&#039;t request that any action be taken, they assert.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Yet just this week the vast majority of those same lawmakers said the government&#039;s interest in removing election interference misinformation from social media justifies banning a site used by 150 million Americans.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;On Monday, the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in &lt;em&gt;Murthy v. Missouri&lt;/em&gt;, a case that raises the issue of whether the federal government violates the First Amendment by asking social media platforms to remove or negatively moderate user posts or accounts. In &lt;em&gt;Murthy&lt;/em&gt;, the government contends that it can strongly urge social media sites to remove posts without violating the First Amendment, as long as it does not coerce them into doing so under the threat of penalty or other official sanction.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We recognize both the hazards of government involvement in content moderation and the proper role in some situations for the government to share its expertise with the platforms. In our &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/document/murthy-v-missouri-amicus-brief&quot;&gt;brief&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;em&gt;Murthy&lt;/em&gt;, we urge the court to adopt a view of coercion that includes indirectly coercive communications designed and reasonably perceived as efforts to replace the platform’s editorial decision-making with the government’s.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;And we argue that close cases should go against the government. We also urge the court to recognize that the government may and, in some cases, should appropriately inform platforms of problematic user posts. But it’s the government’s responsibility to make sure that its communications with the platforms are reasonably perceived as being merely informative and not coercive.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In contrast, the Members of Congress signed an &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:http://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/23/23-411/300209/20240209112253054_23-411%20bsac%20Members%20of%20Congress.pdf&quot;&gt;amicus brief&lt;/a&gt; in &lt;em&gt;Murthy&lt;/em&gt; supporting placing strict limitations on the government’s interactions with social media companies. They argued that the government may hardly communicate at all with social media platforms when it detects problematic posts.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Notably, the specific posts they discuss in their brief include, among other things, posts the U.S. government suspects are foreign election interference. For example, the case includes allegations about the FBI and CISA improperly communicating with social media sites that boil down to the agency passing on pertinent information, such as websites that had already been identified by state and local election officials as disinformation. The FBI did not request that any specific action be taken and sought to understand how the sites&#039; terms of service would apply.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As we argued in our amicus brief, these communications don&#039;t add up to the government dictating specific editorial changes it wanted. It was providing information useful for sites seeking to combat misinformation. But, following an injunction in &lt;em&gt;Murthy&lt;/em&gt;, the government has ceased sharing intelligence about foreign election interference. Without the information, Meta reports its platforms could lack insight into the bigger threat picture needed to enforce its own rules.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The problem of election misinformation on social media also played a prominent role this past week when the U.S. House of Representatives approved a bill that would bar app stores from distributing TikTok as long as it is owned by its current parent company, ByteDance, which is headquartered in Beijing. The bill also empowers the executive branch to identify and similarly ban other apps that are owned by foreign adversaries.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;As stated in the &lt;a href=&quot;mailto:https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/118th-congress/house-report/417/1&quot;&gt;House Report&lt;/a&gt; that accompanied the so-called &quot;Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act,&quot; the law is needed in part because members of Congress fear the Chinese government “push[es] misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda on the American public” through the platform. Those who supported the bill thus believe that the U.S. can take the drastic step of banning an app for the purposes of preventing the spread of “misinformation and propaganda” to U.S. users. A &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-Report.pdf&quot;&gt;public report&lt;/a&gt; from the Office of the Director for National Intelligence was more specific about the threat, indicating a special concern for information meant to interfere with the November elections and foment societal divisions in the U.S.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Over 30 members of the House who signed the amicus brief in &lt;em&gt;Murthy&lt;/em&gt; voted &lt;em&gt;for&lt;/em&gt; the TikTok ban. So, many of the same people who supported the U.S. government’s efforts to rid a social media platform of foreign misinformation, also argued that the government’s ability to address the very same content on other social media platforms should be sharply limited.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Admittedly, there are significant differences between the two positions. The government does have greater limits on how it regulates the speech of domestic companies than it does the speech of foreign companies.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;But if the true purpose of the bill is to get foreign election misinformation off of social media, the inconsistency in the positions is clear.  If ByteDance sells TikTok to domestic owners so that TikTok can stay in business in the U.S., and if the same propaganda appears on the site, is the U.S. now powerless to do anything about it? If so, that would seem to undercut the importance in getting the information away from U.S. users, which is one the chief purposes of the TikTik ban.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We believe there is an appropriate role for the government to play, within the bounds of the First Amendment, when it truly believes that there are posts designed to interfere with U.S. elections or undermine U.S. security on any social media platform. It is a far more appropriate role than banning a platform altogether.&lt;/p&gt;
  1747. &lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
  1748. &lt;p&gt; &lt;/p&gt;
  1749.  
  1750. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1751.     <pubDate>Sat, 16 Mar 2024 02:12:32 +0000</pubDate>
  1752. <guid isPermaLink="false">109421 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1753. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  1754. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/government-social-media-blocking">Government Social Media Blocking</category>
  1755. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/content-blocking">Content Blocking</category>
  1756. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/social-networks">Social Networks</category>
  1757. <dc:creator>David Greene</dc:creator>
  1758. <dc:creator>Karen Gullo</dc:creator>
  1759.  </item>
  1760.  <item>
  1761.    <title>The SAFE Act to Reauthorize Section 702 is Two Steps Forward, One Step Back</title>
  1762.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/safe-act-two-steps-forward-one-step-back</link>
  1763.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/702-spying&quot;&gt;one of the most insidious and secretive mass surveillance authorities&lt;/a&gt; still in operation today. The &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lee.senate.gov/2024/3/lee-durbin-introduce-bipartisan-safe-act-to-reform-fisa-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Security and Freedom Enhancement (SAFE) Act&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; would make some much-needed and long fought-for reforms, but it also does not go nearly far enough to rein in a surveillance law that the federal government has abused time and time again. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1764. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;You can read the full text of the bill &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HEN24217.pdf&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;here&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1765. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While Section 702 was first sold as a tool necessary to stop foreign terrorists, it has since become clear that the government uses the communications it collects under this law as a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/07/deja-vu-fbi-proves-again-it-cant-be-trusted-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;domestic intelligence source&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between people overseas on U.S. persons. Now, it’s this US side of digital conversations that are being routinely sifted through by domestic law enforcement agencies—all without a warrant.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1766. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;like other reform bills introduced this Congress&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, attempts to roll back some of this warrantless surveillance. Despite its glaring flaws and omissions, in a Congress as dysfunctional as this one it might be the bill that best privacy-conscious people and organizations can hope for. For instance, it does not do as much as the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Government Surveillance Reform Act, which EFF supported in November 2023&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;. But imposing meaningful checks on the Intelligence Community (IC) is an urgent priority, especially because the Intelligence Community has been trying to sneak a &quot;clean&quot; reauthorization of Section 702 into government &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/de/deeplinks/2017/12/dont-reauthorize-nsa-spying-must-pass-funding-bill&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;funding bills&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;,&lt;span&gt; and has even sought to have the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twitter.com/LizaGoitein/status/1757053084197368026?s=20&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;renewal happen in secret&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;span&gt;in the hopes of keeping its favorite mass surveillance law intact. The administration is also reportedly &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/us/politics/nsa-fbi-surveillance-program.html&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;planning to seek another year-long extension of the law&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; without any congressional action. All the while, those advocating for renewing Section 702 have toyed with as many talking points as they can—from &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/dont-fall-intelligence-communitys-monster-week-justifications&quot;&gt;cybercrime or human trafficking to drug smuggling, terrorism&lt;/a&gt;, oreven &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/aclu-slams-house-intelligence-committee-plan-to-use-section-702-to-spy-on-pro-palestinian-protestors-without-a-warrant&quot;&gt;solidarity activism in the United States&lt;/a&gt;—to see what issue &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;would scare people sufficiently enough to allow for a clean reauthorization of mass surveillance. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1767. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;So let’s break down the SAFE Act: what’s good, what’s bad, and what aspects of it might actually cause more harm in the future. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1768. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;What’s Good about the SAFE Act &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1769. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act would do at least two things that reform advocates have pressured Congress to include in any proposed bill to reauthorize Section 702. This speaks to the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/federal-governments-privacy-watchdog-concedes-702-must-change&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;growing consensus&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; that some reforms are absolutely necessary if this power is to remain operational. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1770. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The first and most important reform the bill would make is to require the government to obtain a warrant before accessing the content of communications for people in the United States. Currently, relying on Section 702, the government vacuums up communications from all over the world, and a huge number of those intercepted communications are to or from US persons. Those communications sit in a massive database. Both intelligence agencies and law enforcement have &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/04/internal-documents-show-how-little-fbi-did-correct-misuse-section-702-databases&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;conducted millions of queries &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;of&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; this database for US-based communications—all without a warrant—in order to investigate both national security concerns and run-of-the-mill criminal investigations. The SAFE Act would prohibit “warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons and persons located in the United States.” While this is the bare minimum a reform bill should do, it’s an important step. It is crucial to note, however, that this does not stop the IC or law enforcement from querying to see if the government has collected communications from specific individuals under Section 702—it merely stops them from reading those communications without a warrant. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1771. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The second major reform the SAFE Act provides is to close the “data brooker loophole,” which EFF has been calling attention to for years. As one example, mobile apps often collect user data to sell it to advertisers on the open market. The problem is law enforcement and intelligence agencies &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/08/inside-fog-data-science-secretive-company-selling-mass-surveillance-local-police&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;increasingly buy this private user data&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;, rather than obtain a warrant for it. This bill would largely prohibit the government from purchasing personal data they would otherwise need a warrant to collect. This provision does include a potentially significant exception for situations where the government cannot exclude Americans’ data from larger “compilations” that include foreigners’ data. This speaks not only to the unfair bifurcation of rights between Americans and everyone else under much of our surveillance law, but also to the risks of allowing any large scale acquisition from data brokers at all. The SAFE Act would require the government to minimize collection, search, and use of any Americans’ data in these compilations, but it remains to be seen how effective these prohibitions will be. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1772. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;What’s Missing from the SAFE Act &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1773. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;The SAFE Act is missing a number of important reforms that we’ve called for—and which the&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt; Government Surveillance Reform Act &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;would have addressed. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;These reforms include ensuring that individuals harmed by warrantless surveillance are able to challenge it in court, both in civil lawsuits like those brought by EFF in the past, and in criminal cases where the government may seek to shield its use of Section 702 from defendants. After nearly 14 years of Section 702 and countless court rulings&lt;/span&gt; &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/10-years-after-snowden-some-things-are-better-some-were-still-fighting&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;slamming the courthouse door&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;on such legal challenges, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/11/government-surveillance-reform-act-would-rein-some-worst-abuses-section-702&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;it’s well past time to ensure that those harmed by Section 702 surveillance can have the opportunity to challenge it.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1774. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;New Problems Potentially Created by the SAFE Act&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1775. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;While there may often be good reason to protect the secrecy of FISA proceedings, unofficial disclosures about these proceedings has from the very beginning played an indispensable role in reforming uncontested abuses of surveillance authorities. From the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping program through the Snowden disclosures up to the present, when reporting about FISA applications appears on the front page of the &lt;i&gt;New York Times&lt;/i&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/05/10-years-after-snowden-some-things-are-better-some-were-still-fighting&quot;&gt;oversight of the intelligence community would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without these disclosures&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1776. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;Unfortunately, the SAFE Act contains at least one truly nasty addition to current law: an entirely new crime that makes it a felony to disclose “the existence of an application” for foreign intelligence surveillance or any of the application’s contents. In addition to explicitly adding to the existing penalties in the Espionage Act—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/05/governments-indictment-julian-assange-poses-clear-and-present-danger-journalism&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;itself highly controversial&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt;— this new provision seems aimed at discouraging leaks by increasing the potential sentence to eight years in prison. There is no requirement that prosecutors show that the disclosure harmed national security, nor any consideration of the public interest. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Under the present climate, there’s simply no reason to give prosecutors even more tools like this one to punish whistleblowers who are seen as going through improper channels. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1777. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span&gt;EFF always aims to tell it like it is. This bill has some real improvements, but it’s nowhere near the surveillance reform we all deserve. On the other hand, the IC and its allies in Congress continue to have significant leverage to push &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/12/section-702-needs-reform-and-oversight-not-expansion-congress-should-oppose-hpsci&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;fake reform&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span&gt; bills, so the SAFE Act may well be the best we’re going to get. Either way, we’re not giving up the fight.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1778.  
  1779.  
  1780. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1781.     <pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 20:48:46 +0000</pubDate>
  1782. <guid isPermaLink="false">109419 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1783. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying">NSA Spying</category>
  1784. <dc:creator>Matthew Guariglia</dc:creator>
  1785. <dc:creator>Andrew Crocker</dc:creator>
  1786. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/NSA-eagle-2_0.png" alt="" type="image/png" length="61481" />
  1787.  </item>
  1788.  <item>
  1789.    <title>Thousands of Young People Told Us Why the Kids Online Safety Act Will Be Harmful to Minors  </title>
  1790.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/thousands-young-people-told-us-why-kids-online-safety-act-will-be-harmful-minors</link>
  1791.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;With KOSA passed, the information i can access as a minor will be limited and censored, under the guise of &quot;protecting me&quot;, which is the responsibility of my parents, NOT the government. I have learned so much about the world and about myself through social media, and without the diverse world i have seen, i would be a completely different, and much worse, person. For a country that prides itself in the free speech and freedom of its peoples, this bill goes against everything we stand for! - Alan, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1792. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1793. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1794. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If information is put through a filter, that’s bad. Any and all points of view should be accessible, even if harmful so everyone can get an understanding of all situations. Not to mention, as a young neurodivergent and queer person, I’m sure the information I’d be able to acquire and use to help myself would be severely impacted. I want to be free like anyone else. - Sunny, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1795. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1796. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1797. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;How young people feel about the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) matters. It will primarily affect them, and many, many teenagers oppose the bill. Some have been calling and emailing legislators to tell them how they feel. Others have been posting their concerns about the bill on social media. These teenagers have been baring their souls to explain how important social media access is to them, but lawmakers and civil liberties advocates, including us, have mostly been the ones talking about the bill and about what’s best for kids, and often we’re not hearing from minors in these debates at all. We should be — these young voices should be essential when talking about KOSA.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1798. &lt;p&gt;So, a few weeks ago, &lt;a href=&quot;https://eff.org/kosasurvey&quot;&gt;we asked&lt;/a&gt; some of the young advocates fighting to stop the Kids Online Safety Act a few questions:  &lt;/p&gt;
  1799. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;- How has access to social media improved your life? What do you gain from it? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1800. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;- What would you lose if KOSA passed? How would your life be different if it was already law? &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1801. &lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Within a week we received over 3,000 responses. As of today, we have received over 5,000.&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1802. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;These answers are critical for legislators to hear. Below, you can read some of these comments, sorted into the following themes (though they often overlap): &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1803. &lt;ul&gt;
  1804. &lt;li&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#harm&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Will Harm Rights That Young People Know They Ought to Have&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1805. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#art&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Could Impact Young People’s Artistic Education and Opportunities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1806. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#community&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Will Hurt Young People’s Ability to Find Community Online&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1807. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#self&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Could Seriously Hinder People’s Self-Discovery &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1808. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;1&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;#news&quot;&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Could Stop Young People from Learning True News and Valuable Information&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1809. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1810. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;These comments show that thoughtful young people are deeply concerned about the proposed law&#039;s fallout, and that many who would be affected think it will harm them, not help them. Over 700 of those who responded reported that they were currently sixteen or under—the age under which KOSA’s liability is applicable. The average age of those who answered the survey was 20 (of those who gave their age—the question was optional, and about 60% of people responded). &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; In addition to these two questions, we also asked those taking the survey if they were comfortable sharing their email address for any journalist who might want to speak with them; unfortunately much coverage usually only mentions one or two of the young people who would be most affected. So, journalists: &lt;b&gt;We have contact info for over 300 young people who would be happy to speak to you about why social media matters to them, and why they oppose KOSA. &lt;/b&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1811. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Individually, these answers show that social media, despite its current problems, offer an overall positive experience for many, many young people. It helps people living in remote areas find connection; it helps those in abusive situations find solace and escape; it offers education in history, art, health, and world events for those who wouldn’t otherwise have it; it helps people learn about themselves and the world around them. (&lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2022/11/16/connection-creativity-and-drama-teen-life-on-social-media-in-2022/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Research&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; also suggests that social media is more helpful than harmful for young people.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1812. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;And as a whole, these answers tell a story that is 180° different from that which is regularly told by politicians and the media. In those stories, it is accepted as fact that the majority of young people’s experiences on social media platforms are harmful. But from these responses, it is clear that many, many young people also experience help, education, friendship, and a sense of belonging there—precisely because social media allows them to explore, something KOSA is likely to hinder. These kids are deeply engaged in the world around them through these platforms, and genuinely concerned that a law like KOSA could take that away from them and from other young people. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1813. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Here are just a few of the thousands of reasons they’re worried. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1814. &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Note: We are sharing individuals’ opinions, without editing. We do not necessarily endorse them or their interpretation of KOSA.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1815. &lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1816. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;harm&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;KOSA Will Harm Rights That Young People Know They Ought to Have&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1817. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;One of the most important things that would be lost is the freedom of speech - a given right that is crucial to a healthy, functioning environment. Not every speech is morally okay, but regulating what speech is deemed &quot;acceptable&quot; constricts people&#039;s rights; a clear violation of the First Amendment. Those who need or want to access certain information are not allowed to - not because the information will harm them or others, but for the reason that a certain portion of people disagree with the information. If the country only ran on what select people believed, we would be a bland, monotonous place. This country thrives on diversity, whether it be race, gender, sex, or any other personal belief. If KOSA was passed, I would lose my safe spaces, places where I can go to for mental health, places that make me feel more like a human than just some girl. No more would I be able to fight for ideas and beliefs I hold, nor enjoy my time on the internet either. - Anonymous, 16&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1818. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1819. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; ___________________&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1820. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I, and many of my friends, grew up in an Internet where remaining anonymous was common sense, and where revealing your identity was foolish and dangerous, something only to be done sparingly, with a trusted ally at your side, meeting at a common, crowded public space like a convention or a college cafeteria. This bill spits in the face of these very practical instincts, forces you to dox yourself, and if you don’t want to be outed, you must be forced to withdraw from your communities. From your friends and allies. From the space you have made for yourself, somewhere you can truly be yourself with little judgment, where you can find out who you really are, alongside people who might be wildly different from you in some ways, and exactly like you in others. I am fortunate to have parents who are kind and accepting of who I am. I know many people are nowhere near as lucky as me. - Maeve, 25&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1821. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1822. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1823. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I couldn&#039;t do activism through social media and I couldn&#039;t connect with other queer individuals due to censorship and that would lead to loneliness, depression other mental health issues, and even suicide for some individuals such as myself. For some of us the internet is the only way to the world outside of our hateful environments, our only hope. Representation matters, and by KOSA passing queer children would see less of age appropriate representation and they would feel more alone. Not to mention that KOSA passing would lead to people being uninformed about things and it would start an era of censorship on the internet and by looking at the past censorship is never good, its a gateway to genocide and a way for the government to control. – Sage, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1824. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1825. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1826. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Privacy, censorship, and freedom of speech are not just theoretical concepts to young people. Their rights are often already restricted, and they see the internet as a place where they can begin to learn about, understand, and exercise&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span&gt;those&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;freedoms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. They know why censorship is dangerous; they understand why forcing people to identify themselves online is dangerous; they know the value of free speech and privacy, and they know what they’ve gained from an internet that doesn’t have guardrails put up by various government censors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1827. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1828. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1829. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;art&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;KOSA Could Impact Young People’s Artistic Education and Opportunities&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1830. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I found so many friends and new interests from social media. Inspirations for my art I find online, like others who have an art style I admire, or models who do poses I want to draw. I can connect with my friends, send them funny videos and pictures. I use social media to keep up with my favorite YouTubers, content creators, shows, books. When my dad gets drunk and hard to be around or my parents are arguing, I can go on YouTube or Instagram and watch something funny to laugh instead. It gives me a lot of comfort, being able to distract myself from my sometimes upsetting home life. I get to see what life is like for the billions of other people on this planet, in different cities, states, countries. I get to share my life with my friends too, freely speaking my thoughts, sharing pictures, videos, etc. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I have found my favorite YouTubers from other social media platforms like tiktok, this happened maybe about a year ago, and since then I think this is the happiest I have been in a while. Since joining social media I have become a much more open minded person, it made me interested in what others lives are like. It also brought awareness and educated me about others who are suffering in the world like hunger, poor quality of life, etc. Posting on social media also made me more confident in my art, in the past year my drawing skills have immensely improved and I’m shocked at myself. Because I wanted to make better fan art, inspire others, and make them happy with my art. I have been introduce to many styles of clothing that have helped develop my own fun clothing style. It powers my dreams and makes me want to try hard when I see videos shared by people who have worked hard and made it. - Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1831. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1832. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1833. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;As a kid I was able to interact in queer and disabled and fandom spaces, so even as a disabled introverted child who wasn’t popular with my peers I still didn’t feel lonely. The internet is arguably a safer way to interact with other fans of media than going to cons with strangers, as long as internet safety is really taught to kids. I also get inspiration for my art and writing from things I’ve only discovered online, and as an artist I can’t make money without the internet and even minors do commissions. The issue isn’t that the internet is unsafe, it’s that internet safety isn’t taught anymore. - Rachel, 19&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1834. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1835. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1836. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;i am an artist, and sharing my things online makes me feel happy and good about myself. i love seeing other people online and knowing that they like what i make. when i make art, im always nervous to show other people. but when i post it online i feel like im a part of something, and that im in a community where i feel that i belong. – Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1837. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1838. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1839. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media has saved my life, just like it has for many young people. I have found safe spaces and motivation because of social media, and I have never encountered anything negative or harmful to me. With social media I have been able to share my creativity (writing, art, and music) and thoughts safely without feeling like I&#039;m being held back or oppressed. My creations have been able to inspire and reach so many people, just like how other people&#039;s work have reached me. Recently, I have also been able to help the library I volunteer at through the help of social media.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;What I do in life and all my future plans (career, school, volunteer projects, etc.) surrounds social media, and without it I wouldn&#039;t be able to share what I do and learn more to improve my works and life. I wouldn&#039;t be able to connect with wonderful artists, musicians, and writers like I do now. I would be lost and feel like I don&#039;t have a reason to do what I do. If KOSA is passed, I wouldn&#039;t be able to get the help I need in order to survive. I&#039;ve made so many friends who have been saved because of social media, and if this bill gets passed they will also be affected. Guess what? They wouldn&#039;t be able to get the help they need either.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If KOSA was already a law when I was just a bit younger, I wouldn&#039;t even be alive. I wouldn&#039;t have been able to reach help when I needed it. I wouldn&#039;t have been able to share my mind with the world. Social media was the reason I was able to receive help when I was undergoing abuse and almost died. If KOSA was already a law, I would&#039;ve taken my life, or my abuser would have done it before I could. If KOSA becomes a law now, I&#039;m certain that the likeliness of that happening to kids of any age will increase. – Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1840. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1841. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1842. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;A huge number of young artists say they use social media to improve their skills, and in many cases, the avenue by which they discovered their interest in a type of art or music. Young people are rightfully worried that the magic moment where you first stumble upon an artist or a style that changes your entire life will be less and less common for future generations if KOSA passes. We agree: KOSA would likely lead platforms to limit that opportunity for young people to experience unexpected things, forcing their online experiences into a much smaller box under the guise of protecting them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1843. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Also, a lot of young people told us they wanted to, or were developing, an online business—often an art business. Under KOSA, young people could have less opportunities in the online communities where artists share their work and build a customer base, and a harder time navigating the various communities where they can share their art. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1844. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;community&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;KOSA Will Hurt Young People’s Ability to Find Community Online&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1845. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media has allowed me to connect with some of my closest friends ever, probably deeper than some people in real life. i get to talk about anything i want unimpeded and people accept me for who i am. in my deepest and darkest moments, knowing that i had somewhere to go was truly more relieving than anything else. i&#039;ve never had the courage to commit suicide, but still, if it weren&#039;t for social media, i probably wouldn&#039;t be here, mentally &amp;amp; emotionally at least.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;i&#039;d lose the space that accepts me. i&#039;d lose the only place where i can be me. in life, i put up a mask to appease my parents and in some cases, my friends. with how extreme the u.s. is becoming these days, i could even lose my life. i would live my days in fear. i&#039;m terrified of how fast this country is changing and if this bill passes, saying i would fall into despair would be an understatement. people say to &quot;be yourself&quot;, but they don&#039;t understand that if i were to be my true self tomorrow, i could be killed. – march, 14&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1846. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1847. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1848. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Without the internet, and especially the rhythm gaming community which I found through Discord, I would&#039;ve most likely killed myself at 13. My time on here has not been perfect, as has anyone&#039;s but without the internet I wouldn&#039;t have been the person I am today. I wouldn&#039;t have gotten help recognizing that what my biological parents were doing to me was abuse, the support I&#039;ve received for my identity (as queer youth) and the way I view things, with ways to help people all around the world and be a more mindful ally, activist, and thinker, and I wouldn&#039;t have met my mom.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I love my chosen mom. We met at a Dance Dance Revolution tournament in April of last year and have been friends ever since. When I told her that she was the first person I saw as a mother figure in my life back in November, I was bawling my eyes out. I&#039;m her mije, and she&#039;s my mom. love her so much that saying that doesn&#039;t even begin to express exactly how much I love her. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I love all my chosen family from the rhythm gaming community, my older sisters and siblings, I love them all. I have a few, some I talk with more regularly than others. Even if they and I may not talk as much as we used to, I still love them. They mean so much to me. – X86, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1849. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1850. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1851. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;i spent my time in public school from ages 9-13 getting physically and emotionally abused by special ed aides, i remember a few months after i left public school for good, i saw a post online that made me realize that what i went through wasn’t normal. if it wasn’t for the internet, i wouldn’t have come to terms with my autism, i would have still hated myself due to not knowing that i was genderqueer, my mental health would be significantly worse, and i would probably still be self harming, which is something i stopped doing at 13. besides the trauma and mental health side of things, something important to know is that spaces for teenagers to hang out have been eradicated years ago, minors can’t go to malls unless they’re with their parents, anti loitering laws are everywhere, and schools aren’t exactly the best place for teenagers to hang out, especially considering queer teens who were murdered by bullies (such as brianna ghey or nex benedict), the internet has become the third space that teenagers have flocked to as a result. – Anonymous, 17&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1852. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1853. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1854. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA is anti-community. People online don’t only connect over shared interests in art and music—they also connect over the difficult parts of their lives. Over and over again, young people told us that one of the most valuable parts of social media was learning that they were not alone in their troubles. Finding others in similar circumstances gave them a community, as well as ideas to improve their situations, and even opportunities to escape dangerous situations. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1855. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA will make this harder. As platforms limit the types of recommendations and public content they feel safe sharing with young people, those who would otherwise find communities or potential friends will not be as likely to do so. A number of young people explained that they simply would never have been able to overcome some of the worst parts of their lives alone, and they are concerned that KOSA’s passage would stop others from ever finding the help they did.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1856. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;self&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;KOSA Could Seriously Hinder People’s Self-Discovery &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1857. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I am a transgender person, and when I was a preteen, looking down the barrel of the gun of puberty, I was miserable. I didn&#039;t know what was wrong I just knew I&#039;d rather do anything else but go through puberty. The internet taught me what that was. They told me it was okay. There were things like haircuts and binders that I could use now and medical treatment I could use when I grew up to fix things. The internet was there for me too when I was questioning my sexuality and again when my mental health was crashing and even again when I was realizing I&#039;m not neurotypical. The internet is a crucial source of information for preteens and beyond and you cannot take it away. You cannot take away their only realistically reachable source of information for what the close-minded or undereducated adults around them don&#039;t know. - Jay, 17&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1858. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1859. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1860. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media has improved my life so much and led to how I met my best friend, I’ve known them for 6+ years now and they mean so much to me. Access to social media really helps me connect with people similar to me and that make me feel like less of an outcast among my peers, being able to communicate with other neurodivergent queer kids who like similar interests to me. Social media makes me feel like I’m actually apart of a community that won’t judge me for who I am. I feel like I can actually be myself and find others like me without being harassed or bullied, I can share my art with others and find people like me in a way I can’t in other spaces. The internet &amp;amp; social media raised me when my parents were busy and unavailable and genuinely shaped the way I am today and the person I’ve become. – Anonymous, 14&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1861. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1862. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1863. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The censorship likely to come from this bill would mean I would not see others who have similar struggles to me. The vagueness of KOSA allows for state attorney generals to decide what is and is not appropriate for children to see, a power that should never be placed in the hands of one person. If issues like LGBT rights and mental health were censored by KOSA, I would have never realized that I AM NOT ALONE. There are problems with children and the internet but KOSA is not the solution. I urge the senate to rethink this bill, and come up with solutions that actually protect children, not put them in more danger, and make them feel ever more alone. - Rae, 16&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1864. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1865. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1866. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA would effectively censor anything the government deems &quot;harmful,&quot; which could be anything from queerness and fandom spaces to anything else that deviates from &quot;the norm.&quot; People would lose support systems, education, and in some cases, any way to find out about who they are. I&#039;ll stop beating around the bush, if it wasn&#039;t for places online, I would never have discovered my own queerness. My parents and the small circle of adults I know would be my only connection to &quot;grown-up&quot; opinions, exposing me to a narrow range of beliefs I would likely be forced to adopt. Any kids in positions like mine would have no place to speak out or ask questions, and anything they bring up would put them at risk. Schools and families can only teach so much, and in this age of information, why can&#039;t kids be trusted to learn things on their own? - Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1867. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1868. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1869. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media helped me escape a very traumatic childhood and helped me connect with others. quite frankly, it saved me from being brainwashed. – Milo, 16&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1870. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1871. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1872. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media introduced me to lifelong friends and communities of like-minded people; in an abusive home, online social media in the 2010s provided a haven of privacy, safety, and information. I honed my creativity, nurtured my interests and developed my identity through relating and talking to people to whom I would otherwise have been totally isolated from. Also, unrestricted internet access actually taught me how to spot shady websites and inappropriate content FAR more effectively than if censorship had been at play like it is today.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;A couple of the friends I made online, as young as thirteen, were adults; and being friends with adults who knew I was a child, who practiced safe boundaries with me yet treated me with respect, helped me recognise unhealthy patterns in predatory adults. I have befriended mothers and fathers online through games and forums, and they were instrumental in preventing me being groomed by actual pedophiles. Had it not been for them, I would have wound up terribly abused by an &quot;in real life&quot; adult &quot;friend&quot;. Instead, I recognised the differences in how he was treating me (infantilising yet praising) vs how my adult friends had treated me (like a human being), and slowly tapered off the friendship and safely cut contact.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;As I grew older, I found a wealth of resources on safe sex and sexual health education online. Again, if not for these discoveries, I would most certainly have wound up abused and/or pregnant as a teenager. I was never taught about consent, safe sex, menstruation, cervical health, breast health, my own anatomy, puberty, etc. as a child or teenager. What I found online-- typically on Tumblr and written with an alarming degree of normalcy-- helped me understand my body and my boundaries far more effectively than &quot;the talk&quot; or in-school sex ed ever did. I learned that the things that made me panic were actually normal; the ins and outs of puberty and development, and, crucially, that my comfort mattered most. I was comfortable and unashamed of being a virgin my entire teen years because I knew it was okay that I wasn&#039;t ready. When I was ready, at twenty-one, I knew how to communicate with my partner and establish safe boundaries, and knew to check in and talk afterwards to make sure we both felt safe and happy. I knew there was no judgement for crying after sex and that it didn&#039;t necessarily mean I wasn&#039;t okay. I also knew about physical post-sex care; e.g. going to the bathroom and cleaning oneself safely.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;AGAIN, I would NOT have known any of this if not for social media. AT ALL. And seeing these topics did NOT turn me into a dreaded teenage whore; if anything, they prevented it by teaching me safety and self-care.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I also found help with depression, anxiety, and eating disorders-- learning to define them enabled me to seek help. I would not have had this without online spaces and social media. As aforementioned too, learning, sometimes through trial of fire, to safely navigate the web and differentiate between safe and unsafe sites was far more effective without censored content. Censorship only hurts children; it has never, ever helped them. How else was I to know what I was experiencing at home was wrong? To call it &quot;abuse&quot;? I never would have found that out. I also would never have discovered how to establish safe sexual AND social boundaries, or how to stand up for myself, or how to handle harassment, or how to discover my own interests and identity through media. The list goes on and on and on. – June, 21&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1873. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1874. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1875. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;One of the claims that KOSA’s proponents make is that it won’t stop young people from finding the things they already want to search for. But we read dozens and dozens of comments from people who &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;didn’t know something about themselves until they heard others discussing it—&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;a mental health diagnosis, their sexuality, that they were being abused, that they had an eating disorder, and much, much more. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1876. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Censorship that stops you from looking through a library &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/get-real-congress-censoring-search-results-or-recommendations-still-censorship&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;is still dangerous&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; even if it doesn’t stop you from checking out the books you already know. It’s still a problem to stop young people in particular from finding new things that they didn’t know they were looking for.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1877. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1878. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1879. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;&lt;a id=&quot;news&quot;&gt;&lt;/a&gt;KOSA Could Stop Young People from Getting Accurate News and Valuable Information&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1880. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Social media taught me to be curious. It taught me caution and trust and faith and that simply being me is enough. It brought me up where my parents failed, it allowed me to look into stories that assured me I am not alone where I am now. I would be fucking dead right now if it weren&#039;t for the stories of my fellow transgender folk out there, assuring me that it gets better. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I&#039;m young and I&#039;m not smart but I know without social media, myself and plenty of the people I hold dear in person and online would not be alive. We wouldn&#039;t have news of the atrocities happening overseas that the news doesn&#039;t report on, we wouldn&#039;t have mentors to help teach us where our parents failed. - Anonymous, 16&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1881. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1882. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1883. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Through social media, I&#039;ve learned about news and current events that weren&#039;t taught at school or home, things like politics or controversial topics that taught me nuance and solidified my concept of ethics. I learned about my identity and found numerous communities filled with people I could socialize with and relate to. I could talk about my interests with people who loved them just as much as I did. I found out about numerous different perspectives and cultures and experienced art and film like I never had before. My empathy and media literacy greatly improved with experience. I was also able to gain skills in gathering information and proper defences against misinformation. More technically, I learned how to organize my computer and work with files, programs, applications, etc; I could find guides on how to pursue my hobbies and improve my skills (I&#039;m a self-taught artist, and I learned almost everything I know from things like YouTube or Tumblr for free). - Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1884. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1885. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________ &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1886. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;A huge portion of my political identity has been shaped by news and information I could only find on social media because the mainstream news outlets wouldn’t cover it. (Climate Change, International Crisis, Corrupt Systems, etc.) KOSA seems to be intentionally working to stunt all of this. It’s horrifying. So much of modern life takes place on the internet, and to strip that away from kids is just another way to prevent them from formulating their own thoughts and ideas that the people in power are afraid of. Deeply sinister. I probably would have never learned about KOSA if it were in place! That’s terrifying! - Sarge, 17&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1887. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1888. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;  ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1889. &lt;blockquote&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;I’ve met many of my friends from [social media] and it has improved my mental health by giving me resources. I used to have an eating disorder and didn’t even realize it until I saw others on social media talking about it in a nuanced way and from personal experience. - Anonymous, 15&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1890. &lt;/blockquote&gt;
  1891. &lt;p class=&quot;center-image&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;   ___________________&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1892. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Many young people told us that they’re worried KOSA will result in more biased news online, and a less diverse information ecosystem. This seems inevitable—we’ve written before that almost any content could fit into the categories that politicians believe will cause minors anxiety or depression, and so carrying that content could be legally dangerous for a platform. That could include truthful news about what’s going on in the world, including wars, gun violence, and climate change.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1893. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;“Preventing and mitigating” depression and anxiety isn’t a goal of any other outlet, and it shouldn’t be required for social media platforms. People have a right to access information—both news and opinion— in an open and democratic society, and sometimes that information is depressing or anxiety-inducing. To truly “prevent and mitigate” self-destructive behaviors, we must look beyond the media to systems that allow all humans to have self-respect, a healthy environment, and healthy relationships—not hiding truthful information that is disappointing.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1894. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Young People’s Voices Matter&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1895. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;While KOSA’s sponsors intend to help these young people, those who responded to the survey don’t see it that way. You may have noticed that it’s impossible to limit these complex and detailed responses into single categories—many childhood abuse victims found help as well as arts education on social media; many children connected to communities that they otherwise couldn’t and learned something essential about themselves in doing so. Many understand that KOSA would endanger their privacy, and also know it could harm marginalized kids the most. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1896. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In reading thousands of these comments, it becomes clear that social media itself was not in itself a solution to the issues they experienced. What helped these young people was &lt;em&gt;other people&lt;/em&gt;. Social media was where they were able to find and stay connected with those friends, communities, artists, activists, and educators. When you look at it this way, of course KOSA seems absurd: social media has become an essential element of young peoples’ lives, and they are scared to death that if the law passes, that part of their lives will disappear. Older teens and twenty-somethings, meanwhile, worry that if the law had been passed a decade ago, they never would have become the person that they did. And all of these fears are reasonable. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1897. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;There were thousands more comments like those above. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We hope this helps balance the conversation, because if young people’s voices are suppressed now—and if KOSA becomes law—it will be much more difficult for them to elevate their voices in the future. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1898. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1899. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1900. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1901.  
  1902.  
  1903. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1904.     <pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 19:37:23 +0000</pubDate>
  1905. <guid isPermaLink="false">109410 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1906. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  1907. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  1908. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/social-media-surveilance">Social Media Surveillance</category>
  1909. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/student-privacy">Student Privacy</category>
  1910. <dc:creator>Jason Kelley</dc:creator>
  1911. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/youth-3.jpg" alt="young EFF&amp;#039;ers show phones with security icons" type="image/jpeg" length="718308" />
  1912.  </item>
  1913.  <item>
  1914.    <title>Analyzing KOSA’s Constitutional Problems In Depth </title>
  1915.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/analyzing-kosas-constitutional-problems-depth</link>
  1916.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Why EFF Does Not Think Recent Changes Ameliorate KOSA’s Censorship&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1917. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The latest version of the Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) did not change &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/02/dont-fall-latest-changes-dangerous-kids-online-safety-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;our critical view&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; of the legislation. The changes have led some organizations to drop their opposition to the bill, but we still believe it is a dangerous and unconstitutional censorship bill that would empower state officials to target services and online content they do not like. We respect that different groups can come to their own conclusions about how KOSA will affect everyone’s ability to access lawful speech online. EFF, however, remains steadfast in our long-held view that imposing a vague duty of care on a broad swath of online services to mitigate specific harms based on the content of online speech will result in those services imposing age verification and content restrictions. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.parentssos.org/news/kosa-eff-letter&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;At least one group&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; has characterized EFF’s concerns as spreading “disinformation.” We are not. But to ensure that everyone understands why EFF continues to oppose KOSA, we wanted to break down our interpretation of the bill in more detail and compare our views to those of others—both advocates and critics. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1918. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Below, we walk through some of the most common criticisms we’ve gotten—and those criticisms the bill has received—to help explain our view of its likely impacts. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1919. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA’s Effectiveness &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1920. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;First, and most importantly: We have serious and important disagreements with KOSA’s advocates on whether it will prevent future harm to children online. We are deeply saddened by the stories so many supporters and parents have shared about how their children were harmed online. And we want to keep talking to those parents, supporters, and lawmakers about ways in which EFF can work with them to prevent harm to children online, just as we will continue to talk with people &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/thousands-young-people-told-us-why-kids-online-safety-act-will-be-harmful-minors&quot;&gt;who advocate for the benefits of social media&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. We believe, and have advocated for,&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/wp/privacy-first-better-way-address-online-harms&quot;&gt; comprehensive privacy protections&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; as a better way to begin to address harms done to young people (and old) who have been targeted by platforms’ predatory business practices. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1921. &lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;A line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving efforts to prevent book sellers from disseminating certain speech, which resulted in broad, unconstitutional censorship, shows why KOSA is unconstitutional. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1922. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF does not think KOSA is the right approach to protecting children online, however. As we’ve said before, we think that in practice, KOSA is likely to exacerbate the risks of children being harmed online because it will place barriers on their ability to access lawful speech about addiction, eating disorders, bullying, and other important topics. We also think those restrictions will stifle minors who are trying  to find their own communities online.  We do not think that language added to KOSA to address that censorship concern solves the problem. We also don’t think that focusing KOSA’s regulation on design elements of online services addresses the First Amendment problems of the bill, either.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1923. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Our views of KOSA’s harmful consequences are grounded in EFF’s 34-year history of both making policy for the internet and seeing how legislation plays out once it’s passed. This is also not our first time seeing the vast difference between how a piece of legislation is promoted and what it does in practice. Recently we saw this same dynamic with FOSTA/SESTA, which was promoted by politicians and the parents of  child sex trafficking victims as the way to prevent future harms. Sadly, even the politicians who &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-wyden-representative-khanna-lee-introduce-safe-sex-workers-study-act&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;initially championed it&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; now agree that this law was not only &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.bjcl.org/blog/sex-sells-but-not-online-tracing-the-consequences-of-fosta-sesta&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;ineffective&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; at reducing sex trafficking online, but also &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://aidsunited.org/fosta-sesta-and-its-impact-on-sex-workers/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;created additional dangers&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; for those same victims as well as others.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1924. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;KOSA’s Duty of Care &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1925. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;KOSA’s core component requires an online platform or service that is likely to be accessed by young people to “exercise reasonable care in the creation and implementation of any design feature to prevent and mitigate” various harms to minors. These enumerated harms include:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1926. &lt;ul&gt;
  1927. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;2&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;mental health disorders (anxiety, depression, eating disorders, substance use disorders, and suicidal behaviors)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1928. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;2&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;patterns of use that indicate or encourage addiction-like behaviors &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1929. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;2&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;physical violence, online bullying, and harassment&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1930. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1931. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Based on our understanding of the First Amendment and how all online platforms and services regulated by KOSA will navigate their legal risk, we believe that KOSA will lead to broad online censorship of lawful speech, including content designed to help children navigate and overcome the very same harms KOSA identifies. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1932. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;A line of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving efforts to prevent book sellers from disseminating certain speech, which resulted in broad, unconstitutional censorship, shows why KOSA is unconstitutional.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1933. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/361/147/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith v. California&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that made it a crime for a book seller to possess obscene material. The court ruled that even though obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment, the ordinance’s imposition of liability based on the mere presence of that material had a broader censorious effect because a book seller “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;will tend to restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected, as well as obscene literature.” The court recognized that the “ordinance tends to impose a severe limitation on the public’s access to constitutionally protected material” because a distributor of others’ speech will react by limiting access to any borderline content that could get it into legal trouble. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1934. &lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;Online services have even less ability to read through the millions (or sometimes billions) of pieces of content on their services than a bookseller or distributor&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1935. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/372/58/&quot;&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;, the Supreme Court struck down a government effort to limit the distribution of material that a state commission had deemed objectionable to minors. The commission would send notices to book distributors that identified various books and magazines they believed were objectionable and sent copies of their lists to local and state law enforcement. Book distributors reacted to these notices by stopping the circulation of the materials identified by the commission. The Supreme Court held that the commission’s efforts violated the First Amendment and once more recognized that by targeting a distributor of others’ speech, the commission’s “capacity for suppression of constitutionally protected publications” was vast. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1936. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;KOSA’s duty of care creates a more far-reaching censorship threat than those that the Supreme Court struck down in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Bantam Books&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;. KOSA makes online services that host our digital speech liable should they fail to exercise reasonable care in removing or restricting minors’ access to lawful content on the topics KOSA identifies. KOSA is worse than the ordinance in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; because the First Amendment generally protects speech about addiction, suicide, eating disorders, and the other topics KOSA singles out. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1937. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We think that online services will react to KOSA’s new liability in much the same way as the bookstore in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and the book distributer in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Bantam Books&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;: They will limit minors’ access to or simply remove any speech that might touch on the topics KOSA identifies, even when much of that speech is protected by the First Amendment. Worse, online services have even less ability to read through the millions (or sometimes billions) of pieces of content on their services than a bookseller or distributor who had to review hundreds or thousands of books.  To comply, we expect that platforms will deploy blunt tools, either by gating off entire portions of their site to prevent minors from accessing them (more on this below) or by deploying automated filters that will over-censor speech, including speech that may be beneficial to minors seeking help with addictions or other problems KOSA identifies. (Regardless of their claims, &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/everything-moderation-analysis-how-internet-platforms-are-using-artificial-intelligence-moderate-user-generated-content/introduction/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;it is not possible&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; for a service to accurately pinpoint the content KOSA describes with automated tools.)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1938. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But as the Supreme Court ruled in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Bantam Books&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;, the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a law that results in such broad censorship precisely because it limits the distribution of, and access to, lawful speech. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1939. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Moreover, the fact that KOSA singles out certain legal content—for example, speech concerning bullying—means that the bill creates content-based restrictions that are presumptively unconstitutional. The government bears the burden of showing that KOSA’s content restrictions advance a compelling government interest, are narrowly tailored to that interest, and are the least speech-restrictive means of advancing that interest. KOSA cannot satisfy this exacting standard. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1940. &lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;The fact that KOSA singles out certain legal content—for example, speech concerning bullying—means that the bill creates content-based restrictions that are presumptively unconstitutional. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1941. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF agrees that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from being harmed online. But KOSA’s broad requirement that platforms and services face liability for showing speech concerning particular topics to minors is not narrowly tailored to that interest. As said above, the broad censorship that will result will effectively limit access to a wide range of lawful speech on topics such as addiction, bullying, and eating disorders. The fact that KOSA will sweep up so much speech shows that it is far from the least speech-restrictive alternative, too. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1942. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Why the Rule of Construction Doesn’t Solve the Censorship Concern&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1943. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;In response to censorship concerns about the duty of care, KOSA’s authors added a rule of construction stating that nothing in the duty of care “shall be construed to require a covered platform to prevent or preclude:” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1944. &lt;ul&gt;
  1945. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;3&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;minors from deliberately or independently searching for content, or&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1946. &lt;li data-leveltext=&quot;&quot; data-font=&quot;Symbol&quot; data-listid=&quot;3&quot; data-list-defn-props=&quot;&amp;quot;hybridMultilevel&amp;quot;}&quot; data-aria-posinset=&quot;1&quot; data-aria-level=&quot;1&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;the platforms or services from providing resources that prevent or mitigate the harms KOSA identifies, “including evidence-based information and clinical resources.&quot;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;
  1947. &lt;/ul&gt;
  1948. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;We understand that some interpret this language as a safeguard for online services that limits their liability if a minor happens across information on topics that KOSA identifies, and consequently, platforms hosting content aimed at mitigating addiction, bullying, or other identified harms can take comfort that they will not be sued under KOSA.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1949. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1950. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1951. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;But EFF &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2023/09/get-real-congress-censoring-search-results-or-recommendations-still-censorship&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;does not believe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; the rule of construction will limit KOSA’s censorship, in either a practical or constitutional sense. As a practical matter, it’s not clear how an online service will be able to rely on the rule of construction’s safeguards given the diverse amount of content it likely hosts. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1952. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Take for example an online forum in which users discuss drug and alcohol abuse. It is likely to contain a range of content and views by users, some of which might describe addiction, drug use, and treatment, including negative and positive views on those points. KOSA’s rule of construction might protect the forum from a minor’s initial search for content that leads them to the forum. But once that minor starts interacting with the forum, they are likely to encounter the types of content KOSA proscribes, and the service may face liability if there is a later claim that the minor was harmed. In short, KOSA does not clarify that the initial search for the forum precludes any liability should the minor interact with the forum and experience harm later. It is also not clear how a service would prove that the minor found the forum via a search.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1953. &lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;The near-impossible standard required to review such a large volume of content, coupled with liability for letting any harmful content through, is precisely the scenario that the Supreme Court feared&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1954. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Further, the rule of construction’s protections for the forum, should it provide only resources regarding preventing or mitigating drug and alcohol abuse based on evidence-based information and clinical resources, is unlikely to be helpful. That provision assumes that the forum has the resources to review &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;all&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; existing content on the forum and effectively screen &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;all&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; future content to only permit user-generated content concerning mitigation or prevention of substance abuse. The rule of construction also requires the forum to have the subject-matter expertise necessary to judge what content is or isn’t clinically correct and evidence-based. And even that assumes that there is broad scientific consensus about all aspects of substance abuse, including its causes (which &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10511750/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;there is not&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;).&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1955. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Given that practical uncertainty and the potential hazard of getting &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;anything&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; wrong when it comes to minors’ access to that content, we think that the substance abuse forum will react much like the bookseller and distributor in the Supreme Court cases did: It will simply take steps to limit the ability for minors to access the content, a far easier and safer alternative than  making case-by-case expert decisions regarding every piece of content on the forum.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1956. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;EFF also does not believe that the Supreme Court’s decisions in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Bantam Books&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; would have been different if there had been similar KOSA-like safeguards incorporated into the regulations at issue. For example, even if the obscenity ordinance at issue in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; had made an exception letting bookstores  sell scientific books with detailed pictures of human anatomy, the bookstore still would have to exhaustively review every book it sold and separate the obscene books from the scientific. The Supreme Court rejected such burdens as offensive to the First Amendment: “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1957. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The near-impossible standard required to review such a large volume of content, coupled with liability for letting any harmful content through, is precisely the scenario that the Supreme Court feared. “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The bookseller&#039;s self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being privately administered,” the court wrote in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;. “Through it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, would be impeded.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1958. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Those same First Amendment concerns are exponentially greater for online services hosting everyone’s speech. That is why we do not believe that KOSA’s rule of construction will prevent the broader censorship that results from the bill’s duty of care.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1959. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Finally, we do not believe the rule of construction helps the government overcome its burden on strict scrutiny to show that KOSA is narrowly tailored or restricts less speech than necessary. Instead, the rule of construction actually heightens KOSA’s violation of the First Amendment by preferencing certain viewpoints over others. The rule of construction here creates a legal preference for viewpoints that seek to mitigate the various identified harms, and punishes viewpoints that are neutral or even mildly positive of those harms. While EFF agrees that such speech may be awful, the First Amendment does not permit the government to make these viewpoint-based distinctions without satisfying strict scrutiny. It cannot meet that heavy burden with KOSA. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1960. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;KOSA&#039;s Focus on Design Features Doesn’t Change Our First Amendment Concerns&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1961. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;KOSA supporters argue that because the duty of care and other provisions of KOSA concern an online service or platforms’ design features, the bill raises no First Amendment issues. We disagree. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1962. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;It’s true enough that KOSA creates liability for services that fail to “exercise reasonable care in the creation and implementation of any design feature” to prevent the bill’s enumerated harms. But the features themselves are not what KOSA&#039;s duty of care deems harmful. Rather, the provision specifically links the design features to minors’ access to the enumerated content that KOSA deems harmful. In that way, the design features serve as little more than a distraction. The duty of care provision is not concerned per se with any design choice generally, but only those design choices that fail to mitigate minors’ access to information about depression, eating disorders, and the other identified content.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1963. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Once again, the Supreme Court’s decision in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;shows why it’s incorrect to argue that KOSA’s regulation of design features avoids the First Amendment concerns. If the ordinance at issue in &lt;/span&gt;&lt;i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Smith&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/i&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt; regulated the way in which bookstores were designed, and imposed liability based on where booksellers placed certain offending books in their stores—for example, in the front window—we  suspect that the Supreme Court would have recognized, rightly, that the design restriction was little more than an indirect effort to unconstitutionally regulate the content. The same holds true for KOSA. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1964. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1965. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1966. &lt;h3&gt;KOSA Doesn’t “Mandate” Age-Gating, But It Heavily Pushes Platforms to Do So and Provides Few Other Avenues to Comply &lt;/h3&gt;
  1967. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA was amended in May 2023 to include language that was meant to ease concerns about age verification; in particular, it included explicit language that age verification is not required under the “Privacy Protections” section of the bill. The bill now states that a covered platform is not required to implement an age gating or age verification functionality to comply with KOSA. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1968. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF acknowledges the text of the bill and has been clear in our messaging that nothing in the proposal explicitly requires services to implement age verification. Yet it&#039;s hard to see this change as anything other than a technical dodge that will be contradicted in practice. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1969. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA creates liability for any regulated platform or service that presents certain content to minors that the bill deems harmful to them. To comply with that new liability, those platforms and services’ options are limited. As we see them, the options are either to filter content for known minors or to gate content so only adults can access it. In either scenario, the linchpin is the platform knowing every user’s age  so it can identify its minor users and either filter the content they see or  exclude them from any content that could be deemed harmful under the law. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1970. &lt;p class=&quot;pull-quote&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt;EFF acknowledges the text of the bill and has been clear in our messaging that nothing in the proposal explicitly requires services to implement age verification.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1971. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;There’s really no way to do that without implementing age verification. Regardless of what this section of the bill says, there’s no way for platforms to block either categories of content or design features for minors without knowing the minors are minors. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1972. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We also don’t think KOSA lets platforms  claim ignorance if they take steps to never learn the ages of their users. If a 16-year-old user misidentifies herself as an adult and the platform does not use age verification, it could still be held liable because it should have “reasonably known” her age. The platform’s ignorance thus could work against it later, perversely incentivizing the services to implement age verification at the outset.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1973. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;EFF Remains Concerned About State Attorneys General Enforcing KOSA&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1974. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Another change that KOSA’s sponsors made  this year was to remove the ability of state attorneys general to enforce KOSA’s duty of care standard. We respect that some groups believe this addresses  concerns that some states would misuse KOSA to target minors’ access to any information that state officials dislike, including LGBTQIA+ or sex education information. We disagree that this modest change prevents this harm. KOSA still lets state attorneys general  enforce other provisions, including a section requiring certain “safeguards for minors.” Among the safeguards is a requirement that platforms “limit design features” that lead to minors spending more time on a service, including the ability to scroll through content, be notified of other content or messages, or auto playing content. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1975. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;But letting an attorney general  enforce KOSA’s requirement of design safeguards could be used as a proxy for targeting services that host content certain officials dislike.  The attorney general would simply target the same content or service it disfavored, butinstead of claiming that it violated KOSA’s duty to care, the official instead would argue that the service failed to prevent harmful design features that minors in their state used, such as notifications or endless scrolling. We think the outcome will be the same: states are likely to use KOSA to target speech about sexual health, abortion, LBGTQIA+ topics, and a variety of other information.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1976. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Applies to Broad Swaths of the Internet, Not Just the Big Social Media Platforms&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1977. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Many sites, platforms, apps, and games would have to follow KOSA’s requirements. It applies to “an online platform, online video game, messaging application, or video streaming service that connects to the internet and that is used, or is reasonably likely to be used, by a minor.” &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1978. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;There are some important exceptions—it doesn’t apply to services that only provide direct or group messages only, such as Signal, or to schools, libraries, nonprofits, or to ISP’s like Comcast generally. This is good—some critics of KOSA have been concerned that it would apply to websites like Archive of Our Own (AO3), a fanfiction site that allows users to read and share their work, but AO3 is a nonprofit, so it would not be covered. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1979. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;But  a wide variety of niche online services that are for-profit  would still be regulated by KOSA. Ravelry, for example, is an online platform focused on knitters, but it is a &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.ravelry.com/about/terms&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;business&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;.  &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1980. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;And it is an open question whether the comment and community portions of major mainstream news and sports websites are subject to KOSA. The bill exempts news and sports websites, with the huge caveat that they are exempt only so long as they are “not otherwise an online platform.” KOSA defines “online platform” as “&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;any public-facing website, online service, online application, or mobile application that predominantly provides a community forum for user generated content.” It’s easily arguable that the New York Times’ or ESPN’s comment and forum sections are predominantly designed as places for user-generated content. Would KOSA apply only to those interactive spaces or does the exception to the exception mean the entire sites are subject to the law? The language of the bill is unclear.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1981. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Not All of KOSA’s Critics Are Right, Either&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1982. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Just as we don’t agree on KOSA’s likely outcomes with many of its supporters, we also don’t agree with every critic regarding KOSA’s consequences. This isn’t surprising—the law is broad, and a major complaint is that it remains unclear how its vague language would be interpreted. So let’s address some of the more common misconceptions about the bill.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1983. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Large Social Media May Not Entirely Block Young People, But Smaller Services Might&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1984. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Some people have concerns that KOSA will result in minors not being able to use social media at all. We believe a more likely scenario is that the major platforms would offer different experiences to different age groups. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1985. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;They already do this in some ways—Meta currently places teens into the most restrictive content control setting on Instagram and Facebook. The company &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;specifically updated&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; these settings for many of the categories included in KOSA, including suicide, self-harm, and eating disorder content. Their update describes precisely what we worry KOSA would require by law: “While we allow people to share content discussing their own struggles with suicide, self-harm and eating disorders, our policy is not to recommend this content and we have been focused on ways to make it harder to find.” TikTok also has blocked some videos for users under 18. To be clear, this content filtering as a result of KOSA will be harmful and would violate the First Amendment. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1986. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Though large platforms will likely react this way, many smaller platforms will not be capable of this kind of content filtering. They very well may decide blocking young people entirely is the easiest way to protect themselves from liability. We cannot know how every platform will react if KOSA is enacted, but smaller platforms that do not already use complex automated content moderation tools will likely find it financially burdensome to implement both age verification tools and content moderation tools. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1987. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;KOSA Won’t Necessarily Make Your Real Name Public by Default&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1988. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;One recurring fear that critics of KOSA have shared is that they will no longer to be able to use platforms anonymously. We believe this is true, but there is some nuance to it. No one should have to hand over their driver&#039;s license—or, worse, provide biometric information—just to access lawful speech on websites. But there&#039;s nothing in KOSA that would require online platforms to publicly tie your real name to your username. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1989. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Still, once someone shares information to verify their age, there’s no way for them to be certain that the data they’re handing over is not going to be retained and used by the website, or further shared or even sold. As we’ve said, KOSA doesn&#039;t technically require age verification but we think it’s the most likely outcome. Users still will be forced to trust that the website they visit, or its third-party verification service, won’t misuse their private data, including their name, age, or biometric information. Given the numerous  data privacy blunders we’ve seen from companies like Meta in the past, and the general concern with data privacy that Congress seems to share with the general public (and with EFF), we believe this outcome to be extremely dangerous. Simply put: Sharing your private info with a company doesn’t necessarily make it public, but it makes it far more likely to become public than if you hadn’t shared it in the first place. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1990. &lt;h3&gt;&lt;b&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We Agree With Supporters: Government Should Study Social Media’s Effects on Minors&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/b&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/h3&gt;
  1991. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;We know tensions are high; this is an incredibly important topic, and an emotional one. EFF does not have all the right answers regarding how to address the ways in which young people can be harmed online. Which is why we agree with KOSA’s supporters that the government should conduct much greater research on these issues. We believe that comprehensive fact-finding is the first step to both identifying the problems and legislative solutions. A provision of KOSA does require the National Academy of Sciences to research these issues and issue reports to the public. But KOSA gets this process backwards. It creates solutions to general concerns about young people being harmed without first doing the work necessary to show that the bill’s provisions address those problems. As we have said repeatedly, we do not think KOSA will address harms to young people online. We think it will exacerbate them. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1992. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Even if your stance on KOSA is different from ours, we hope we are all working toward the same goal: an internet that supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world. We don’t believe KOSA will get us there, but neither will ad hominem attacks. To that end,  we look forward to more detailed analyses of the bill from its supporters, and to continuing thoughtful engagement from anyone interested in working on this critical issue.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;279}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1993. &lt;p class=&quot;take-action&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TAKE ACTION&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1994. &lt;p class=&quot;take-explainer&quot;&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://act.eff.org/action/tell-congress-kosa-will-censor-the-internet-but-won-t-help-kids&quot; target=&quot;_blank&quot; rel=&quot;noopener noreferrer&quot;&gt;TELL CONGRESS: OPPOSE THE KIDS ONLINE SAFETY ACT&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  1995.  
  1996. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  1997.     <pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 19:35:53 +0000</pubDate>
  1998. <guid isPermaLink="false">109418 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  1999. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/free-speech">Free Speech</category>
  2000. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/privacy">Privacy</category>
  2001. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/social-networks">Social Networks</category>
  2002. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/student-privacy">Student Privacy</category>
  2003. <dc:creator>Aaron Mackey</dc:creator>
  2004. <dc:creator>Jason Kelley</dc:creator>
  2005. <enclosure url="https://www.eff.org/files/banner_library/student-privacy-og.jpg" alt="" type="image/jpeg" length="57309" />
  2006.  </item>
  2007.  <item>
  2008.    <title>San Diego City Council Breaks TRUST</title>
  2009.    <link>https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2024/03/san-diego-city-council-breaks-trust</link>
  2010.    <description>&lt;div class=&quot;field field--name-body field--type-text-with-summary field--label-hidden&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__items&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;field__item even&quot;&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;In a stunning reversal against the popular &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Transparent &amp;amp; Responsible Use of Surveillance Technology (TRUST)&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; ordinance, the &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;San Diego city council voted&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; earlier this year to cut many of the provisions that sought to ensure public&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;transparency for law enforcement surveillance technologies.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2011. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Similar to &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;other &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/issues/community-control-police-surveillance-ccops&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Community Control Of Police Surveillance &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;(CCOPS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;) ordinances, the TRUST ordinance &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;was intended to&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; ensure that each &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.eff.org/pages/tecnologia-de-vigilancia-en-el-condado-de-san-diego-california&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;police surveillance &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;technology&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; would be subject to basic democratic oversight in the form of public disclosures and city council votes. The TRUST ordinance&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; was fought for by &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://sandiegotrust.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span&gt;a coalition of community organizations&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;– &lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;including several members of the Electronic Frontier Alliance – responding to surprise smart streetlight surveillance that was not put under public or city council review. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2012. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;The TRUST ordinance was passed one and a half years ago, but law enforcement advocates immediately set up roadblocks to implementation. Police unions, for example, insisted that some of the provisions around accountability for misuse of surveillance needed to be halted after passage to ensure they didn’t run into conflict with union contracts. The city kept the ordinance unapplied and untested, and then in the late summer of 2023, a little over a year after passage, the mayor proposed a package of changes that would gut the ordinance. This included exemption of a long list of technologies, including ARJIS databases and record management system data storage. These changes were later approved this past January. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2013. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;But use of these databases should require, for example, auditing to protect data security for city residents. There also should be limits on how police share data with federal agencies and other law enforcement agencies, which might use that data to criminalize San Diego residents for immigration status, gender-affirming health care, or exercise of reproductive rights that are not criminalized in the city or state. The overall TRUST ordinance stands, but partly defanged with many carve-outs for technologies the San Diego police will not need to bring before democratically-elected lawmakers and the public.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2014. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;Now, opponents of the TRUST ordinance are emboldened with their recent victory, and are &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://www.lajollalight.com/news/story/2024-01-26/sweeping-changes-to-san-diego-surveillance-law-bring-criticism-from-privacy-advocates&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;vowing to introduce even more amendments&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; to further erode the gains of this ordinance so that San Diegans won’t have a chance to know how their local law enforcement surveils them, and no democratic body will be required to consent to the technologies, new or old. The members of the TRUST Coalition are not standing down, however&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;,&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt; and will continue to fight to defend the standing portions of the TRUST ordinance, and to regain the wins for public oversight that were lost.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2015. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;As Lilly Irani, from Electronic Frontier Alliance member and TRUST Coalition member &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href=&quot;https://twcsandiego.org/&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;Tech Workers Coalition San Diego&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;, &lt;a href=&quot;https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/story/2024-01-17/opinion-mayors-effort-to-weaken-surveillance-oversight-threatens-privacy-and-california-values&quot;&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;has said&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2016. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;none&quot;&gt;“City Council members and the mayor still have time to make this right. And we, the people, should hold our elected representatives accountable to make sure they maintain the oversight powers we currently enjoy — powers the mayor’s current proposal erodes.”&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;720}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2017. &lt;p&gt;&lt;span data-contrast=&quot;auto&quot;&gt;If you live or work in San Diego, it’s important to make it clear to city officials that San Diegans don’t want to give police a blank check to harass and surveil them. Such dangerous technology needs basic transparency and democratic oversight to preserve our privacy, our speech, and our personal safety.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span data-ccp-props=&quot;{}&quot;&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
  2018.  
  2019. &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</description>
  2020.     <pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2024 18:54:46 +0000</pubDate>
  2021. <guid isPermaLink="false">109417 at https://www.eff.org</guid>
  2022. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/street-level-surveillance">Street-Level Surveillance</category>
  2023. <category domain="https://www.eff.org/issues/efa">EFA</category>
  2024. <dc:creator>José Martinez</dc:creator>
  2025.  </item>
  2026.  </channel>
  2027. </rss>
  2028.  

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